Temporary Internal Displacement and Receiving Communities' Voting Behavior *

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of a temporary forced internal migration on the voting behavior in the receiving municipalities. During World War I, around 500,00 thousand displaced nationals were resettled from the Italian government within the country and stayed in the receiving place for less than two years. Leveraging on the quasi-random relocation policy and the short stay of displaced individuals, I evaluate whether hosting a large share of refugees affects voting behavior in the subsequent elections. Findings indicate that an increase in the share of hosted refugees corresponds to a decrease in the vote share for the Italian Popular Party (PPI), the Catholic party. This aligns with historical evidence highlighting the significant role of Catholic associations in assisting displaced people at arrival. The negative impact on the Catholic party persisted for two consecutive elections, 1919 and 1921, before dissipating in 1924. Anti-competitive behavior for public services is likely to explain the voting behavior.

JEL Classification codes: D72, H53, I38, N34

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1 Introduction

Over the past decade, Europe has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of forcibly displaced persons, rising from 3.42 million in 2011 to 19.5 million in 2023 (UNHCR, 2024). This unexpected influx has led to a notable change in voting behavior within receiving communities. Specifically, in areas hosting a higher proportion of displaced individuals relative to their population size, residents have increasingly shifted their political support from pro-integration to anti-immigration parties (Bratti et al., 2020; Bredtmann, 2022; Campo et al., 2024; Dustmann et al., 2019). Although cultural diversity and permanent settlement intentions of recent forced migrants in Europe may partially explain the change in the electoral support, the political backlash against pro-integration parties may be independent from displaced individuals' characteristics and common to all the displacement events. Indeed, individuals may exhibit stronger anti-immigration attitudes and/or anti-competitive behaviors if they perceive societal changes or economic threats resulting from the arrival of forced migrants in their communities. However, the limited research on other types of displacement events makes it difficult to determine whether the political effects observed in the context of recent forced migration are unique or indicative of a more general response to hosting displaced individuals. To contribute to the debate on common versus context-based effects of hosting displaced individuals, this paper examines a unique historical event: the temporary internal displacement of Italians during World War I.

Following the Italian army's defeat at the Battle of Caporetto, October-November 1917, in WWI, the Italian government resettled randomly around 500,000 internally displaced people (IDPs), primarily children, women and the elderly, from war territories to other Italian municipalities. Upon the arrival of forced migrants in the receiving communities,*Azione Cattolica*, the movement of the Catholic associations, mitigated the initial lag in governmental financial as-

sistance by appealing to worshipers for aid in the receiving communities. While the immediate response showed a high degree of solidarity, the economic distress of the 1918 spring fueled public discontent, leading many to blame IDPs for soaring prices and food shortage (Battistello, 2007). The hostile environment in the receiving communities, coupled with the end of the governmental financial assistance, pushed displaced individuals to return to their hometowns at the end of the Great War. Almost all IDPs returned to their hometowns before the 1919 general elections.

This historical setting offers several advantages for comparing the political effects of different displacement events. First, the return of displaced individuals to their hometowns before the 1919 elections provides a unique opportunity to isolate the electoral outcomes of host communities from any potential bias caused by the votes of internally displaced persons. Second, the contrasting characteristics of this event compared to the recent European refugee crisis allow for an investigation into whether displacement events generate common political effects across different contexts. Finally, since the Italian Popular Party (PPI) represented *Azione Cattolica* in the 1919 elections, this setting enables an examination of the political backlash against a pro-integration party in a political environment devoid of anti-immigration parties.

To perform the analysis, My empirical strategy leverages on the quasi-random resettlement of displaced people across municipalities, facilitated by the ban on internal movements imposed during the Spanish Flu outbreak and the reluctance of provincial authorities to accept additional refugees. The Italian government, within a month, assigned destinations to refugees based on two criteria: proximity to the battlefield and the minimization of displaced individuals in large urban areas (Emercora 2007, 451). To address the endogeneity arising from these resettlement criteria, I interact district fixed effects, where districts are administrative areas larger than municipalities but smaller than provinces, and population-decile fixed effects to capture

the heterogeneity in the geographical resettlement and the urbanization of receiving places, respectively. To test the validity of the research design, I perform a set of empirical tests to check the self-selection of displaced people across municipalities. Finally, to improve the reliability of my estimates, I add step-by-step a large set of controls to check the robustness of my results.

Main findings show that hosting a large share of IDPs, relatively to the population in the receiving municipalities, has a negative effect on the vote share for PPI in 1919. Estimates are quite stable in magnitude and precision across specifications. The electoral punishment towards PPI lasts also in the 1921 general elections even if the size and the precision of the estimates are lower than 1919 elections. Results hold to falsification tests and robustness checks.

Since the negative effect may stem from both anti-immigration and anti-competitive behaviors, I investigate three possible mechanisms: cultural distance (measured as geographical distance), job competition, and public service competition. Cultural distance is more likely to proxy an anti-immigration behavior as residents may fear changes in the society, while job and public service competition are more likely to proxy anti-competitive behaviors as people could loose, either in absolute or relative terms, the benefits of a lower competition.

My findings reveal that the negative impact of hosting displaced people is greater in municipalities with a lower public spending per capita. Cultural distance and job competition appear to play less significant roles in shaping voting preferences. The empirical results on job competition align with the demographic characteristics of the displaced people as children, elders, and women are less likely to participate in the labor market and affect the job competition. Additionally, the relatively short duration of the displacement may have limited any societal transformation in the receiving places.

This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, I exploit a novel temporal dimension for studying the political effects of hosting forced migrants. While the electoral impact

of passing-through asylum seekers (Dinas et al. (2019), Gessler et al. (2022), Hangartner et al. (2019) and Steynmair (2021)) and of permanent, or perceived as such, displaced people (Bratti et al. (2020), Campo et al. (2021), Gamalerio et al. (2023), Fremerey et al. (2024) and Vertier et al. (2023)) have been widely investigated, the effects of a temporary displacement on political outcome have received less attention. A closely related study by Hangartner et al. (2019) shows that exposure to passing-through asylum seekers leads to sustained support for right-wing parties years after the event. However, my context differs significantly, as the temporary permanence of displaced people may foster interactions between newcomers and residents in host communities lowering the losses of political support for pro-integration parties (Allport, 1954). The lack of any mitigation effect is consistent with other studies, as Achard et al. (2024) and Fremerey et al. (2024), that suggest a pro-integration voting behavior only at a more granular level than municipality, the geographical level of my analysis.

Second, this study relates also to the literature on economic and non-ecoomic motivations for demanding stricter anti-immigration policies (see Alesina and Tabellini 2024, for a survey). Barone et al. (2016) and Halla et al. (2017) show that voting behavior depends on local dimensions like cultural diversity and competition in labor market and public services, while Mayda et al. (2022) display that immigrants' skill level has heterogeneous effects on political outcomes. Other papers, like Dustmann et al. (2019) and Mendez and Cutilla (2014), focus on peoples' attitudes towards migrants highlight that cultural distance plays a key role in the perceiving migrants as future residents. This paper shows that public spending per capita has a leading role in shaping voting preferences when the pool of displaced people is not participating in the labor market and does not lead to society's changes.

Finally, my findings add to a recent literature on the effect of forced internal displacement on host communities from an historical perspective (see Becker (2022) and Becker et al. (2019)

for a survey). Related papers look at the effect of permanent internal resettlement on voting behavior following the end of Word War II. In Germany, Chavalier et al. (2024) display a larger support for pro-redistribution parties in communities which hosted greater shares of expelled Germans in 1953 Federal elections. In the same context, Braun et al. (2020) show that a larger share of resettled individuals increases the vote share for parties that do not back up on expelled Germans' claims in 1950 Bavarian elections. Ochsner et al. (2022) show that Austrian regions with a large presence of Nazis in the aftermath of the WWII display a large support for far-right parties in both short and long-run. While all the mentioned papers look at the effect of a permanent internal resettlement, I focus on the effect of a temporary internal displacement.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Great War and the displacement

The main of enemy of Italian army was Austria-Hungary in World War I. From May 1915, the Italian army had started to attack the Austrian-Hungarian army to seize the Italian-rooted territories. Up to October 1917, the Italian army conquered a large share of the targeted territories moving the Italian front up to the north-east of the Gorizia province. The advance of the Italian army stuck in the Giulian Alpes because of the high number of fatalities among soldiers. The temporary stop led Austrian-Hungarian army to prepare the counterattack with the help of the German army. The joint attack of Austria-Hungary and Germany started in October 1917 forcing the Italian army to withdraw beyond the Piave river (Battle of Caporetto). Figure 1 shows the dates of the counterattack and the Italian front before and after the defeat.

Following the defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto on 19th November 1917, around 500,000 people living between the Isonzo river and Piave river fled from their hometown. The

fear of living under Austrian occupation pushed around 250,000 of people to flee and the occupation of the Italian army on the western side of the Piave river forced around 250,000 people to migrate (Mondini and Frizzera 2017, 183). To cope with the issue of reallocating refugees, the Italian government followed two steps. In the first step, people left the Veneto by train and were temporary relocated in the train stations of the municipalities of Bologna, Florence and Milan. Following the first reception, Italian government relocated refugees across Italian municipalities (Ceschin 2016, 36-37).

The dispersal policy followed the two main criteria: distance from the evacuated areas and avoiding massive inflow refugees in urban areas (Emercora 2007, 96-97). The first criterion aimed at reallocating as soon as possible displaced individuals.[1] The second criterion aimed at avoiding public discontent due to a massive concentration of refugees in big urban municipalities (Emercora 2007, 451).[2] As a result, the dispersal policy was fast and confused without considering family links or socio-demographic characteristics of displaced people. Indeed, the head of the High Commissioner of the commission of war refugees' management, Giuseppe Girardini, wrote down a report on the management of refugees (Girardini, 1919).[3] In the report, the deputy describes the reallocation of refugees highlighting the lack of economic criteria.

> "..., the distribution of displaced people in Italy happened hastily, without any logical criteria from the government. [...], family members were quite often relocated in different municipalities, [...], refugees coming from different municipalities and having different cultural background were mixed together multiplying the assistance problems; [...], for instance, fishermen from Grado were resettled in Potenza (inland), while the mountaineers from Carnia were resettled on the

[1] The 1918 census shows that only the 20% of refugees were hosted in Southern regions.

[2] A large concentration of displaced people in the urban municipalities would have shown the extent of the catastrophic defeat at Caporetto leading dissatisfaction against the ruling government.

[3] In 1918, the Italian government appointed the deputy Giuseppe Girardini who replaced Luigi Luttazzi as the High Commissioner of the commission of war refugees' management.

Ligurian Riviera (seaside), leading difficulties to the labor market integration of displaced people in the host municipalities." Giardini(1919, p. 10-11)

The High Commissioner was committed to resettling refugees to reunite families and improve their labor market integration. However, the Spanish flu outbreak led the government to restrict internal movements, halting the resettlement plan. Since the pandemic did not stop to circulate in Italy until the end of the conflict, the deputy Giardini could not fulfill his resettlement plan.

" The General Direction of Public Health invited to suspend the resettlement plan because of hard flu epidemic arisen. The epidemic was still aggressive at the end of the World War I leading to substitute the resettlement plan with the writing of the return-to-home plan." Giardini(1919, p. 11)

At the end of the WWI, almost all refugees returned to their homes before the 1919 general elections.

2.2 The reception and the Catholic Church

Immediately after the arrival of refugees, local parishes organized collections of donations to help refugees in the hosting municipalities.[4] To manage the redistribution of donations, local authorities and catholic communities established committees for refugees.[5] The decree of the January 10 1918 established that local committees, *Comitati* and *Patronati*, paid in advance a subsidy and, following the payment, local offices of the Ministry of Interior, *Prefetture*, re-

[4]The large diffusion of catholic associations across Italy helped to reach all the displaced people in the receiving communities, while socialist organizations, as *Società Umanitaria*, organized donations at local level but they could not cover the same area of catholic organizations.

[5]Figure A1 in Appendix A shows a sheet that includes information on the date of the establishment of the Catholic Commiteee, its offices and duties and some warnings regarding the functions not under its competence.

fund *Comitati* and *Patronati*[6]. However, *Comitati* and *Patronati* often needed the help of local authorities to pay subsidies since the refund from *Prefetture* was slow[7].

The financial assistance provided by the government to refugees triggered public discontent among inhabitants in the host municipalities in 1918 when the vexations of the war reached their peak. Refugees became the scapegoats of the food rationing scheme imposed by the government (Emercora 2017, 100). Furthermore, locals started to blame refugees for stealing food and for soaring prices (Ceschin 2006, p. 190). As consequence, large groups of displaced people had been living segregated from the inhabitants of the host municipalities (Ceschin 2006, p. 200).

Only Catholic organizations and the representatives of Catholic Church, parishioners and bishops, kept on providing moral and financial assistance to refugees in the host communities for the whole displacement period (Ceschin 2006, p. 75-77). While the humanitarian help of the Catholics was intended as a duty of good worshipers, Catholic associations aimed at showing governing skills for gathering public approval at the next elections (Ceschin 2006, p. 75). Indeed, at the end of the WWI, the Catholic Church repealed the *Non Expedit* policy, which forbade Catholics to run for elections, and funded the first mass catholic political party, the *Italian Popular Party* (PPI), on January 18 1919. However, since the presence of refugees was perceived as an economic burden among host communities' inhabitants over the last year of the war, the displaced people' assistance may have led inhabitants of many host communities

[6]However, government left a discretionary power to the local office on who should receive the subsidy and on the amount of the subsidy.

[7]The following documents report evidences on the expenses bore by some municipalities: Turin: *La Stampa*, December 27 1917, http://www.archiviolastampa.it/component/option,com_lastampa/task,search/mod,libera/action,viewer/Itemid,3/page,2/articleid,0025_01_1917_0358_0002_24237667/; Piacenza: Antonini C., *Appunti per una storia di Piacenza nella Grande Guerra*, 2016, https://www.istitutostoricopiacenza.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2009_5_antonini.pdf; Foligno: Comitato di soccorso per i profughi di guerra <Foligno>, Relazione / Patronato di Foligno per i profughi di guerra, 1920, http://www.14-18.it/opuscolo/BNCF_CFI0823798/001?search=37a6259cc0c1dae299a7866489dff0bd&searchPos=1.

not to support Catholics in the 1919 elections.[8]. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, historical documents showing public discontent against Catholic Church in the destination municipalities are not available. To overcome this problem, I evaluate empirically the relationship between the share of hosted refugees and the vote for the Catholic party.

3 Empirical Strategy

Let y_m denote the share of votes for a political party in the municipality m and $refugees_m$ the share of refugees relative to the municipality's 1911 total population. The main specification is:

$$y_{m(dp)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 refugees_m + \gamma_{dp} + X'_m\phi + \varepsilon_m \tag{1}$$

where γ_{dp} and X'_m are population-district fixed effects and a set of municipal-level controls, respectively. Since the resettlement policy follows the criterion of the closest less-populated municipalities (defense industry firms are more likely to establish in large populated urban areas), the inclusion of the population-district fixed effects is key to adjust for the selection criteria of the resettlement policy and, thus, to estimate the causal effect of hosting displaced people on the vote shares for the Popular Party [9]. I do not include the distance from the battlefield to the hosting municipalities since districts are small enough to fully capture the variation in the distance. Finally, I include a set of covariates to control for omitted variable bias.

The estimated coefficient is the continuous average treatment effect (CATE) of hosting displaced refugees on voting preferences. To estimate the CATE parameter, the following assumption must hold: no selection into treatment, quasi-random reallocation of force migrants across

[8]The PPI was the most voted party in Veneto collecting around 35% and around 40% votes at 1919 general elections and at 1920 municipal elections, respectively(COMPENDIO DELLE STATISTICHE ELETTORALI ITALIANE dal 1848 al 1934)

[9]To compute the population-district cells, I interact population deciles dummies and district dummies.

municipalities. Selection into the treatment would have occurred if the government resettled displaced individuals according to their labor market skills and/or to gain political support (or at least, not to loose it). From an historical perspective, since government's dispersal policy does not take into account refugees' skills, the endogenous reallocation of displaced individuals to municipalities for labor market motivations should not be a concern. In the following section, I will provide some empirical exercises to test this assumption.

Government manipulation for political reasons should be a concern if the main findings showed a negative relationship between the vote shares of ruling parties and the refugee share. In other words, government would resettle refugees in municipalities with a low chance of getting high vote shares. I discuss whether this type of selection occurs in the section Results.

4 Data and Identification Tests

4.1 Data

I compile a new dataset by merging existing datasets with new digitized historical archives. First I use the 1918 census data of hosted refugees in each municipality. The dataset is available from the digital library of University of Padua. The dataset includes the following variable: i) the number of families hosted in each Italian municipality; ii) the number of repatriates from countries involved in the war before Italy joined the Great War; iii) the number of displaced people following the defeat of the battle of Caporetto; iv) the number of defectors from Austrian-Hungarian empire, (*irredenti*). I will use the third category to perform the analysis. Unfortunately, the 1918 census of refugees has information at moment of the data collection since the government does not collect all the movements of displaced people across municipalities during the displacement period. However, the break of the Spanish-flu and the unwilling-

ness of provincial government officials to accept new refugees prevented people to move out from the assigned municipality. Therefore, the 1918 census is very likely to be representative of the number of refugees hosted in each municipality.

Second I use the Acemoglu et al. (2022) data on the political outcomes in 1913, 1919, 1921 and 1924 and municipal level variables. The dataset includes the vote shares of the main parties for the elections in 1919, 1921 and 1923 for more than 5,000 municipalities out of around 8,000. Furthermore, I use municipal data on geographical characteristics, 1911 population, 1911 industrial firms and workers, 1913 vote shares of the socialist party, 1911 literacy rate as controls and for heterogeneity analyses.

Third, I collect the 1918 census of auxiliary establishments at municipal level to test the correlation between the share of refugees and the number of auxiliary establishments. During the Great War, the Italian government signed several deals with more than 500 Italian private companies in the several industries, defined as auxiliary establishments, to provide a continuous supply of materiel, military equipment and food to the army. I use these data to check whether the distribution of refugees is skewed towards municipalities with a large number of auxiliary establishments.

Fourth, I collect microdata on refugees hosted in the province of Naples from the State Archive of Naples to check whether the individual characteristics of the hosted refugees from Veneto match with historical narratives. The State Archive of Naples has published on its website the microdata of more than 7,000 refugees in Naples. The dataset includes name, surname, age, and municipality of origin for more than 4,000 refugees. Unfortunately, only the State Archive of Naples has published microdata on refugees. However, given that Naples was one of the most important province to host refugees, the descriptive statistics coming up from the data should be consistent with the descriptive statistics of the overall population of forced mi-

grants.[10]

Fifth, I collect the information on the 1912 municipal spending for each municipality. The data on 1912 municipal spending are published in volume *Bilanci Comunali per l'anno 1912* digitized by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Since the discrimination against refugees may stem from an increase in the competition for public services, the municipal spending per capita is a good proxy for studying the heterogeneity of voting behavior across different degrees of competition.[11]

Finally, I collect the population of parishes at municipal level from the 1884 Census of the Italian Ecclesiastic Statistics (*Statistica Ecclesiastica d'Italia*) to test whether greater refugee shares have been hosted in municipalities with greater share of priests relative to the 1881 municipality's total population. The census includes information on the municipality and the number of churches and priests affiliated with each parish for all the Italian parishes[12]. I use the number of priests, instead of the number of churches, to proxy the influence of the Catholic Church at municipal level since the parish census displays a large number of empty parishes.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Evidence for Identification Assumption

The final sample includes more than 4,000 municipalities. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the outcome variables, the main regressor and the covariates in the Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, respectively. Panel A shows the vote share for each party in each election year[13]. Panel

[10] Following the internal displacement, Naples hosted more than 70,000 temporary displaced individuals who were later resettled in the southern regions. The province of Naples hosted more than 20,000 individuals for the whole displacement period.

[11] In 1912, municipalities cannot borrow money without the authorization of the provincial offices of the Ministry of Interior, Prefetture, because of the balanced budget amendment.

[12] The definitions of church and parish are the following: a church is the place of worship within a parish community; parish is the principal church in a parish community. A parish community is an administrative unit.

[13] Social party and Popular party were the two mass parties in 1919 and 1921, while Traditionalist includes all the traditional political parties (for instance Nationalist, Liberal, Liberal Democrat, and Agrarian Parties). The Fascist party run the 1921 elections with Traditionalist parties, while fascists run alone in 1924. I refer to Acemoglu et al. (2022) for a detailed explanation on the 1919, 1921 and 1924 elections.

B shows the summary statistics for the refugee share in October 1918. The refugee share is the ratio of October 1918 refugees to the 1911 population in each municipality. Municipalities host 8 refugees per 1 000 inhabitants on average. Panel C shows the summary statistics of the covariates at municipal level.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the share of refugees at district level with and without controlling for district fixed effects. The Panel (a) of the Figure 2 displays the first criterion of the dispersal policy, the distance from the battlefield. To check whether the inclusion of district fixed effects as control leads to random dispersion of the refugee share across Italian districts, I predict the residuals from a regression between refugees share and district fixed effects and plot the residuals within districts. The Panel (b) of the Figure 2 displays adjusted refugee shares across districts showing that inclusion of district fixed effects captures the first criterion of the dispersal policy leading to a quasi-random geographical distribution of refugees across the country.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of refugee share's residuals by population deciles. The second criterion of the resettlement policy is the population since the government tried to avoid the mass resettlement of refugees in the urban areas. Panel (a) show the distribution of refugee share by population decile without adjusting for district and population-decile fixed effects. Panel (b) shows the distribution of refugee share adjusted for district fixed effects by population decile. Since the resettlement policy aimed at avoiding the resettlement of displaced people in populated municipalities, the adjusted refugee share drops in the top 4 deciles. Panel (c) shows that the share of refugees is randomly distributed around zero following including population decile fixed effects.

To test the exogeneity of the refugee share at local characteristics, I follow two-stage procedure. First, I predict the vote share of the Popular Party in 1919 using the municipal covariates

to obtain the joint distribution between the main regressor and the local characteristics. Then, I regress the predicted values on the refugee share to test whether the refugee share predict the joint distribution of covariates. Table 2 shows that the share of displaced people has a strong correlation with the demographic characteristics in Column (1). However, Columns (2)-(3)-(4)-(5) show that the correlation fades away when I add other covariates to predict the 1919 Popular Party's vote share. Even if the correlation is not meaningful, the negative sign of the estimates may hide a negative selection in the hosting municipality. In other words, Popular party does not collect many votes where refugees have settled. To test whether this is the case, I will show the main results adding step-by-step predictors as controls.

Another concern is the potential decision of the government to increase the production of military equipment by resettling refugees in municipalities with a large defense industry. During wartime, the massive production of military equipment may increase the labor demand in the defense industry leading some places to be short in the labor supply. As a consequence, the government may decide to resettle refugees to fill the excess demand in such municipalities. Since the suppliers of military equipment, which belong to the manufacturing sector, tend to be larger and more likely to be unionized, the higher concentration of refugees may show a spurious negative relationship with the vote share for the Popular Party (and positive with the Socialist Party). To test whether the resettlement policy was driven by economic reasons, I compute the mean of the municipal refugee share by the number of auxiliary firms to see whether the distribution is skewed towards municipalities with a greater defense industry.[14] Figure 4 shows that distribution of refugee share by level of municipal auxiliary firms is not skewed towards places with a greater defense industry confirming the low correlation between governmental economic interests and the dispersal policy.

[14]The definition of defense industry includes all the firms which signed a contract with the government to produces goods (for instance food, garments, weapons) for the Italian army

To verify the demographic composition of refugees, I use microdata on refugees in the province of Naples to show the age and the gender of hosted displaced people. Using the information on the municipality of origin, I select more than 4,000 individuals that have been living in the evacuated zones. Around 56% of them are females confirming the majority of women in the hosting municipality. Table 3 shows the share of females and males in six age classes[15]. Women dominate the age classes between 19 and 38 years old, while men are mainly distributed in the extreme age classes. The age distribution confirms the fact that refugees were mainly women followed by children and old people.

Finally, I test whether municipalities with a greater influence of Catholic Church experience a higher probability of hosting a larger share of refugees. I estimate the relationship between the share of refugees and the influence of the Catholic Church using the following Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood model (PQML):

$$refugees_m = exp^{[\omega_0+\omega_1 CathInfl_m+X_m^{'}\Phi+\varepsilon_m]} \tag{2}$$

where $refugees_m$ is the share of refugees in the municipality m, $CathInfl_m$ is the share of priests in the municipality m.[16] Table 4 shows a positive relationship between the share of refugees and the catholic influence with and without including demographic and geographic covariates. This evidence suggests that a greater influence of Catholic Church at municipal level, measured as the share of priests, leads to a higher likelihood of hosting a greater share of refugees.

[15] Unfortunately, many folders do not include the age of birth leading to a drastic drop in the number of observations. The total sample including the age information is 1,243.

[16] Since the share of refugees has a large fraction of zeros (44%), the PQML has the advantage to provide unbiased estimates of the coefficients (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).

5 Results and Robustness Checks

5.1 Main Results

Table 5 shows the effect of the refugee ratio on the vote share for Popular Party in 1919 including step-by-step further controls to check for estimation bias. Column (1) shows that hosting displaced people has a negative significant effect on the vote share for the Popular Party in 1919 including only district-population fixed effects. The magnitude of the estimates lowers when I include further controls even if estimates are significantly different from zero and precisely estimated. In particular, demographics, labor demand and 1913 socialist vote share controls are important to narrow the estimation bias. Column (6) shows the result for the main specification highlighting the negative selection in the baseline specification in Column (1). However, point estimates do not vary a lot across specifications. To test whether the selection on unobservables does not invalidate my estimates, I run an Oster δ test on the coefficient in the column (6) of Table 5. Figure 5 shows the values of Oster δ over several values of R^2 starting from the optimal value, $1.3R^2_{med}$, to the maximal value, 1. All the δs are above the cut-off, δ=1. Therefore, we can claim that the unobservable component of the regression should be almost twice of the observable component to lead the coefficient towards zero.

To test the reliability of the causal effect of the refugee share on the vote share for the Popular Party, I use the same specification substituting the vote share for the Popular Party with the vote share for other parties. If the refugee share affects only the vote share for the Catholic party, I should not observe a significant effect on the vote share for other parties. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C of Table 6 show the effect of the refugee share on the vote share for Socialist Party, Fascist Party, and traditional parties, respectively. Panel A estimates confirm a omitted variable bias since the share of displaced people has a positive correlation with the

vote share for the Socialist Party without including controls. Following the inclusion of the full set of controls, estimate goes towards zero. Panel B shows the null effect of the treatment on the vote share for the Fascist Party. Finally, Panel C show a low significant positive effect of hosting refugees on the vote share for the traditional parties in Column (6). However, the positive effect may stem from the high substitution between the Popular Party and the traditional not-mass parties which are a huge collection of parties. Since the sum of the shares must be equal to one, the result displayed in the Column (6) of Panel 3 mirrors the loss of votes for the Popular Party even if there is no a specific party which gains votes following the internal displacement.

5.2 Placebo Test

To test whether the refugee share does not proxy general vote preferences in the hosting municipalities, I perform two placebo tests using two other indicators as main regressor: *irredenti* and repatriated Italians. *irredenti* are defectors of the Austro-Hungarian empire living in Italian-rooted territories and wished to be Italians. Repatriated Italians are natives who had been living abroad for at least four years. The 1918 Census of refugees provides data on the number of *irredenti* and repatriated individuals hosted in each municipality. The pool of both *irredenti* and repatriated is very tiny and many of them decided to live in urban areas to find good job opportunities. Therefore, the arrival of these two groups in the host municipality should not have any meaningful impact on the vote for the Popular Party.

Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the placebo tests using *irredenti* and repatriated Italians as treatment, respectively. Estimate are not different from zero even if they display a negative sign that highlights the negative selection already shown in Table 6. However, large standard errors show the lack of a significant relationship between the fake treatments and the vote share for the Popular Party in 1919.

5.3 Robustness Checks

The choice of using population deciles and provincial clustered standard errors may affect the magnitude and the statistical significance of the results. To exclude the two concerns, I run a two separated models where I use population quintiles and standard errors clustered at district level.

Panel A of Table 8 shows the effect of refugee ratio on the vote share for Popular Party in 1919 when population quintiles are used to compute district-population fixed effects. Looking only at Column (6), the effect is quite similar to Column (6) in Table 4 showing the lack of difference between using population deciles and population quintiles to compute district-population fixed effects. Panel B of Table 8 shows the standard errors using district clustered standard errors. Standard errors are little bit larger than the main specification that uses province clustered standard errors. However, the statistical significance of the results do not change.

5.4 1921 and 1924 Elections

Next, I explore whether the punishment towards the Popular Party lasts also in the 1921 and 1924 general elections. The short stay of displaced people in the hosting municipalities allows to study whether the public discontent against hosting refugees, measured as a decrease in the vote share for the Popular Party, persists years after the return of refugees to their homes.[17]

The Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 show the impact of hosting refugees on the Popular Party's vote share in 1921 and 1924 general elections, respectively. Panel 1 shows that hosting refugees has still a negative effect in 1921, even if the effect is smaller in size and noisier than the effect estimated in 1919, while Panel 2 shows that hosting refugees has no effect in

[17] Municipalities have hosted displaced people only for less than a couple of years from November 1917 to January-May 1919. The vast majority of refugees came back to their origin municipalities before 1919 elections. However, Ceschin (2016) documents that there was a tiny share of refugees who left hosting municipalities at the beginning of 1920.

1924, almost 5 years following the internal displacement.[18] To provide some insights on the motivations behind the decline in the electoral support for the PPI, the next section tests the heterogeneity of the voting behavior across potential channels.

6 Mechanisms and Discussion

This section provides a discussion on the possible causes of the negative effect of hosting refugees on the most charitable party, the Popular Party. I investigate three mechanisms: cultural distance, a measure of 'compositional' concerns; job competition; public spending. Cultural distance should proxy the fear of inhabitants to host people with different habits since a large number of refugees may affect the cultural amenities in hosting municipalities. Therefore, the negative effect of hosting refugees on the vote share for Popular party should vary with the distance from the evacuated areas if the "compositional" concerns play a role in the voting preferences. Second, the refugee share may proxy the increase in the labor supply in the hosting municipalities leading to lower wages and/or lower probability of being employed. So, an increase in the job competition may lead people to vote against the charitable party. Finally, the decrease in the supply of public goods during wartime may lead inhabitants to punish the party that helps the new public-goods competitors.

6.1 Cultural Distance

I split the sample in border regions and non-border regions to check whether the negative effect of refugee share stems from the cultural distance. Regions sharing a border with Veneto are

[18] Results in 1921 are much more reliable than the results in 1924 since the violence of the Fascist party affected the 1924 elections.

Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. In particular, Lombardy and Veneto have been part of the Austrian Empire until the Unification of Italy in 1861. Therefore, the cultural distance between Lombardy and Veneto should be smaller than between Veneto and other Italian regions.

Panel A and Panel B in Table 10 show the effect of hosting refugees on the Popular party in 1919 for the border and non-border regions, respectively. The magnitude of the effect is larger in Panel 1 even if estimates are noisier. The greater effect for border regions than non-border regions shows that cultural distance does not play a role in the voting preferences. Inhabitants of hosting municipalities should not have a "compositional" concern if the cultural distance between the locals and refugees do not differ. Therefore, a larger negative effect shows that the electoral punishment does not rely on cultural differences.

6.2 Job Competition

Inhabitants of hosting municipalities may lower the electoral support for the PPI if the increase in the job competition due to the arrival of displaced individuals would lead to a decrease in wages and increase unemployment. Unfortunately, yearly data on wages and unemployment at local level do not exist and I do not have any information on the skill level of forced migrants. To address these measurement issues, I compare the votes share for PPI in municipalities with higher and lower population density as a proxy of labor supply and in municipalities with higher and lower concentrations concentration of manufacturing firms relative to the male population size as a proxy for labor demand. Greater population density proxies greater labor supply, while a higher concentration of industrial firms proxies a greater number of job vacancies during WWI.

Panel A and Panel B in Table 11 show the effect of hosting refugees on the vote share for Popular party in 1919 above and below median of 1911 population density, respectively.

Estimates are quite similar in two groups showing lack of a greater electoral punishment in municipalities with a greater labor supply. Therefore, the refugee effect does not proxy a job competition mechanism from the labor supply side.

Panel A and Panel B in Table 12 show the effect of hosting refugees on the vote share for Popular party in 1919 above and below median of 1911 industrial firms, respectively. Point estimates in Panel A are a larger than in Panel B by less than .16. This results may indicate that an increase in the job competition for the best paid jobs leads to an electoral punishment for the Popular party. However, estimates are not meaningful different since the confidence intervals of the two coefficients overlap and the Chow test does not reject the null hypothesis of indifference between means at 5% (p-value =0.43). Therefore, job competition using industrial firms as a proxy for the labor demand seems not to play a role in changing voting preferences.

6.3 Public Spending

Finally, I discuss the last mechanism on public spending per capita. The food rationing scheme and the provision of subsidies to refugees may trigger public discontent in host municipalities. Subsidies often have been paid using the municipal budget lowering the public spending per capita of inhabitants and the presence of refugees may have lowered the food ration per capita in the host community. Since Catholic associations had a leading role in helping refugees during the displacement period, inhabitants may have decided to vote against the PPI to express their dissatisfaction for the increase in public service competition.

Panel A and B in Table 13 show the refugee effect for municipalities below and above the median of the 1912 public spending per capita. Estimates are greater and more precise for municipalities below the median of the 1912 public spending per capita. This results highlight that the public spending mechanism has a prominent role in shaping the voting preferences in 1919

general elections. My findings are similar to Rozo and Vargas (2021) who show an increase in the vote share for right-wing parties and a greater redistribution from natives to refugees in the receiving communities that host a greater share of refugees relative to the population size.

7 Conclusions

This paper investigates the political effects of hosting temporary internal displaced people in the receiving communities. Exploiting the different degrees of exposure to forced migrants across host municipalities in Italy during World War I. Findings show that inhabitants of host communities that host a larger share of displaced individuals relative to the population size vote less for the Italian Popular Party, the Catholic party, in 1919 general elections. Results are in line with historical evidence that highlights the prominent role of the Catholic associations in helping forced migrants in the receiving communities. The political backlash against the Catholic party last for two consecutive general elections.

Results highlight that even if the characteristics of this displacement event, the short duration of stay in the receiving communities and the within-nation resettlement, differ from those of the recent European refugee crisis, long duration of stay and between-nation resettlement, the political response is similar. Inhabitants of receiving communities that host a large share of displaced people relative to their population size vote less for pro-integration parties.

The context of the analysis shows that voting behavior depends on redistribution concerns, probably depending on the economic distress witness by voters during the WWI. However, the weights of potential mechanisms may differ depending on the type of displacement and on the economic situation. Indeed, many other dimension may influence the voting behavior as the skill level of displaced individuals, the economic cycle, or the openness of hosting communities. Therefore, future research should focus more on different types of displacement events

to have a comprehensive understanding of the political effects common across displacement events and of those context-based. A deeper knowledge of voting behaviors in the receiving communities could help to prevent anti-immigration voting and implement context-based re-settlement policies.

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8 Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Battle of Caporetto



Notes: The Figure 1 shows the chronology of the Battle of Caporetto and the Italian front before and after the defeat.

Figure 2: Distribution of Refugee to Population Ratio at District Level with and without controlling for District Fixed Effects



Notes: Figure 2 shows the actual and the adjusted refugee share in subfigure (a) and (b), respectively. Adjusted refugee share are the residuals from the regression between the refugee to population ratio and the district fixed effects.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Panel A: Outcomes				
Popular Party 1919	.268	.228	0	1
Popular Party 1921	.287	.223	0	1
Popular Party 1924	.132	.149	0	1
Panel B: Further Outcomes				
Fascist 1919	.005	.036	0	.656
Socialist Party 1919	.335	.272	0	1
Traditionalist 1919	.334	.272	0	1
Panel C: Treatment				
Refugee Share	.008	.021	0	.615
Panel D: Controls				
Altitude	865.925	858.830	1	4810
Altitude of the major centre	328.398	274.860	1	1816
Auxiliary Firms	.240	3.276	0	161
Log Area	7.369	1.185	2.303	12.243
Literacy rate	.760	.204	.101	1
Log Pop 1911	7.558	1.114	3.97	13.427
Presence of Army suppliers	.0837	.277	0	1
Public Spending per Cap	23.906	24.447	.803	412.885
Share of Industrial Firms	.013	.011	0	.138
Share of Industrial Workers	.126	.236	0	6.028
Share Pop below 6	.154	.030	.0537	.864
Socialist Party 1913	.171	.232	0	1
N	4,517	4,517	4,517	4,517

Table 2: Exogeneity Test

	Fitted 1919 Popular Party Vote Share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ref/Pop	-0.120***	0.021	-0.010	-0.036	-0.083
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.068)
Demographic predictors	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic predictors		✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban predictors			✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand predictors				✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913 predictor					✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: The Table 2 shows whether a set of covariates helps to predict both the vote share of the Popular Party in 1919 and the share of displaced people. Column (1) includes demographic predictors (quartic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (2) additionally includes geographic predictors (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (3) adds urban predictors (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (4) adds labor demand predictors (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (5) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as predictor. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3: Gender Distribution by Age Classes

	Females	**Males**
Age Class:		
Less than 16	53	47
Between 16 and 18	48	52
Between 19 and 28	80	20
Between 29 and 38	72	28
Between 39 and 48	49	51
More than 48	47	53
Total	59	41

Notes: The total sample includes 1,243 observations.

Figure 3: Refugee Share by Population Deciles



Notes: Figure 3 shows the distribution of the actual and adjusted refugee share by population deciles. Panel (a), Panel (b), Panel (c) shows the share of refugees by population deciles without adjusting for district fixed effects and population deciles fixed effects, by adjusting for district fixed effects and without adjusting for population decile fixed effects and adjusting for both district and population deciles fixed effects, respectively.

Figure 4: Distribution of the Refugee Share by Number of Auxiliary Firms



Notes: Figure 4 shows the mean of refugee share by municipal number of auxiliary firms.

Figure 5: Oster δ values over the interval [$1.3R^2_{med}$,1]



Notes: Figure 5 shows the values of the Oster δ over the interval from Oster's rule of thumb, $1.3 * R^2_{med}$, to the maximum R^2,1. The underlying hypothesis is that β in the column (6) of Table 5 is equal to zero.

Table 4: Catholic Influence and Refugees' Settlement

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CathInfl	43.975**	43.840**	48.297***
	(17.104)	(17.076)	(18.673)
Demographic controls		✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓
N	3613	3613	3613

Notes: The specificaAll specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes population in 1881 as control. Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Regressions are estimated using Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood models. Standard errors are clustered at *circondario* level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ref/Pop	-0.463***	-0.421***	-0.413***	-0.389***	-0.365***	-0.318***
	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.076)
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517
Adjusted R-squared	0.552	0.555	0.560	0.563	0.565	0.579

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 6: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Other Running Parties in 1919

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Socialist Party						
Ref/Pop	0.370**	0.351**	0.190	0.168	0.155	0.055
	(0.170)	(0.164)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.119)
Adjusted R-squared	0.651	0.652	0.666	0.666	0.667	0.709
Panel B: Fascist Party						
Ref/Pop	0.000	-0.004	-0.010	-0.009	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Adjusted R-squared	0.312	0.313	0.314	0.315	0.315	0.316
Panel C: Traditionalist Parties						
Ref/Pop	0.032	0.022	0.191*	0.193**	0.185*	0.225**
	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.092)
Adjusted R-squared	0.649	0.651	0.674	0.674	0.675	0.682
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

Table 7: Falsification Test on the Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: *Irredenti*						
Irr/Pop	-0.311	-0.247	-0.231	-0.180	-0.129	-0.128
	(0.210)	(0.205)	(0.193)	(0.187)	(0.170)	(0.174)
Panel B: Repatriated Italians						
Rep/Pop	-0.166	-0.224	-0.163	-0.045	-0.063	-0.065
	(0.345)	(0.345)	(0.361)	(0.356)	(0.352)	(0.373)
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

Table 8: Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Population Quintiles						
Ref/Pop	-0.492***	-0.434***	-0.439***	-0.410***	-0.390***	-0.350***
	(0.079)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.061)
N	4647	4647	4647	4647	4647	4647
Panel B: District Cluster Standard Errors						
Ref/Pop	-0.463***	-0.421***	-0.413***	-0.389***	-0.365***	-0.318***
	(0.104)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.095)
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: Panel 1 use population quintiles to compute district-population fixed effects, while Panel 2 use population deciles. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level in Panel 1. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$ *

Table 9: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1921 and 1924

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Vote Share for Popular Party in 1921						
Ref/Pop	-0.434**	-0.392**	-0.375**	-0.356**	-0.337**	-0.277**
	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.152)	(0.126)
N	4082	4082	4082	4082	4082	4082
Adjusted R^2	0.510	0.513	0.518	0.520	0.521	0.541
Panel B: Vote Share for Popular Party in 1924						
Ref/Pop	-0.146*	-0.122	-0.134	-0.126	-0.114	-0.096
	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.072)
N	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517	4517
Adjusted R-squared	0.461	0.465	0.470	0.472	0.473	0.478
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

Table 10: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 by Geographical Distance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna						
Ref/Pop	-0.434**	-0.392**	-0.375**	-0.356**	-0.337**	-0.277**
	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.152)	(0.126)
N	2101	2101	2101	2101	2101	2101
Adjusted R-squared	0.522	0.526	0.531	0.538	0.542	0.568
Panel B: No-Border Regions						
Ref/Pop	-0.335**	-0.307**	-0.280**	-0.250**	-0.215**	-0.200**
	(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.095)
N	2416	2416	2416	2416	2416	2416
Adjusted R-squared	0.385	0.387	0.400	0.403	0.403	0.408
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

Table 11: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 Below and Above the Median of 1911 Population Density

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Below Median of Population Density						
Ref/Pop	-0.487***	-0.466***	-0.470***	-0.433**	-0.437**	-0.415**
	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.173)	(0.189)
N	2135	2135	2135	2135	2135	2135
Adjusted R-squared	0.513	0.513	0.521	0.522	0.523	0.528
Panel B: Above Median of Population Density						
Ref/Pop	-0.387***	-0.309***	-0.305***	-0.294***	-0.269***	-0.242***
	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.098)	(0.079)
N	2163	2163	2163	2163	2163	2163
Adjusted R-squared	0.593	0.601	0.603	0.607	0.612	0.628
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

Table 12: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 Below and Above the Median of 1911 Industrial Firms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Below Median of Industrial Firms						
Ref/Pop	-0.565***	-0.557***	-0.600***	-0.565***	-0.546***	-0.507***
	(0.162)	(0.156)	(0.175)	(0.186)	(0.172)	(0.159)
N	2096	2096	2096	2096	2096	2096
Adjusted R-squared	0.578	0.578	0.582	0.583	0.584	0.591
Panel B: Above Median of Industrial Firms						
Ref/Pop	-0.527***	-0.429***	-0.429***	-0.399***	-0.385***	-0.341***
	(0.159)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.106)
N	2105	2105	2105	2105	2105	2105
Adjusted R-squared	0.530	0.538	0.542	0.545	0.548	0.571
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

Table 13: The Effect of Internal Displacement on Vote Share for Popular Party in 1919 Below and Above the Median of 1912 Public Spending Per Capita

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Below Median of 1912 Public Spending Per Capita						
Ref/Pop	-0.503***	-0.489***	-0.488***	-0.402***	-0.418***	-0.392***
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.090)
N	2149	2149	2149	2149	2149	2149
Adjusted R-squared	0.591	0.592	0.597	0.604	0.607	0.623
Panel B: Above Median of 1912 Public Spending Per Capita						
Ref/Pop	-0.311**	-0.239**	-0.221*	-0.208*	-0.182	-0.156
	(0.139)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.110)
N	2086	2086	2086	2086	2086	2086
Adjusted R-squared	0.513	0.515	0.522	0.522	0.522	0.531
Demographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Urban controls				✓	✓	✓
Labor Demand controls					✓	✓
Socialist share in 1913						✓

Notes: All specifications include district-population fixed effects. Column (2) includes demographic controls (quadratic in log population and share of population below the age of six in 1911). Column (3) additionally includes geographic controls (log area, elevation of the main center, and maximum elevation). Column (4) adds urban controls (industry workers as a share of male population in 1911, literacy rate in 1911, public spending per capita and public spending in 1912). Column (5) adds labor demand controls (industrial firms as a share of male population in 1911, a dummy for the presence of army-supplying production plants, and the total number of auxiliary plants). Column (6) adds socialist vote share in 1913 as control. Standard errors are clustered at province level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 *

A Appendix

A.1 Informative paper on the Catholic Committee

Figure A1: Informative paper on the Catholic Committee



NOTIZIE SUL COMITATO NAZIONALE DELLA GIOVENTÙ CATTOLICA ITALIANA DI ASSISTENZA E DI SOCCORSO AI PROFUGHI DALLE TERRE INVASE.

L' Comitato Nazionale venne costituito il giorno 7 Novembre 1917. Presidente del Comitato è il Comm. Avv. Paolo Pericoli. Segretario Generale Augusto Ciriaci. Segretario particolare Giovanni Venni.

Dipendono dal Comitato i sottocomitati regolarmente costituiti dai vari centri di azione giovanile; e cioè Consigli Regionali, Diocesani e Circoli della G. C. I.

La Segreteria del Comitato Nazionale coordina il lavoro e lo svolgimento di esso, distribuendolo ai vari uffici e disbriga tutte le pratiche d'indole generale.

Il Comitato Nazionale ha costituito i seguenti uffici e li assiste nelle loro mansioni e pratiche:

Ufficio Segretariato dei profughi (affidato alla Segreteria del Comitato). Esso compie un primo ufficio di assistenza e indirizzo per le necessità più urgenti dei profughi. — Sede, via della Scrofa, 70, Roma.

Ufficio alloggi (affidato al Circolo S. Pietro). — Sede Via della Scrofa, 70. Roma.

Ufficio Collocamento (affidato al Consorzio di Emigrazione e Lavoro) — Sede, via Giovanni Lanza, 200, Roma.

Ufficio Notizie (costituito dall'Unione fra le donne Cattoliche d'Italia), Sede, via della Scrofa, 70. Roma.

Ufficio Sussidi (affidato ad una Commissione speciale nominata dal Comitato Nazionale), che risiede presso la Sede del medesimo in via della Scrofa, 70. Roma.

Ufficio Assistenza Sacerdoti (affidato ad una Commissione speciale di sacerdoti di Roma e profughi, con a capo Mons. Francesco dott. Pascucci), — Sede, presso il Vicariato di Roma.

Ufficio Assistenza giovani e donne sole (affidato all'Associazione per la Protezione della giovane). Sede, via S. Sebastianello, Roma.

Ufficio Assistenza Religiosa a tutti i profughi (affidato ad una Commissione Ecclesiastica speciale costituita d'intesa con le autorità delle Diocesi delle terre invase e di quelle ove si trovano concentramenti di profughi),

Ufficio Assistenza ai giovanetti e alle ragazze studenti (affidato ad una Commissione speciale nominata dal Comitato Nazionale) che risiede presso la sede del Comitato stesso.

Ufficio legale (affidato ad una Commissione nominata dal Comitato), che risiede pure nella Sede del Comitato.

Ufficio assistenza sanitaria (affidato ad una commissione nominata dal Comitato).

Ufficio Assistenza ai maestri profughi (affidato a una Commissione dell'« Associazione Magistrale Niccolò Tommaseo ») — Sede, via della Scrofa, 70. Roma.

SOTTOSCRIZIONE NAZIONALE

La sottoscrizione promossa dal Comitato Nazionale, oltre che alla Presidenza e Segreteria del Comitato, è affidata ai singoli Consigli Regionali e Diocesani e ai Circoli della C. C. I. ed a tutti i giornali cattolici, che pubblicano le liste delle offerte delle rispettive regioni. La sottoscrizione validamente appoggiata dalle Autorità Ecclesiastiche, dalle Banche Cattoliche e da altri istituti ha superato di già le L. 180.000 (centottantamila).

OPERE ISTITUITE, PROTETTE ED ASSISTITE DAL COMITATO.

Pensionato per i giovani studenti. E' stato fondato in Roma per gli studenti di scuole secondarie, le cui famiglie, per essere state ricoverate in luoghi dove mancano dette scuole, o per altre particolari ragioni, si sarebbero trovate in condizioni di non potere far loro proseguire gli studi. Il pensionato ha sede presso l'Istituto Imperiali Borromeo. (Roma Piazza S. Maria Maggiore N. 21). I giovanetti frequentano le pubbliche scuole. (Ginnasio Tecniche, Istituto Tecnico, Liceo). Il Comitato Nazionale presiede all'andamento del Pensionato per mezzo d'una Commissione di vigilanza, di cui fa parte il Direttore; al quale ufficio è stato assunto il rev.mo Mons. Paolo Sandrini, Vicario Generale di Portogruaro.

Collocamento dei Profughi Agricoltori. Il Comitato, accogliendo l'invito dell'Alto Commissario dei profughi, ha preso rapporti con gli Enti relativi per il collocamento di profughi in aziende agricole.

Assistenza Colonie Agricole, Laboratori, Istituti d'educazione, Comunità Religiose, Collegi. Il Comitato ha procurato locali, lavoro, clientela e quanto altro è potuto occorrere a queste istituzioni o collettività di profughi. Nel mezzogiorno ha già istituito speciali laboratori di calzatura ed altri ne sorgeranno presto in altri luoghi. E' già iniziato in Roma un apposito corso per la formazione delle maestre.

Assistenza ai profughi viaggianti. Il Circolo S. Pietro, incaricato dal Comitato, tiene aperta, quando occorre, alla stazione ferroviaria di Roma una Cucina Economica. Una Commissione speciale poi, esercita la sorvegliarza sui minorenni.

Segretariato del Popolo di Venezia. Il Comitato Nazionale ha preso sotto la sua protezione quest'Ufficio, dandogli ospitalità in Via della Scrofa 70, Roma, dove può spiegare la assistenza, sopratutto ai profughi veneziani.

Visite ai profughi. Il Comitato Nazionale, per disimpegnare nel modo più efficace le diverse assistenze assunte in tutta Italia per mezzo dei suoi incaricati, sacerdoti e laici, fa compiere visite ed ispezioni nei posti di concentramento, e quindi provvede ai bisogni più urgenti dei profughi stessi. (Sono state già compiute ispezioni nella Romagna, nel Veneto, nella Campania, nella Toscana, nel Lazio ecc. ecc.).

AVVERTENZE

Il Comitato, ossequente alle disposizioni governative e prefettizie, che non consigliano la permanenza di profughi nei grandi centri e sopratutto nella capitale, fa opera perchè sia facilitata l'ospitalità dei profughi in quei centri, che si prestano di più con vantaggio dei profughi stessi e senza danno degli interessi locali.

In seguito a ciò, non si presta nella ricerca di alloggi se non per quelle persone che debbono e possono rimanere in Città per ragioni di Ufficio o di lavoro, e non concede sussidi individuali che subordinatamente a questo criterio; invece invia soccorsi ai raggruppamenti di profughi, oltre che fornire i mezzi finanziari necessari per l'opera che esplicano i vari Uffici e le istituzioni dipendenti.

Source: https://www.14-18.it/foglio/RML0341365_01?search=37a6259cc0c1dae299a7866489dff0bd&searchPos=1.