Selective Accountability: Performance Indicators and MPs' Behavior

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Abstract

Performance indicators transform political press coverage, yet their effects on MPs' behavior remain unstudied. Using Nosdeputes.fr, the French website computing such indicators, we address this gap. We compile a comprehensive dataset of press articles, identifying all mentions of MPs' indicators, to disentangle the effects of the website from those of indicator coverage. Performances increase following the website's launch, further amplified by coverage. However, MPs explicitly mentioned do not show additional improvements. While transparency prompts some manipulation– e.g., increased copy-pasting–there is no evidence of strategic inflation in amendments or speeches. Thus, indicators enhance collective but not individual accountability, with limited adverse effects.

JEL Classification: D72, L82, H83. Keywords: Political accountability; Media; Transparency; Data journalism.

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1 Introduction

Data journalism has dramatically changed the media coverage of members of parliament (MPs). The press is increasingly reporting on MPs' statistical performance, including their attendance rates, the number of amendments they write, and the number of questions they ask. This data-driven shift in media coverage stems from independent websites, such as GovTrack.us in the U.S., TheyWorkForYou.com in the U.K., and Nosdeputes.fr in France, which transform raw parliamentary data into performance indicators readily usable by citizens and journalists (François and Rozenberg, 2019). In the public debate, this new type of coverage has been seen as a game-changer for MPs' work. These websites have been praised for increasing accountability but also criticized for fueling anti-parliamentarism. However, the effects of data-driven coverage on MPs' behavior have so far received little attention in the academic literature. This paper fills this gap by analyzing the compelling case study of Nosdeputes.fr: launched in 2009, the website attracts significant public attention, provides reliable indicators automatically generated by an independent collective, and is virtually the only provider of such indicators for French MPs.

The indicators we consider differ from what was traditionally covered by journalists. In general, press coverage improves performance through accountability (Besley and Burgess, 2001; Snyder Jr and Strömberg, 2010). However, statistical performance indicators may incentivize MPs to engage in behaviors aimed at inflating their indicators, potentially to the detriment of the legislative process, as suggested by some nonacademic reports and articles (Hurst, 2006; Acatrinei and Quénel, 2019). Our paper is the first to quantify these potential effects.

The website Nosdeputes.fr receives non-trivial attention from citizens, averaging 400,000 visits per month, and the press amplifies the visibility of the performance indicators. In particular, local newspapers regularly cover the performance of locally elected MPs. A key contribution of our paper is to collect a comprehensive dataset on the press coverage of the indicators, enabling us to disentangle the direct effect of the website from the effect of its use in the press. We find that the website's launch was followed by an overall increase in performance on all indicators. However, we surprisingly do not find an additional reaction from MPs individually mentioned in the press. This suggests that performance indicators have an effect through collective accountability, but individual accountability plays little role. We also document that MPs increasingly resort to copy-pasting to artificially inflate the number of written questions they submit to the government, which is tracked by one of the indicators. Hence, we uncover the manipulation of some performance indicators. However, there is

no evidence of increased amendments or short interventions—two strategies regularly pointed out by critics as ways of gaming the indicators.

To analyze how the visibility of performance indicators affects MPs' behavior, we combine data from two different sources, detailed in Section 2. First, we use the data from Nosdeputes.fr, which contains the weekly performance of all MPs of the National Assembly on 13 indicators.¹ The website was launched in September 2009 by an independent consortium of citizens, but data from June 2007, i.e., the starting date of the 2007-2012 legislature, are available. Moreover, we collect data on the press coverage of these indicators. Using several press databases, we gather a comprehensive dataset of articles mentioning Nosdeputes.fr, resulting in 885 articles. In these articles, we identify 3,920 instances where the performance of an MP was reported, recording the name of the MP as well as the indicators mentioned in each article.

We present our main results in Section 3. Our preferred specification disentangles the effect of the website's launch from that of press coverage on MPs' performance. The analysis spans the period from September 2007 to the first COVID-19 lockdown in March 2020. To account for heterogeneities among MPs, we include legislature-MP fixed effects, while political cycles are controlled using week-of-the-year and legislatureyear fixed effects. Residual differences in performance following the website's launch are thus interpreted as the effects attributable to the website itself. Additionally, we identify the effects of general press coverage, measured by the number of press articles mentioning the website within a given timeframe, and MP-specific coverage.

First, we estimate the effect on an aggregated indicator of activity, which we construct as a normalized sum of the indicators provided by Nosdeputes.fr. The results reveal that the website's launch led to an increase in aggregate performance, even during periods of low indicator coverage. Moreover, the effect more than doubles during periods of high coverage. To illustrate the magnitude of the impact during high-coverage periods, we calculate that it would correspond to a jump of 50 places in the ranking of the 577 MPs by the aggregated indicator for an MP with average performance. However, MPs explicitly mentioned in the press do not exhibit a further increase in performance. Our interpretation is that the effects are primarily driven by collective accountability.

Next, we estimate the effects for each indicator published by Nosdeputes.fr separately. We find an increase in MPs' performance on almost all indicators during periods of high general press coverage, confirming the positive impact of press attention. However, the effect of the website during periods of low coverage is more nuanced, with negative effects observed for indicators receiving less media attention, such as amendments.

¹The complete list of indicators includes attendance and interventions in committees, interventions in plenary sessions (short and long), the number of amendments proposed, signed, and accepted, the number of published reports, law proposals written and signed, and questions asked (oral and written). Finally, the number of weeks of activity measures attendance by combining other indicators.

The combined effects of the website's launch and general press coverage suggest that indicators have a stronger impact on activities that receive greater media attention.

Finally, we observe minimal effects on an MP's performance when the press reports on that MP's specific indicator. In other words, an article highlighting an MP's performance does not lead to noticeable improvements, either on the specific indicator mentioned or on others not referenced.

We then demonstrate that our results are robust to alternative specifications. One concern is that high coverage of statistical indicators may coincide with increased scrutiny of the National Assembly as a whole. However, our estimates remain unaffected when we control for the general coverage of the National Assembly, confirming that the effect is specific to the coverage of the indicators.

We analyze the mechanisms in Section 4. The most plausible explanation for our results is that MPs react to indicators to enhance their press coverage. Reassuringly, we find that higher performance is associated with more favorable coverage, while MPs with lower performance are more frequently and often critically mentioned in the press. Nonetheless, press coverage does not appear predictable enough to support complex strategic behaviors, such as targeting specific ranking positions.

Then, we explore a central criticism in countries where indicators are used (Hurst, 2006; François and Rozenberg, 2019; Acatrinei and Quénel, 2019), namely the manipulation of indicators, which has so far been supported only by anecdotal evidence. One manipulation strategy involves using copy-pasting to increase the number of written texts, particularly written questions to the government. By collecting and analyzing the text of these questions, we identify identical queries and find that indicators indeed led to a higher share of copy-pasted questions. When adjusting for copy-pasting, the increase in original questions is reduced by half compared to initial measurements. Another manipulation often cited is the increase in unnecessary oral interventions to boost the indicators that track this activity. Our analysis of debate transcripts does not provide evidence to support this claim, leading us to conclude that concerns about the manipulation of indicators are not all justified.

As collective accountability emerges as a key channel, we investigate the collective dimension of MPs' reactions. Political groups appear to play a role: we observe a relative decrease in performance among MPs of a group when its members receive high coverage. One possible explanation is that other groups increase their efforts in an attempt to amplify criticism directed at the mentioned group. Interestingly, we also document a reallocation of activity from high-performing MPs to those with lower performance levels, further suggesting that collective dynamics are at play. This result is observed only for indicators with constrained total performance, such as oral interventions, where total speaking time is inherently limited. Finally, we find little evidence of individual heterogeneity. Apart from a stronger response from right-wing MPs, there is no indication that MPs' reactions depend on personal characteristics. Moreover, their responses do not appear to be strongly influenced by electoral incentives. Although mentions in local newspapers—more visible to constituents—are generally more influential, the effects do not vary based on the MP's margin of victory in the last election or the proximity to the upcoming election. A potential explanation for the limited impact of individual mentions is that they provoke opposition from the MPs mentioned, who criticize the indicators rather than improving their performance. We find suggestive evidence for this, as positive-toned mentions tend to have a stronger impact than neutral or negative ones, though this effect varies by indicator. However, while we document instances of MPs criticizing indicators, we find no evidence that such criticism affects their reactions.

Our paper makes a significant contribution to the debate on performance indicators and their press coverage. Proponents argue that these indicators enhance the visibility of MPs' actions–a claim supported by the frequent press coverage of the indicators that we document. They also assert that these indicators promote political accountability, a notion confirmed by our findings, which suggest that collective accountability through general press coverage is the primary channel. Furthermore, we do not find strong evidence of a backfire from this visibility, refuting some critics of performance indicators.

Nosdeputes.fr provides a compelling case study, as it garners significant public attention and is virtually the sole source of statistical indicators on MPs' performance in France.² The indicators are particularly relevant for citizens, journalists, and researchers: they resonate with the public and are reliable for academic analysis. Moreover, the platform is managed by Regards Citoyens, a collective of independent citizens who automatically compute the indicators using data provided by the French National Assembly. Therefore, political manipulation of the indicators is not plausible. Additionally, we believe that our results are of interest beyond the French context, as statistical indicators are widely used and have raised similar questions in other countries.

One limitation of this study is that we cannot examine how MPs reallocate their efforts between activities that are captured by the indicators and those that are not, particularly those occurring at the district level. Furthermore, the indicators quantify the number of specific activities performed but do not account for their quality. As a result, these unobserved aspects of MPs' work prevent us from conducting a comprehensive welfare analysis.

²Other French initiatives were short-lived or received much less attention. For example, mondepute.fr, operated by a single citizen, reported data on legislative votes. NosSenateurs.fr, also managed by Regards Citoyens, focuses on the upper chamber of the French Parliament. These initiatives are unlikely to affect our results because they concentrate on different activities and MPs.

Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of information on politicians' behavior. Snyder Jr and Strömberg (2010) use the congruence between newspaper markets and congressional districts to show a positive effect of press coverage on parliamentary activity. Balles et al. (2022) find similar results for television. Moreover, Adsera et al. (2003) and Brunetti and Weder (2003) document a negative relationship between press freedom and corruption. Besley and Burgess (2001) explain this result through the lens of political accountability: information helps voters monitor and discipline politicians. This is confirmed by Strömberg (2004), who show that districts covered by radio received more benefits during the New Deal. Voters' attention also plays a crucial role: Balles et al. (2023) and Kaplan et al. (2019) show that MPs favor special interest groups over their districts when important events occur.³ Some studies also highlight the critical role of the press in enhancing political accountability (Garz and Sörensen, 2017; Larreguy et al., 2020; Cagé, 2020; Djourelova and Durante, 2022). We contribute to this literature by offering the first analysis of statistical performance indicators, a significant recent development in media coverage of politicians. Moreover, while most studies examine general press coverage, we focus on the visibility of specific performances.

In our setting, new data resources are made available to journalists, contributing to the literature that examines the effects of data transparency and open data policies (Parasie, 2022; Louis-Sidois and Mougin, 2023). The positive effects of transparency are often nuanced and may trigger a misalignment between the agent and the principal's interests (Groseclose and McCarty, 2001; Prat, 2005; Fehrler and Hughes, 2018; Hansen et al., 2018). Additionally, Malesky et al. (2012) finds that visibility can inhibit MPs' expression in authoritarian assemblies, while Fasone and Lupo (2015) suggest that transparency harms the legislative process by encouraging MPs to favor conflict. In the French context, Cloléry (2023) argues that increased vote transparency reduces MP turnout. However, Harden and Kirkland (2021) show that laws that promote political transparency in the U.S. did not hinder political efficiency. Our paper also suggests that transparency through indicators has a positive effect on collective accountability and there is little support for the claim that they reduce political efficiency.

In addition to the media, other channels disclose information on politicians' performance, as reviewed in Finan et al. (2017). Banerjee et al. (2011), Humphreys and Weinstein (2012), and Grossman and Michelitch (2018) study the distribution of cards summarizing incumbents' performance. Among these, only Grossman and Michelitch (2018) find an effect, and only in competitive districts. Additionally, Bidwell et al. (2020) find that

³Our goal is to study how politicians respond to changes in the visibility of their actions. Hence, we do not consider voters directly, but a large body of literature has established that they respond to information (Chong et al., 2015; Kendall et al., 2015; Le Pennec and Pons, 2023).

debates between candidates increase local political activity. Furthermore, corruption audits have been shown to discipline politicians (Olken, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Ferrali et al., 2023). Additionally, Benesch et al. (2018) find that a monitoring tool positively impacted MPs' attendance in Switzerland. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2019) show that NGO monitoring increases local Chinese authorities' compliance with environmental regulations. Nevertheless, a handful of studies find negative or ambiguous effects due to politicians' adaptive behavior. Politicians may over-invest in visible public goods at the expense of more beneficial ones (Mani and Mukand, 2007; Johannessen, 2019), delay corruption in response to predictable audits (Bobonis et al., 2016), and increase vote buying (Cruz et al., 2021). Our paper adds new evidence on how information shapes politicians' behavior.

Finally, our paper contributes to the broader literature on the determinants of politicians' performance (Besley and Larcinese, 2011; Bernecker, 2014), which demonstrates the positive effects of electoral competition (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Bełdowski et al., 2022; Gavoille and Verschelde, 2017; Gavoille, 2018) and the length of legislative terms on parliamentary attendance (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011).

2 Context and Data

2.1 French National Assembly

We focus on the MPs of the National Assembly, the lower chamber of the French Parliament. MPs are responsible for debating and voting on laws, scrutinizing the government's work, and representing the interests of their constituents. They participate in plenary sessions, serve on committees, ask questions to the government, and may draft or amend pieces of legislation. 577 MPs are elected for 5-year terms per district in a two-round runoff system. Our study period includes the legislatures from 2007-2012 (right-wing majority), 2012-2017 (left-wing majority), and 2017-2022 (center majority). Performance indicators are available for 1,381 MPs, including the substitutes who replace MPs who vacate their seats due to reasons such as illness or taking government positions. More details on the French political landscape are reported in Appendix A.1.

2.2 Performance indicators

Nosdeputes.fr is a website founded in September 2009 by Regards Citoyens, a collective of citizens aiming to simplify access to public data. The website utilizes content published by the National Assembly, which, while already publicly available, was difficult to navigate for citizens and journalists.⁴ Nosdeputes.fr simplifies this information into statistical indicators that are accessible to all.

Nosdeputes.fr is practically the sole provider of statistical indicators for the French National Assembly. It receives significant attention from both citizens and journalists, with an average of 400,000 visits per month during the period studied. Additionally, the press coverage of these indicators enhances their visibility. MPs frequently discuss the impact of these indicators on their work, as evidenced by their regular comments in the press. Furthermore, the founders of the website report being regularly contacted by MPs regarding their indicators. As a result, we believe that all MPs quickly became aware of the website's existence and understand how the indicators are computed.

Among the 13 indicators reported on the website, three relate to oral interventions: long interventions count those exceeding an arbitrary threshold of 20 words made by an MP during plenary sessions; short interventions count those under 20 words; and interventions in committees refer to those made in specialized working groups. These statistics are established from the transcripts of debates. Additionally, one indicator tracks the number of committee meetings attended, recorded by an attendance sheet. Two indicators pertain to questions: the number of oral questions asked to the government during a dedicated weekly meeting, and the number of written questions, which MPs can send at any time to any member of the government. Furthermore, three indicators relate to amendments: the number of amendments proposed (i.e., personally written), signed (i.e., written by another MP but supported), and adopted. Two other indicators pertain to law proposals: the number of laws proposed and the number of laws signed. One indicator tracks the number of parliamentary reports written. Finally, the number of weeks of activity indicates whether an MP was active in a given week. This last indicator combines oral interventions and attendance in committees; an MP is considered active if at least one of these activities is recorded during the week.

However, two of the indicators are not suitable for our analysis. First, the number of accepted amendments is influenced by joint decisions, limiting the control of individual MPs. Second, the number of weeks of activity aggregates multiple other indicators, making it difficult to interpret independently. Therefore, our results will focus on the remaining 11 indicators.

The website is easy to navigate, allowing users to view statistics for specific MPs and to list them by indicator, as illustrated in Appendix A.2. When listed by indicators, the website displays MPs' total performance over the last 12 months. Although the website is not designed as a ranking tool, indicators on which an MP ranks among the top 150 are displayed in green, while those in the bottom 150 are shown in red.

⁴For instance, transcripts of legislative debates have been available online since 1999. Between 2012 and 2017, they consist of one document for each of the 1,562 sessions, each up to 50 pages long.

We collect all available indicators from the website and aggregate them at the weekly level. Although the website was launched in 2009, the indicators were retroactively computed from the June 2007 legislative elections. On average, MPs attend 0.72 committee sessions per week, submit 0.73 questions to the government, and make 2.74 short interventions and 1.73 long interventions in plenary sessions. Descriptive statistics for all indicators are displayed in Panel A of Table 1.

2.3 Press coverage

We compile all articles referencing Nosdeputes.fr from Europresse, Factiva, and Nexis, covering the period from the website's launch in September 2009 until March 2020. The dataset includes all media types available in these databases, comprising 50 local newspapers, 43 national newspapers, and 5 magazines, for a total of 98 distinct outlets. In total, we identified 885 articles, from which 3,920 mentions of statistical indicators were manually extracted.⁵ For each mention, we recorded the indicator and the MP mentioned. Summary statistics of our press database are displayed in Panel B of Table 1. Coverage varies notably among indicators: attendance in committees, for example, is mentioned seven times more frequently than adopted amendments. The bottom line indicates the 1,050 cases where articles mention MPs' general performance according to Nosdeputes.fr but without referencing any specific indicator. The last two columns report the coverage per MP: 53% are mentioned at least once, and the average number of mentions per MP is 2.82.

Additional details on data collection and further descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix A.3, including an example article that illustrates our coding process. We also display the distribution of the number of articles published over time in Figure A.3. Furthermore, for each mention, we coded the tone of the coverage, noting whether the performance is reported positively, negatively, or presented neutrally. Additionally, some journalists report statistics for groups of indicators, either by summing them intentionally or due to a lack of precision. We reflect this approach in Table A.2, where we aggregate the main legislative activities.

One limitation is that we only consider articles explicitly mentioning Nosdeputes.fr. Some articles may have gone undetected, but this would likely lead to an underestimation of our results rather than invalidate our conclusions.

⁵The annotation was conducted by one of us, and another coauthor independently checked 100 articles using the same guidelines, achieving an agreement rate of 91%. We attempted using OpenAI for this task but found the results less consistent and decided not to use it.

Panel A: Performance indicators					Panel B: Press Coverage				
	Mean	SD	Max		Number of mentions	Number of articles	Share of MPs mentionned	Avg. mentions by MP	
Citing indicators				-	3920	480	0.53	2.82	
Interventions									
Interv. committees	1.26	7.39	894		273	148	0.17	0.20	
Short interv. plenary	2.74	24.09	$2,\!632$		260	133	0.14	0.19	
Long interv. plenary	1.73	9.29	673		434	196	0.23	0.31	
Attendance									
Attendance committees	0.72	0.82	7		532	212	0.23	0.38	
Questions									
Written questions	0.73	4.42	967		254	147	0.15	0.18	
Oral questions	0.05	0.22	3		175	115	0.11	0.13	
Amendements									
Signed amendments	11.61	33.33	$1,\!557$		236	118	0.14	0.17	
Written amendments	1.23	14.40	$1,\!551$		147	81	0.091	0.11	
Adopted amendments	1.34	5.38	373		75	44	0.050	0.054	
Proposals									
Written proposals	0.02	0.17	19		175	95	0.11	0.13	
Signed proposals	0.47	1.15	22		132	76	0.081	0.095	
${f Reports}$									
Written reports	0.02	0.16	9		177	95	0.11	0.13	
Activity (overall)	•	•			1050	349	0.44	0.76	

 Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Notes: Panel A: descriptive statistics on the performance indicators. A performance is the number of activities corresponding to the indicator in the row performed by an MP in a given week. There are 326,621 observations for each indicator between 2007 and 2020. The minimum value for all indicators is 0. For example, MPs, on average, made 1.26 interventions in committee per week. Panel B: descriptive statistics on the press mentions of indicators. We identified 3,920 mentions across 885 articles between 2009 and 2020. Number of mentions: number of mentions for the indicator in a row. Number of article: number of distinct articles that mentions at least once a MP for the indicator in a row. Share of MPs mentioned: share of MPs mentioned at least once for the indicators in a row. Avg. mentions by MP: average number of mentions per MP for the indicator in a row. Citing indicators: number of mentions that reference any of the performance indicators or overall activity. For example, 53% of MPs are mentioned at least once, with an average of 2.82 mentions per MP. Activity (overall): articles that mention MPs' general performance without referring to any specific indicator.

3 Statistical indicators and MP performance

3.1 Empirical strategy

We aim to identify how performance indicators affect MPs' behavior. The effect could be driven by several channels. First, MPs may respond to the creation of the indicators: the website quickly gained public attention and MPs are very likely to be aware of it and to understand how the indicators are computed. Furthermore, we expect the effect to depend on the press coverage of the indicators. Increased coverage could influence all MPs through collective accountability. Additionally, individual coverage may hold MPs personally accountable. Mentioned MPs might react on all indicators or focus on those specifically mentioned in the article. Our main specification decomposes these different channels:

$$y_{it}^{s} = \beta_{1} \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_{t} + \beta_{2} \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_{t} + \beta_{3} \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_{4} \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^{s}$$
(1)
+ WeekOfYear_{t} + LegislatureYear_{t} + MP \times Legislature_{it} + \epsilon_{it}.

 y_{it}^s represents the performance of MP *i* on indicator *s* in week *t*. Before analyzing separately the indicators provided by Nosdeputes.fr, we consider an aggregated indicator of performance. We construct this measure to have a mean of zero, a standard deviation of one, and to assign equal weight to all indicators:

Aggregated Indicator^s_{itl} =
$$\frac{1}{\sigma_l^A} \cdot \sum_s \frac{y_{itl}^s - \bar{y}_l^s}{\sigma_l^s}$$
. (2)

 \bar{y}_l^s denotes the mean of indicator *s* over the legislature *l*, and σ_l^s represents its standard deviation. The term $\sum_s (y_{itl}^s - \bar{y}_l^s) / \sigma_l^s$ reflects the sum of normalized performances of MP *i* during week *t*. It assigns equal weight to all indicators, which are standardized to have the same distribution (mean of zero and standard deviation of one). Therefore, Aggregated Indicator_{itl}^s has a mean of zero. To ensure that the final aggregated indicator also has a standard deviation of one, we compute the standard deviation of the sum, σ_l^A , and divide the result by this standard deviation. We will first estimate Model 1 using this aggregated indicator before examining each indicator individually.

In Model 1, PostWebsite_t is a dummy that takes the value of one after the creation of the website in September 2009. Additionally, HighCoverage_t measures general press coverage and is a function of the number of articles mentioning the website that have been recently published. In our main specification, HighCoverage_t equals one if the number of articles published during the 12 weeks preceding week t is greater than the median of this variable (p50 = 11). Therefore, PostWebsite_t and HighCoverage_t measure average effects for all MPs. The coefficient β_1 measures the change in performance following the creation of the website when press coverage is low, interpreted as the direct effect of the website's launch. β_2 shows whether this effect is amplified by high coverage, which we interpret as the collective accountability effect of press coverage.

Furthermore, individual coverage is measured by MentionMP_{it}, which reflects the number of articles referencing the performance of MP *i*. In our main specification, MentionMP_{it} equals one if any performance of MP *i* is mentioned in the press during the 12 weeks preceding week *t*. Moreover, MentionMPIndicator^s_{it} indicates whether indicator *s* for MP *i* was explicitly mentioned during the same period. Accordingly, β_3 and β_4 capture the individual accountability effect of press coverage. Specifically, β_4 measures the MP's response to mentions of the specific indicator, while β_3 reflects the response to indicators not mentioned. For indicator mentions, we rely on the grouped categories presented in Table A.2.

We introduce fixed effects to control for the political cycle. WeekOfYear_t represents 52 week-of-the-year fixed effects, capturing seasonal trends. For instance, it accounts for reduced parliamentary activities during the summer. Additionally, LegislatureYear_t includes five legislature-year fixed effects, which control for trends within each legislature. For example, MPs may become more active toward the end of a legislature to enhance their reelection prospects. Together, we expect WeekOfYear_t and LegislatureYear_t to capture most political cycle effects. We also introduce MP-legislature fixed effects, MP × Legislature, which control for each MP's average performance during a given legislature. We introduce one fixed effect for each legislature in which the MP serves because MPs' roles change after their reelection. In particular, committee appointments are redefined, and changes in the majority party further alter the roles. Consequently, we cannot include legislature fixed effects separately, but differences in average activities across legislatures are captured by the combination of all MP-legislature fixed effects.

Our estimation strategy relies on three main identification assumptions. First, the identification of the website's impact leverages the difference between the first legislature, for which retroactively computed indicators from 2007–2009 provide two years of pre-indicator data, and the subsequent legislatures, which consistently have indicators. We assume that our fixed effects adequately capture other political cycle dynamics and that no other critical changes affected MPs in September 2009. This assumption is, in our view, plausible. Second, the distribution of article publication dates over time, as shown in Figure A.3, does not align with the political cycle, and we demonstrate below that our results remain robust when controlling for general press coverage of the National Assembly, providing strong support for the identification of the press coverage of the indicators. Third, as discussed in Section 4, the website's launch and subsequent media coverage were largely unpredictable, which we argue makes it plausibly exogenous. Any potential anticipation effects would lead to an underestimation of our results, rather than compromising the validity of our conclusions.

3.2 Results

We estimate Model 1 in Table 2. In the first column, the dependent variable is the aggregated indicator. The estimate for PostWebsite_t in the first row indicates a positive overall effect on performance following the website's launch, amounting to 0.06 of a standard deviation of the aggregated indicator. We also find a positive effect of HighCoverage_t, showing that the effect is reinforced when the press dedicates significant coverage to the indicators. Summing the point estimates, the total increase in performance during high coverage periods is 0.14 of a standard deviation of the aggregated indicator, compared to the pre-website period. Although the magnitude should be interpreted with caution, this impact is sizable: ranking the 577 MPs by the aggregated indicator, a 0.14 standard deviation increase would translate to a gain of 50 places for an MP with an aggregated indicator of 0 (i.e., with an average performance). In the robustness checks, we show that this effect is larger when the aggregated indicator accounts for the relative press coverage of the indicators. However, we do not find an additional increase in aggregate performance for MPs who are individually mentioned: the point estimate for individual mentions is very close to zero.

Thus, the effect of indicators appears to be driven by collective accountability. The website's launch, which made the indicators visible in the public debate, was followed by an increase in performance according to the aggregated indicator. This effect is significant during low-coverage periods (effect of PostWebsite_t) and more than doubles when indicators receive high media attention. However, individual accountability does not appear to drive any additional effect.

In columns 2 to 12, we estimate Model 1 with each indicator separately. The disaggregated results for the website's launch reveal interesting heterogeneities. During low coverage periods, we observe an increase in the number of attendances and interventions in committees, as well as the number of written questions, compared to the pre-website period. However, there is a decrease in the number of long interventions in plenary sessions, the number of written and signed amendments, and the number of proposals signed.

Moreover, the disaggregated results indicate that high coverage has a positive effect on performance for almost all indicators. The only exceptions are the estimates for written questions and laws proposed, which are close to zero and not statistically significant. The point estimates are substantial, particularly for interventions. For example, the average weekly number of long interventions is 1.7, and it increases by

		Plenary Sessions		Com	mittees	Ques	Questions		dments	Reports	Prop	posals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	-0.211^{*}	-0.396	0.310^{***}	0.167^{**}	0.003^{*}	0.425^{***}	-1.109^{***}	-4.788^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095***
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.140)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.085***	0.438***	0.732^{***}	0.085***	0.232***	0.002**	0.004	0.191***	1.765^{***}	0.003***	0.001	0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.140)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect				· · · ·	· · · ·	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	· · · ·	. ,	. ,
Mention MP	-0.002	-0.106	-0.146	0.020	-0.203**	0.003	0.006	-0.394***	-0.773*	-0.000	-0.001	0.027^{**}
	(0.013)	(0.137)	(0.419)	(0.013)	(0.081)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.132)	(0.437)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.295	0.053	-0.011	-0.316	-0.005	0.446^{*}	0.099	-1.255	0.003	-0.004	0.118***
		(0.239)	(0.724)	(0.019)	(0.262)	(0.005)	(0.249)	(0.369)	(0.853)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table 2: Effects of statistical indicators and their press coverage on MPs' performances

Notes: p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

0.4 when press coverage is high.

Furthermore, the disaggregated results for MentionMP_{it} reveal that mentioned MPs intervene less in committees and contribute fewer amendments, although they sign more proposals. Turning to the effect of mentions on specific indicators, the estimates for MentionMPIndicator^s_{it} suggest that only the performances on written questions and signed proposals respond positively and significantly to specific mentions of these indicators. We further investigate the heterogeneities of these results in Section 4.

3.3 Interpretation and potential limitations

Our findings reveal a positive effect of statistical indicators on MPs' performance, significantly amplified by general press coverage. This suggests that collective accountability plays a larger role than individual accountability in driving the results. The combined effects of PostWebsite_t and HighCoverage_t indicate a positive impact on most performance metrics, though not uniformly. The effect is more pronounced for the number of attendances and interventions in legislative committees—two indicators that receive significant media attention, as shown in Panel B of Table 1—and for the number of written questions to the government. Conversely, we observe a negative combined effect on the number of amendments, which attract less media attention. Hence, MPs appear to prioritize their efforts on frequently covered indicators.

It is important to note that not all indicators can be improved to the same extent, and the magnitude of the estimates should be interpreted with caution. A complementary explanation for the higher impact on certain indicators, in particular committee attendance and written questions, is their relative ease of improvement. In contrast, some indicators, such as oral interventions, are inherently constrained; since total speaking time is limited, all MPs can only increase this measure simultaneously if sessions are extended. Indeed, the combined effect of PostWebsite_t and HighCoverage_t on interventions in plenary sessions is close to zero: estimates show a decrease of 0.2 during below-median coverage weeks and an increase of 0.2 (0.4 - 0.2) during highcoverage weeks, implying that the total number of interventions is roughly the same before and after the implementation of the indicators. Interestingly, the positive impact of general press coverage on these interventions suggests that MPs collectively extend or reschedule sessions during high-coverage periods, underscoring the importance of collective dynamics in these adjustments.

Although we have found significant effects of the indicators, the rationale behind MPs' reactions is subtle. We believe the most likely explanation is that the publication of articles leads MPs to update positively on the likelihood of such articles being published. As a result, they exert more effort when many articles have recently been

published, as they believe they are more likely to be scrutinized. In Section 4, we show that better performance is indeed linked to more favorable coverage, which rationalizes these increased efforts. Conversely, the absence of articles decreases the perceived likelihood of future articles, leading to lower performance. This explanation is also consistent with the higher effect documented for frequently covered indicators.

This updating may be performed by MPs individually, but the effect of collective accountability suggests that a group mechanism may play a role. As demonstrated in Section 4, political groups likely influence these dynamics. Additionally, peer pressure among MPs may play a role in shaping their responses, though our data does not allow us to test this hypothesis.

Moreover, MPs might adjust their perception of being individually mentioned after an article mentions them. This adjustment would imply a positive effect of individual mentions, which is not supported by our results. One possible explanation is that when MPs are mentioned negatively, they respond by publicly criticizing the performance indicators, which increases their resistance to these indicators and results in lower performance. We find mixed support for this possibility in Section 4. Another interpretation is that MPs may not use individual mentions to update their beliefs about the likelihood of future mentions. In this scenario, the information from new articles would be similar for all MPs, which would explain why the results are mainly driven by general coverage. Additionally, some MPs might believe that once they have been personally mentioned, they are less likely to be mentioned again, as journalists might shift their focus elsewhere. They might also assume that their reputation is established after a mention, possibly because their voters form opinions based on the initial performance revealed, thereby reducing their incentive to improve their indicators further. However, a lack of attention to their own coverage is unlikely to explain the limited effect of individual mentions: in Section 4, we show that MPs who comment on their performance—making limited attention implausible—exhibit a similarly small reaction.

Modeling this as a formal game would require a precise understanding of how performance affects coverage, which is challenging due to the many uncertainties involved. MPs do not know in advance which indicators will be covered or the baseline to which they will be compared. Moreover, the timing of coverage is uncertain, and indicators are displayed on the website over the last 12 months. Thus, a perfectly rational MP would need to continuously track all indicators for all MPs, which is unrealistic. MPs likely decide their effort allocation based on more straightforward reasoning, such as the simple updating we propose.

Interestingly, one of the most regular criticisms of performance indicators is that they caused a surge in the number of amendments. This was argued by various French political figures and commentators, and also in other countries where performance indicators are used (Hurst, 2006; Acatrinei and Quénel, 2019; François and Rozenberg, 2019). The founders of Nosdeputes.fr replied by showing that the number of amendments does not exhibit an upward trend,⁶ and our results confirm that there is no statistical link. Indeed, the combined effect of PostWebsite_t and HighCoverage_t is negative for both amendment indicators, indicating that MPs write and sign fewer amendments compared to the period before the website, even when the press coverage of the indicators is high.

3.4 Robustness checks

We report the results of robustness checks in Appendix B. First, the press coverage of statistical indicators might align with a broader increase in scrutiny of the National Assembly overall. As a result, the observed effect of general press coverage could stem from heightened pressure to perform due to overall parliamentary coverage, rather than from the coverage of the indicators themselves. To test this alternative explanation, we used Europresse to collect data on the number of articles mentioning various keywords related to the National Assembly across all French newspapers, excluding those in our sample specifically focused on Nosdeputes.fr.⁷ In Table B.1, we estimate Model 1 with an added control for general parliamentary coverage, consisting of a binary variable equal to 1 if the number of articles on the National Assembly in the past 12 weeks exceeds the median. This control does not alter our main estimates, indicating that the observed effect is indeed driven by specific coverage of the indicators. Interestingly, periods of high general parliamentary coverage tend to negatively affect MP performance, which may suggest that MPs deprioritize performance on specific indicators to focus on other activities not captured by the indicators, such as working with their staff or intervening in the media. Similar results are found when controlling for the weekly number of articles mentioning the National Assembly (not reported).

For the main results, reported in Table 2, MPs' performance on each indicator corresponds to the weekly number of activities. It implies that the coefficients reflect effects on the intensive margin. To evaluate the effects on the extensive margin, we estimate Model 1 with the dependent variable as a dummy that equals one if an MP performed at least one activity of a given type during the week. We report the results in Table B.2. Our aggregated indicator does not allow for an analysis of the extensive margin. For each indicator, we find comparable effects for the website's launch, general

⁶Regards Citoyens, "Increase in the Number of Amendments in the Assembly: Pragmatic, Regards Citoyens Makes a Responsible Decision" April 1, 2019 (link).

⁷We selected the keywords "National Assembly" (*Assemblée Nationale*) and "MP" (*Député*, *Députée*, or *Parlementaire*), yielding 813,002 articles.

press coverage, and the mention of specific indicators. However, the effect of individual mentions on the extensive margin is positive for most indicators, albeit not always significant. Hence, while individual mentions have a mixed effect on the intensive margin, they might encourage inactive MPs to become active.

Moreover, the construction of the aggregated indicator assigns equal weight to all indicators, including those that receive limited attention and those that are challenging to improve. Consequently, while the effects observed for the aggregated indicator are already sizable, they might be understated. In Table B.3, we present alternative versions of the aggregated indicator: first, we focus on the four metrics included in the weekly activity indicator computed by Nosdeputes.fr, which are also the most discussed in the press. Additionally, we weight the indicators by their frequency of press mentions, as reported in Table 1. In both cases, we find larger effects of the website's launch and general press coverage, with combined effects reaching up to 0.25 standard deviations. However, individual mentions still have no significant effect.

Additionally, we estimate Model 1 with alternative time lengths in the definition of the variable press coverage. In Table B.4, we find that the results remain consistent when the general coverage dummy accounts for articles published in the past 16 weeks, as opposed to the 12-week window used in the main specification. Similarly, we obtain comparable results in Table B.5 with an 8-week window, except for indicators related to amendments, where the effect of general press coverage becomes negative. This finding reinforces the conclusion that indicators did not lead to an increase in the number of amendments. Regarding individual press coverage, we observe similar results when using a 16-week time specification for both MP mentions and mentions of specific indicators in Table B.6. The estimates are also comparable with an 8-week specification in Table B.7.

Furthermore, reversion to the mean is a common concern in similar research designs (Mattozzi et al., 2023), but it cannot explain our results. A positive effect of individual mentions could have resulted from a focus on MPs performing exceptionally poorly, who then mechanically revert to average performance levels. This is not a concern since we observe a limited effect of individual mentions.

Moreover, the distribution of performance across indicators, illustrated in Figure B.1, is skewed to the left and features a substantial number of zeros. In Table B.8, we exclude the top percentile of values and obtain similar results for Model 1, indicating that the findings are not driven by outliers. To further address the large number of zeros, we estimate a Tobit model, which is specifically designed for such distributions (Wooldridge, 2020). Although a direct comparison of coefficient magnitudes between the Tobit and OLS models is not possible, the results reported in Table B.9 show consistent signs, with some estimates becoming more significant, especially for written

questions.

Finally, our findings remain consistent across different fixed effect specifications. In Table B.10, we replace week-of-the-year and legislature-year fixed effects with month-year fixed effects. While this approach flexibly controls for time variation in performance, it prevents us from separately estimating the effect of the website's launch, as PostWebsite_t overlaps with months after September 2009. The sign and significance of the press coverage coefficients remain unchanged. Similarly, results are similar with week-year fixed effects in Table B.11, although this specification precludes estimating the effect of general press coverage, which is defined at the weekly level. Additionally, we introduce MP fixed effects and legislature fixed effects in Table B.12 instead of MP-legislature fixed effects, yielding consistent results.

4 Mechanisms

We now turn to the mechanisms explaining our results. First, we confirm that better performance is linked to more favorable coverage, indicating that MPs plausibly react to secure more positive press coverage. Next, we examine the criticism that MPs manipulate performance indicators, potentially compromising political efficiency. We then explore the collective dimension of MPs' responses. Finally, we consider individual factors influencing these reactions.

4.1 Performance and media coverage

The most plausible explanation for the impact of performance indicators is that MPs enhance their performance to secure more favorable press coverage. Figure C.1 supports this assertion by demonstrating that better performance correlates with a more positive tone in media coverage. Furthermore, poorly performing MPs are more frequently mentioned, indicating a journalistic inclination to spotlight negative performance.

Moreover, it is conceivable that MPs adopt specific strategies to influence their coverage, in line with the literature on contests for multiple prizes (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001). However, we demonstrate in Appendix C.1 that, despite a positive relationship between performance and coverage, the timing of coverage and the specific indicators mentioned are likely too unpredictable for MPs to implement precise strategies, such as targeting specific rankings.

4.2 Indicators manipulation

MPs are often accused of manipulating indicators, which raises serious concerns about the impact of these measures on political efficiency and aligns with the literature indicating that transparency can backfire (Prat, 2005; Hansen et al., 2018). In a non-academic report, Acatrinei and Quénel (2019) present anecdotal evidence of such manipulations in the French Parliament, although this criticism is not unique to France and can be found in press articles such as Hurst (2006). In this subsection, we focus on the two most commonly cited strategies that MPs might employ to inflate their indicators.

Copy-pasting

First, Acatrinei and Quénel (2019) claim that MPs inflate indicators for written activities by submitting identical texts. Given the limited effect observed on amendments, we focus on written questions to test whether this strategy is employed. These questions can be submitted at any time, on any topic, to any member of the government, who is obligated to respond. MPs can use copy-pasting and submit identical questions, which will inflate the written question indicator with little effort, as this indicator merely counts the number of questions asked. It is, for instance, possible to ask the same question to different members of the government, or to copy a question sent by another MP.

We collected the text of all 262,283 written questions submitted during the study period from Nosdeputes.fr. For each question, we computed its cosine similarity with all questions asked in the same or preceding weeks of the legislature. A question was tagged as copy-pasted if its cosine similarity score with at least one previously submitted question was above 0.9. For each MP who asked at least one question in a given week, we calculated the share of copy-pasted questions. The data collection process, descriptive statistics, and methodology are detailed in Appendix C.2.

In the first column of Table 3, we estimate Model 1 using the weekly share of copy-pasted questions as the dependent variable. We find positive and significant effects from both the website's launch and general coverage, but no significant effect from individual coverage. The magnitude of these coefficients is substantial: with a mean share of 0.18 for copy-pasted questions, the sum of β_1 and β_2 suggests an increase of 0.1 in this share under high general coverage.

Since the submission date of questions is recorded weekly, it is impossible to determine which of two identical questions submitted in the same week is the original. In the first column, we consider a question as copy-pasted only if an identical question had been submitted in a previous week. Consequently, if a new question is submitted multiple times within the same week, we treat all instances as original. This approach provides a lower bound on the share of copy-pasted questions. In column 2, we classify identical questions submitted in the same week as copy-pasted, providing an upper bound for these shares. We also estimate Model 1 under this assumption and obtain

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Ratio copyp.	Ratio copyp.		Ratio copyp.	Ratio copyp.	
	(strict)	(extended)	New written qu.	(strict)	(strict)	Length
General effect						
Post Website	0.076^{***}	0.092^{***}	0.186^{***}	0.050^{***}	0.079^{***}	3.764
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(2.396)
High Coverage	0.020***	0.022^{***}	-0.008	0.028^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.483
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.882)
Individual effect						
Mention MP	-0.002	0.002	0.011	-0.004	-0.002	3.433
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(2.621)
Mention MP Indicator	0.000	0.009	0.059	0.002	0.016	-4.106
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.118)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(4.978)
Observations	79,955	79,955	321,422	59,390	72,175	79,955
Mean DepVar	0.18	0.21	0.54	0.20	0.18	221.45
Adjusted R2	0.22	0.23	0.12	0.23	0.21	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
MP \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table 3: Effects of statistical indicators on the copy-pasting of written questions

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{H$ $\beta_3 \cdot \text{Mention} \text{MP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Mention} \text{MPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{Legislature}_{\text{Year}_t} + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \text{ Standard} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Mention} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Men$ errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP \times legislature level. Observations: Column 1: share of questions asked by the MP during the week classified as strict copy-paste, i.e., identical to another question submitted in a previous week. Column 2: share of questions classified as extended copy-paste, i.e., identical to another question submitted in a previous week or during the current week. Column 3: number of original written questions asked by the MP during the week. Column 4: share of questions asked by the MP during the week classified as strict copy-paste, 2007-2015 (pre-52 weekly submission cap). Column 5: share of questions asked by the MP during the week classified as strict copy-paste, MPs who reach the 52 weekly submission limit before June 2015 excluded. Column 6: average length of questions asked by the MP during the week. PostWebsite: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. HighCoverage: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). MentionMP: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. MentionMPIndicator: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the written questions in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. Dependent variables: All columns except column 4 only include observations for which the number of written questions is non-zero. See Appendix C.2 for details on the computation of the variables.

larger estimates compared to the first column. For the remainder of the analysis, we rely on the first approach, as it is the most conservative.

Hence, the positive effect of indicators on written questions can be partly explained by an increase in copy-pasting. However, the rise in copy-pasting does not rule out a simultaneous increase in original questions. To investigate the effect of indicators on original questions, we calculate the weekly number of original written questions submitted by MPs, subtracting the copy-pasted questions from the total. We estimate Model 1 with this number as the dependent variable in column 3 of Table 3. We then compare these results with those presented in Table 2, which includes all written questions and where we observed a positive effect of the website's launch, but no significant effects from the coverage measures. While the effect of the website's launch remains significant, the magnitude is halved when focusing on original questions, suggesting that about half of the increase in written questions is attributable to copy-pasting.

In response to the surge in the number of written questions, a cap of 52 weekly submissions per MP was introduced in June 2015. This cap likely restricted the use of copy-pasting, thereby reducing the observed effect. As a first robustness check, we restrict the sample to the period prior to the implementation of this regulation in column 4. Alternatively, in column 5, we exclude MPs who reached the 52-submission limit at least once. In both cases, we obtain similar results, indicating that the introduction of the cap had a limited effect on how MPs respond to indicators regarding copy-pasting.

In addition to the increase in copy-pasting, there may be a corresponding decrease in the quality of the questions. Although quality is difficult to measure, length can serve as a proxy. In the last column of Table 3, we observe that indicators and their coverage had a positive but non-significant effect on question length, which does not provide evidence for a decrease in quality.

It should be pointed out that not all copy-pasted questions reflect indicator manipulation. For instance, it may be appropriate to ask the same question to multiple members of the government. However, such legitimate copy-pasting would influence the baseline shares but are unlikely to increase because of indicators, making them irrelevant to the interpretation of our results.

Therefore, our analysis confirms that statistical indicators triggered an increase in the use of copy-pasted questions, which we interpret as a form of manipulation of the indicators. However, this finding is not sufficient to conclude that the indicators have a detrimental effect on the legislative process. In fact, if we consider the number of original questions as a measure of performance, we still observe a positive effect of the indicators, even though the estimate is halved compared to when we do not account for copy-pasted questions.

Number of interventions

It is also claimed that MPs manipulate their number of oral interventions. According to Acatrinei and Quénel (2019), French MPs often make short, meaningless interventions solely to boost their statistics. This concern is echoed by Hurst (2006), who notes that British MPs "will say just about anything to notch up their hit rate on sites such as TheyWorkForYou.com, where even the briefest intervention is classified as a speech."

We analyze the distribution of the number of words per intervention to determine whether these strategies have significantly affected the structure of the debate. Using legislative transcripts from the National Assembly's website for the entire study period (2007–2020), we identified 1,428,892 oral interventions in plenary sessions and 400,675 in committees. We then calculated the word count for each intervention. The data collection process and the methodology for this analysis are detailed in Appendix C.3. We first plot the distribution of the number of words per intervention before and after the website's launch in Figure C.2. We present the distributions separately for plenary sessions and committees. The distributions remain similar and appear to refute the idea that MPs increased the frequency of short interventions in response to performance indicators. In fact, very short interventions seem to be more frequent before the website's launch.

To formally assess potential effects, we focus on MPs who made at least one intervention and calculate the share of interventions within several word count ranges, including very short interventions consisting of fewer than 10 words. We then estimate Model 1 using this share as the dependent variable, with the results displayed in Table C.1. This analysis is carried out separately for plenary sessions and committee meetings. In both cases, the estimated effects—whether from the website's launch or its press coverage—are small, and the combined effect is negative. These findings confirm that the indicators are not associated with an increase in the share of short interventions.

Another strategy mentioned by Acatrinei and Quénel (2019) involves MPs targeting the 20-word threshold to ensure that an intervention qualifies as a long intervention rather than a short one. However, the comparison of word count distributions in Figure C.2 does not suggest that this strategy is widely used. This conclusion is further supported by Table C.1, where we find that the combined effects for interventions between 20 and 30 words tend to be negative. Therefore, there is no evidence to support the idea that MPs aim for the 20-word threshold.

The strategies aimed at inflating the number of interventions are often mentioned as contributing to the deterioration of legislative debates, making them a primary concern for critics of statistical indicators (Hurst, 2006; François and Rozenberg, 2019; Acatrinei and Quénel, 2019). However, while we cannot definitively assert that such strategies are never employed, our analysis suggests that their potential negative impact on the legislative process is limited.

4.3 Collective mechanisms

Our main results suggest that collective accountability plays a key role in how indicators affect MPs' behavior. In this subsection, we investigate further the collective dynamics.

Political groups

To test if political parties coordinate MPs' responses, we examine the behavior of political groups in the National Assembly. These groups typically align with political parties, except for small parties that lack the 15 members required to form a group. We assess how these groups react to their press coverage by creating a dummy variable that equals one if the number of articles mentioning their members during the last 12 weeks exceeds the median value. This variable captures periods of heightened scrutiny for a particular political group.

We incorporate this variable into Model 1 and present the results in Table C.2. The findings reveal that when members of a political group receive a high level of press mentions, the members of that group exhibit a relative decline in performance. One possible explanation is that when a party faces increased scrutiny, other groups intensify their efforts to emphasize that party's shortcomings. Alternatively, when members are criticized for low performance, the group may collectively push back by questioning the validity of the indicators, rather than making efforts to improve their performance.

To ensure that this result is not driven by the specific behavior of larger political groups, we aggregate performance at the group level and replicate the analysis in Table C.3. The results confirm that group-level scrutiny leads to a collective relative reduction in activity.

Reallocation of performance

The collective response to indicators can lead to a reallocation of tasks. Before the introduction of indicators, some MPs may have specialized in unmeasured activities and could face stigma following the indicators' implementation. As a result, a collective reallocation of roles may occur, allowing these MPs to improve their rankings. Testing the effect of ranking on MPs' response is challenging because performance—and therefore rankings—are likely correlated with MPs' sensitivity to media coverage. To address this endogeneity issue, we focus on the 2007-2012 legislature that was subject to the implementation. We base these rankings on the number of weeks of activity, as retrospectively calculated by Nosdeputes.fr, which we interpret as reflecting a performance ranking in the absence of the indicators. We then divide the MPs into three equal-sized groups corresponding to low, medium, and high pre-website performance. We estimate Model 1 separately for these three subgroups and present the results in Table C.4.

Looking at the aggregated indicator, we observe similar effects in all groups. For plenary session interventions—both short and long—we observe a positive effect in the low-performance group and a negative effect in the medium- and high-performance groups. The low-performance group also shows a stronger response in terms of committee interventions and oral questions to the government, although the difference is less pronounced. For other indicators, the coefficients related to the website's launch tend to be similar in both sign and magnitude across the three groups. Interestingly, the indicators for which we observe differential reactions are those where total performance is limited: while it is possible to increase the total number of amendments or law proposals, the total number of oral interventions is constrained by session lengths. Thus, one interpretation is that following the website's launch, there was a reallocation of speaking time from high- to low-performing MPs.

4.4 Individual reactions

Although we found that individual coverage had little effect in Section 3, there may still be heterogeneities based on the individual characteristics of MPs. Table C.5 provides no evidence of gender-specific differences in reactions. We also find minimal influence from geographic proximity to the National Assembly, which may have facilitated improvements in some indicators. Table C.6 shows that MPs from districts within two hours by train of Paris exhibit similar reactions to those from districts farther away. Reactions are also unaffected by majority status: while majority group membership could ease improvements in oral intervention indicators due to agenda-setting power, Table C.7 does not reveal different reactions. However, we do find an effect of party affiliation. In Table C.8, we find a stronger effect among right-wing MPs. A possible explanation is that right-wing voters may be more sensitive to performance indicators, leading to a stronger reaction from right-wing MPs.

We now investigate two additional mechanisms that could influence individuals' reactions: first, reactions could depend on electoral motives; and second, the limited impact of individual mentions might be explained by a backlash from the MPs mentioned, who criticize the indicators rather than improving their performance.

Electoral motives

The electoral implications of indicators and their press coverage may affect MPs' responses. Although assessing the electoral consequences is challenging—for both researchers and MPs—we can hypothesize that certain mentions carry more weight, especially when an MP is cited in a local outlet or faces electoral uncertainty.

First, articles in the local press can be more effective for individual accountability, as they directly target voters in the MP's electoral district. Local newspapers also have the largest circulation among all print media, with a total average of 3 million copies per issue. We use geographical data on newspaper distributions to identify mentions in local newspapers covering the MP's district, which account for 68% of individual mentions.

To test the specific effect of local mentions, we extend Model 1 by interacting the individual mention variable with a dummy indicating if the mention was made in a local newspaper. In Table C.9, we find that non-local mentions (the uninteracted coefficient

of MentionMP_{it}) tend to have a slightly negative effect on performance. The coefficient of the interaction suggests that this negative effect is absent for local mentions. While this evidence points to an effect of electoral motives, it should be interpreted with caution: the interaction is significant only at the 10% level for the aggregated indicator and we obtain mixed results for the separate indicators.

The effects of indicators may also be more important for narrowly elected MPs, as they are more likely to affect the outcome of the next election. In Table C.10, we consider MPs elected in 2007 and 2012 and divide them into two groups: those elected with a win margin above the median and those below this threshold.⁸ We then separately estimate Model 1 on the two subsamples. We observe minimal differences between the two groups. Additionally, individual mentions may have a stronger effect closer to election time. However, we do not find support for this hypothesis in Table C.11, where we interact MentionMP_{it} with a dummy variable indicating whether the mention occurred during the year preceding the election.

It should be pointed out that these results do not imply that electoral concerns play no role in MPs' reactions; rather, they suggest that their responses do not vary based on the specific electoral incentives they face. Indeed, Table C.12 reveals that the effect of general press coverage is greater at the beginning and end of legislatures, suggesting that electoral motives influence the collective response to the indicators.

Potential backlash from individual mentions

A potential explanation for the limited impact of individual mentions is that they provoke opposition from the MPs mentioned, who criticize the indicators rather than improving their performance. This backlash would be less likely for positive mentions. To test this hypothesis, we incorporate the tone of coverage into our analysis and extend Model 1 by interacting the indicator mention variable with dummy variables representing positive and negative tones of each mention. As journalists typically comment on both the positive and negative aspects of each MP's performance, our tone annotation was performed at the indicator level, which precludes an analysis of the aggregated indicator. In Table C.13, we find that positive mentions, compared to neutral ones, have a greater effect on long and short plenary interventions and written questions, but not on written law proposals. In contrast, there is no clear pattern for the effect of negative mentions compared to neutral ones. These findings suggest that positive mentions may correlate with increased (or less diminished) performance for certain indicators, potentially because they do not provoke any backlash.

However, this pattern is not consistent across all indicators, and the interpretation

 $^{^{8}}$ Legislative elections have two rounds, and we focus on the win margin in the second round. The median win margin was 55.1% in 2007 and 55.5% in 2012.

is not supported by the analysis of MPs' comments on the press mentions of their performance indicators. In some cases, journalists contacted MPs before publication, and their comments were included alongside the mention of their indicators. Additionally, newspapers sometimes published MPs' comments in follow-up articles. MPs typically comment on their overall performance, implying that we cannot associate comments with specific indicators. We identified comments from 123 MPs, accounting for 5% of all mentions of indicators. In Table C.14, we estimate an extended version of Model 1, interacting the individual mention variable with a dummy variable equal to one if the MP provided a comment. We do not find that comments are associated with different reactions, whether for the aggregated indicator or for separate indicators.

Hence, we find mixed evidence for a potential backlash. Moreover, the results on comments confirm that the lack of effect of individual mentions is not due to MPs being unaware of their press coverage. A comment from an MP guarantees their awareness of the article, yet we still observe no additional effect of individual mentions.

5 Conclusion

This paper provides the first statistical analysis of the effects of performance indicators on MPs' behavior, establishing several key findings. We document a positive impact of indicators on MPs' performance, primarily driven by collective accountability. However, individual mentions do not lead to further performance improvements. We also address concerns about the manipulation of indicators and find no evidence that such practices undermine the positive impact of indicators. While we observe an increase in copypasting, there is no indication of manipulation in the counts of legislative interventions or amendments. Finally, our findings have relevance beyond the French context, as similar debates exist in other countries that use comparable performance indicators.

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For Online Publication - Additional Materials

A Additional contextual information

A.1 French political landscape

The French political system is characterized by a semi-presidential representative democracy, where the President of the Republic holds significant power. The French Parliament consists of two chambers: the National Assembly (lower house) and the Senate (upper house). Our focus is on the National Assembly between 2007 and 2020.

Legislative elections in France are held every five years to elect the 577 members of the National Assembly. These elections occur shortly after the presidential election and use a two-round runoff system. French citizens aged 18 and above are eligible to vote. In the first round, a candidate is elected if they secure more than 50% of the votes in their constituency. This happened once in the 2007 elections, 36 times in 2012, and 4 times in 2017. If no candidate wins outright in the first round, a second round is held. Candidates who receive the support of at least 12.5% of registered voters in the first round qualify. The candidate with the highest number of votes in the second round is elected.

We summarize the key information on each of the 3 legislatures covered in Table A.1.

First and second round	Majority party	Turnout (first round, $\%$)
2007: June 10 and 17	UMP (right, 313 seats)	60.44
2012: June 10 and 17	PS (left, 280 seats)	57.22
2017: June 11 and 18	REM (center, 308 seats)	48.70

Table A.1: French legislative elections (2007-2017)

A.2 Nosdeputes.fr

We collected data on the performance indicators available on the website Nosdeputes.fr. Data were extracted from SQL dumps of Nosdeputes.fr, available <u>here</u> (last accessed 12 April 2024). We were not able to extract oral questions from the SQL dumps, and we collected them directly from the National Assembly website. We aggregated the data at the week-individual level and display the summary statistics in Table 1.

The following figures illustrate the display on the website Nosdeputes.fr. Figure A.1 presents indicators shown as a list, comparing the performance of all MPs. In Figure A.2, the individual performance of a specific MP is displayed, along with additional details such as biographical information, areas of expertise, and recent legislative contributions.

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	Semaines Commission Hémicycle Amendements Rapport							Rapports	Propo	Propositions		Questions		
Nom	d'activité	réunion	interv.	interv. longues	interv. courtes	proposé	s signés	adoptés	écrits	écrites	signées	écrites	orales	5
François Brottes	4,13	16,32	166,23	51,39	65,45	11,61	19,29	12,77	0,13	0,10	1,16	4,55	0,06	
Éric Straumann	3,96	7,81	8,00	4,72	14,64	6,32	166,68	4,21	0,11	0,06	7,60	5,85	0,34	
Régis Juanico	3,94	11,43	8,83	4,51	7,94	3,21	37,83	8,15	0,28	0,00	1,72	2,04	0,17	
Pascal Popelin	3,91	8,45	12,21	18,13	24,09	4,34	16,53	9,49	0,49	0,00	1,66	5,51	0,36	
Frédérique Massat	3,85	12,43	21,32	5,19	4,53	3,89	32,19	12,72	0,06	0,02	1,96	1,32	0,19	
Jean-Paul Chanteguet	3,83	10,30	47,64	5,30	4,09	12,64	24,43	11,70	0,15	0,09	1,62	0,68	0,15	
Jean-Luc Laurent	3,83	9,38	5,72	16,64	34,81	13,19	38,40	8,19	0,02	0,09	1,43	1,02	0,62	
Jacques Myard	3,83	10,68	19,30	12,04	44,26	6,94	86,87	2,26	0,11	0,21	4,04	2,38	0,43	
Christophe Caresche	3,81	9,15	12,00	11,66	13,55	9,13	19,23	5,34	0,55	0,13	1,11	0,02	0,17	
Charles de Courson	3,81	8,85	75,30	68,26	42,74	50,55	114,87	5,19	0,13	0,00	0,77	1,47	0,74	
Patrick Hetzel	3,81	7,09	16,30	35,89	41,43	37,74	250,79	7,53	0,11	0,19	10,40	13,66	0,64	
Claude Bartolone	3,79	1,53	8,45	97,60	384,91	0,00	0,02	0,02	0,06	0,04	0,98	0,00	0,00	
Karine Daniel	3,78	5,89	2,44	1,56	0,11	1,11	9,78	1,89	0,11	0,00	1,89	1,44	0,44	
Éric Alauzet	3,77	9,26	15,51	22,74	5,55	20,53	138,87	16,36	0,11	0,00	1,40	3,91	0,62	
Olivier Falorni	3,77	7,34	9,11	6,17	3,19	2,11	72,53	9,15	0,02	0,09	0,79	5,70	0,66	
Danielle Auroi	3,74	9,60	32,87	6,72	3,72	4,74	134,70	15,91	0,66	0,36	1,60	2,94	0,53	
Guillaume Chevrollier	3,74	10,60	7,11	10,15	2,30	3,79	66,04	1,91	0,09	0,06	2,36	12,30	0,66	
Marie-Hélène Fabre	3,72	8,91	4,26	2,04	0,83	3,17	41,62	12,51	0,13	0,17	1,85	10,55	0,21	
0 0 11		5.04	** **		FC 07	- •	60.4F	0.00	0.40	0.00	7.40	0.55	0.00	

Figure A.1: List of indicators on Nosdeputes.fr

Source: http://2012-2017.Nosdeputes.fr/synthese/tri/1.



Figure A.2: Individual MP profile on Nosdeputes.fr

Source: http://2012-2017.Nosdeputes.fr/francois-brottes.

A.3 Press coverage

Tone of coverage. With each mention of indicators, we noted whether it was reported as good, bad, or presented neutrally. We merely focused on what was reported in the article: we coded an indicator as positive if the MP was reported to perform well in general or better than others. Summary statistics on the tone of coverage are displayed in Table A.3. 45% of mentions are identified as positive. Cases of positive reporting include the following examples: "With N written amendments, MP X is very active," "MP X is the champion of long parliamentary interventions," "MP X ranks among the 150 best for written questions," "MP X is the best in the region for attendance in

committees," "MP X performs better than MP Y for reports." Instead, we identified an indicator as negative if the MP was said to perform poorly or worse than others. Finally, coverage was coded neutral if the article plainly reported a statistic, if it was presented as average, or if it was presented as better than some but worse than others.

Comments on articles. We coded whether the MP commented on the article, either within the article if the journalist asked them to comment, or after the publication in a separate article. We found individual comments on 123 articles, representing 5% of all mentions of indicators.

Mentions per type of legislative activities. Some journalists report statistics for groups of indicators, either by summing them intentionally or due to a lack of precision. We reflect this approach in Table A.2, where we aggregate press mentions related to different legislative activities. Specifically, we combine mentions of amendments (proposed, signed, and adopted), mentions of questions (both written and oral), and mentions of interventions in plenary sessions (both short and long).

Press article example. The following article was published in a local newspaper in northern France. We provide a translation by ChatGPT and display the coded information below.

Bataille and Pérat, Notable Mention. La Voix du Nord, Maubeuge, Monday, November 16, 2009

If you don't know what to do today, take a look at the website Nosdeputes.fr. You can compare the work of two MPs from the area: Jean-Luc Pérat and Christian Bataille. These two elected officials from Sambre-Avesnois are among the top 150 for their attendance in the hemicycle and in committees. Jean-Luc Pérat, who is in his first term in the Assembly, seems more comfortable writing than speaking, with 74 written questions compared to 19 from his colleague from the 22nd district. A parliamentarian since 1988, the latter excels in oral interventions with 74 short interventions and 14 long ones.

From this article, we collected the following information:

- Attendance in committees: Positive for both MPs (indicated as being in the top 150).
- Written questions: Positive for Jean-Luc Pérat, negative for Christian Bataille (one is indicated as performing better than the other).
- Short and long interventions: Positive for Christian Bataille (positive comment: "excels in oral interventions"). No information for Jean-Luc Pérat.

	Number of mentions	Number of articles	Share of MPs mentionned	Avg. mentions by MP
Interventions				
Interv. committees	273	148	0.17	0.20
Interv. plenary sessions (all)	451	203	0.23	0.32
Attendance				
Attendance committees	532	212	0.23	0.38
Questions				
Written questions	254	147	0.15	0.18
Oral questions	175	115	0.11	0.13
Amendements				
Amendements (all)	336	166	0.18	0.24
Proposals				
Proposals (all)	220	117	0.13	0.16
Reports				
Written reports	177	95	0.11	0.13
Activity (overall)	1050	349	0.44	0.76

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics - Press coverage indicators grouped

Notes: Descriptive statistics on the press mentions of indicators. We identified 3,920 mentions across 885 articles between 2009 and 2020 (see Table 1). We group certain indicators together. *Interv. plenary session (all)*: short and long interventions in plenary session. *Amendments (all)*: signed, written and adopted amendments. *Proposal (all)*: written and signed proposals. Grouped indicators variables equal 1 if at least one of the indicators concerned is mentioned for the MP in the article. *Activity (overall)*: articles that mention MPs' general performance without referring to any specific indicator. *Number of mentions*: number of mentions for the indicator in a row. *Number of article*: number of distinct articles that mention at least once an MP for the indicator in a row. *Share of MPs mentioned*: share of MPs mentioned at least once for the indicator in a row. For example, 17% of MPs are mentioned at least once on interventions in committees, with an average of 0.20 mentions on interventions in committees per MP.



Figure A.3: Monthly number of articles mentioning Nosdeputes.fr
	Number of mentions	Positive (share)	Negative (share)	Neutral (share)
Citing indicators	3,920	0.39	0.33	0.29
Interventions	,			
Interv. committees	273	0.40	0.37	0.22
Short interv. plenary	260	0.40	0.37	0.24
Long interv. plenary	434	0.41	0.33	0.26
Attendance				
Attendance committees	532	0.28	0.47	0.25
Questions				
Written questions	254	0.56	0.16	0.28
Oral questions	175	0.44	0.33	0.23
Amendements				
Signed amendments	236	0.41	0.18	0.41
Written amendments	147	0.42	0.37	0.21
Adopted amendments	75	0.40	0.25	0.35
Proposals				
Written proposals	175	0.45	0.19	0.37
Signed proposals	132	0.36	0.21	0.42
Reports				
Written reports	177	0.46	0.20	0.34
Activity (overall)	$1,\!050$	0.37	0.36	0.29

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics - Tone of coverage

Notes: Descriptive statistics on the press mentions of indicators, by tone of coverage. We identified 3,920 mentions across 885 articles between 2009 and 2020 (see Table 1). *Activity (overall)*: articles that mention MPs' general performance without referring to any specific indicator. *Number of mentions*: number of mentions for the indicator in a row. *Positive (share)*: share of positive mentions for the indicator in a row. *Negative (share)*: share of neutral (share): share of neutral mentions for the indicator in a row. For example, 17% of MPs are mentioned at least once on interventions in committees, with an average of 0.20 mentions on interventions in committees per MP.

B Robustness Checks: Tables and Figures

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	tions	Ameno	lments	Reports	Prop	oosals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.065^{***}	-0.185	-0.347	0.314^{***}	0.210^{***}	0.003^{*}	0.399^{***}	-0.999***	-4.375^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095***
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.367)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.059)	(0.127)	(0.267)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Coverage Assembly	-0.046***	-0.085*	-0.159	0.021***	-0.162***	-0.004***	0.001	-0.320***	-0.379**	-0.001	0.000	-0.082***
	(0.006)	(0.045)	(0.121)	(0.004)	(0.043)	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.069)	(0.171)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)
High Coverage	0.087***	0.451***	0.754***	0.087***	0.241***	0.002^{**}	0.001	0.208***	1.885***	0.003***	0.001	0.009**
0 0	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.141)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect	· /	· · · ·	× ,	· · · ·	· · ·	()	· /	· /	· /	()	()	· /
Mention MP	-0.002	-0.095	-0.133	0.020	-0.202**	0.004	0.006	-0.394***	-0.769*	-0.000	-0.001	0.029**
	(0.013)	(0.137)	(0.418)	(0.013)	(0.081)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.132)	(0.437)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.303	0.036	-0.010	-0.321	-0.006	0.443^{*}	0.109	-1.250	0.003	-0.005	0.117***
		(0.239)	(0.723)	(0.019)	(0.262)	(0.005)	(0.249)	(0.369)	(0.852)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580	322,580
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.75	0.72	1.27	0.05	0.74	1.24	11.73	0.02	0.02	0.48
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.1: Control for press coverage of the National Assembly

Notes: * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{CoverageAssembly}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_5 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *CoverageAssembly*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles about the National Assembly in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (14770). *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *Mag. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of and the MP during the Week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of antervents in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Written amend*

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	Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Ameno	dments	Reports	Prop	posals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect											
Post Website	0.008^{*}	-0.006	0.199^{***}	0.095^{***}	0.070^{***}	0.003^{**}	-0.030***	-0.023***	-0.001	0.001	-0.175^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)
High Coverage	0.024***	0.030***	0.061***	0.028***	0.007***	0.002**	0.014***	0.042***	0.002***	0.001**	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Individual effect	· /		. ,	· /		· /	· /	· /	· /	. ,	· /
Mention MP	0.007	0.015^{***}	0.015^{**}	0.012^{**}	0.016^{***}	0.003	-0.013**	0.012^{*}	0.000	0.000	0.014^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Mention MP Indicator	-0.010	-0.015*	-0.005	-0.013	-0.000	-0.005	0.024**	-0.006	0.002	-0.002	0.022^{*}
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.18	0.18	0.52	0.25	0.25	0.05	0.12	0.45	0.02	0.01	0.25
Adjusted R2	0.15	0.22	0.24	0.20	0.16	0.03	0.18	0.37	0.06	0.05	0.15
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.2: General coverage, extensive margin

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column; the dependent variable is equal to one if the MP has performed at least one activity corresponding to the indicator during the week. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables are dummies equal to 1 if at least one occurrence of the outcome was shown during the week. *Sound*: *North* (long) interventions: interventions: in committee attendance: committee assions attended by the MP during the week. *Oral (written) questions*: oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. *Written amendments*: amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Agg. Índic.	Agg. Indic.
	Agg. Indic.	(weeks of activity)	(weighted by visibility)
General effect			
Post Website	0.058^{***}	0.168^{***}	0.157^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)
High Coverage	0.085^{***}	0.088^{***}	0.103^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Individual effect			
Mention MP	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.20	0.22
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP}\times\mathrm{Legi}\;\mathrm{FE}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.3: Alternative specifications for the aggregated indicator

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. PostWebsite: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. HighCoverage: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). MentionMP: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. Dependent variables: Agg. Indic.: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Agg. Indic. (weeks of activity): Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, using only the indicators taken into account in the number of weeks of activity (short and long interventions during plenary sessions and participation in committees), giving equal weight to the three indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Agg. Indic. (weighted by visibility): Weighted aggregate weekly performance of MPs. Weights are calculated by dividing the total number of mentions of an indicator by the total number of mentions of all indicators, as reported in Table 1. The aggregated indicator is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Ameno	lments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.101^{***}	-0.087	-0.175	0.359^{***}	0.258^{***}	0.005^{***}	0.429^{***}	-1.231^{***}	-5.351^{***}	0.000	0.003^{*}	-0.018
	(0.013)	(0.119)	(0.386)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.002)	(0.059)	(0.161)	(0.298)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.014)
High Coverage (16 weeks)	0.020^{***}	0.246^{***}	0.391^{***}	0.012^{***}	0.094^{**}	-0.001	-0.002	0.352^{***}	2.469^{***}	0.001	-0.001	-0.099***
	(0.005)	(0.044)	(0.119)	(0.004)	(0.039)	(0.001)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.105)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.019	-0.028	-0.012	0.045^{***}	-0.152^{*}	0.004^{**}	0.007	-0.406^{***}	-0.728^{*}	0.000	-0.000	0.048^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.136)	(0.428)	(0.013)	(0.082)	(0.002)	(0.051)	(0.132)	(0.432)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.273	0.087	-0.014	-0.310	-0.005	0.446^{*}	0.110	-1.178	0.004	-0.004	0.121^{***}
		(0.239)	(0.725)	(0.019)	(0.263)	(0.005)	(0.248)	(0.369)	(0.851)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark							
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark							
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark							

Table B.4: General coverage, 16 weeks

Notes: p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{Legislature}_{eat} + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 16 weeks is higher than the median. *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Oral (written) questions*: number of amendments: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Ameno	dments	Reports	Prop	posals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.075^{***}	0.056	0.009	0.319^{***}	0.211^{***}	0.001	0.435^{***}	-0.821^{***}	-3.188^{***}	-0.000	0.001	-0.120***
	(0.013)	(0.126)	(0.396)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.059)	(0.120)	(0.245)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.014)
High Coverage (8 weeks)	0.086***	0.072	0.206	0.103***	0.242***	0.006***	-0.014	-0.333***	-0.821***	0.003***	0.004^{***}	0.066***
	(0.006)	(0.054)	(0.150)	(0.004)	(0.052)	(0.001)	(0.023)	(0.093)	(0.199)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Individual effect		. ,		. ,	. ,		. ,		. ,	. ,		
Mention MP	0.004	0.004	0.019	0.022^{*}	-0.190**	0.003	0.010	-0.263**	-0.059	-0.000	-0.001	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.137)	(0.425)	(0.013)	(0.081)	(0.002)	(0.051)	(0.128)	(0.432)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.279	0.076	-0.010	-0.308	-0.005	0.446^{*}	0.109	-1.228	0.003	-0.005	0.116***
		(0.239)	(0.724)	(0.019)	(0.262)	(0.005)	(0.248)	(0.369)	(0.859)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.5: General coverage, 8 weeks

Notes: p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{Legislature}_{Year}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes. fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 8 weeks is higher than the median. *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Oral (written) questions*: number of amendments: number of anticher the week. *Written reports*: number of anticher by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of week week. *Written reports*: number of amendments: number of amendments: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Amendments		Reports	Prop	oosals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	-0.208*	-0.393	0.310^{***}	0.170^{**}	0.170^{**}	0.425^{***}	-1.105^{***}	-4.781^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.139)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.085***	0.443***	0.744^{***}	0.086***	0.230***	0.230***	0.003	0.190***	1.746***	0.003***	0.001	0.012***
	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.143)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect	· · ·	· /	· · ·	× /	· · · ·	· /		· /	· /	· /	· /	· · · ·
Mention MP (16 weeks)	-0.014	-0.137	-0.203	0.006	-0.122	-0.122	0.001	-0.311**	-0.292	-0.001	0.000	-0.007
	(0.013)	(0.121)	(0.331)	(0.011)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.051)	(0.137)	(0.424)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.012)
Mention MP Indicator (16 weeks)	· · ·	-0.412**	-0.264	-0.012	-0.523**	-0.523**	0.546	-0.152	-1.792**	0.004	-0.002	0.102***
× ,		(0.206)	(0.577)	(0.016)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.382)	(0.334)	(0.811)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.033)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	1.26	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.6: Individual coverage, 16 weeks

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic:*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Mritten amendments*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP dur

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Que	stions	Ameno	dments	Reports	Pro	oosals
	(1)	(2) Long	(3) Short	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	-0.210^{*}	-0.395	0.309^{***}	0.168^{**}	0.003^{*}	0.424^{***}	-1.108^{***}	-4.786^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.096***
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.139)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.084^{***}	0.438^{***}	0.728^{***}	0.084^{***}	0.224^{***}	0.002^{**}	0.006	0.181^{***}	1.696***	0.003***	0.001	0.010^{**}
	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.143)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.123)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,		
Mention MP (8 weeks)	0.014	-0.233	-0.343	0.052^{***}	-0.187^{**}	0.003	0.013	-0.336**	0.364	0.003	-0.001	0.043^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.152)	(0.373)	(0.015)	(0.093)	(0.003)	(0.047)	(0.143)	(0.497)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)
Mention MP Indicator (8 weeks)	. ,	-0.223	0.637	-0.033	-0.205	-0.005	0.396	0.097	-1.404	-0.006	0.001	0.145***
		(0.311)	(1.193)	(0.023)	(0.294)	(0.006)	(0.317)	(0.427)	(1.023)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.043)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.7: Individual coverage, 8 weeks

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 8 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks is *Agg. Indic:*. Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic:*. Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions:* number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance:* number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. *Written amendments:* number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments:* number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports:* number of amendments or standard by the MP during the week. *Written reports:* number of any to famendments or signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports:* number of law proposals aut

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Amene	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	0.006	-0.032	0.305^{***}	0.213^{***}	0.229^{***}	0.004^{**}	-0.152^{***}	-2.866^{***}	-0.001	-0.000	-0.219^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.176)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)
High Coverage	0.085***	0.203***	0.270^{***}	0.087***	0.079^{***}	0.010^{*}	0.002^{*}	0.076***	1.963^{***}	0.002^{**}	0.001^{***}	0.009***
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.084)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.002	0.034	0.107	0.013	0.020	0.030^{*}	0.003	-0.097***	0.108	0.000	0.001	0.023**
	(0.013)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.290)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.088	-0.315***	-0.012	0.042	-0.012	-0.004	0.182**	-1.103**	0.002	-0.001	0.071**
		(0.098)	(0.114)	(0.017)	(0.090)	(0.036)	(0.005)	(0.074)	(0.517)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.028)
Observations	326,617	323,362	323,393	325,506	323,444	323,441	326,373	323,422	323,352	326,247	326,042	323,463
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.02	1.08	0.71	0.75	0.50	0.05	0.56	9.32	0.02	0.01	0.40
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.13	0.16	0.25	0.15	0.16	0.03	0.12	0.30	0.06	0.03	0.15
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.8: General coverage, trimmed outcomes

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. The highest 1% of values for each week are excluded. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions: number of short (long) interventions: number of suther extendance: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments: number of amendments: number of amendments: co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

	Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	tions
	_(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Written	Oral
General effect						
Post Website	0.124	-2.248	0.646^{***}	4.606^{***}	2.289^{***}	0.057^{*}
	(0.506)	(1.409)	(0.022)	(0.365)	(0.296)	(0.032)
High Coverage	2.744^{***}	7.051^{***}	0.168^{***}	1.427^{***}	0.245^{***}	0.057^{***}
	(0.205)	(0.784)	(0.007)	(0.129)	(0.076)	(0.019)
Individual effect						
Mention MP	0.774	3.082^{**}	0.045^{**}	0.085	0.423^{**}	0.081^{*}
	(0.584)	(1.529)	(0.022)	(0.293)	(0.202)	(0.047)
Mention MP Indicator	-1.297	-2.617	-0.005	-0.969	0.718	-0.122
	(0.917)	(2.188)	(0.034)	(0.692)	(0.495)	(0.116)
Observations	326,620	326,620	326,620	326,620	326,620	326,620
Mean DepVar	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.73	0.05
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
MP \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

(a) Interventions, committees, and questions

(b) Amendments and proposals

	Ameno	dments	Prop	posals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Written	Signed	Written	Signed
General effect				
Post Website	-8.775***	-4.556^{***}	0.053	-1.102^{***}
	(1.241)	(0.720)	(0.100)	(0.045)
High Coverage	4.641^{***}	6.281^{***}	0.085^{*}	0.006
	(0.462)	(0.255)	(0.051)	(0.014)
Individual effect				
Mention MP	-3.630***	-0.074	0.013	0.115^{**}
	(1.262)	(0.877)	(0.106)	(0.048)
Mention MP Indicator	4.934**	-1.937	-0.115	0.304^{***}
	(2.025)	(1.493)	(0.208)	(0.103)
Observations	326,620	326,620	326,620	326,620
Mean DepVar	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.47
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP}\times\mathrm{Legi}\mathrm{FE}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1 with a Tobit regression model: $y_{iat}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. PostWebsite: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. HighCoverage: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). MentionMP: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: Short (long) interventions: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. Committee attendance: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. Committee interventions: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. Written amendments: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. Written amendments: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. Signed amendments: number of any proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	tions	Ameno	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
High Coverage	0.095^{***}	0.607^{***}	0.885^{***}	0.051^{***}	0.187^{**}	-0.012^{***}	0.056	-0.187	1.951^{***}	-0.001	0.005^{***}	0.228^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.105)	(0.216)	(0.007)	(0.086)	(0.002)	(0.037)	(0.304)	(0.272)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.001	-0.114	-0.168	0.026^{**}	-0.141^{*}	0.004^{*}	-0.027	-0.139	-0.013	-0.002	-0.002	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.139)	(0.427)	(0.012)	(0.082)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.127)	(0.402)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.209	0.195	-0.023	-0.284	-0.004	0.447^{*}	-0.054	-1.002	0.004	-0.005	0.106^{***}
		(0.238)	(0.719)	(0.018)	(0.263)	(0.005)	(0.250)	(0.382)	(0.830)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.034)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.25	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.31	0.04	0.04	0.21
Month FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP} \times \mathrm{Legi} \; \mathrm{FE}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.10: Month-year fixed effects

Notes: p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. Estimation of: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1$. HighCoverage $t + \beta_2$. MentionMP_{it} + β_3 . MentionMPIndicator $t_i^s + Month_t + Legislature Year_t + MP \times Legislature <math>t_i + \epsilon_{it}$. Month fixed effects for each month of our sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of amendments: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Que	stions	Ameno	lments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2) Long	(3) Short	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.007	-0.102	-0.148	0.017	-0.158^{*}	0.002	-0.031	-0.143	0.076	-0.003	-0.002	0.019
	(0.013)	(0.139)	(0.426)	(0.012)	(0.083)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.127)	(0.403)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.198	0.214	-0.021	-0.297	-0.003	0.451^{*}	-0.037	-0.888	0.004	-0.005	0.096^{***}
		(0.240)	(0.725)	(0.018)	(0.263)	(0.005)	(0.252)	(0.381)	(0.827)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.033)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.26	0.12	0.24	0.34	0.08	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.42	0.07	0.05	0.39
Week FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
MP \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.11: Week-year fixed effects

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{Week}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Week fixed effects for each week of our sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. MentionMP: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. MentionMPIndicator: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. MentionMPIndicator: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. MentionMPIndicator: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in the originate equal as the A2. Dependent variables equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Short (long) interventions: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. Committee interventions: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. Written amendments: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. Signed amendments: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. Written reports authored by the MP during the week. Written proposals: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. Signed proposals: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Amen	dments	Reports	Prop	posals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.057^{***}	-0.210^{*}	-0.442	0.308^{***}	0.185^{***}	0.002	0.422^{***}	-1.087^{***}	-4.733^{***}	-0.001	0.003	-0.094^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.119)	(0.368)	(0.010)	(0.072)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.139)	(0.280)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.083***	0.420***	0.706***	0.085***	0.222***	0.002^{**}	0.001	0.179^{***}	1.732***	0.003***	0.001	0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.046)	(0.139)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.025)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,				. ,			. ,
Mention MP	0.021	-0.066	-0.313	0.024^{*}	-0.162**	0.003	0.004	-0.266**	-0.544	0.001	-0.000	0.033^{**}
	(0.013)	(0.138)	(0.433)	(0.013)	(0.079)	(0.002)	(0.057)	(0.133)	(0.449)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		0.061	1.414	-0.018	-0.055	-0.004	0.638**	0.095	-1.307	0.008	-0.001	0.109***
		(0.270)	(1.280)	(0.019)	(0.208)	(0.005)	(0.283)	(0.350)	(0.848)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.036)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.18	0.09	0.17	0.23	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.24	0.05	0.04	0.18
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
MP FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table B.12: MP and legislature fixed effects

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP_i + \text{Legislature}_t + \epsilon_{it}$. MP fixed effects for each MP of our sample. Legislature fixed effects for each legislature of our sample. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks in Table A.2. Dependent variables: Agg. Indic.: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. Committee attendance: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. Oral (written) questions: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. Written amendments: number of amendments: co-signed by the MP during the week. Written reports: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. Signed amendments: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. Written proposals: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.



Figure B.1: Distribution of indicators

Notes: For each indicator, we display the mean value for each percentile level of the distribution.

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C Mechanisms

C.1 Predictability of media coverage

Figure C.1 illustrates a clear positive relationship between performance and media coverage. Furthermore, drawing from the literature on contests for multiple prizes (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), one might consider that MPs' incentives depend on their exact rankings, leading them to set specific targets. For instance, they might aim to avoid ranking near the bottom, as these positions tend to attract more scrutiny. However, the analysis presented in this appendix indicates that such complex strategic behavior is unlikely, as the specifics of coverage are too unpredictable to be effectively manipulated.

We examine the impact of specific ranking positions on MPs' press coverage in Table C.15. Specifically, we attempt to predict the likelihood of an MP being mentioned in the press based on their ranking. The results presented are for the model with the best predictive power, which includes both time and MP-legislature fixed effects. While certain positions do appear to influence coverage, the effects are minimal, and the low R^2 values confirm that media coverage remains largely unpredictable.

This unpredictability stems from several factors. First, the timing of press articles cannot be forecasted, and MPs cannot predict which of their indicators will be covered. There is also some uncertainty in the tone of coverage, as a performance can be compared to various benchmarks, including legislative, party, or regional averages. Figure C.1 illustrates this point, showing that MPs sometimes receive coverage that does not reflect their rankings. This is further demonstrated by the examples in the press article in Appendix A.3, where two MPs from neighboring districts are compared. For one indicator, both MPs are praised for ranking in the top 150 of the legislature; for another, the journalist directly compares the two, deeming one superior; and for a third indicator, one MP is noted as excelling while the performance of the other is not mentioned.

Consequently, we believe it is unlikely that MPs engage in forecasting how performance indicators will be covered and strategically adjust their efforts accordingly. This also implies that MPs cannot anticipate their media coverage, although if they did, it would likely result in an underestimation of our findings. This uncertainty may help explain the limited effect of individual mentions: MPs may hesitate to exert additional effort if the impact on future coverage remains unclear. This supports the interpretation proposed in Section 3: when an article on performance indicators is published, MPs update their expectations about the likelihood of future coverage and subsequently increase their efforts. However, personal mentions do not provide additional information that would guide the MPs mentioned in further increasing their performance.

C.2 Written questions

This section details our identification of copy-pasted questions. We extract the 262,283 written questions from Nosdeputes.fr, covering the entire period studied (2007-2020). The example of copy-pasted questions at the end of this appendix reveals small differences, such as names, pronouns, and dates. Testing if questions are exactly identical would fail to detect these cases. Hence, we use cosine similarity to infer which questions are copy-pasted, in the spirit of Cagé et al. (2020) and Bertrand et al. (2021). For a more detailed overview of text analysis methods with algorithms in economics, see Ash and Hansen (2023).

We eliminate the beginning of each question, which lists the name of the sender and recipient. We also eliminate words that appear only in one question and those that appear in more than 80% of the sample, as they are not informative. Then, we use a term frequency-inverse document frequency function (TF-IDF) to transform each question into a vector where each word is assigned a weight based on its frequency in a specific document and its rarity across all documents. Each vector has a length corresponding to the number of unique words in the question sample. The weight w_{iq} is computed from the count c_{iq} of word *i* in question *q* as follows:

$$w_{iq} = c_{iq} \times \left[\log \left(\frac{N+1}{n_i+1} \right) + 1 \right]$$

where n_i in the number of question containing word i and N is the total number of questions.

Then, we use cosine similarity to measure the similarity between two questions by calculating the cosine of the angle between their vector representations. For any given document vectors v_i and v_j , this is:

$$\theta_{ij} = \frac{v_i \cdot v_j}{\|v_i\| \|v_j\|}$$

 θ_{ij} ranges between 0 (v_i and v_j are totally different) and 1 (v_i and v_j are exactly the same).

For each question q, we compute its similarity with all other questions asked in the same week and before. Then, we categorize each question as follows:

- Copy-paste (strict): at least one question asked previously has a similarity higher than 0.9 with q, but no question asked in the same week has a similarity greater than 0.9 with q
- Copy-paste (extended): at least one question asked previously has a similarity higher than 0.9 with q, and/or at least one question asked in the same week has a similarity greater than 0.9 with q

• Original: no question asked previously nor in the same week has a similarity greater than 0.9 with q

As questions are recorded on a weekly basis, it is impossible to determine which of two identical questions submitted in the same week is the original. *Copy-paste* (*strict*) considers questions to be copy-pasted only if they were submitted in a previous week; identical questions submitted in the same week are not considered copy-pasted. *Copy-paste* (*extended*) classifies identical questions submitted in the same week as copy-pasted.

To manage the high computational cost of comparing each question with all other questions asked during the legislature, we employ a dimensionality-reduction algorithm, specifically Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). LSA reshapes questions in terms of Dlatent subjects, where D is less than m, the total number of words used over the whole legislature. We stack the weights w_{iq} of the TF-IDF function into a large and sparse feature-document matrix A of dimensions $N \times m$ (where N is the number of questions and m is the number of words) and apply a truncated singular value decomposition (SVD) to produce a rank D approximation of A:

$$A \approx U_D \Sigma_D V_D^T$$

where U_D is the truncated question-topic matrix, Σ_D is a diagonal matrix containing the *D* largest singular values of *A*, V_D^T is the truncated words-topic matrix. We keep $U_D\Sigma_D$ as the set of LSA document vectors. The output is a question-topic matrix where each question is represented by how much it belongs to each topic, weighted by the importance of each topic. For each question *q*, we compute its similarity (using topic vectors) with all other questions asked in the legislature (before or after).

We report the resulting descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table C.16.

Example of copy-pasted questions. The following questions, translated by ChatGPT, are identified as identical. We infer that the second question, published later, is a copy-paste of the first one. Screenshots from the National Assembly website in French are provided in Figure C.3. The differences are highlighted in bold in the translation and in red in the screenshots.

First question asked on May 8, 2018 (accessed <u>here</u>):

M. Martial Saddier draws the attention of the Minister of Solidarity and Health to the effective implementation of advanced practice nursing in France. Article 119 of Law No. 2016-41 of January 26, 2016, on the modernization of our healthcare system has defined the legal framework for advanced practice. In order to address the major challenges of the French healthcare system, which faces an explosion of chronic diseases requiring long-term care, with follow-up by healthcare professionals, and in the face of the worrying increase in medical deserts, the Parliament wanted the scopes of practice for healthcare professionals to be redefined by creating new intermediate-level health professions (between the 8-year medical degree and the 3-4-year degrees of paramedical professionals, particularly nurses). Present since the 1960s in the United States and Canada, as well as in the United Kingdom and Ireland, these advanced practice nurses are recognized with broader competencies, including prescribing, renewing, and adjusting treatments, and performing procedures, provided they have undergone additional master's-level training. These professionals play an important first-line role in remote areas. However, the implementing decree, which has still not been published more than two years after the law was enacted, is reportedly keeping the physician in a central role and not granting the advanced practice nurse the full autonomy needed to meet the healthcare needs of citizens. Therefore, he asks her to indicate what the Government plans to do to establish in France a true intermediate profession of advanced practice nurse with sufficient autonomy to adequately care for patients.

Second question asked on May 29, 2018 (accessed <u>here</u>):

M. Franck Marlin draws the attention of the Minister of Solidarity and Health to the effective implementation of advanced practice nursing in France. Article 119 of Law No. 2016-41 of January 26, 2016, on the modernization of our healthcare system has defined the legal framework for advanced practice. In order to address the major challenges of the French healthcare system, which faces an explosion of chronic diseases requiring long-term care, with follow-up by healthcare professionals, and in the face of the worrying increase in medical deserts, the Parliament wanted the scopes of practice for intermediate-level healthcare professionals to be redefined (between the 8-year medical degree and the 3-4-year degrees of paramedical professionals, particularly nurses). Present since the 1960s in the United States of America and Canada, as well as in the United Kingdom and Ireland, these advanced practice nurses are recognized with broader competencies, including prescribing, renewing, and adjusting treatments, and performing procedures, provided they have undergone additional master's-level training. These professionals play an important first-line role in remote areas. However, the implementing decree, which

has still not been published more than two years after the law was enacted, is reportedly keeping the physician in a central role and not granting the advanced practice nurse the full autonomy needed to meet the healthcare needs of citizens. Therefore, he asks her to indicate the measures considered by the Government to establish in France a true intermediate profession of advanced practice nurse with sufficient autonomy to adequately care for patients.

C.3 Number of interventions

This section outlines the methodology we used to analyze the distribution of word counts. We extracted the transcripts of plenary sessions for the entire period studied (2007-2020), totaling 1,428,892 interventions, along with committee sessions, which amount to 400,675 interventions, from the National Assembly's website. Each intervention is delimited in the transcripts and linked to the name of the MP who made it, allowing us to associate interventions with individual MPs.

We calculated the number of words in each intervention. For both plenary sessions and committee meetings, we computed the shares of weekly interventions by each MP across different word count categories: interventions of 10 words or less, 10 to 20 words, 20 to 30 words, and more than 30 words. This analysis focuses on MPs who made at least one intervention during the week. We present the descriptive statistics of the variables in Panel B of Table C.16.

We remind readers that Nosdeputes.fr classifies interventions of 20 words or fewer as short interventions, while those exceeding 20 words are categorized as long interventions. These categories only apply to interventions in plenary sessions.

C.4 Tables and Figures

		Interventions in Ple	nary Sessions			Interventions in	Committes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Share ≤ 10	Share 11-20 words	Share 21-30	Share > 30	Share ≤ 10	Share 11-20 words	Share 21-30	Share > 30
General effect								
Post Website	-0.013^{*}	0.001	-0.003**	0.015^{**}	0.002	0.004	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)
High Coverage	0.010^{***}	-0.003**	0.001	-0.008**	-0.008***	-0.000	0.002	0.007^{**}
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Individual effect								
Mention MP	0.012	0.003	-0.001	-0.014^{*}	0.009	-0.003	-0.007**	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Mention MP Indicator	-0.023*	0.001	0.001	0.021^{*}	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.016)
Observations	77,874	77,874	77,874	77,874	81,487	81,487	81,487	81,487
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.06	0.03	0.49	0.13	0.05	0.04	0.78
Adjusted R2	0.33	0.17	0.04	0.37	0.26	0.07	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	✓

Table C.1: Press coverage and oral interventions

Notes: p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the shares of interventions with the word count indicated in the column for each MP from 2007 until 2020. We consider interventions in plenary sessions in columns 1-4 and interventions in committees in columns 5-8. For each type of intervention, we focus on MPs who made at least one intervention during the week. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator* are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent vari

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Ameno	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)Long	(3) Short	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.060^{***}	-0.201^{*}	-0.396	0.302^{***}	0.175^{**}	0.002	0.425^{***}	-1.091^{***}	-4.324^{***}	-0.002	0.003^{*}	-0.096***
	(4.48)	(-1.66)	(-1.04)	(29.32)	(2.43)	(1.28)	(6.93)	(-7.67)	(-16.15)	(-1.17)	(1.81)	(-7.11)
High Coverage	0.092^{***}	0.499^{***}	0.792^{***}	0.084^{***}	0.300^{***}	0.002^{**}	-0.047	0.354^{***}	3.358^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.000	0.002
	(16.47)	(9.70)	(5.03)	(18.41)	(6.43)	(2.27)	(-1.60)	(5.04)	(23.73)	(3.20)	(0.55)	(0.42)
Group effect												
Mention Group	-0.021***	-0.129^{***}	-0.187	0.002	-0.145^{***}	-0.000	0.104^{***}	-0.448^{***}	-3.827^{***}	0.001	0.001	0.021^{***}
	(-4.41)	(-2.75)	(-1.26)	(0.41)	(-3.84)	(-0.19)	(4.02)	(-8.51)	(-20.93)	(1.48)	(0.89)	(4.10)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.007	-0.051	-0.118	0.023^{*}	-0.167^{*}	0.004^{*}	-0.012	-0.330**	-0.162	0.000	-0.001	0.020
	(0.49)	(-0.36)	(-0.27)	(1.77)	(-1.90)	(1.81)	(-0.21)	(-2.49)	(-0.36)	(0.13)	(-0.77)	(1.41)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.348	0.232	-0.005	-0.311	-0.005	0.485^{*}	0.135	-1.026	0.001	-0.004	0.128^{***}
		(-1.38)	(0.29)	(-0.26)	(-1.11)	(-0.99)	(1.81)	(0.34)	(-1.14)	(0.22)	(-0.67)	(3.44)
Observations	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670	310,670
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.71	2.74	0.72	1.25	0.05	0.74	1.20	11.60	0.02	0.02	0.48
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
MP \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.2: MP's reactions to mentions of the parliamentary group

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \beta_5 \cdot \text{MentionGroup}_{it} + WeekYear_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionGroup*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles as shown in Table A.2. *MentionGroup*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles about the MP's group in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the group's median during the legislative term. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic*.: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of oral (written) questions: number of oral (written) questions: number of anticutes as show the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of anticher proposals: number of anticher proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of alw proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of alw proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: numb

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Que	estions	Amen	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.013	-0.488	-0.945^{*}	0.261^{***}	0.201^{**}	0.008	0.315^{*}	-3.837	-7.902**	-0.001	0.003	-0.048
	(0.27)	(-1.43)	(-2.01)	(8.60)	(2.60)	(1.43)	(1.93)	(-1.56)	(-2.37)	(-0.36)	(0.40)	(-0.65)
High Coverage	0.092***	0.702***	0.863***	0.058^{***}	0.146^{*}	0.001	-0.030	0.585	5.190^{***}	-0.000	0.000	-0.001
	(3.81)	(3.67)	(3.23)	(4.53)	(1.82)	(0.26)	(-0.47)	(0.48)	(3.52)	(-0.15)	(0.15)	(-0.02)
Group effect			. ,				. ,	. ,			. ,	
Mention Group	-0.048**	-0.295^{*}	-0.917	0.005	-0.118	0.003	0.116^{*}	-1.041	-5.522^{***}	-0.000	-0.003	-0.028
	(-2.09)	(-1.89)	(-1.45)	(0.46)	(-1.60)	(0.71)	(1.99)	(-1.65)	(-2.93)	(-0.14)	(-1.15)	(-0.79)
Observations	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399
Mean DepVar	0.06	2.65	4.07	0.69	1.40	0.07	0.69	2.55	21.47	0.02	0.02	0.40
Adjusted R2	0.28	0.22	0.16	0.51	0.22	0.35	0.19	0.02	0.27	0.42	0.10	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.3: Group reaction to mentions of the parliamentary group

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{gt}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionGroup}_{gt} + \text{WeekYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{Group} \times \text{Legislature}_{gt} + \epsilon_{gt}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly average performances of the members of each political group from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *MentionGroup*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles about the MP's group in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the group's median during the legislative term. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

Table C.4: Performance before Nosdeputes.fr

(a) Low	v performanc	e
		/		

		DI	a .									
		Plenary	Sessions	Com	nittees	Ques	tions	Amene	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.141^{***}	0.297^{*}	0.772	0.248^{***}	0.353^{***}	0.003	0.183^{**}	0.109	-2.052^{***}	0.002	0.001	0.149^{***}
	(0.022)	(0.159)	(0.543)	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.004)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.573)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.029)
High Coverage	0.060***	0.102**	0.296**	0.089***	0.116***	0.004	0.024	0.014	0.755***	0.003^{*}	0.000	-0.017
	(0.009)	(0.046)	(0.127)	(0.011)	(0.037)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.192)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.026	-0.067	-0.158	0.038	-0.193^{***}	-0.002	0.007	-0.032	0.345	-0.007***	-0.005	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.073)	(0.129)	(0.037)	(0.070)	(0.004)	(0.140)	(0.038)	(0.416)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.031)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.263	-0.189	-0.041	0.123	-0.021***	0.931	-0.011	-1.160	-0.006	0.002	0.187^{*}
		(0.207)	(0.190)	(0.041)	(0.121)	(0.008)	(1.161)	(0.122)	(1.537)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.107)
Observations	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041	41,041
Mean DepVar	-0.24	0.40	0.44	0.34	0.27	0.03	0.81	0.12	2.86	0.01	0.01	0.38
Adjusted R2	0.12	0.06	0.10	0.18	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.16
Week of Year FE	√	\checkmark	√	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	√	\checkmark	√	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	✓	√	√	√	√	\checkmark	~	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	~	√

(b) Medium performance

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	tions	Amen	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2) Long	(3) Short	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{*}	-0.392	0.173	0.229^{***}	0.048	-0.013^{**}	-0.119	-0.018	-2.234^{***}	-0.005	0.005	0.216^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.311)	(0.525)	(0.023)	(0.197)	(0.006)	(0.151)	(0.168)	(0.636)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.036)
High Coverage	0.132***	0.353***	0.673***	0.127***	0.116^{*}	0.009***	0.154	0.158^{**}	0.766***	0.013***	0.005^{*}	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.090)	(0.234)	(0.012)	(0.060)	(0.003)	(0.124)	(0.065)	(0.209)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.014)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.009	-0.025	-0.467	0.170^{***}	-0.021	0.019^{**}	0.371	-0.124	-0.013	0.004	-0.009	0.005
	(0.036)	(0.275)	(0.354)	(0.051)	(0.157)	(0.008)	(0.394)	(0.105)	(0.680)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.039)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.109	0.297	-0.268***	-0.443*	-0.005	-0.896	-0.022	-2.281**	-0.024*	-0.028*	0.068
		(0.494)	(0.392)	(0.062)	(0.266)	(0.029)	(0.678)	(0.219)	(1.110)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.123)
Observations	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437	44,437
Mean DepVar	-0.04	1.02	1.12	0.54	0.60	0.04	0.93	0.33	3.57	0.02	0.02	0.49
Adjusted R2	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.17	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.19
Week of Year FE	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	✓	√	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

(c) High performance

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	nittees	Ques	tions	Amen	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	-0.041	-1.393^{**}	-2.734^{*}	0.203***	0.227	-0.005	0.085	-0.167	-3.177^{***}	-0.007	-0.007	0.163^{***}
	(0.054)	(0.582)	(1.418)	(0.028)	(0.317)	(0.005)	(0.101)	(0.226)	(0.792)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.031)
High Coverage	0.225^{***}	1.261^{***}	1.876^{***}	0.154^{***}	0.738^{***}	0.010^{***}	0.087	0.227^{**}	1.150^{***}	0.014^{***}	0.006^{**}	0.013
	(0.026)	(0.253)	(0.558)	(0.013)	(0.162)	(0.004)	(0.072)	(0.093)	(0.273)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.014)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.016	-0.789	0.092	0.186^{***}	-0.334	0.002	-0.352^{**}	-0.297^{**}	-0.406	0.001	-0.009^{*}	0.095^{***}
	(0.039)	(0.494)	(0.840)	(0.047)	(0.244)	(0.007)	(0.145)	(0.129)	(0.632)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.036)
Mention MP Indicator		0.402	-1.100	-0.140**	-0.375	0.014	0.381**	0.491	-0.818	0.002	0.037	0.064
		(0.741)	(2.102)	(0.057)	(0.413)	(0.018)	(0.171)	(0.509)	(0.926)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.094)
Observations	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373	42,373
Mean DepVar	0.29	2.99	5.38	0.78	1.71	0.05	1.04	0.70	4.98	0.03	0.02	0.46
Adjusted R2	0.16	0.12	0.21	0.20	0.09	0.04	0.16	0.03	0.10	0.06	0.03	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP}\times\mathrm{Legi}\mathrm{FE}$	√	√	√	√	√	~	✓	~	√	√	~	✓

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from June 2007 until June 2012 on the indicator displayed in the column. MPs are split according to their level of performance on the weekly activity indicator computed over the 12 months preceding the website's launch. Panel (a): MPs whose pre-ND.fr average performance was in the last third, Panel (b): in the second third, Panel (c): in the top third (best-performing MPs). *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of oral (written) questions as standardized by the MP during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the w

Table C.5: Heterogeneity: Gender

(a) Interventions and written questions

	Agg.	Indic.	Long Int	. (Plen.)	Short Int	. (Plen.)	Attend.	(Comm.)	Int. (C	Comm.)	Oral Qu	estions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Μ	F	Μ	F	Μ	F	Μ	F	Μ	F	Μ	F
General effect												
Post Website	0.068^{***}	0.033	-0.159	-0.271	-0.426	-0.130	0.301^{***}	0.330^{***}	0.270^{***}	-0.145	0.002	0.006^{*}
	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.136)	(0.252)	(0.418)	(0.879)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.081)	(0.123)	(0.002)	(0.003)
High Coverage	0.091^{***}	0.066^{***}	0.499^{***}	0.286^{***}	0.858^{***}	0.393	0.087^{***}	0.079^{***}	0.230^{***}	0.237^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.172)	(0.245)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.000	-0.010	-0.140	-0.005	-0.282	0.287	0.034^{**}	-0.024	-0.240^{**}	-0.085	0.002	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.172)	(0.160)	(0.536)	(0.318)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.098)	(0.121)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Mention MP Indicator			-0.338	-0.132	0.315	-0.798	-0.031	0.049	-0.477	0.107	-0.005	-0.006
			(0.298)	(0.271)	(0.915)	(0.689)	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.340)	(0.319)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Observations	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323
Mean DepVar	0.01	-0.04	1.78	1.58	2.81	2.56	0.69	0.80	1.23	1.33	0.05	0.05
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.19	0.11	0.13	0.22	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.08	0.06	0.03	0.03
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
MP \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

(b) Amendments, proposals and reports

	Wr. Qu	iestions	Wr. A	mend.	Signed	Amend.	Wr. R	eports	Wr.	Prop.	Signed	Prop.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9) M	(10)	(11)	(12)
Carranal affect	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	r	M	r	M	F
General ellect	0.405***	0.450***	0.000***	1 4 7 7 8 8 8	1.100***	0.010***	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000**	0.050***	0.150***
Post Website	0.427	0.456	-0.966	-1.4//	-4.166	-0.648	-0.000	-0.003	0.001	0.006	-0.073	-0.159
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.160)	(0.277)	(0.298)	(0.658)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.024)
High Coverage	-0.001	0.016	0.236^{***}	0.099	1.696^{***}	1.994^{***}	0.004^{***}	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.012^{**}	0.003
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.074)	(0.116)	(0.141)	(0.246)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.002	0.038	-0.334^{**}	-0.644^{***}	-0.341	-2.441^{**}	-0.001	0.002	0.000	-0.004^{*}	0.034^{**}	0.005
	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.159)	(0.182)	(0.476)	(1.026)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Mention MP Indicator	0.677**	-0.153	0.006	0.478	-1.387	-0.127	0.000	0.011	-0.006	0.001	0.133***	0.076
	(0.333)	(0.154)	(0.476)	(0.479)	(1.050)	(1.468)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Observations	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323	241,294	85,323
Mean DepVar	0.80	0.56	1.19	1.32	10.95	13.47	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.49	0.42
Adjusted R2	0.08	0.14	0.04	0.03	0.27	0.27	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.19	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
${\rm MP}$ \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	\checkmark

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances on the indicator displayed in the column of each male MP in odd-numbered columns, and female MP in even-numbered columns, from 2007 until 2020. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short* (*long*) *interventions*: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of oral (written) questions: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of law proposals: number of law proposals: number of law proposals: number of law proposals: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

Table (C.6:	Heterogeneity:	distance	to	Paris
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	Agg.	Indic.	Long Int	. (Plen.)	Short Int	t. (Plen.)	Attend.	(Comm.)	Int. (C	omm.)	Oral Qı	iestions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far
General effect												
Post Website	0.062^{***}	0.075^{***}	-0.100	-0.160	0.088	-0.490	0.290^{***}	0.334^{***}	0.282^{***}	0.174	0.002	0.005^{*}
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.192)	(0.166)	(0.542)	(0.462)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.104)	(0.130)	(0.002)	(0.003)
High Coverage	0.100^{***}	0.084^{***}	0.551^{***}	0.396^{***}	0.848^{***}	0.748^{***}	0.088^{***}	0.091^{***}	0.357^{***}	0.151^{**}	0.003^{**}	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.171)	(0.256)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.007	0.010	-0.306**	0.108	-0.387^{**}	-0.409	0.030	0.001	-0.399***	-0.035	0.003	0.004
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.149)	(0.330)	(0.183)	(1.205)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.102)	(0.154)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Mention MP Indicator			-0.109	-0.045	-0.774	2.925	-0.022	0.026	0.005	-0.373	-0.005	-0.003
			(0.367)	(0.554)	(0.574)	(2.654)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.334)	(0.261)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Observations	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906
Mean DepVar	0.02	0.03	1.94	1.71	3.16	2.76	0.73	0.77	1.38	1.27	0.05	0.05
Adjusted R2	0.19	0.22	0.11	0.13	0.23	0.26	0.24	0.23	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.03
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark								
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark								
$\mathrm{MP}\times\mathrm{Legi}\mathrm{FE}$	\checkmark	√	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark						

(a) Interventions and written questions

(b) Amendments, proposals and reports

	Wr. Qu	iestions	Wr. A	mend.	Signed	Amend.	Wr. R	eports	Wr. 1	Prop.	Signed	l Prop.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far	Close	Far
General effect												
Post Website	0.378^{***}	0.402^{***}	-1.220^{***}	-0.834^{***}	-4.228^{***}	-4.857^{***}	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.004	-0.103***	-0.083***
	(0.076)	(0.092)	(0.229)	(0.195)	(0.399)	(0.450)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.024)
High Coverage	0.013	0.001	0.216^{**}	0.108	1.962^{***}	1.741^{***}	0.004^{***}	0.003^{*}	0.000	0.002	0.011^{**}	0.016^{**}
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.174)	(0.215)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.017	-0.033	-0.329^{*}	-0.335	-0.909	-0.245	-0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.005	0.045^{**}	0.012
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.175)	(0.291)	(0.618)	(0.686)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Mention MP Indicator	0.949^{**}	0.011	0.157	0.192	-1.070	-2.658^{*}	-0.007	0.012	0.002	-0.000	0.155^{***}	0.065
	(0.478)	(0.122)	(0.635)	(0.550)	(1.318)	(1.363)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Observations	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906	155,208	107,906
Mean DepVar	0.71	0.76	1.28	1.25	11.65	11.14	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.45	0.51
Adjusted R2	0.08	0.14	0.03	0.05	0.27	0.28	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.19	0.20
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP} \times \mathrm{Legi} \; \mathrm{FE}$	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	√	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	√	√	\checkmark

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances on the indicator displayed in the column of each MP whose district's main city is close to Paris in odd-numbered columns (less than 2 hours), and farther away (more than 2 hours) in even-numbered columns from 2007 until 2020. PostWebsite: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes. fr in September 2009. HighCoverage: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). MentionMP: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. MentionMPIndicator: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: Agg. Indic.: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Short (long) interventions: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. Committee attendance: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. Written amendments: number of antendments authored by the MP during the week. Signed amendments: number of antendments authored by the MP during the week. Signed proposals: number of an week. Written proposals: number of antendments oversigned by the MP during the week. Signed proposals: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. Signed proposals: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

Table C.7: Heterogeneity: majority and opposition

	Agg.	Indic.	Long Int	. (Plen.)	Short Int	. (Plen.)	Attend.	(Comm.)	Int. (C	Comm.)	Oral Qu	iestions
	(1) Opp	(2) Maj	(3) Opp	(4) Maj	(5) Opp	(6) Maj	(7) Opp	(8) Maj	(9) Opp	(10) Maj	(11) Opp	(12) Maj
General effect												
Post Website	0.071^{***}	0.044^{**}	-0.267	-0.192	-0.634	-0.194	0.331^{***}	0.294^{***}	0.229^{**}	0.110	0.009^{***}	-0.002
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.179)	(0.157)	(0.472)	(0.554)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.093)	(0.101)	(0.002)	(0.002)
High Coverage	0.099^{***}	0.072^{***}	0.596^{***}	0.305^{***}	0.943^{***}	0.542^{***}	0.078^{***}	0.091^{***}	0.169^{***}	0.283^{***}	0.003^{*}	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.008	0.003	-0.116	-0.098	-0.509	0.168	-0.017	0.057^{***}	-0.111	-0.293^{***}	-0.002	0.009^{***}
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.248)	(0.136)	(0.809)	(0.336)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.129)	(0.097)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Mention MP Indicator			-0.307	-0.276	0.335	-0.184	0.017	-0.040	-0.171	-0.417	0.002	-0.012**
			(0.390)	(0.281)	(0.931)	(1.184)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.339)	(0.384)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Observations	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653	144,964	$181,\!653$	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653
Mean DepVar	0.10	-0.08	2.15	1.38	3.05	2.50	0.66	0.77	1.25	1.26	0.06	0.04
Adjusted R2	0.22	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.21	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.11	0.05	0.04	0.02
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark									
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark									
MP \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark									

(a) Interventions and written questions

(b) Amendments, proposals and reports

	Wr. Qu	iestions	Wr. A	mend.	Signed	Amend.	Wr. R	leports	Wr.	Prop.	Signed	l Prop.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Opp	Maj	Opp	Maj	Opp	Maj	Opp	Maj	Opp	Maj	Opp	Maj
General effect												
Post Website	0.709^{***}	0.196^{***}	-1.834^{***}	-0.458^{***}	-6.790***	-3.045^{***}	0.001	-0.003	0.007^{**}	-0.002	-0.117^{***}	-0.093***
	(0.112)	(0.057)	(0.281)	(0.084)	(0.555)	(0.190)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.016)
High Coverage	0.003	0.003	0.204	0.138^{***}	2.290^{***}	1.208^{***}	0.002^{**}	0.004^{***}	0.000	0.001	0.030^{***}	-0.007
	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.134)	(0.040)	(0.240)	(0.104)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.004	-0.000	-0.576^{**}	-0.167	-1.154	-0.324	0.001	-0.002	0.002	-0.004^{**}	0.050^{**}	-0.002
	(0.057)	(0.083)	(0.247)	(0.106)	(0.813)	(0.295)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator	0.911^{*}	0.066	-0.192	0.375	-1.963	-0.491	-0.001	0.007	-0.012	0.003	0.131**	0.104^{***}
	(0.471)	(0.202)	(0.563)	(0.475)	(1.491)	(0.776)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.055)	(0.036)
Observations	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653	144,964	181,653
Mean DepVar	0.89	0.61	1.86	0.72	18.90	5.79	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.54	0.42
Adjusted R2	0.07	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.26	0.24	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.24	0.16
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP}\times\mathrm{Legi}\;\mathrm{FE}$	~	√	~	√	\checkmark	~	✓	√	~	~	√	√

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances on the indicator displayed in the column of each MP from the opposition group in the Parliament in odd-numbered columns, or from the majority group in even-numbered columns from 2007 until 2020. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of scoresponds by the MP during the week. *Oral (written) questions*: number of oral (written) questions asked by the MP to the government during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

Table C.8: Heterogeneity: left and right

(a) Interventions and written questions

	Agg.	Indic.	Long Int	. (Plen.)	Short In	t. (Plen.)	Attend.	(Comm.)	Int. (C	'omm.)	Oral Q	uestions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
General effect												
Post Website	0.003	0.140^{***}	-0.506^{***}	0.312^{**}	-0.464	-0.148	0.314^{***}	0.244^{***}	0.091	0.320^{***}	0.008^{***}	-0.004^{**}
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.191)	(0.156)	(0.577)	(0.440)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.002)	(0.002)
High Coverage	0.059^{***}	0.115^{***}	0.314^{***}	0.434^{***}	0.357	0.797^{***}	0.110***	0.099***	0.260***	0.246^{***}	0.002	0.003**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.263)	(0.173)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.014	0.057^{**}	-0.160	0.357	-0.086	0.913^{**}	0.002	0.058^{***}	-0.237^{**}	-0.133	0.001	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.157)	(0.228)	(0.352)	(0.413)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.109)	(0.145)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Mention MP Indicator			-0.318	-0.359	-0.339	-1.093^{*}	0.027	-0.070**	0.009	0.098	0.015	-0.015^{**}
			(0.250)	(0.382)	(0.782)	(0.603)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.269)	(0.260)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Observations	117,678	125,042	117,678	125,042	117,678	125,042	117,678	125,042	117,678	125,042	117,678	125,042
Mean DepVar	-0.06	0.06	1.58	1.48	2.45	2.47	0.67	0.61	1.06	0.99	0.05	0.05
Adjusted R2	0.16	0.21	0.09	0.13	0.20	0.24	0.25	0.22	0.05	0.09	0.03	0.03
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	√	√	√	√	√	✓	√	√	√	√	√	√

(b) Amendments, proposals and reports

	Wr. Qu	iestions	Wr. A	mend.	Signed	Amend.	Wr. F	eports	Wr. 1	Prop.	Signed	Prop.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
General effect												
Post Website	0.389^{***}	0.627^{***}	-0.603***	0.166^{**}	-3.385^{***}	-1.852^{***}	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.008^{**}	-0.265^{***}	0.110^{***}
	(0.079)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.082)	(0.396)	(0.268)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.024)
High Coverage	0.015	0.056	0.137^{**}	0.366^{***}	0.603^{***}	1.722^{***}	0.003^{**}	0.005^{***}	-0.000	0.002	-0.042^{***}	0.067^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.137)	(0.144)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.078	-0.074	-0.128	0.160	0.283	0.269	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.003	0.018	0.089^{***}
	(0.052)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.158)	(0.461)	(0.383)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.029)
Mention MP Indicator	0.159	1.253^{**}	-0.018	0.595	-1.927^{**}	0.602	0.014	-0.003	-0.007	-0.006	0.014	0.178^{**}
	(0.376)	(0.589)	(0.307)	(0.554)	(0.747)	(1.067)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.072)
Observations	117,678	125,042	117,678	125,042	$117,\!678$	125,042	117,678	125,042	$117,\!678$	125,042	117,678	125,042
Mean DepVar	0.65	1.04	0.78	0.78	6.88	7.46	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.25	0.67
Adjusted R2	0.13	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.11	0.27	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.11	0.18
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
${\rm MP}$ \times Legi FE	✓	√	√	~	~	√	√	~	~	√	√	√

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances on the indicator displayed in the column of each MP belonging to a left-wing party in odd-numbered columns, and to a right-wing party in even-numbered columns from 2007 until 2020. PostWebsite: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. HighCoverage: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). MentionMP: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: Agg. Indic.: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Short (long) interventions: number of committee sessions attended by the MP during the week. Committee interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. Oral (written) questions: number of committee sessions by the MP during the week. Written amendments: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. Signed amendments: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. Written proposals: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. Written proposals: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

		DI	d	C		0		A	1	Director	D	1.
		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	stions	Amen	dments	Reports	Prop	posals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	-0.209^{*}	-0.396	0.310^{***}	0.169^{**}	0.003^{*}	0.427^{***}	-1.107^{***}	-4.781^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.140)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.084^{***}	0.437^{***}	0.732^{***}	0.085^{***}	0.230^{***}	0.002^{**}	0.003	0.189^{***}	1.760^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.001	0.009^{**}
	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.141)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.049*	-0.334	-0.195	-0.006	-0.493**	0.005	-0.163	-0.713^{***}	-1.726^{**}	-0.002	0.000	0.006
	(0.027)	(0.275)	(0.752)	(0.018)	(0.213)	(0.003)	(0.104)	(0.257)	(0.771)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.021)
Mention MP \times local outlet	0.022	0.019	-0.120	0.035^{**}	-0.031	0.003	0.116	-0.203	-0.202	0.001	-0.002	0.039**
	(0.014)	(0.130)	(0.405)	(0.015)	(0.103)	(0.003)	(0.086)	(0.148)	(0.454)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.016)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.305	0.050	-0.013	-0.372	-0.005	0.384	0.045	-1.417^{*}	0.003	-0.004	0.113^{***}
		(0.240)	(0.731)	(0.019)	(0.281)	(0.005)	(0.245)	(0.373)	(0.861)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.036)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
${\rm MP}$ \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.9: Local and national press coverage

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of : $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} \times \text{Local outlet}_{it} + \beta_5 \cdot \text{MentionMPI}_{it} + WeekOfYear_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *Local outlet*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in a local outlet circulation in her district. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, so the area of 2 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions: number of interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions: number of amendments: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

Table C.10: Margin of victory

(a`) Interventions.	attendance	and o	mestions
N		, interventerono,	automatico	and o	Jucobulond

	Agg.	Indic.	Long Int	. (Plen.)	Short Int	. (Plen.)	Attend.	(Comm.)	Int. (C	'omm.)	Oral Q	uestions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Nrrw	Lrg	Nrrw	Lrg								
General effect												
Post Website	0.094^{***}	0.058^{***}	-0.013	0.024	-0.060	0.402	0.300^{***}	0.278^{***}	0.165	0.191	0.004	0.000
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.148)	(0.221)	(0.208)	(0.720)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.105)	(0.125)	(0.002)	(0.002)
High Coverage	0.094^{***}	0.097^{***}	0.414^{***}	0.468^{***}	0.752^{***}	0.642^{**}	0.114^{***}	0.108^{***}	0.253^{***}	0.371^{***}	0.001	0.003^{*}
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.201)	(0.285)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	0.026	-0.004	0.190	0.071	0.605	0.165	0.017	0.008	-0.106	-0.261^{*}	0.005	0.001
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.210)	(0.247)	(0.389)	(0.411)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.135)	(0.145)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mention MP Indicator			-0.241	-1.000**	0.027	-2.024^{**}	-0.029	0.020	0.060	-0.152	0.000	-0.008
			(0.374)	(0.459)	(0.684)	(0.783)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.250)	(0.435)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Observations	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765
Mean DepVar	0.01	0.02	1.48	1.82	2.02	3.20	0.68	0.65	0.99	1.19	0.05	0.05
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.19	0.11	0.11	0.25	0.20	0.23	0.24	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.04
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark									
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark									
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	√	√	\checkmark	√	√	√	\checkmark

(b) Amendments, proposals and reports

	Wr. Qu	iestions	Wr. A	Amend.	Signed	Amend.	Wr. F	leports	Wr. 1	Prop.	Signe	d Prop.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Nrrw	Lrg	Nrrw	Lrg	Nrrw	Lrg	Nrrw	Lrg	Nrrw	Lrg	Nrrw	Lrg
General effect												
Post Website	0.620^{***}	0.403^{***}	-0.209**	-0.418^{***}	-3.511^{***}	-2.112^{***}	-0.001	-0.001	0.008^{***}	0.000	-0.026	-0.140^{***}
	(0.130)	(0.082)	(0.106)	(0.121)	(0.373)	(0.343)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.021)
High Coverage	-0.016	0.053	0.329^{***}	0.266^{***}	1.656^{***}	1.161^{***}	0.003^{**}	0.005^{***}	0.000	0.001	0.013^{*}	0.002
	(0.067)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.172)	(0.157)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.064	0.057	0.056	-0.042	0.320	0.045	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004	0.000	0.070^{***}	0.036
	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.145)	(0.207)	(0.493)	(0.465)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Mention MP Indicator	0.906^{*}	0.581	0.465	0.195	-1.371*	-0.955	0.001	0.018^{*}	-0.004	-0.010	0.108^{*}	0.155^{**}
	(0.488)	(0.511)	(0.407)	(0.537)	(0.753)	(1.302)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.058)	(0.063)
Observations	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765	102,807	101,765
Mean DepVar	0.88	0.86	0.86	0.93	8.64	7.42	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.47	0.43
Adjusted R2	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.05	0.17	0.17	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.18	0.17
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$\mathrm{MP} \times \mathrm{Legi} \; \mathrm{FE}$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. In odd-numbered columns, we focus on MPs with a win margin in the second round below the median score. In even-numbered columns, we focus on MPs with a win margin above the median. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Oral (written) questions*: number of anitements authored by the MP during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Que	stions	Amen	dments	Reports	Pro	oosals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	$\frac{1000100}{(10)}$	(11)	(12)
	Agg. Indic.	Long interventions	Short interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	-0.211^{*}	-0.396	0.310^{***}	0.167^{**}	0.003^{*}	0.425^{***}	-1.109***	-4.788^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095***
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.140)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.085***	0.438^{***}	0.732***	0.085***	0.232***	0.002**	0.004	0.191***	1.765***	0.003***	0.001	0.009**
5 5	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.140)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect	× /	· · · ·	· · · ·	· /		` ´	. ,	· /	. ,	· · · ·	` '	
Mention MP	-0.013	-0.143	-0.164	-0.007	-0.255^{**}	0.004	0.024	-0.416^{**}	-0.804	-0.003	-0.000	0.022
	(0.017)	(0.179)	(0.565)	(0.014)	(0.113)	(0.002)	(0.056)	(0.180)	(0.587)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.015)
Mention MP \times Election Year	0.039	0.117	0.056	0.105***	0.186	-0.001	-0.066	0.071	0.095	0.009^{*}	-0.003	0.019
	(0.027)	(0.202)	(0.593)	(0.021)	(0.162)	(0.005)	(0.121)	(0.206)	(0.641)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Mention MP Indicator	. ,	-0.281	0.059	-0.012	-0.306	-0.005	0.445^{*}	0.112	-1.238	0.003	-0.004	0.117***
		(0.240)	(0.742)	(0.018)	(0.258)	(0.005)	(0.247)	(0.364)	(0.870)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.11: Mentions before an election

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of : $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} \times \text{ElectionYear}_{it} + \beta_5 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *ElectionYear*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: Agg. Indic.: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee attendance*: number of committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the Week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of written reports authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

		Plenary	Sessions	Com	mittees	Ques	tions	Amen	dments	Reports	Prop	osals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	ат. 1	Long	Short	A., 1	T.,		XX7 •	XX7 •	C: 1	TT 7 •	TT 7 •	C: 1
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.031^{**}	-0.315***	-0.591	0.284^{***}	0.157^{**}	-0.001	0.423^{***}	-0.788***	-5.142^{***}	-0.002	0.002	-0.100***
	(0.013)	(0.116)	(0.365)	(0.010)	(0.068)	(0.002)	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.248)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.014)
High Coverage	0.088^{***}	0.664^{***}	1.035^{***}	0.131^{***}	0.217^{***}	0.009^{***}	-0.090	-0.921^{***}	-2.130^{***}	-0.003**	-0.006***	-0.076***
	(0.011)	(0.107)	(0.325)	(0.008)	(0.071)	(0.002)	(0.058)	(0.218)	(0.394)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.011)
High Coverage \times 2nd Year	0.042^{***}	-0.065	0.135	-0.042^{***}	0.035	-0.003*	0.103^{**}	0.631^{***}	8.460^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.010^{***}	0.144^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.123)	(0.397)	(0.010)	(0.097)	(0.002)	(0.047)	(0.103)	(0.439)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage \times 3rd Year	-0.088***	-0.508***	-0.770*	-0.189***	-0.195**	-0.024***	0.111	2.030***	2.937***	0.005**	0.008***	0.190***
	(0.016)	(0.154)	(0.408)	(0.011)	(0.095)	(0.002)	(0.072)	(0.381)	(0.588)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.015)
High Coverage \times 4th Year	-0.032**	-0.294**	-0.491	0.012	0.262**	0.002	-0.004	0.988***	3.771***	-0.000	0.002	-0.113***
	(0.015)	(0.137)	(0.367)	(0.013)	(0.121)	(0.003)	(0.072)	(0.238)	(0.435)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.014)
High Coverage \times 5th Year	0.095^{***}	-0.143	-0.205	0.058^{***}	0.098	0.002	0.237^{***}	1.481***	4.603^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.012^{***}	0.135^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.130)	(0.417)	(0.012)	(0.100)	(0.002)	(0.089)	(0.251)	(0.442)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.016)
Individual effect												
Mention MP	-0.003	-0.104	-0.142	0.024^{*}	-0.188**	0.004^{*}	-0.004	-0.431^{***}	-0.705	-0.001	-0.001	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.138)	(0.422)	(0.012)	(0.081)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.134)	(0.429)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.279	0.078	-0.009	-0.311	-0.004	0.447^{*}	0.010	-1.301	0.003	-0.005	0.111^{***}
		(0.239)	(0.728)	(0.018)	(0.262)	(0.005)	(0.249)	(0.369)	(0.850)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.25	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
${\rm MP}$ \times Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.12: Heterogeneity in general coverage by year of legislature

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of : $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t \times \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes.fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *LegislatureYear*: variable ranging from 1 to 5 to indicate the corresponding year of the legislature. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg. Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions: in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written amendments*: number of amendments week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. *Signed proposals*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week.

	Plenary Sessions		Committees		Questions		Amendments		Reports	Prop	oosals
	(1) Long	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect											
Post Website	-0.213^{*}	-0.404	0.310^{***}	0.167^{**}	0.003^{*}	0.424^{***}	-1.109^{***}	-4.787^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095^{***}
	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.140)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.439^{***}	0.735^{***}	0.085^{***}	0.232^{***}	0.002^{**}	0.005	0.191^{***}	1.765^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.001	0.009^{**}
	(0.047)	(0.141)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect											
Mention MP	-0.105	-0.144	0.020	-0.203**	0.003	0.006	-0.394^{***}	-0.771^{*}	-0.000	-0.001	0.027^{**}
	(0.137)	(0.419)	(0.013)	(0.081)	(0.002)	(0.050)	(0.132)	(0.437)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)
Mention MP Indicator	-0.821***	-1.851^{**}	0.010	-0.099	0.002	0.031	-0.120	-2.764^{**}	0.005	0.008	0.168^{***}
	(0.282)	(0.886)	(0.026)	(0.252)	(0.009)	(0.088)	(0.359)	(1.115)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.048)
Mention MP Indicator \times Positive	0.784	3.653^{**}	-0.057	-0.674	-0.015	0.706^{*}	-0.058	2.260	0.001	-0.020^{*}	-0.010
	(0.525)	(1.611)	(0.035)	(0.642)	(0.012)	(0.414)	(0.692)	(1.613)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.067)
Mention MP Indicator \times Negative	0.629^{**}	1.143	-0.007	0.221	-0.002	0.093	0.989	2.026	-0.016^{**}	-0.014^{*}	-0.202^{***}
	(0.270)	(0.860)	(0.032)	(0.259)	(0.010)	(0.096)	(0.872)	(2.131)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.074)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	$326,\!617$
Mean DepVar	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.13: Tone of coverage

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of Model 1: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1 \cdot \text{PostWebsite}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{HighCoverage}_t + \beta_3 \cdot \text{MentionMP}_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s + \beta_5 \cdot \text{MentionMPIndicator}_{it}^s \times \text{Negative}_{it}^s + WeekOfYear_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + MP \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes. In September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *MentionMPIndicator*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the mention is positive. *Negative*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the mention is negative. Dependent variables: *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions: number of short (long) interventions: number of short (long) interventions: number of interventions in plenarts: number of amendments authored by the MP during the week. *Oral (written) questions*: number of amendments co-signed by the MP during the week. *Written reports*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week. *Written proposals*: number of law proposals authored by the MP during the week.

		Plenary Sessions		Committees		0116	Questions		Amendments		Proposals	
						- Que						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
		Long	Short		_							
	Agg. Indic.	interventions	interventions	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written	Signed	Written	Written	Signed
General effect												
Post Website	0.058^{***}	-0.211^{*}	-0.396	0.310^{***}	0.167^{**}	0.003^{*}	0.425^{***}	-1.109^{***}	-4.788^{***}	-0.001	0.002	-0.095***
	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.369)	(0.010)	(0.070)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.140)	(0.275)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.013)
High Coverage	0.085^{***}	0.438^{***}	0.733^{***}	0.085^{***}	0.232^{***}	0.002**	0.004	0.190^{***}	1.766^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.001	0.009**
	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.140)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.063)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Individual effect	. ,	. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,		. ,				. ,
Mention MP	-0.002	-0.096	-0.072	0.022^{*}	-0.225**	0.003	0.017	-0.440***	-0.690	0.000	-0.001	0.030**
	(0.015)	(0.147)	(0.465)	(0.013)	(0.088)	(0.002)	(0.054)	(0.142)	(0.458)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.014)
Mention MP \times Comment	-0.009	-0.188	-0.730	0.007	-0.021	0.003	-0.093	-0.003	-1.476^{*}	-0.003	0.002	-0.002
	(0.022)	(0.201)	(0.615)	(0.025)	(0.154)	(0.005)	(0.074)	(0.224)	(0.753)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.025)
Mention MP Indicator		-0.296	0.039	-0.011	-0.316	-0.005	0.447^{*}	0.100	-1.256	0.003	-0.004	0.118***
		(0.238)	(0.724)	(0.019)	(0.262)	(0.005)	(0.249)	(0.369)	(0.853)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)
Observations	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617	326,617
Mean DepVar	0.00	1.73	2.74	0.72	1.26	0.05	0.73	1.23	11.61	0.02	0.02	0.47
Adjusted R2	0.20	0.11	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.27	0.06	0.04	0.19
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.14: Comments on articles

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of: $y_{it}^s = \beta_1$. PostWebsite_t + β_2 . HighCoverage_t + β_3 . MentionMP_{it} + β_4 . MentionMP_{it} × Comment_{it} + β_5 . MentionMPIndicator^s_{it} + WeekOfYear_t + Legislature Year_t + MP × Legislature_{it} + ϵ_{it} . Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are the weekly performances of each MP from 2007 until 2020 on the indicator displayed in the column. *PostWebsite*: dummy variable equal to 1 after the creation of the website Nosdeputes. fr in September 2009. *HighCoverage*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of articles in the previous 12 weeks is higher than the median (p50 = 11). *MentionMP*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *Comment*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *Comment*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks. *Comment*: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP is mentioned on the corresponding indicator in one or more articles in the previous 12 weeks, indicators are grouped as shown in Table A.2. Dependent variables: *Agg*. *Indic.*: Aggregate weekly performance of MPs, as defined in Equation 2, giving equal weight to all indicators and standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. *Short (long) interventions*: number of short (long) interventions in plenary sessions made by the MP during the week. *Committee interventions*: number of interventions in committee sessions by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of oral (written) questions: number of oral (written) questions authored by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of authored by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of law proposals co-signed by the MP during the week. *Signed amendments*: number of

		Plenary Sessions	Committees		Questions		Amendments	Reports	Proposals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Any citation	Any intervention	Attendance	Interventions	Oral	Written	Written or signed	Written or signed	Written or signed
Top 50	0.0021	0.0003	0.0010	-0.0005	-0.0006	-0.0004	0.0001	-0.0001	0.0004
	(0.0021)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0011)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)
Top 150	0.0002	-0.0008	-0.0006	-0.0007	0.0005	-0.0009	0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0006
	(0.0013)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)
Bottom 50	0.0068**	0.0002	0.0061***	0.0015	0.0011	0.0024^{*}	0.0017	0.0005	0.0025^{*}
	(0.0026)	(0.0014)	(0.0018)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)
Bottom 150	0.0011	0.0001	0.0009	-0.0002	0.0000	-0.0003	0.0000	-0.0002	0.0003
	(0.0013)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)
Observations	263,466	263,466	263,466	263,466	263,466	263,466	263,466	263,466	263,466
Mean DepVar	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.002
Adjusted R2	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
Week of Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
Year of Legi FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark
$MP \times Legi FE$	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

Table C.15: Probability of being mentioned in the press

Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimation of: Mentions $f_{it} = \beta_1 \cdot \text{Top } 50_{it} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Top } 150_{it} + \beta_3 \cdot \text{Bottom } 50_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{Bottom } 150_{it} + \text{WeekOfYear}_t + \text{LegislatureYear}_t + \text{MP} \times \text{Legislature}_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the MP × legislature level. Observations are weekly coverage of MPs' performance on the indicator shown in the column from September 2009 until 2020. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the MP's performance was mentioned in the press during the week, and zero otherwise. Top 50 (resp. 150): dummy variable equal to one if an MP's cumulative performance ranks in the top 50 (resp. 150) over the past 12 months. Bottom 50 (resp. 150): dummy variable equal to one if an MP's cumulative performance ranks in the top 50 (resp. 150) over the past 12 months. Bottom 50 (resp. 150): dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP was mentioned for an intervention in plenary sessions during the week. Committee attendance: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP was mentioned for an intervention in committee interventions in during the week. Oral (written) questions: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP was mentioned for an oral (written) question during the week. Aments: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP was mentioned for a proposal during the week. Reports: dummy variable equal to 1 if the MP was mentioned for a proposal during the week.

Table C.16: Descriptive statistics - Indicators manipulation

	Mean	SD	Max	Ν
Written questions	0.74	4.46	967	321,423
Copy-paste (strict)	0.14	1.26	318	$321,\!423$
Copy-paste (extended)	0.21	2.73	540	$321,\!423$
New written questions	0.54	2.69	529	$321,\!423$
Length	221.47	123.78	22,023	79,992

Panel A: Written questions

Panel B: Oral interventions

	Mean	SD	Max	Ν
Plenary sessions				
Share ≤ 10	0.43	0.39	1	$77,\!887$
Share 11-20 words	0.06	0.13	1	$77,\!887$
Share 21-30 words	0.03	0.07	1	$77,\!887$
Share > 30 words	0.49	0.39	1	$77,\!887$
Committees				
Share ≤ 10	0.13	0.28	1	81,522
Share 11-20 words	0.05	0.13	1	81,522
Share 21-30 words	0.04	0.14	1	81,522
Share > 30 words	0.78	0.33	1	81,522

Notes: Observations are at the MP-week level. The minimum value for all variables is 0. Panel A: Written questions: total number of written questions. Copy-paste (strict): number of questions identified as identical to a question asked during a previous week. Copy-paste (extended): number of questions identified as identical to a question asked during a previous week or during the same week. New written questions: number of original questions. Length: average number of words for the questions asked by the MP during the week, provided the MP asked at least one question. See subsection C.2 for details on how we identify copy-pasting and new questions. Panel B: Rows 1 to 3 report data on interventions in plenary sessions, and rows 4 to 6 on interventions in committee, including only MPs who made at least one intervention in both cases. Share ≤ 10 : share of interventions with a word count between 11 and 20. Share 21-30 words: share of interventions with a word count between 21 and 30. Share > 30 words: share of interventions with a word count greater than 30.


(b) Percentage of mentions

Figure C.1: Press coverage by quintile of activity

Notes: We plot the monthly number of indicator mentions in the press for each quantile of the distribution of weeks of activity (as computed by Nosdeputes.fr) over the past 12 months. For example, the 20% of MPs with the lowest number of weeks of activity receive an average of 5 mentions per month. Furthermore, over 70% of these mentions have a negative tone.



(b) Committees

Figure C.2: Distribution of number of words in interventions before/after the website

Notes: We plot density estimates of the number of words in interventions during plenary sessions and committees using the Epanechnikov kernel function. The distributions are displayed separately for periods before and after the website's launch in September 2009. To ensure that observed differences are not driven by changes in the composition of the National Assembly, we focus on the 2007-2012 legislature. We do not display the top 5% of the distribution.

Question écrite n°8199 : Statut d'infirmier de pratique avancée

15ème Législature

Publication de la question au Journal Officiel du 8 mai 2018, page 3849 Publication de la réponse au Journal Officiel du 22 mai 2018, page 4320

Question de : M. Martial Saddier (Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - Les Républicains)

M. Martial Saddier attire l'attention de Mme la ministre des solidarités et de la santé sur la mise en œuvre effective en France de la pratique avancée infirmière. L'article 119 de la loi n° 2016-41 du 26 janvier 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé a défini le cadre légal de l'exercice en pratique avancée. Afin de répondre aux défis majeurs du système de santé français confronté à une explosion des maladies chroniques nécessitant une prise en charge au long cours, avec un suivi par les professionnels de santé, et face à l'accroissement inquiétant des déserts médicaux, le Parlement a voulu que soient redéfinis les périmètres d'exercice des professionnels de santé en créant de nouveaux métiers en santé de niveau intermédiaire (entre le bac +8 du médecin et le bac+3-4 des professionnels paramédicaux notamment des infirmières). Présents depuis les années 1960 aux États-Unis et au Canada, mais aussi au Royaume-Uni ou en Irlande, ces infirmiers de pratique avancée souent reconnaître des compétences plus étendues, notamment de prescription, de renouvellement et d'adaptation de traitements, de réalisation d'actes, moyennant une formation supplémentaire de niveau master. Ces professionnels jouent un rôle important de premier recours dans les zones reculées. Or le décret d'application qui, plus de deux ans après la promulgation de la loi, n'est pas encore publié est annoncé comme conservant au médecin un rôle central et ne conférant pas à l'infirmier de pratique avancée toute l'autonomie requise pour apporter la réponse nécessaire aux besoins de santé des citoyens. Il lui demande donc de bien vouloir lui indiquer ce que le Gouvernement envisage pour que soit créé en France un véritable métier intermédiaire d'infirmier de pratique avancée doté de l'autonomie suffisante pour bien prendre en charge les patients.

Données clés

Auteur : M. Martial Saddier (Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes - Les Républicains) Type de question : Question écrite Rubrique : Professions de santé Ministère interrogé : Solidarités et santé Ministère répondant : Solidarités et santé Dates : Question publiée le 8 mai 2018 Réponse publiée le 22 mai 2018

Question écrite n°8780 : Mise en œuvre effective de la pratique avancée infirmière

15ème Législature

Publication de la question au Journal Officiel du 29 mai 2018, page 4431 Publication de la réponse au Journal Officiel du 5 juin 2018, page 4850

Question de : M. Franck Marlin (Ile-de-France - Les Républicains)

M. Franck Marlin appelle l'attention de Mme la ministre des solidarités et de la santé sur la mise en œuvre effective en France de la pratique avancée infirmière. L'article 119 de la loi n° 2016-41 du 26 janvier 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé a défini le cadre légal de l'exercice en pratique avancée. Afin de répondre aux défis majeurs du système de santé français confronté à une explosion des maladies chroniques nécessitant une prise ne charge en long cours, avec un suivi par les professionnels de santé, et face à l'accroissement inquiétant des déserts médicaux, le Parlement a voulu que soient redéfinis les périmètres d'exercice des professionnels de santé de niveau intermédiaire (entre le bac +8 du médecin et le bac +3/4 des professionnels paramédicaux notamment des infirmières). Présents depuis les années 1960 aux États unis d'Amérique et au Canada, mais aussi au Royaume-Uni ou en Irlande, ces infirmiers de pratique avancée se voient reconnaître des compétences plus étendues, notamment de prescription, de renouvellement et d'adaptation de traitements, de réalisation d'actes, moyennant une formation supplémentaire de niveau Master. Ces professionnels jouent un rôle important de premier recours dans les zones reculées. Or le décret d'application qui, plus de deux ans après la promulgation de la loi, n'est pas encore publié est annoncé comme conservant au médeci nu n'ôle central et ne conférant pas à l'infirmier de pratique avancée toute l'autonomie requise pour apporter la réponse nécessaire aux besoins de santé des citoyens. Il lui demande donc de bien voulori lui indiquer les mesures envisagées par le Gouvernement pour que soit créé en France un véritable métier intermédiaire d'infirmier de pratique avancée doté de l'autonomie suffisante pour bien prendre en charge les patients.

Figure C.3: Copy-pasted questions

Données clés

Auteur : M. Franck Marlin (Ile-de-France - Les Républicains) Type de question : Question écrite Rubrique : Professions de santé Ministère interrogé : Solidarités et santé Ministère répondant : Solidarités et santé Dates :

Question publiée le **29 mai 2018** Réponse publiée le **5 juin 2018**

Notes: Screenshots of the two questions from the National Assembly website. The sections highlighted in red indicate the differences between the two questions.