

# Corporate Taxation in Open Economies\*

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## Abstract

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic impact of corporate taxation. The analysis is conducted in a quantitative two-country model. First, the paper describes the long-run effects of corporate taxation. A reduction in the corporate-income tax rate increases GDP, wages, consumption, investment, and business density. The trade balance is at the same time negatively affected. Firms headquartered in a country which lowers its corporate tax become internationally less active and instead focus more on their domestic market. Next, the paper examines adjustment dynamics that are induced by a corporate-tax reform. The dynamic response of the economy can substantially differ when comparing shorter and longer time horizons. Finally, the paper investigates the effects of international profit shifting in high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions.

**JEL Classification:** E62, F42, H25

**Keywords:** corporate taxation, macroeconomy, heterogeneous firms, multinationals, international spillovers, profit shifting

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# 1 Introduction

Corporate taxation belongs to the economic topics that receive a lot of attention not only among economists but also among politicians and the general public. Proposals to change the corporate tax, typically either to increase or to decrease the corporate-income tax rate, occur on a regular basis. Recent examples of implemented corporate-tax reforms are the US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 or the French gradual decrease in the corporate tax rate between 2020 and 2022. From a policy perspective, it is crucial to understand which effects arise from such corporate-tax cuts. Policymakers want to take the various effects into account when preparing their forecasts and decisions. This paper aims to provide an analysis of the effects that corporate taxation has on the macroeconomy. The paper analyzes how a change in the corporate tax rate affects the domestic economy as well as which international spillover effects are triggered.

I carry out the analysis of corporate taxation in a dynamic macroeconomic model, which consists of two microfounded countries—home and foreign. The modeling of the corporate sector is inspired by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The key feature of this modeling framework is that firms differ in their productivities. A newly founded firm draws its productivity from a Pareto distribution. On the basis of its idiosyncratic productivity, each firm decides how many markets it wants to serve. A firm can supply its good domestically and also internationally. If a firm makes the decision to be internationally active, it can either export or produce abroad in a subsidiary. To ensure the model allows me to draw quantitative conclusions about the effects of corporate taxation, the model contains a wide range of frictions like search and matching, nominal-wage stickiness, habit formation, investment-adjustment costs, and liquidity-constrained households. Section 2 describes the model in detail, and Section 3 presents its calibration.

In the first step, I use the model to analyze the long-run effects of corporate taxation. I study in Section 4 how a change in the home corporate tax rate affects the steady states of the home and foreign economy. A reduction in the home corporate tax rate causes a rise in home macroeconomic aggregates like GDP, private consumption, or private investment. It additionally stimulates firm creation in the home country and positively impacts the labor market by raising wages and lowering unemployment. As the home corporate tax rate is reduced, the trade balance of the home country worsens. Firms headquartered in the home country start focusing more on the domestic market. They become reluctant to engage in activities like exporting or multinational production. In the foreign economy, a cut in the home corporate tax invokes a small increase in GDP and tax revenue. Firms headquartered in the foreign country start perceiving the market of the home country, due to its lower tax

rate and higher demand, as more attractive. They increasingly decide to export or to open an affiliate in the home country.

In addition to the long-run analysis, the paper offers a dynamic perspective on corporate taxation. Section 5 examines which adjustment dynamics are triggered by a change in the corporate tax rate. The dynamic analysis demonstrates that a corporate-tax reform can temporarily move some variables into an opposite direction than one could conclude from the long-run analysis. For instance, households do not immediately benefit from a corporate-tax cut. Their consumption and real wages initially decrease before they start approaching a new higher steady-state level. Faster inflation together with an elevated real interest rate are responsible for this discrepancy between the short-run and the long-run effect. The simulations in Section 5 also show how a cut in the corporate tax rate causes bigger losses of tax revenue in the short run than in the long run. The partial self-financing of the tax cut needs time to materialize. The expansion of the economy only gradually translates into a broader tax base. Furthermore, the dynamic analysis enables me to investigate the differences between a permanent and a temporary corporate-tax reduction. The model predicts that a temporary cut generates a smaller increase in GDP than a permanent cut. Because economic agents are able to anticipate the reversal of a temporary corporate-tax reduction, the creation of new firms stays relatively subdued. The total number of firms in the economy does not rise substantially, and so GDP expands, in comparison with a permanent cut, only slightly.

Finally, I devote Section 6 to the analysis of international profit shifting. Tax-planning practices that multinational firms leverage to artificially shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions have come under public scrutiny in recent years. Policymakers have taken several initiatives to limit the amount of shifted profits (OECD, 2013, 2025). I use the model presented here to explore the macroeconomic consequences of profit shifting. The model analysis suggests that the possibility to move profits across borders positively impacts output worldwide. Profit-shifting techniques, which multinational firms apply to reduce their overall tax bill, weaken the distortive power of corporate taxation. A smaller degree of tax distortion improves economic performance in low-tax as well as high-tax jurisdictions. If firms lost the possibility to shift profits, they would become less inclined to open affiliates abroad. Highly productive firms would be more willing to concentrate their activities in headquarters, from which they would export to overseas markets. The number of multinational firms would consequently decrease. Moreover, Section 6 points out that profit shifting does not affect all countries uniformly. Low-tax countries experience higher tax revenue and higher private consumption due to profit shifting. In contrast, high-tax countries have to cope with lower tax revenue and lower private consumption.

In my analysis of corporate taxation, I focus exclusively on territorial taxation, which

represents the most common tax regime among OECD countries. Worldwide taxation and the related topic of repatriation taxes were treated by Gu (2017), Curtis, Garín and Mehkari (2020), or Spencer (2022). To be in line with the real world, I model the corporate-income tax as a tax on firms' profits. A levy imposed on the return of households' capital stock, which the literature sometimes freely interprets as a corporate tax, was assessed by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006), Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), McGrattan (2012), Cuñat, Deák and Maffezzoli (2022), or Gross, Klein and Makris (2022). The primary reason why the theoretical macro literature has often preferred the analysis of capital-return taxes to the analysis of profit taxes is simple: In many macroeconomic models a tax on firms' profits is non-distortive; the level of profit taxation does not alter firms' behavior. In the model I develop here, profit taxes are distortive and influence the equilibrium through three channels. First, profit taxation impacts the creation of new firms. A lower tax rate on profits increases, *ceteris paribus*, the expected stream of after-tax profits and therefore incentivizes more intensive firm creation. Secondly, profit taxes distort the decision of high-productivity firms how to serve the overseas market. While exports are subject to the domestic profit tax, production abroad faces the overseas profit tax. Hence, the profit tax rates in the two alternative production locations play a significant role when deciding between exporting and multinational production. The third channel operates through the balance-of-payments constraint. For example, a lower profit tax rate in the foreign country implies, all else being equal, that foreign affiliates of home multinationals earn higher after-tax profits, which appear as a stronger dividend inflow in the balance of payments of the home country.

Recent studies by Bilicka, Devereux and Güçeri (2024) and Chodorow-Reich et al. (2024) investigate the effects of corporate taxation through the lens of an investment model. They hence stand in the tradition of Hall and Jorgenson (1967). My modeling approach is different. I do not only formalize the behavior of the corporate sector, but I also explicitly model the behavior of the household sector. The explicit treatment of households allows me to scrutinize the potential effects of corporate taxation on variables like unemployment or private consumption. In this context, it is worth mentioning that I consider a parsimonious form of household heterogeneity. I distinguish between Ricardian and hand-to-mouth households. The hand-to-mouth households are assumed to have no direct exposure to business income. Their consumption hinges on wage growth and unemployment rate. Changes in the corporate tax rate impact the hand-to-mouth households only indirectly through general-equilibrium effects. In contrast, the Ricardian households are, as recipients of business income, directly affected by corporate taxation. The assumed hand-to-mouth households mirror the stylized fact that some households in the economy neither own a private business nor participate in the stock market (i.a., Christelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos, 2013; Badarinza, Campbell and

Ramadorai, 2016).

The widely discussed proposals to reform the international system of corporate taxation known as Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 of the OECD/G20 Initiative were evaluated by Ferrari et al. (2023) and Dyrda, Hong and Steinberg (2024a). Both papers assessed the impact of the proposed reforms in a static model. My paper, by comparison, applies a different model framework to answer a distinct research question. I use a dynamic model to explore the short-run and long-run effects of a unilateral change in the corporate tax rate. The dynamic nature of the model makes possible to examine the differences in propagation between temporary and permanent corporate-tax shocks.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the model enables me to study the interplay between the corporate tax and other types of taxation. The corporate tax has the potential to influence, via general-equilibrium effects, the revenue from other taxes. Because the model includes taxes on employees, employers, and consumption, I am able to investigate how a change in the corporate tax rate affects not only the corporate-tax revenue but also the overall tax revenue.

My paper also contributes to the still relatively nascent literature on the real effects of profit shifting (Alstadsæter et al., 2024). This strand of literature intends to move beyond a zero-sum understanding of profit shifting. Sometimes shifted profits are seen as a mere transfer of tax base from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. However, such a mechanical view ignores the possibility that profit shifting could shape real economic outcomes. For instance, government of a high-tax jurisdiction could be forced to cut back its expenditures due to weaker corporate-tax receipts. A multinational firm, on the other hand, could channel its corporate-tax savings into business expansion. Several recent papers identify such real effects of profit shifting. Suárez Serrato (2018) finds that a curb on profit shifting can have unintended consequences for a high-tax jurisdiction like the US in the form of lower investment and lower employment. Martin, Parenti and Toubal (2023) argue that corporate-tax avoidance gives firms a competitive edge, which has a positive causal effect on their sales. Altshuler et al. (2025) document that the decision of a multinational to engage in complex tax planning positively affects its domestic payroll and investment. In comparison to these papers, my analysis of profit shifting does not rely on an empirical identification strategy. I instead use the model presented here as a laboratory in which I analyze the impact of profit shifting on different macroeconomic variables.

I offer in this paper a purely positive analysis of corporate taxation and do not make any normative statements about the optimal design of corporate taxation. An analysis of Ramsey

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<sup>1</sup>Mertens and Ravn (2013) explore the dynamic effects of a corporate-tax shock in a structural vector autoregression. However, they do not distinguish between permanent and temporary shocks. They also abstract from open-economy issues: They do not quantify how corporate taxation affects the trade balance or the international operations of firms; they do not investigate the cross-border spillover and feedback effects.

corporate-tax policies in an open-economy setup is provided in Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2023) and Dyrda, Hong and Steinberg (2024b). Bauer, Davies and Haufler (2014) derive the optimal corporate-tax structure of a small open economy. Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008), Davies and Eckel (2010), Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), Haufler and Stähler (2013), and Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2024) scrutinize international competition over corporate tax rates. Wang (2020), Johannesen (2022), and Hebous and Keen (2023) point out possible welfare improvements from international tax coordination.

Lastly, my paper relates to the vast empirical public-finance literature on corporate taxation. The literature has, for example, estimated the impact of corporate taxes on wages (Arulampalam, Devereux and Maffini, 2012; Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch, 2018; Carbonnier et al., 2022; Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2023), investment (Zwick and Mahon, 2017; Ohrn, 2018; Curtis et al., 2021), or multinational activity (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004; Becker and Riedel, 2012; Becker, Fuest and Riedel, 2012). Such estimates have to be typically interpreted as partial-equilibrium effects—how the variable of interest responds to a change in corporate taxation when everything else is kept constant. In contrast, I explore here the general-equilibrium effects of corporate taxation. My exploration is based on a model that formalizes the interaction between firms, households, and governments of the domestic as well as overseas economy.

## 2 Model

The model economy consists of two countries: home and foreign. Variables and parameters of the home country are denoted by the subscript  $h$ . Similarly, the subscript  $f$  denotes the symbols that correspond to the foreign country. I describe only the home country in detail; the foreign country behaves analogously. I present the list of all equilibrium conditions in Appendix A.

### 2.1 Households

The home country is populated by a continuum of households  $[0; \mathcal{P}_h]$ . Each household is constituted by a continuum of members  $[0; 1]$ , who inelastically supply their labor. The households are either savers or non-savers. The share of the non-savers is captured by the parameter  $\mu_h$ .

### 2.1.1 Non-Savers

A non-saver household  $j \in [0; \mu_h \mathcal{P}_h]$  consumes its after-tax income completely:

$$c_{ht}^{ns}(j) = \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ht}^{va}} \left[ \int_{\vartheta \in \Theta_{ht}^{ns}(j)} (1 - \tau_{ht}^w) v_{ht}^{ns}(\vartheta, j) d\vartheta + \tau_{ht}^{ub} u_{ht}^{ns}(j) - \tau_{ht}^{ls,ns} \right].$$

An employed household member  $\vartheta \in \Theta_{ht}^{ns}(j)$  earns a real wage  $v_{ht}^{ns}(\vartheta, j)$ , which is taxed by  $\tau_{ht}^w$ . Unemployed household members  $u_{ht}^{ns}(j)$  receive real unemployment benefits  $\tau_{ht}^{ub}$ . Each non-saver household has to pay a real lump-sum tax  $\tau_{ht}^{ls,ns}$ . The consumption tax  $\tau_{ht}^{va}$  distorts the consumption of the non-saver  $c_{ht}^{ns}(j)$ . The role of the non-savers in the model is to mimic households that have no direct exposure to corporate income—households that are neither business owners nor participate in the stock market.

### 2.1.2 Savers

A saver household  $j \in (\mu_h \mathcal{P}_h; \mathcal{P}_h]$  maximizes its expected utility with respect to a budget and a capital-accumulation constraint:

$$\max_{c_{ht}^s(j), b_{ht}^s(j), b_{ht}^{*s}(j), i_{ht}^s(j), k_{ht}^s(j)} E_t \sum_{z=t}^{\infty} (\beta_h)^{z-t} \frac{[c_{hz}^s(j) - \chi_h c_{hz-1}^s(j)]^{1-\sigma_h} - 1}{1 - \sigma_h} \exp(\epsilon_{hz}^\beta)$$

s.t.

$$k_{hz}^s(j) = (1 - \delta_h^k) k_{hz-1}^s(j) + i_{hz}^s(j) \left[ 1 - \frac{\Upsilon_h}{2} \left( \frac{i_{hz}^s(j)}{i_{hz-1}^s(j)} - 1 \right)^2 \right] \exp(\epsilon_{hz}^i)$$

$$\begin{aligned} (1 + \tau_{hz}^{va}) c_{hz}^s(j) + i_{hz}^s(j) + b_{hz}^s(j) + \mathcal{E}_z b_{hz}^{*s}(j) + \Gamma_{hz}^s + \tau_{hz}^k (r_{hz}^k - \delta_h^k) k_{hz-1}^s(j) + \tau_{hz}^{ls,s} = \\ = \int_{\vartheta \in \Theta_{hz}^s(j)} (1 - \tau_{hz}^w) v_{hz}^s(\vartheta, j) d\vartheta + \tau_{hz}^{ub} u_{hz}^s(j) + r_{hz}^k k_{hz-1}^s(j) + \frac{R_{hz-1}}{\Pi_{hz}} b_{hz-1}^s(j) + \mathcal{E}_z \frac{R_{z-1}^*}{\Pi_{fz}} b_{hz-1}^{*s}(j) + d_{hz}^s \end{aligned}$$

As in the case of the non-savers, a saver household obtains after-tax labor income and unemployment benefits. Apart from consumption  $c_{ht}^s(j)$ , a saver decides how much to invest into domestic government bonds  $b_{ht}^s(j)$ , international private bonds  $b_{ht}^{*s}(j)$ , and physical capital  $k_{ht}^s(j)$ . The bonds yield in real home terms  $R_{ht-1}/\Pi_{ht}$  and  $\mathcal{E}_t(R_{t-1}^*/\Pi_{ft})$ , respectively. How successfully physical investment  $i_{ht}^s(j)$  is installed depends on investment-adjustment costs. The resulting capital stock brings the real return  $r_{ht}^k = R_{ht}^k/P_{ht}$ , which is taxed by  $\tau_{ht}^k$ . Each saver household has to pay a real lump-sum tax  $\tau_{ht}^{ls,s}$ . In addition, each home saver finances the creation of new home firms by  $\Gamma_{ht}^s$ . The variable  $d_{ht}^s$  sums the dividend income and the

income that the saver household generates from advertising vacancies.<sup>2</sup>

## 2.2 Labor Market

A continuum of home labor-service providers  $[0; \mathcal{P}_h]$  hire home household members to supply labor services to firms that produce in the home country. A labor-service provider  $s \in [0; \mathcal{P}_h]$  employs  $e_{ht}(s)$  workers for a real wage  $v_{ht}(s) = V_{ht}(s)/P_{ht}$  and supplies labor services  $l_{ht}(s)$  for a real price  $w_{ht} = W_{ht}/P_{ht}$ . In order to maximize its expected profit, the labor-service provider controls the number of posted vacancies  $pv_{ht}(s)$ . The vacancies are associated with quadratic costs, which are paid to saver households, who spread information about the new job postings.

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{pv_{ht}(s), e_{ht}(s), l_{ht}(s)} \quad & E_t \sum_{z=t}^{\infty} (\beta_h)^{z-t} \frac{l_{hz}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \left\{ w_{hz} l_{hz}(s) - v_{hz}(s) e_{hz}(s) - \frac{\Phi_h}{2} [pv_{hz}(s)]^2 \right\} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ & l_{hz}(s) = e_{hz}(s) \\ & e_{hz}(s) = (1 - \delta_h^e) e_{hz-1}(s) + \frac{M_{hz}}{PV_{hz}} pv_{hz}(s) \end{aligned}$$

The saver households own the labor-service providers. Therefore, each labor-service provider applies the savers' stochastic discount factor. Employees leave their jobs at an exogenous separation rate  $\delta_h^e$ . The posted vacancies are filled at a rate  $M_{ht}/PV_{ht}$ , where  $PV_{ht} = \int_0^{\mathcal{P}_h} pv_{ht}(s) ds$ . The total employment is defined as  $e_{ht} = \int_0^{\mathcal{P}_h} e_{ht}(s) ds$ . The total number of matches  $M_{ht}$  comes from an aggregate matching function:

$$M_{ht} = A_{ht}^M (\mathcal{P}_h - e_{ht-1} + \delta_h^e e_{ht-1})^{\alpha_h^M} (PV_{ht})^{1-\alpha_h^M},$$

in which individuals who enter the quarter as unemployed meet the posted vacancies. The pool of the unemployed at the beginning of quarter  $t$  comprises individuals  $\mathcal{P}_h - e_{ht-1}$ , who have already been unemployed in quarter  $t-1$ , and individuals  $\delta_h^e e_{ht-1}$ , who got separated between quarters  $t-1$  and  $t$ . After the hiring process is finished, the unemployment rate reads:

$$u_{ht} = \frac{\mathcal{P}_h - e_{ht}}{\mathcal{P}_h},$$

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<sup>2</sup>To keep the model compact, I do not consider dividend taxes. A proper treatment of dividend taxation would require the introduction of a principal-agent problem, which would further enlarge the model. Dividend taxes were studied, for example, by Chetty and Saez (2005), Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), or Boissel and Matray (2022).

where the numerator measures the number of individuals who stay unemployed during quarter  $t$ , and the denominator corresponds to the labor force.

Nominal wages of the labor-service providers exhibit stickiness. With probability  $\xi_h$ , the labor-service provider indexes its nominal wage to past and trend inflation:  $V_{ht}(s) = V_{ht-1}(s) (\Pi_{ht-1})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1-\varphi_h}$ . With probability  $1 - \xi_h$ , the labor-service provider pays the newly bargained wage:  $V_{ht}(s) = V_{ht}^*$ . Each firm-worker pair that negotiates the nominal wage faces the following Nash bargaining:

$$\max_{V_{ht}^*} [VW_{ht}(V_{ht}^*) - VU_{ht}]^{\iota_{ht}} [VF_{ht}(V_{ht}^*)]^{1-\iota_{ht}},$$

in which the joint surplus of the worker and the labor-service provider is maximized. The worker surplus equals the difference between the value from employment  $VW_{ht}(V_{ht}^*)$  and the value from unemployment  $VU_{ht}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} VW_{ht}(V_{ht}^*) &= (1 - \tau_{ht}^w) \frac{V_{ht}^*}{P_{ht}} + E_t \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} \left\{ \delta_h^e \left[ \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e e_{ht}} \int_0^{\mathcal{P}_h} VW_{ht+1}(V_{ht+1}(s)) \frac{M_{ht+1}(s)}{M_{ht+1}} ds \right. \right. \\ &\quad \left. \left. + \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e e_{ht}} \right) VU_{ht+1} \right] \right. \\ &\quad \left. + (1 - \delta_h^e) [\xi_h VW_{ht+1}(V_{ht}^* (\Pi_{ht})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1-\varphi_h}) + (1 - \xi_h) VW_{ht+1}(V_{ht+1}^*)] \right\}, \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} VU_{ht} &= \tau_{ht}^{ub} + E_t \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} \left\{ \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e e_{ht}} \int_0^{\mathcal{P}_h} VW_{ht+1}(V_{ht+1}(s)) \frac{M_{ht+1}(s)}{M_{ht+1}} ds \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e e_{ht}} \right) VU_{ht+1} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

The firm surplus is identical to the value  $VF_{ht}(V_{ht}^*)$ , which the labor-service provider receives from the match:

$$\begin{aligned} VF_{ht}(V_{ht}^*) &= w_{ht} - \frac{V_{ht}^*}{P_{ht}} \\ &\quad + E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} \left\{ \xi_h VF_{ht+1}(V_{ht}^* (\Pi_{ht})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1-\varphi_h}) + (1 - \xi_h) VF_{ht+1}(V_{ht+1}^*) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

## 2.3 Bundler

A representative bundler maximizes its after-tax profit:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{X_{ht}, X_{ht}(\omega) \forall \omega \in \Omega_{ht}} \quad & (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \left( P_{ht} X_{ht} - \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{ht}} p_{ht}(\omega) X_{ht}(\omega) d\omega \right) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \\ X_{ht} = \quad & \left[ \int_{\omega \in \Omega_{ht}} (X_{ht}(\omega))^{\frac{\theta_{ht}-1}{\theta_{ht}}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \end{aligned}$$

A set of goods  $\Omega_{ht}$  are available in the home country. Some of the goods are produced in the home country; some are imported from the foreign country. The bundler decides how much of each good  $\omega \in \Omega_{ht}$  to buy for a given price  $p_{ht}(\omega)$ . The goods  $X_{ht}(\omega)$  are bundled by a Dixit–Stiglitz aggregator into a final good  $X_{ht}$ , which is sold at  $P_{ht}$ . The bundler faces a corporate-income tax rate  $\tau_{ht}^c$ .<sup>3</sup> The final good  $X_{ht}$  is non-tradable; it is used in the home country for consumption and investment.

## 2.4 Firms

The saver households act in the model as venture capitalists. The home savers finance the creation of firms that are headquartered in the home country. An initial investment  $\kappa_{ht}^N$ , which is expressed in terms of the final good, is needed to create a single-product firm  $\omega$  that has headquarters in the home country. The savers pay for the initial investment and are, in exchange, rewarded by future dividends.<sup>4</sup> After the payment of the initial investment, the newly founded firm draws its idiosyncratic productivity  $a(\omega)$  from a Pareto distribution. A scale parameter  $\bar{a}_h^{min}$  together with a shape parameter  $\zeta_h$  characterizes the underlying probability-density function  $g_h(a)$ . The newly founded firm becomes active one quarter after the draw of its idiosyncratic productivity. The firm offers its good  $\omega$  in the home country and potentially also in the foreign country till it experiences an exogenous death shock. The exit occurs with a probability  $\delta_h$ .

The free-entry condition  $\kappa_{ht}^N = D_{ht}$  determines the number of the newly founded firms  $\mathcal{N}_{ht}$ . In equilibrium, the initial investment  $\kappa_{ht}^N$  has to equal the entrant's expected discounted

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<sup>3</sup>The bundler generates zero profits in equilibrium. Consequently, the corporate-tax revenue from the bundler equals zero.

<sup>4</sup>The model features, like the majority of open-macro models, full home bias in equities: Home households are the exclusive shareholders of firms that are headquartered in the home country.

stream of real after-tax profits  $D_{ht}$ :

$$D_{ht} = E_t \sum_{z=t+1}^{\infty} (1 - \delta_h)^{z-t} (\beta_h)^{z-t} \frac{\iota_{hz}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} \tilde{d}_{hz}.$$

The symbol  $\tilde{d}_{ht}$  denotes the average real after-tax profit of firms that are headquartered in the home country:

$$\tilde{d}_{ht} = \int_{\bar{a}_h^{min}}^{\infty} d_{ht}(a) g_h(a) da.$$

The expected after-tax profit  $\tilde{d}_{hz}$  is discounted by the probability of firm survival  $(1 - \delta_h)^{z-t}$  and by the stochastic discount factor of the saver households  $(\beta_h)^{z-t} (\iota_{hz}^{c,s} / \iota_{ht}^{c,s})$ . The number of active firms that are headquartered in the home country  $N_{ht}^h$  depends on the number of active home firms in the past quarter as well as on the number of home entrants:

$$N_{ht}^h = (1 - \delta_h) (N_{ht-1}^h + \mathcal{N}_{ht}).$$

In every quarter, an active firm decides whether to operate purely domestically or to operate internationally. If the firm decides for international operations, it has to specify the form how to serve the market abroad. The firm can supply the foreign market either by exporting or by producing abroad. Effectively, the firm chooses among three different strategies: the domestic strategy, the export strategy, and the multinational strategy.<sup>5</sup>

### 2.4.1 Domestic Strategy

The domestic strategy represents the simplest mode of operation a firm can select. For a firm  $\omega$  that is headquartered in the home country, the domestic strategy means producing and supplying its good only in the home country. Under the domestic strategy, the home firm  $\omega$  maximizes its after-tax profit with respect to the home production function and the

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<sup>5</sup>A firm's choice set that consists of a domestic, export, and a multinational strategy was used in the past by Devereux and Griffith (1998), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Lewis (2014), Fillat and Garetto (2015), Gumpert et al. (2020), or Imura (2023).

demand of the home bundler:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{p_{ht}(\omega), k_{ht}(\omega), l_{ht}(\omega), y_{ht}(\omega)} (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) [p_{ht}(\omega)X_{ht}(\omega) - R_{ht}^k k_{ht}(\omega) - (1 + \tau_{ht}^p) W_{ht} l_{ht}(\omega)] \\
& \text{s.t.} \\
& X_{ht}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ht}(\omega)}{P_{ht}} \right)^{-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} \\
& y_{ht}(\omega) = a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} a(\omega) (k_{ht}(\omega))^{\alpha_h} (l_{ht}(\omega))^{1-\alpha_h} \\
& X_{ht}(\omega) = y_{ht}(\omega)
\end{aligned}$$

The firm sets its price  $p_{ht}(\omega)$ . The output  $y_{ht}(\omega)$ , which arises from an optimal input mix of capital  $k_{ht}(\omega)$  and labor services  $l_{ht}(\omega)$ , satisfies the demand of the bundler  $X_{ht}(\omega)$ . Apart from the factor inputs and the firm-specific productivity, the output depends on the aggregate productivity  $a_{ht}$  and the government capital  $gk_{ht}$ .<sup>6</sup> The home government collects an employer tax  $\tau_{ht}^p$  and a corporate-income tax  $\tau_{ht}^c$ .

The domestic strategy is optimal for firms with a low idiosyncratic productivity:  $a(\omega) \in [\bar{a}_h^{min}; \bar{a}_{ht}^{ex}]$ . The cutoff  $\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex}$  denotes the idiosyncratic productivity at which home firms are indifferent between the domestic and the export strategy. The variable  $N_{ht}^{h,dom}$  captures the number of home firms that play the domestic strategy.

## 2.4.2 Export Strategy

Let us focus again on a firm  $\omega$  that is headquartered in the home country. If such a firm chooses the export strategy, it serves the home as well as the foreign market from a home plant. During the maximization of its after-tax profit, the firm  $\omega$  takes into account the

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<sup>6</sup>My analysis abstracts from a possible impact of corporate taxation on long-run growth. I assume the aggregate productivity  $a_{ht}$  to follow an exogenous stationary process. This assumption broadly corresponds to the findings of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2017), who show that low and moderate corporate tax rates have only a small impact on long-run growth rates.

demand of the home and foreign bundler as well as the home production function:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{p_{ht}(\omega), p_{ft}(\omega), k_{ht}(\omega), l_{ht}(\omega), y_{ht}(\omega)} (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) [p_{ht}(\omega)X_{ht}(\omega) + S_t p_{ft}(\omega)X_{ft}(\omega) - R_{ht}^k k_{ht}(\omega) \\
& \quad - (1 + \tau_{ht}^p) W_{ht} l_{ht}(\omega) - P_{ht} \kappa_{ht}^{ex}] \\
& \quad \text{s.t.} \\
& \quad X_{ht}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ht}(\omega)}{P_{ht}} \right)^{-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} \\
& \quad X_{ft}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ft}(\omega)}{P_{ft}} \right)^{-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} \\
& \quad y_{ht}(\omega) = a_{ht} (g k_{ht})^{\gamma_h} a(\omega) (k_{ht}(\omega))^{\alpha_h} (l_{ht}(\omega))^{1-\alpha_h} \\
& \quad X_{ht}(\omega) + \eta_{ht} X_{ft}(\omega) = y_{ht}(\omega)
\end{aligned}$$

The export strategy entails iceberg costs  $\eta_{ht}$  and a fixed cost  $\kappa_{ht}^{ex}$ . Similarly to Ghironi and Melitz (2005), firms incur the period fixed cost of exporting in the country in which they are headquartered. The firm  $\omega$  observes the nominal exchange rate  $S_t$  and prices to market accordingly by controlling  $p_{ht}(\omega)$  and  $p_{ft}(\omega)$ .

In equilibrium, firms with a medium idiosyncratic productivity  $a(\omega) \in (\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex}; \bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}]$  play the export strategy. The cutoff  $\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}$  captures the idiosyncratic productivity of home firms at which the export strategy yields the same after-tax profit as the multinational strategy. The number of home firms that select the export strategy equals  $N_{ht}^{h,ex}$ .

### 2.4.3 Multinational Strategy

The multinational strategy represents the most sophisticated mode of operation a firm can select. If a firm chooses the multinational strategy, it serves the home market from a home plant and the foreign market from a foreign plant. The optimization problem of a firm  $\omega$  that is headquartered in the home country and decides to play the multinational strategy

has the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\substack{p_{ht}(\omega), k_{ht}(\omega), l_{ht}(\omega), y_{ht}(\omega), \\ p_{ft}(\omega), k_{ft}(\omega), l_{ft}(\omega), y_{ft}(\omega)}} (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) [p_{ht}(\omega)X_{ht}(\omega) - R_{ht}^k k_{ht}(\omega) - (1 + \tau_{ht}^p) W_{ht} l_{ht}(\omega) - P_{ht} \kappa_{ht}^{mn}] \\
& \quad + S_t (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) [p_{ft}(\omega)X_{ft}(\omega) - R_{ft}^k k_{ft}(\omega) - (1 + \tau_{ft}^p) W_{ft} l_{ft}(\omega)] \\
& \quad \text{s.t.} \\
& \quad X_{ht}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ht}(\omega)}{P_{ht}} \right)^{-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} \\
& \quad X_{ft}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ft}(\omega)}{P_{ft}} \right)^{-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} \\
& \quad y_{ht}(\omega) = a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} a(\omega) (k_{ht}(\omega))^{\alpha_h} (l_{ht}(\omega))^{1-\alpha_h} \\
& \quad y_{ft}(\omega) = a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f} a(\omega) (k_{ft}(\omega))^{\alpha_f} (l_{ft}(\omega))^{1-\alpha_f} \\
& \quad X_{ht}(\omega) = y_{ht}(\omega) \\
& \quad X_{ft}(\omega) = y_{ft}(\omega)
\end{aligned}$$

The firm maximizes its worldwide after-tax profit with respect to the home and foreign demand as well as the home and foreign production function. Similarly to the export strategy, the firm encounters a period fixed cost  $\kappa_{ht}^{mn}$ , which is expressed in terms of the home final good. The fixed cost  $\kappa_{ht}^{mn}$  can be interpreted, for instance, as business services that the parent firm demands in order to manage the multinational production.

Only firms with the highest idiosyncratic productivity  $a(\omega) \in (\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}; \infty)$  find the multinational strategy optimal. The number of home firms that select the multinational strategy is denoted by  $N_{ht}^{h,mn}$ .

## 2.5 Fiscal Policy

The government balances the fiscal-budget constraint:

$$GC_{ht} + GI_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^{ub} u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \frac{R_{ht-1}}{\Pi_{ht}} b_{ht-1} = \tau_{ht}^{ls,ns} \mu_h \mathcal{P}_h + \tau_{ht}^{ls,s} (1 - \mu_h) \mathcal{P}_h + TR_{ht} + b_{ht}.$$

While the government spends money on government consumption  $GC_{ht}$ , government investment  $GI_{ht}$ , unemployment benefits, and debt repayment, it generates revenue from lump-sum taxes, non-lump-sum taxes  $TR_{ht}$ , and bond issuance  $b_{ht}$ . The unemployment benefits replace only a part of the labor income:  $\tau_h^{ub} = \psi_h^{ub} v_h$ . The group of the non-lump-sum taxes consists

of the capital, employee, employer, consumption, and corporate-income tax:

$$TR_{ht} = \tau_{ht}^k (r_{ht}^k - \delta_h^k) K_{ht-1} + \tau_{ht}^w v_{ht} e_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^p w_{ht} L_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^{va} C_{ht} + TR_{ht}^c.$$

The model abstracts from the possibility of pass-through taxation. All firms in the model have to pay the corporate-income tax. They are not allowed to pass their profits into the tax base of the personal-income tax. Like the majority of OECD countries, the model features territorial taxation. Profits that multinational firms earn abroad face no repatriation taxes. The real revenue from the corporate-income tax consequently reads:

$$\begin{aligned} TR_{ht}^c = & \tau_{ht}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ht-1}^h + \tau_{ht}^c \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,ex} \\ & + \tau_{ht}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h})^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \tau_{ht}^c k_{ht}^{ex} N_{ht}^{h,ex} - \tau_{ht}^c k_{ht}^{mn} N_{ht}^{h,mn}. \end{aligned}$$

The variable  $\tilde{q}_{ht}^h$  denotes the average relative price of home firms on the domestic market,  $\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h}$  stands for the average relative price of home exporters on the overseas market, and  $\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h}$  is the average relative price of foreign multinationals in the home country.

Government capital  $GK_{ht}$  accumulates in line with the usual rule:

$$GK_{ht} = (1 - \delta_h^{GK}) GK_{ht-1} + GI_{ht}.$$

The productivity of a firm that produces in the home country depends on the government capital per active firm  $gk_{ht}$ :

$$gk_{ht} = \frac{GK_{ht-1}}{N_{ht-1}^h + N_{ft}^{f,mn}}.$$

In the simulations of Section 4, 5, and 6, I vary the home corporate-income tax rate  $\tau_{ht}^c$ . As is common in the literature, the government balances its fiscal-budget constraint in a non-distortionary fashion (i.a., Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2006; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2017; Spencer, 2022). The government adjusts its bonds  $b_{ht}$  and lump-sum taxes on savers  $\tau_{ht}^{ls,s}$  to satisfy the fiscal constraint. It follows from Ricardian equivalence that the exact combination of government bonds and lump-sum taxes on savers is irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome. The remaining fiscal instruments are kept constant during the simulations; they are calibrated to values that Section 3 presents. Throughout the paper, I make the usual assumption of a passive fiscal policy and an active monetary policy.

## 2.6 Monetary Policy

The central bank conducts its monetary policy by an interest-rate rule:

$$\frac{R_{ht}}{R_h} = \left( \frac{R_{ht-1}}{R_h} \right)^{\phi_h^R} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi_{ht}}{\Pi_h} \right)^{\phi_h^\Pi} \left( \frac{Y_{ht}}{Y_{ht-1}} \right)^{\phi_h^Y} \right]^{1-\phi_h^R} \exp(\epsilon_{ht}^R).$$

The nominal interest rate  $R_{ht}$  responds to inflation  $\Pi_{ht} = P_{ht}/P_{ht-1}$  and output growth  $Y_{ht}/Y_{ht-1}$ .

## 2.7 International Linkages

The gross growth rate of the nominal exchange rate  $\Delta S_t$  can be expressed in terms of the growth rate of the real exchange rate  $\mathcal{E}_t/\mathcal{E}_{t-1}$  and the inflation differential  $\Pi_{ht}/\Pi_{ft}$ :

$$\Delta S_t = \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} = \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} \frac{\Pi_{ht}}{\Pi_{ft}}.$$

The international nominal interest rate  $R_t^*$  features a risk premium, which depends on the amount of international bonds  $b_t^*$ :

$$R_t^* = R_{ft} \exp\left(-\phi^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_t b_t^*}{Y_{ht}}\right).$$

Under a positive value of  $b_t^*$ , the home country is a lender; under a negative value of  $b_t^*$ , the home country is a borrower. If one combines the budget constraints of the home and the foreign country, one obtains the following international relation:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} (Y_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t Y_{ft}) &= \frac{1}{2} (X_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t X_{ft}) + \mathcal{E}_t b_t^* - \mathcal{E}_t \frac{R_{t-1}^*}{\Pi_{ft}} b_{t-1}^* \\ &+ \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn}. \end{aligned}$$

A cross-country difference in output leads either to an adjustment of international bonds or to cross-country differences in domestic demand and repatriated profits. This relation represents the so-called balance-of-payments constraint. To see this fact more explicitly, let's combine the cross-country difference in GDP ( $Y_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t Y_{ft}$ ) with the cross-country difference

in final domestic demand ( $X_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t X_{ft}$ ). The rewritten equation then looks like:

$$0 = NX_{ht} + \mathcal{E}_t \frac{R_{t-1}^*}{\Pi_{ft}} b_{t-1}^* - \mathcal{E}_t b_t^* \\ + \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1 - \theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn} - \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1 - \theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn}.$$

The equation requires components of the balance of payments to sum to zero. In other words, net exports  $NX_{ht}$  have to be in line with cross-border flows of bonds and dividends.

### 3 Calibration

Table 1 presents the calibration of the model. As it is common in the open-macro literature, the two countries—home and foreign—are symmetrically calibrated (i.a., Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Bergin and Corsetti, 2023; Itskhoki and Mukhin, 2025).<sup>7</sup> Their parameters are set to conventional values. The number of households is normalized to one; a fourth of the households behave as non-savers (Coenen et al., 2012; Drautzburg and Uhlig, 2015). Because the time periods in the model represent quarters, I set the discount factor to 0.99. The saver households possess a logarithmic utility function with an internal habit of 0.5. The selected habit formation conforms with estimates summarized in the meta-analysis by Havranek, Rusnak and Sokolova (2017). While the private capital depreciates at a rate of 2.5%, the installation of new capital suffers from investment-adjustment costs of size four. Such costs are in line with estimates reviewed by Ascari et al. (2024). The risk premium of international bonds features a sensitivity to outstanding debt of 0.1. The net-foreign-asset position between the home and foreign country is balanced in the steady state.

A nominal-wage contract exhibits on average a duration of one year (Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk, 2014; Bills, Chang and Kim, 2022). If the wage contract is not renegotiated, the nominal wage is equally indexed to past and trend inflation. Employers and employees have the same bargaining power (Krause and Lubik, 2007; Leduc and Liu, 2016; Bills, Chang and Kim, 2022). The average employer-employee match lasts for two and a half years (Shimer, 2012; Leduc and Liu, 2016; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt, 2016). The aggregate matching function puts identical weights on the unemployed and posted vacancies (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; Gertler, Sala and Trigari, 2008; Leduc and Liu, 2016). I calibrate the vacancy costs and the steady-state matching efficiency such that the steady-state unemployment rate and the steady-state vacancy-filling rate equal six percent and 70%,

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<sup>7</sup>The two countries can be freely interpreted as, for example, the US vis-à-vis the rest of the world or the US vis-à-vis the EU.

Group	Symbol	Description	Value
Households	$\mathcal{P}_h, \mathcal{P}_f$	population size	1
	$\mu_h, \mu_f$	fraction of non-savers	0.25
	$\beta_h, \beta_f$	discount factor	0.99
	$\sigma_h, \sigma_f$	relative risk aversion	1
	$\chi_h, \chi_f$	habit formation	0.5
	$\delta_h^k, \delta_f^k$	depreciation of private capital	0.025
	$\Upsilon_h, \Upsilon_f$	investment-adjustment costs	4
	$\phi^*$	sensitivity of risk premium	0.1
	$b^*$	steady-state international bonds	0
	Labor Market	$\xi_h, \xi_f$	nominal-wage stickiness
$\varphi_h, \varphi_f$		weight of past inflation in wage indexation	0.5
$\iota_h, \iota_f$		steady-state bargaining power of labor	0.5
$\delta_h^e, \delta_f^e$		separation rate	0.1
$\alpha_h^M, \alpha_f^M$		weight of the unemployed in the matching function	0.5
$\Phi_h, \Phi_f$		vacancy costs	8.02
$A_h^M, A_f^M$		steady-state matching efficiency	0.654
Firms		$\theta_h, \theta_f$	steady-state price elasticity
	$\bar{a}_h^{min}, \bar{a}_f^{min}$	scale parameter of Pareto distribution	1
	$\zeta_h, \zeta_f$	shape parameter of Pareto distribution	8
	$\delta_h, \delta_f$	exit rate	0.025
	$\gamma_h, \gamma_f$	weight of government capital in production function	0
	$\alpha_h, \alpha_f$	weight of private capital in production function	0.177
	$\eta_h, \eta_f$	steady-state iceberg costs	1.2
	$\kappa_h^N, \kappa_f^N$	steady-state initial investment	1
	$\kappa_h^{ex}, \kappa_f^{ex}$	steady-state fixed cost of export strategy	0.005
	$\kappa_h^{mn}, \kappa_f^{mn}$	steady-state fixed cost of multinational strategy	0.626
Fiscal Policy	$\tau_h^c, \tau_f^c$	steady-state corporate-income tax rate	0.25
	$\tau_h^p, \tau_f^p$	steady-state employer tax rate	0.1
	$\tau_h^{va}, \tau_f^{va}$	steady-state consumption tax rate	0.1
	$\tau_h^w, \tau_f^w$	steady-state employee tax rate	0.15
	$\tau_h^k, \tau_f^k$	steady-state capital tax rate	0.25
	$\tau_h^{ls,ns}, \tau_f^{ls,ns}$	steady-state lump-sum tax on non-savers	0
	$\psi_h^{ub}, \psi_f^{ub}$	replacement rate of unemployment benefits	0.34
	$GC_h/Y_h, GC_f/Y_f$	government consumption to GDP in steady state	0.2
	$GI_h/Y_h, GI_f/Y_f$	government investment to GDP in steady state	0.03
	$\delta_h^{GK}, \delta_f^{GK}$	depreciation of government capital	0.025
Monetary Policy	$\Pi_h, \Pi_f$	steady-state inflation	1.005
	$\phi_h^R, \phi_f^R$	interest-rate smoothing	0.75
	$\phi_h^\Pi, \phi_f^\Pi$	reaction to inflation	1.5
	$\phi_h^Y, \phi_f^Y$	reaction to GDP growth	0.2

Table 1: Calibration

respectively.

Firms encounter a price elasticity of seven (e.g., Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland,

2012; Adam and Weber, 2019). They thus charge a markup of roughly 17% over their marginal costs, which is in line with estimates provided in Basu (2019) or Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2023). The scale parameter of the Pareto distribution—the lowest productivity a firm can draw—is normalized to one (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Fillat and Garetto, 2015). The shape parameter of the Pareto distribution is set to eight. This means that the upper tail of domestic sales follows a power-law distribution with a steady-state exponent  $\zeta/(\theta - 1) \approx 1.3$ , which lies in the range of estimates reported by Gaubert and Itskhoki (2021, Figure A4). On average, a firm experiences a death shock after 10 years of existence (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2012). The productivity of firms is not affected by government capital. The weight of private capital in the production function ensures that the steady-state ratio of total private investment to GDP equals 18%. Export firms have to overcome iceberg costs, which cause a wedge of 20% between export sales and production (Lewis, 2014; Fillat and Garetto, 2015). The initial investment that is required during firm creation is normalized to one (Ghironi and Melitz, 2005; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2012). The fixed cost of the export strategy implies a steady-state ratio between exports and GDP of 15%. The fixed cost of the multinational strategy is calibrated such that affiliates of foreign multinational firms are in the steady state responsible for 15% of the total turnover.

The home and foreign government tax the corporate income at 25%. The governments set the employer tax as well as the consumption tax to 10%, the employee tax to 15%, and the capital tax to 25%. The non-saver households neither receive lump-sum benefits nor have to pay lump-sum taxes. Unemployment benefits replace 40% of the after-tax labor income. I calibrate the steady-state ratio between government consumption and GDP to 20% and the ratio between government investment and GDP to three percent. The government capital depreciates at the same pace as the private capital.

Monetary policy in both countries targets annual inflation of two percent. Due to the smoothing parameter of 0.75, the central banks sluggishly adjust their nominal interest rates. The reactions of the central banks to inflation and GDP growth equal 1.5 and 0.2. Table 2 lists the steady-state great ratios of the model at the presented calibration.

## 4 The Long-Run Effects of Corporate Taxation

This section studies how corporate taxation affects the long run of the economy. I analyze how the steady state of the model alters when the corporate-income tax rate changes. I vary the home corporate tax rate  $\tau_h^c$  between 0% and 50% while the foreign corporate tax rate  $\tau_f^c$  stays unchanged at 25%. To ensure that the fiscal-budget constraints in the home and

	Home Country	Foreign Country
Private Consumption/GDP	59.0	59.0
Private Investment/GDP	18.0	18.0
Government Consumption/GDP	20.0	20.0
Government Investment/GDP	3.0	3.0
Export/GDP	15.0	15.0
Import/GDP	15.0	15.0
Turnover of Affiliates of Foreign Multinationals/Total Turnover	15.0	15.0
Unemployed/Labor Force	6.0	6.0
Matches/Vacancies	70.0	70.0
Matches/Job Seekers	61.0	61.0
Revenue from Corporate-Income Tax/GDP	3.3	3.3
Revenue from Employer Tax/GDP	6.4	6.4
Revenue from Consumption Tax/GDP	5.9	5.9
Revenue from Employee Tax/GDP	8.7	8.7
Revenue from Capital Tax/GDP	1.3	1.3
Expenditure on Unemployment Benefits/GDP	1.3	1.3

Table 2: Great Ratios of the Model Economy in Percent

the foreign country are satisfied, government bonds and lump-sum taxes on saver households adjust accordingly. The remaining fiscal instruments are held constant at values that Table 1 presents. Figures 1–4 show the resulting steady states of home and foreign variables at the different calibrations of the home corporate tax rate. The long run of the home variables is depicted by black solid lines, the long run of the foreign variables by blue dashed lines.

A lower home corporate tax triggers more intensive firm creation in the home country  $\mathcal{N}_h$ , which translates into a larger number of home firms  $N_h^h$ . The larger number of home firms raises home output  $Y_h$ . The expansion of output leads to a stronger demand for capital  $K_h$  and labor services  $L_h$ . Saver households respond to the stronger demand for capital by expanding their investment  $I_h$ . Due to the expanded capital investment and the intensive firm creation, the broad definition of private investment  $\mathcal{I}_h$  rises as well.<sup>8</sup> A lower unemployment rate  $u_h$  together with a more generous wage  $v_h$  supports the private consumption  $C_h$ .

The size of the corporate-tax distortion also influences which strategy firms decide to play. The prevalence of the domestic, export, and multinational strategy among the home firms is determined by the corresponding productivity cutoffs  $\bar{a}_h^{ex}$  and  $\bar{a}_h^{mn}$ . Both cutoffs increase as the home corporate tax decreases. The increasing pattern of the export cutoff  $\bar{a}_h^{ex}$  is caused by the rising wage  $v_h$ .<sup>9</sup> A higher real wage discourages firms that feature a medium

<sup>8</sup>The model analysis corroborates empirical findings of Djankov et al. (2010), who identified an adverse effect of corporate taxes on investment and business density. A negative relation between corporate taxation and entry rates was empirically documented by Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011).

<sup>9</sup>The average export price of home firms  $\tilde{q}_f^{h,h}$  increases only negligibly despite of the rising real wage




Figure 1: The Long-Run Effect of Corporate Taxation on Output, Consumption, Investment, and the Number of Firms. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is set to values between 0% and 50%. All remaining parameters are kept constant. Output, consumption, investment, and the number of firms are normalized to 100% at  $\tau_h^c = 25\%$ .




Figure 2: The Long-Run Effect of Corporate Taxation on the Operational Status of Firms. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is set to values between 0% and 50%. All remaining parameters are kept constant. The numbers of firms in the bottom subplots are normalized to 100% at  $\tau_h^c = 25\%$ .




Figure 3: The Long-Run Effect of Corporate Taxation on the Labor Market and International Trade. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is set to values between 0% and 50%. All remaining parameters are kept constant. Exports, imports, and wages are normalized to 100% at  $\tau_h^c = 25\%$ .




Figure 4: The Long-Run Effect of Corporate Taxation on Tax Revenue and Repatriated Profits. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is set to values between 0% and 50%. All remaining parameters are kept constant. All variables are normalized to 100% at  $\tau_h^c = 25\%$ .

idiosyncratic productivity from exporting and instead prompts them to focus entirely on the domestic market. Therefore, the fraction of domestically oriented firms  $N_h^{h,dom}/N_h^h$  increases with a lower corporate tax  $\tau_h^c$ . For high-productivity home firms, which contemplate serving the foreign market either by exporting or multinational activity, the export strategy becomes through a home corporate-tax cut more appealing. As a result, the fraction of multinational firms  $N_h^{h,mn}/N_h^h$  declines with a lower corporate tax  $\tau_h^c$ . The fraction of export firms  $N_h^{h,ex}/N_h^h$  decreases as well because the number of firms that switch from the multinational strategy to the export strategy does not compensate for the firms that switch from the export strategy to the domestic strategy.

To figure out the impact of corporate taxation on the absolute number of firms playing one of the three operational strategies ( $N_h^{h,dom}$ ,  $N_h^{h,ex}$ , and  $N_h^{h,mn}$ ), one has to combine two effects that I just described in the preceding paragraphs. Corporate taxation affects the prevalence of the specific strategy ( $N_h^{h,dom}/N_h^h$ ,  $N_h^{h,ex}/N_h^h$ , and  $N_h^{h,mn}/N_h^h$ ) as well as the total number of firms ( $N_h^h$ ). When thinking about domestically oriented firms, the two effects point into the same direction. Therefore, the absolute number of domestically oriented firms  $N_h^{h,dom}$  rises if the corporate tax rate decreases. In the case of exporters and multinationals, the two effects are opposing and roughly offset each other. The absolute numbers of exporters  $N_h^{h,ex}$  and multinationals  $N_h^{h,mn}$  thus stay nearly stable despite changes in the corporate tax rate.

At lower levels of the home corporate tax, the smaller prevalence of the export strategy among the home firms is reflected in weaker home exports  $EX_h$ . By contrast, the home

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$v_h$ . The average productivity of home exporters  $\tilde{a}_f^{h,h}$ , which increases with a lower corporate tax rate  $\tau_h^c$ , stabilizes the average export price.

import  $IM_h$  strengthens with a lower home corporate tax. The import is propelled by a stronger home demand  $X_h$ . The export and import jointly imply that the home net exports  $NX_h$  worsen as the home corporate tax is reduced. The home country experiences a trade surplus if the tax rate  $\tau_h^c$  lies above 25% and a trade deficit if the tax rate  $\tau_h^c$  lies below 25%. Under the symmetrical calibration, when both countries tax the corporate income at 25%, the international trade is balanced. Because components of the balance of payments have to sum to zero, the reaction of net exports is mirrored in the behavior of repatriated profits. Trade surpluses are associated with net dividend outflows, trade deficits with net dividend inflows.

The model analysis demonstrates that a change in the home corporate tax triggers several cross-border effects. A reduction in the home corporate tax has a small positive impact on foreign variables like output  $Y_f$ , real wage  $v_f$ , private consumption  $C_f$ , and tax revenue  $TR_f$ . Moreover, if one cuts the home corporate tax rate, the home market becomes more attractive for foreign firms. Technically speaking, the stronger home demand  $X_h$  and the lower taxation  $\tau_h^c$  decrease the productivity cutoffs of foreign firms  $\bar{a}_f^{ex}$  and  $\bar{a}_f^{mn}$ . The fraction of export firms  $N_f^{f,ex}/N_f^f$  as well as the fraction of multinational firms  $N_f^{f,mn}/N_f^f$  rise with a lower home corporate tax.<sup>10</sup>

## 5 Adjustment Dynamics Induced by a Corporate-Tax Reform

While Section 4 presents how a change in the corporate tax rate affects the long run of the economy, Section 5 describes how the long run is reached. I investigate here which adjustment dynamics a corporate-tax reform induces before the economy stabilizes at a steady state. Concretely, I simulate three different scenarios, in which the home government always lowers the corporate-income tax rate from 25% to 20%. The first scenario represents a permanent tax cut, which the home government announces and implements at the beginning of the simulation. The second scenario considers a temporary tax cut. The home government lowers the corporate tax rate at the beginning of the simulation and promises to keep it at 20% for the next five years. After the five years pass, the tax rate returns back to 25% as promised by the government. In the third scenario, the home government announces and starts to implement the same temporary tax cut as in the second scenario. However, the government does not now deliver on its promise to reverse the tax cut. The government instead surprises economic agents in quarter 21 by making the cut permanent. In all three

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<sup>10</sup>The relevance of the corporate tax for the location decision of a multinational firm was empirically documented by Devereux and Griffith (1998) or Barrios et al. (2012).

scenarios, the tax reforms are financed in a non-distortionary fashion by a combination of government bonds and lump-sum taxes on saver households.

Figures 5–8 show how home and foreign variables adjust during the three simulated scenarios; additional plots are provided in Appendix B. The first scenario is depicted by black solid lines, the second scenario by blue dashed lines, and the third scenario by green dotted lines. The permanent corporate-tax cuts in the first and the third scenario prompt the economy to move from the original steady state toward a new long run. In contrast, the temporary corporate-tax cut in the second scenario induces only a transitory deviation from the original steady state.

The two simulations of a permanent tax reform—scenario 1 and 3—share the same path of the corporate-income tax. In both scenarios, the home corporate tax drops in the first quarter from 25% to 20% and stays reduced for the rest of the simulation. Therefore, the differences in the adjustment dynamics between the first and the third scenario arise purely due to the differences in how the tax cut is announced. Because the first scenario reveals the permanent character of the tax cut already at the beginning of the simulation, the economy immediately starts converging toward a new steady state. In the third scenario, economic agents at first perceive, in line with the government’s announcement, the tax cut as temporary. The adjustment dynamics under the third scenario are hence during the first five years identical to the dynamics under the second scenario. In quarter 21, when the home government announces that the corporate-tax cut becomes permanent, economic agents update their beliefs about the nature of the tax reform. The economy leaves the trajectory of the temporary reform and begins approaching a new long run.

One of the key predictions of the dynamic model is that output responds more strongly to a permanent than to a temporary corporate-tax cut. This result closely relates to the different firm dynamics under the permanent and the temporary scenario. Under the permanent cut, the expectation that the corporate tax rate stays reduced not only in the near but also in the distant future triggers large firm creation  $\mathcal{N}_{ht}$ , which leads to a substantial increase in the number of home firms  $N_{ht}^h$ . The substantially increased number of home firms translates into a sizable expansion of the home output  $Y_{ht}$ . Under the temporary scenario, economic agents anticipate the reversal of the tax cut. The rise in firm creation is therefore smaller and short-lived. The number of new firms falls below the steady state already before the corporate-income tax rate returns back to 25%. In consequence, the number of home firms and so the home output expand only modestly.

Furthermore, the simulations point out that it takes several quarters for households to benefit from a corporate-tax cut in the form of higher real wages and higher consumption. The delayed increase in the real wage  $v_{ht}$  and private consumption  $C_{ht}$  can be observed




Figure 5: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the permanent cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.




Figure 6: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the permanent cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.




Figure 7: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the permanent cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.




Figure 8: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.

under the permanent as well as the temporary scenario. The reduction in the corporate-income tax initiates a stronger demand for labor services  $L_{ht}$ . Labor-service providers react by posting more vacancies  $PV_{ht}$ . As the labor-service providers intensify their hiring activity, their vacancy costs increase. The rise in the vacancy costs feeds into higher marginal costs and consequently into faster inflation  $\Pi_{ht}$ . Because wages feature nominal stickiness, the real aggregate wage declines before increasing in line with the overall economic expansion. During the first quarters after the corporate-tax cut, households respond to the declined real wage and the elevated real interest rate  $E_t(R_{ht}/\Pi_{ht+1})$  by restricting their consumption. Later on, when the real wage climbs up and the real interest rate eases, the households decide to consume more.

The dynamics of the real wage and private consumption are mirrored in the behavior of net exports  $NX_{ht}$ . A robust demand in the foreign country  $X_{ft}$  supports home exports  $EX_{ht}$ . Nevertheless, the increasing real wage, through which the home economy loses its competitiveness, curbs the export in later quarters. The import  $IM_{ht}$  closely follows the path of consumption. It weakens during the first quarters and strengthens afterward. All in all, the home net exports improve at shorter and worsen at longer time horizons.

Finally, the simulated permanent cut in the corporate tax rate reveals that the induced loss of tax revenue markedly differs across time. The revenue from non-lump-sum taxes  $TR_{ht}$  is much more depressed at shorter horizons than in the long run. As the economy adjusts to the corporate-tax cut, all tax bases start enlarging. The partial self-financing of the reform becomes gradually more visible.

## 6 The Macroeconomic Impact of International Profit Shifting

So far my analysis has abstracted from the possibility of international profit shifting. In practice, multinational firms, which usually run subsidiaries in several countries with different corporate-income tax rates, have the option to engage in profit-shifting activities. The cross-country differences in corporate taxation create an incentive to move profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. Such profit reallocations help multinationals, by reducing the overall tax liability, to maximize the global after-tax profit. Instruments that multinationals can employ when shifting profits across borders are for instance royalties or interest payments.

The topic of tax-base erosion and profit shifting is currently high on the agenda of policymakers at the G20 and OECD level. Researchers in public finance generally agree on the existence of profit shifting. However, their estimates of shifted profits vary widely. Because

profit shifting represents a latent variable, it is a challenging endeavor to quantify its extent. As Dharmapala (2014) and Riedel (2018) summarize, the estimates crucially depend on the data and the method that researchers decide to use. More recently, Guvenen et al. (2022), Laffitte and Toubal (2022), Blouin and Robinson (2023), and Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman (2023) have provided additional estimates of profit shifting. I do not intend to offer here a new estimate of shifted profits. I investigate instead how the possibility of profit shifting affects macroeconomic outcomes.

Let me now describe how I introduce profit shifting into the model. Firms that choose to play the multinational strategy get the option to move profits between the home and foreign country. I discuss only the behavior of a multinational firm  $\omega$  whose headquarters is located in the home country. A foreign multinational behaves again in a similar fashion. The optimization problem of the multinational takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\substack{p_{ht}(\omega), k_{ht}(\omega), l_{ht}(\omega), y_{ht}(\omega), \\ p_{ft}(\omega), k_{ft}(\omega), l_{ft}(\omega), y_{ft}(\omega), \\ \Lambda_t(\omega)}} (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \left[ p_{ht}(\omega) X_{ht}(\omega) - R_{ht}^k k_{ht}(\omega) - (1 + \tau_{ht}^p) W_{ht} l_{ht}(\omega) - P_{ht} \kappa_{ht}^{mn} \right. \\
& \quad \left. - \Lambda_t(\omega) - P_{ht} \frac{\Xi_h}{2} \left( \frac{\Lambda_t(\omega)}{P_{ht}} \right)^2 \right] \\
& \quad + S_t (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \left[ p_{ft}(\omega) X_{ft}(\omega) - R_{ft}^k k_{ft}(\omega) - (1 + \tau_{ft}^p) W_{ft} l_{ft}(\omega) + \frac{1}{S_t} \Lambda_t(\omega) \right] \\
& \quad \text{s.t.} \\
& \quad X_{ht}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ht}(\omega)}{P_{ht}} \right)^{-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} \\
& \quad X_{ft}(\omega) = \left( \frac{p_{ft}(\omega)}{P_{ft}} \right)^{-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} \\
& \quad y_{ht}(\omega) = a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} a(\omega) (k_{ht}(\omega))^{\alpha_h} (l_{ht}(\omega))^{1-\alpha_h} \\
& \quad y_{ft}(\omega) = a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f} a(\omega) (k_{ft}(\omega))^{\alpha_f} (l_{ft}(\omega))^{1-\alpha_f} \\
& \quad X_{ht}(\omega) = y_{ht}(\omega) \\
& \quad X_{ft}(\omega) = y_{ft}(\omega)
\end{aligned}$$

In comparison to the profit maximization in Section 2.4.3, the set of control variables is expanded by the nominal shifted profit  $\Lambda_t(\omega)$ . The sign of  $\Lambda_t(\omega)$  reflects which direction of profit shifting the multinational selects. The multinational chooses a positive value when it wants to shift profits from the parent firm to the overseas affiliate. A negative value is selected when shifting from the affiliate to the parent is seen as desirable. If the multinational makes the decision to move a part of its profits across borders, it has to bear costs, which

are quadratic in real shifted profits  $\lambda_t(\omega) = \Lambda_t(\omega)/P_{ht}$ . The costs can be interpreted, for example, as expenditures on tax-advisory services. I assume home multinationals pay the profit-shifting costs to home saver households, who fulfill the role of tax advisors for firms that are headquartered in the home country. This modeling metaphor ensures the profit-shifting costs do not distort aggregate resource constraints. In Appendix C, I present what the introduction of profit shifting into the model implies for equilibrium conditions.

In order to easily assess the amount of shifted profits, I express the overall profit shifting of home multinational firms  $PS_{ht} = \lambda_{ht} N_{ht}^{h,mn}$  in relative terms. I define the ratio  $\rho_{ht}$ , which reveals how many percent of the profits that home multinationals could potentially shift from the high-tax to low-tax country are actually shifted:

$$\rho_{ht} = \begin{cases} \frac{PS_{ht}}{\mathcal{E}_t \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} (\bar{q}_{ft}^{h,f})^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn}} & \text{if } \tau_{ht}^c < \tau_{ft}^c \\ \frac{PS_{ht}}{\left[ \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} (\bar{q}_{ht}^{h,mn})^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} - \kappa_{ht}^{mn} - \frac{\Xi_h}{2} (\lambda_{ht})^2 \right] N_{ht}^{h,mn}} & \text{if } \tau_{ht}^c \geq \tau_{ft}^c \end{cases}$$

The sign of  $\rho_{ht}$  signals, in the same way as the sign of  $\Lambda_t(\omega)$ , the direction of profit shifting. Positive values are associated with shifting from firm headquarters, negative values with shifting toward firm headquarters. The profit-shifting ratio for foreign multinationals  $\rho_{ft}$  is defined by applying the same logic. In addition, I calculate the relative term  $\varrho_t$ :

$$\varrho_t = \begin{cases} \frac{\frac{1}{\bar{\varepsilon}_t} |PS_{ht}| + PS_{ft}}{Y_{ft}} & \text{if } \tau_{ht}^c < \tau_{ft}^c \\ \frac{PS_{ht} + \mathcal{E}_t |PS_{ft}|}{Y_{ht}} & \text{if } \tau_{ht}^c \geq \tau_{ft}^c \end{cases}$$

This ratio puts the total profit shifting of home and foreign multinationals in relation to output of the high-tax country, in which the shifted profits originate.

I investigate the impact of profit shifting on the macroeconomy by repeating the exercise from Section 4. I compute the steady state of the model extended by profit shifting at different home corporate tax rates  $\tau_h^c$  and compare it to the steady state of the baseline model, which abstracts from the possibility of shifted profits. The common parameters of the baseline and extended model are identically calibrated and set again to values from Table 1. To cope with the above described uncertainty surrounding the exact degree of profit shifting, I consider two calibrations of the profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). The baseline model without the possibility to shift profits can be viewed as a limiting case of the extended model in which the parameter of the profit-shifting costs approaches infinity. I would like to emphasize that the model variables like output, exports, or imports record true economic activities. Profit shifting is separately measured by the variables  $PS_{ht}$  and  $PS_{ft}$ . This is a convenient feature of the model setup. In contrast, if one uses national-accounts




Figure 9: The Long-Run Effect of Corporate Taxation on International Profit Shifting. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is varied between 0% and 50% while the corporate-income tax rate in the foreign country  $\tau_f^c$  is kept unchanged at 25%. The analysis considers two calibrations of profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). The signs of  $\rho_h$  and  $\rho_f$  capture the direction of profit shifting. A positive sign signals profit shifting from parent firms to offshore affiliates; a negative sign expresses profit shifting from offshore affiliates to parents.

data in the form as published by statistical offices, variables like GDP and trade balance are contaminated by profit-shifting activities. The data has to undergo adjustments in order to obtain a clear picture of the underlying economic performance (Güvenen et al., 2022; Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman, 2023).

Figure 9 shows how profit shifting responds to different values of the home corporate tax  $\tau_h^c$ . When the home government levies a tax of 25% on corporate income, the fiscal policies of the home and foreign country are identically designed. In such a situation, there is no reason for firms to move profits across borders because they face the same corporate tax rate in both countries ( $\rho_h = \rho_f = \varrho = 0$ ). If the home government sets a tax rate below 25%, the home country becomes, in comparison to the foreign country, a low-tax jurisdiction and starts attracting profits from abroad. Home multinationals begin moving profits from foreign subsidiaries to parent firms; foreign multinationals launch profit shifting from parent firms to home subsidiaries ( $\rho_h < 0$ ,  $\rho_f > 0$ ). At tax rates  $\tau_h^c$  above 25%, the home country transforms into a high-tax jurisdiction, from which profits try to escape. Home multinationals desire to relocate corporate income from parent firms to foreign affiliates; foreign multinationals attempt to declare profits from home affiliates in parent firms ( $\rho_h > 0$ ,  $\rho_f < 0$ ).

In Figures 10 and 11, I depict how macroeconomic outcomes alter due to the described profit reallocations. Additional figures are delegated to Appendix C. From the perspective of output, profit shifting is globally beneficial. It raises output in the low-tax as well as high-tax jurisdiction. Shifted profits represent a way how multinational firms can circumvent a rela-

tively high corporate tax rate. The opportunity to tax profits at a lower rate attenuates the distortive power of corporate taxation in the global economy. Less tax distortion translates into more output.

The real net gain that a home multinational derives from profit shifting equals in equilibrium:

$$\frac{(\tau_{ht}^c - \tau_{ft}^c)^2}{2(1 - \tau_{ht}^c)\Xi_h}.$$

It summarizes the gain from reducing the corporate-tax liability and the corresponding profit-shifting costs. An analogous expression holds for foreign multinationals. The net gain from profit shifting makes the multinational strategy more appealing. It induces the most productive export firms to switch from the export to multinational strategy. In model terminology, the multinational productivity cutoffs  $\bar{a}_h^{mn}$  and  $\bar{a}_f^{mn}$  decrease. The multinational strategy hence gets more prevalence among the home and foreign firms.

From the analysis of the extended model, one can also conclude that a low-tax jurisdiction benefits from profit shifting in the form of higher tax revenue and higher private consumption. Because profits of the multinational firms tend to be declared in the low-tax rather than in the high-tax jurisdiction, the tax base of the low-tax jurisdiction broadens. The low-tax government collects more revenue from the corporate tax; therefore, its total revenue from non-lump-sum taxes increases as well. The increased tax revenue creates room to ease the tax burden on households. In the language of the model, the government reduces the lump-sum tax on saver households. The budgets of the households in the low-tax jurisdiction improve, and private consumption can consequently rise. In the high-tax jurisdiction, profit shifting has the exact opposite effect. The government of the high-tax jurisdiction experiences base erosion as the profits of the multinational firms move to the low-tax jurisdiction. The corporate-tax revenue in the high-tax jurisdiction unavoidably drops. The worsening of the fiscal position forces the government to impose higher taxes on households. The households respond by restraining their consumption expenditures.

## 7 Conclusion

The paper explored the effects of corporate taxation from a macroeconomic standpoint. The presented model enabled me to analyze the corporate tax in an open-economy setting. I examined how a change in the corporate tax rate affects the economy at home and abroad across different time horizons. Not only did the paper describe the reaction of the usual macroeconomic aggregates like GDP or investment, but it showed as well how international operations of firms respond to changes in corporate taxation. I also investigated the differ-




Figure 10: The Impact of International Profit Shifting on Long-Run Output and Tax Revenue. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is varied between 0% and 50% while the corporate-income tax rate in the foreign country  $\tau_f^c$  is kept unchanged at 25%. The analysis considers two calibrations of profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). All variables are expressed as deviations from the long run of the baseline model, which does not allow for profit shifting.




Figure 11: The Impact of International Profit Shifting on Long-Run Private Consumption and the Long-Run Number of Multinational Firms. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is varied between 0% and 50% while the corporate-income tax rate in the foreign country  $\tau_f^c$  is kept unchanged at 25%. The analysis considers two calibrations of profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). All variables are expressed as deviations from the long run of the baseline model, which does not allow for profit shifting.

ences in the propagation of temporary and permanent corporate-income tax shocks. Finally, I used the model to study the impact of international profit shifting. The paper expanded the macro perspective on corporate taxation; its findings could be useful for the assessment of future corporate-tax reforms.

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## A Equilibrium Conditions

### A.1 Home Country

Consumption of non-savers:

$$c_{ht}^{ns} = \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ht}^{va}} \left[ (1 - \tau_{ht}^w) v_{ht} (1 - u_{ht}) + \tau_{ht}^{ub} u_{ht} - \tau_{ht}^{ls,ns} \right]$$

The shadow price of wealth:

$$l_{ht}^{c,s} = \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ht}^{va}} (c_{ht}^s - \chi_h c_{ht-1}^s)^{-\sigma_h} \exp(\epsilon_{ht}^\beta) - \frac{\beta_h \chi_h}{1 + \tau_{ht}^{va}} E_t (c_{ht+1}^s - \chi_h c_{ht}^s)^{-\sigma_h} \exp(\epsilon_{ht+1}^\beta)$$

Euler equation for domestic bonds:

$$l_{ht}^{c,s} = \beta_h E_t l_{ht+1}^{c,s} \frac{R_{ht}}{\Pi_{ht+1}}$$

Euler equation for international bonds:

$$l_{ht}^{c,s} = \beta_h E_t l_{ht+1}^{c,s} \frac{R_t^*}{\Pi_{ft+1}} \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t}$$

Saver's decision on investment:

$$1 = \frac{l_{ht}^{k,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \left[ 1 - \frac{\Upsilon_h}{2} \left( \frac{i_{ht}^s}{i_{ht-1}^s} - 1 \right)^2 - \Upsilon_h \left( \frac{i_{ht}^s}{i_{ht-1}^s} - 1 \right) \frac{i_{ht}^s}{i_{ht-1}^s} \right] \exp(\epsilon_{ht}^i) \\ + \beta_h \Upsilon_h E_t \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \frac{l_{ht+1}^{k,s}}{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}} \left( \frac{i_{ht+1}^s}{i_{ht}^s} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{i_{ht+1}^s}{i_{ht}^s} \right)^2 \exp(\epsilon_{ht+1}^i)$$

Saver's decision on capital:

$$\frac{l_{ht}^{k,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} = \beta_h E_t \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \left[ (1 - \delta_h^k) \frac{l_{ht+1}^{k,s}}{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}} + r_{ht+1}^k - \tau_{ht+1}^k (r_{ht+1}^k - \delta_h^k) \right]$$

The accumulation of private capital:

$$k_{ht}^s = (1 - \delta_h^k) k_{ht-1}^s + i_{ht}^s \left[ 1 - \frac{\Upsilon_h}{2} \left( \frac{i_{ht}^s}{i_{ht-1}^s} - 1 \right)^2 \right] \exp(\epsilon_{ht}^i)$$

Aggregate private consumption:

$$C_{ht} = \mu_h \mathcal{P}_h c_{ht}^{ns} + (1 - \mu_h) \mathcal{P}_h c_{ht}^s$$

Aggregate investment in private capital stock:

$$I_{ht} = (1 - \mu_h) \mathcal{P}_h i_{ht}^s$$

Aggregate private capital:

$$K_{ht} = (1 - \mu_h) \mathcal{P}_h k_{ht}^s$$

Posted vacancies:

$$(PV_{ht})^2 = M_{ht} \frac{\mathcal{P}_h}{\Phi_h} (w_{ht} - \tilde{v}_{ht}) + (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h E_t \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \frac{M_{ht}}{M_{ht+1}} (PV_{ht+1})^2$$

Matching function:

$$M_{ht} = A_{ht}^M (u_{ht-1} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht-1})^{\alpha_h^M} (PV_{ht})^{1 - \alpha_h^M}$$

Employment dynamics:

$$L_{ht} = (1 - \delta_h^e) L_{ht-1} + M_{ht}$$

Unemployment rate:

$$u_{ht} = \frac{\mathcal{P}_h - L_{ht}}{\mathcal{P}_h}$$

Average wage:

$$\tilde{v}_{ht} = \xi_h \frac{(\Pi_{ht-1})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1 - \varphi_h}}{\Pi_{ht}} \tilde{v}_{ht-1} + (1 - \xi_h) v_{ht}^*$$

Average squared wage:

$$\tilde{v}_{ht}^{sq} = \xi_h \left[ \frac{(\Pi_{ht-1})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1 - \varphi_h}}{\Pi_{ht}} \right]^2 \tilde{v}_{ht-1}^{sq} + (1 - \xi_h) (v_{ht}^*)^2$$

Discounted sum of inflation rates:

$$DS_{ht}^{\Pi} = 1 + E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \xi_h \frac{(\Pi_{ht})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1-\varphi_h}}{\Pi_{ht+1}} DS_{ht+1}^{\Pi}$$

Discounted sum of inflation rates and employee taxes:

$$DS_{ht}^{\Pi,\tau} = 1 - \tau_{ht}^w + E_t \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_h^e) \xi_h \frac{(\Pi_{ht})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1-\varphi_h}}{\Pi_{ht+1}} DS_{ht+1}^{\Pi,\tau}$$

Discounted sum of prices for labor services:

$$DS_{ht}^w = w_{ht} + E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} DS_{ht+1}^w$$

Discounted sum of optimal wages:

$$DS_{ht}^{v^*} = E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} DS_{ht+1}^{\Pi} v_{ht+1}^* + E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} DS_{ht+1}^{v^*}$$

Aggregate wage:

$$v_{ht} L_{ht} = \left[ \xi_h \frac{(\Pi_{ht-1})^{\varphi_h} (\Pi_h)^{1-\varphi_h}}{\Pi_{ht}} v_{ht-1} + (1 - \xi_h) v_{ht}^* \right] (1 - \delta_h^e) L_{ht-1} + \tilde{v}_{ht}^M M_{ht}$$

The average wage of new matches:

$$\tilde{v}_{ht}^M = \left\{ [DS_{ht}^w - (1 - \xi_h) DS_{ht}^{v^*}] \tilde{v}_{ht} - DS_{ht}^{\Pi} \tilde{v}_{ht}^{sq} \right\} \frac{\mathcal{P}_h}{\Phi_h} \frac{M_{ht}}{(PV_{ht})^2}$$

The average value of a worker at a new match:

$$\begin{aligned} VW_{ht}^M &= \tilde{v}_{ht}^M DS_{ht}^{\Pi,\tau} - E_t \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_h^e) \xi_h \tilde{v}_{ht+1}^M DS_{ht+1}^{\Pi,\tau} \\ &+ E_t \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \delta_h^e \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht}} \right) VU_{ht+1} + E_t \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_h^e) (1 - \xi_h) VW_{ht+1}^* \\ &+ E_t \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \left[ \delta_h^e \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht}} + (1 - \delta_h^e) \xi_h \right] VW_{ht+1}^M \end{aligned}$$

The value of an unemployed:

$$VU_{ht} = \tau_{ht}^{ub} + E_t \beta_h \frac{l_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ht}^{c,s}} \left[ \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht}} VW_{ht+1}^M + \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht}} \right) VU_{ht+1} \right]$$

The value of a worker at the newly bargained wage:

$$\begin{aligned}
VW_{ht}^* &= v_{ht}^* DS_{ht}^{\Pi, \tau} - E_t \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_h^e) \xi_h v_{ht+1}^* DS_{ht+1}^{\Pi, \tau} + E_t \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_h^e) VW_{ht+1}^* \\
&\quad + E_t \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} \delta_h^e \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht}} VW_{ht+1}^M + E_t \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} \delta_h^e \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ht+1}}{u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h + \delta_h^e L_{ht}} \right) VU_{ht+1}
\end{aligned}$$

The value of a labor-service provider at the newly bargained wage:

$$VF_{ht}^* = w_{ht} - v_{ht}^* DS_{ht}^{\Pi} + E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \xi_h \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} v_{ht+1}^* DS_{ht+1}^{\Pi} + E_t (1 - \delta_h^e) \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} VF_{ht+1}^*$$

Nash bargaining:

$$\iota_{ht} DS_{ht}^{\Pi, \tau} VF_{ht}^* = (1 - \iota_{ht}) DS_{ht}^{\Pi} (VW_{ht}^* - VU_{ht})$$

Export cutoff:

$$\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex} = \left( \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right)^{\frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft}-1}} \left( \frac{\kappa_{ht}^{ex}}{X_{ft}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}} \frac{\eta_{ht}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h}}$$

Multinational cutoff:

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn} &= [(1 - \tau_{ht}^c) (\kappa_{ht}^{mn} - \kappa_{ht}^{ex})]^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}} \left\{ (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \left\{ \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f}} \right\}^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right. \\
&\quad \left. - (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \left\{ \frac{\eta_{ht}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h}} \right\}^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\theta_{ft}}} \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \left( \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\mathcal{E}_t X_{ft}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}}
\end{aligned}$$

The number of home firms:

$$N_{ht}^h = (1 - \delta_h) (N_{ht-1}^h + \mathcal{N}_{ht})$$

The number of home firms that play the domestic strategy:

$$N_{ht}^{h, dom} = N_{ht-1}^h \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex}} \right)^{\zeta_h} \right]$$

The number of home firms that play the export strategy:

$$N_{ht}^{h, ex} = N_{ht-1}^h \left[ \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex}} \right)^{\zeta_h} - \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_h} \right]$$

The number of home firms that play the multinational strategy:

$$N_{ht}^{h,mn} = N_{ht-1}^h \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_h}$$

The average productivity of home firms that serve the home country:

$$\tilde{a}_{ht}^h = \left( \frac{\zeta_h}{1 + \zeta_h - \theta_{ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \bar{a}_h^{min}$$

The relative price of home firms that serve the home country:

$$\tilde{q}_{ht}^h = \frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} \tilde{a}_{ht}^h}$$

The average productivity of foreign firms that serve the home country by the export strategy:

$$\tilde{a}_{ht}^{f,f} = \left[ \frac{\zeta_f}{1 + \zeta_f - \theta_{ht}} \frac{(\bar{a}_{ft}^{ex})^{\theta_{ht}-\zeta_f-1} - (\bar{a}_{ft}^{mn})^{\theta_{ht}-\zeta_f-1}}{(\bar{a}_{ft}^{ex})^{-\zeta_f} - (\bar{a}_{ft}^{mn})^{-\zeta_f}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}}$$

The relative price of foreign firms that serve the home country by the export strategy:

$$\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} = \mathcal{E}_t \frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \eta_{ft} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f} \tilde{a}_{ht}^{f,f}}$$

The average productivity of foreign firms that serve the home country by the multinational strategy:

$$\tilde{a}_{ht}^{f,h} = \left( \frac{\zeta_f}{1 + \zeta_f - \theta_{ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \bar{a}_{ft}^{mn}$$

The relative price of foreign firms that serve the home country by the multinational strategy:

$$\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} = \frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} \tilde{a}_{ht}^{f,h}}$$

Aggregate price level:

$$1 = N_{ht-1}^h (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} + N_{ft}^{f,ex} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f})^{1-\theta_{ht}} + N_{ft}^{f,mn} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h})^{1-\theta_{ht}}$$

The average after-tax profit of home firms from serving the domestic market:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{dom} = \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht}$$

The average after-tax profit of home firms from the export activity:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{ex} = \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ft}} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} - (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \kappa_{ht}^{ex}$$

The average after-tax profit of home firms from the multinational activity:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{mn} = \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f})^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} - (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \kappa_{ht}^{mn}$$

The average after-tax profit of home firms:

$$\tilde{d}_{ht} = \tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{dom} + \left[ \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex}} \right)^{\zeta_h} - \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_h} \right] \tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{ex} + \left( \frac{\bar{a}_h^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_h} \tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{mn}$$

Expected after-tax profits of a potential entrant:

$$D_{ht} = E_t (1 - \delta_h) \beta_h \frac{\iota_{ht+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ht}^{c,s}} (\tilde{d}_{ht+1} + D_{ht+1})$$

Free-entry condition:

$$\kappa_{ht}^{\mathcal{N}} = D_{ht}$$

Capital demand:

$$K_{ht-1} = \frac{\alpha_h}{r_{ht}^k} \left\{ \frac{\theta_{ht} - 1}{\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} \left[ N_{ht-1}^h (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} + N_{ft}^{f,mn} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h})^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right] + \mathcal{E}_t \frac{\theta_{ft} - 1}{\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,ex} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right\}$$

Demand for labor services:

$$L_{ht} = \frac{1 - \alpha_h}{(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}} \left\{ \frac{\theta_{ht} - 1}{\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} \left[ N_{ht-1}^h (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} + N_{ft}^{f,mn} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h})^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right] + \mathcal{E}_t \frac{\theta_{ft} - 1}{\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,ex} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right\}$$

Market clearing by the bundler:

$$X_{ht} = C_{ht} + I_{ht} + \kappa_{ht}^{\mathcal{N}} \mathcal{N}_{ht} + \kappa_{ht}^{ex} N_{ht}^{h,ex} + \kappa_{ht}^{mn} N_{ht}^{h,mn} + GC_{ht} + GI_{ht}$$

Government capital:

$$GK_{ht} = (1 - \delta_h^{GK}) GK_{ht-1} + GI_{ht}$$

Government capital per firm:

$$gk_{ht} = \frac{GK_{ht-1}}{N_{ht-1}^h + N_{ft}^{f,mn}}$$

Revenue from the corporate-income tax:

$$\begin{aligned} TR_{ht}^c &= \tau_{ht}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ht-1}^h + \tau_{ht}^c \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,ex} \\ &\quad + \tau_{ht}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h})^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \tau_{ht}^c \kappa_{ht}^{ex} N_{ht}^{h,ex} - \tau_{ht}^c \kappa_{ht}^{mn} N_{ht}^{h,mn} \end{aligned}$$

Revenue from non-lump-sum taxes:

$$TR_{ht} = \tau_{ht}^{va} C_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^w v_{ht} L_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^k (r_{ht}^k - \delta_h^k) K_{ht-1} + \tau_{ht}^p w_{ht} L_{ht} + TR_{ht}^c$$

Fiscal budget:

$$GC_{ht} + GI_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^{ub} u_{ht} \mathcal{P}_h = TR_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^{ls,ns} \mu_h \mathcal{P}_h + \tau_{ht}^{ls,s} (1 - \mu_h) \mathcal{P}_h + b_{ht} - \frac{R_{ht-1}}{\Pi_{ht}} b_{ht-1}$$

Monetary policy:

$$\frac{R_{ht}}{R_h} = \left( \frac{R_{ht-1}}{R_h} \right)^{\phi_h^R} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi_{ht}}{\Pi_h} \right)^{\phi_h^\Pi} \left( \frac{Y_{ht}}{Y_{ht-1}} \right)^{\phi_h^Y} \right]^{1-\phi_h^R} \exp(\epsilon_{ht}^R)$$

Output:

$$Y_{ht} = \left[ N_{ht-1}^h (\tilde{q}_{ht}^h)^{1-\theta_{ht}} + N_{ft}^{f,mn} (\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h})^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right] X_{ht} + \mathcal{E}_t N_{ht}^{h,ex} (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft}$$

The broad definition of private investment:

$$\mathcal{I}_{ht} = I_{ht} + \kappa_{ht}^N \mathcal{N}_{ht} + \kappa_{ht}^{ex} N_{ht}^{h,ex} + \kappa_{ht}^{mn} N_{ht}^{h,mn}$$

Export:

$$EX_{ht} = \mathcal{E}_t (\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h})^{1-\theta_{ft}} N_{ht}^{h,ex} X_{ft}$$

Import:

$$IM_{ht} = \mathcal{E}_t EX_{ft}$$

Net exports:

$$NX_{ht} = EX_{ht} - IM_{ht}$$

Output in the home country created by foreign multinationals:

$$Y_{ht}^{f,h} = \left(\tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h}\right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn}$$

Repatriated profits from the foreign country to the home country:

$$RP_{ht} = \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} Y_{ft}^{h,f}$$

## A.2 Foreign Country

Consumption of non-savers:

$$c_{ft}^{ns} = \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ft}^{va}} \left[ (1 - \tau_{ft}^w) v_{ft} (1 - u_{ft}) + \tau_{ft}^{ub} u_{ft} - \tau_{ft}^{ls,ns} \right]$$

The shadow price of wealth:

$$l_{ft}^{c,s} = \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ft}^{va}} (c_{ft}^s - \chi_f c_{ft-1}^s)^{-\sigma_f} \exp(\epsilon_{ft}^\beta) - \frac{\beta_f \chi_f}{1 + \tau_{ft}^{va}} E_t (c_{ft+1}^s - \chi_f c_{ft}^s)^{-\sigma_f} \exp(\epsilon_{ft+1}^\beta)$$

Euler equation for domestic bonds:

$$l_{ft}^{c,s} = \beta_f E_t l_{ft+1}^{c,s} \frac{R_{ft}}{\Pi_{ft+1}}$$

Saver's decision on investment:

$$1 = \frac{l_{ft}^{k,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \left[ 1 - \frac{\Upsilon_f}{2} \left( \frac{i_{ft}^s}{i_{ft-1}^s} - 1 \right)^2 - \Upsilon_f \left( \frac{i_{ft}^s}{i_{ft-1}^s} - 1 \right) \frac{i_{ft}^s}{i_{ft-1}^s} \right] \exp(\epsilon_{ft}^i) \\ + \beta_f \Upsilon_f E_t \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \frac{l_{ft+1}^{k,s}}{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}} \left( \frac{i_{ft+1}^s}{i_{ft}^s} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{i_{ft+1}^s}{i_{ft}^s} \right)^2 \exp(\epsilon_{ft+1}^i)$$

Saver's decision on capital:

$$\frac{l_{ft}^{k,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} = \beta_f E_t \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \left[ (1 - \delta_f^k) \frac{l_{ft+1}^{k,s}}{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}} + r_{ft+1}^k - \tau_{ft+1}^k (r_{ft+1}^k - \delta_f^k) \right]$$

The accumulation of private capital:

$$k_{ft}^s = (1 - \delta_f^k) k_{ft-1}^s + i_{ft}^s \left[ 1 - \frac{\Upsilon_f}{2} \left( \frac{i_{ft}^s}{i_{ft-1}^s} - 1 \right)^2 \right] \exp(\epsilon_{ft}^i)$$

Aggregate private consumption:

$$C_{ft} = \mu_f \mathcal{P}_f c_{ft}^{ns} + (1 - \mu_f) \mathcal{P}_f c_{ft}^s$$

Aggregate investment in private capital stock:

$$I_{ft} = (1 - \mu_f) \mathcal{P}_f i_{ft}^s$$

Aggregate private capital:

$$K_{ft} = (1 - \mu_f) \mathcal{P}_f k_{ft}^s$$

Posted vacancies:

$$(PV_{ft})^2 = M_{ft} \frac{\mathcal{P}_f}{\Phi_f} (w_{ft} - \tilde{v}_{ft}) + (1 - \delta_f^e) \beta_f E_t \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \frac{M_{ft}}{M_{ft+1}} (PV_{ft+1})^2$$

Matching function:

$$M_{ft} = A_{ft}^M (u_{ft-1} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft-1})^{\alpha_f^M} (PV_{ft})^{1 - \alpha_f^M}$$

Employment dynamics:

$$L_{ft} = (1 - \delta_f^e) L_{ft-1} + M_{ft}$$

Unemployment rate:

$$u_{ft} = \frac{\mathcal{P}_f - L_{ft}}{\mathcal{P}_f}$$

Average wage:

$$\tilde{v}_{ft} = \xi_f \frac{(\Pi_{ft-1})^{\varphi_f} (\Pi_f)^{1 - \varphi_f}}{\Pi_{ft}} \tilde{v}_{ft-1} + (1 - \xi_f) v_{ft}^*$$

Average squared wage:

$$\tilde{v}_{ft}^{sq} = \xi_f \left[ \frac{(\Pi_{ft-1})^{\varphi_f} (\Pi_f)^{1 - \varphi_f}}{\Pi_{ft}} \right]^2 \tilde{v}_{ft-1}^{sq} + (1 - \xi_f) (v_{ft}^*)^2$$

Discounted sum of inflation rates:

$$DS_{ft}^{\Pi} = 1 + E_t (1 - \delta_f^e) \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \xi_f \frac{(\Pi_{ft})^{\varphi_f} (\Pi_f)^{1-\varphi_f}}{\Pi_{ft+1}} DS_{ft+1}^{\Pi}$$

Discounted sum of inflation rates and employee taxes:

$$DS_{ft}^{\Pi,\tau} = 1 - \tau_{ft}^w + E_t \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_f^e) \xi_f \frac{(\Pi_{ft})^{\varphi_f} (\Pi_f)^{1-\varphi_f}}{\Pi_{ft+1}} DS_{ft+1}^{\Pi,\tau}$$

Discounted sum of prices for labor services:

$$DS_{ft}^w = w_{ft} + E_t (1 - \delta_f^e) \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} DS_{ft+1}^w$$

Discounted sum of optimal wages:

$$DS_{ft}^{v^*} = E_t (1 - \delta_f^e) \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} DS_{ft+1}^{\Pi} v_{ft+1}^* + E_t (1 - \delta_f^e) \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} DS_{ft+1}^{v^*}$$

Aggregate wage:

$$v_{ft} L_{ft} = \left[ \xi_f \frac{(\Pi_{ft-1})^{\varphi_f} (\Pi_f)^{1-\varphi_f}}{\Pi_{ft}} v_{ft-1} + (1 - \xi_f) v_{ft}^* \right] (1 - \delta_f^e) L_{ft-1} + \tilde{v}_{ft}^M M_{ft}$$

The average wage of new matches:

$$\tilde{v}_{ft}^M = \left\{ [DS_{ft}^w - (1 - \xi_f) DS_{ft}^{v^*}] \tilde{v}_{ft} - DS_{ft}^{\Pi} \tilde{v}_{ft}^{sq} \right\} \frac{\mathcal{P}_f}{\Phi_f} \frac{M_{ft}}{(PV_{ft})^2}$$

The average value of a worker at a new match:

$$\begin{aligned} VW_{ft}^M &= \tilde{v}_{ft}^M DS_{ft}^{\Pi,\tau} - E_t \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_f^e) \xi_f \tilde{v}_{ft+1}^M DS_{ft+1}^{\Pi,\tau} \\ &+ E_t \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \delta_f^e \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ft+1}}{u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft}} \right) VU_{ft+1} + E_t \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_f^e) (1 - \xi_f) VW_{ft+1}^* \\ &+ E_t \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \left[ \delta_f^e \frac{M_{ft+1}}{u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft}} + (1 - \delta_f^e) \xi_f \right] VW_{ft+1}^M \end{aligned}$$

The value of an unemployed:

$$VU_{ft} = \tau_{ft}^{ub} + E_t \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} \left[ \frac{M_{ft+1}}{u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft}} VW_{ft+1}^M + \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ft+1}}{u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft}} \right) VU_{ft+1} \right]$$

The value of a worker at the newly bargained wage:

$$\begin{aligned} VW_{ft}^* &= v_{ft}^* DS_{ft}^{\Pi, \tau} - E_t \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_f^e) \xi_f v_{ft+1}^* DS_{ft+1}^{\Pi, \tau} + E_t \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} (1 - \delta_f^e) VW_{ft+1}^* \\ &+ E_t \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} \delta_f^e \frac{M_{ft+1}}{u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft}} VW_{ft+1}^M + E_t \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} \delta_f^e \left( 1 - \frac{M_{ft+1}}{u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f + \delta_f^e L_{ft}} \right) VU_{ft+1} \end{aligned}$$

The value of a labor-service provider at the newly bargained wage:

$$VF_{ft}^* = w_{ft} - v_{ft}^* DS_{ft}^{\Pi} + E_t (1 - \delta_f^e) \xi_f \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} v_{ft+1}^* DS_{ft+1}^{\Pi} + E_t (1 - \delta_f^e) \beta_f \frac{\iota_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{\iota_{ft}^{c,s}} VF_{ft+1}^*$$

Nash bargaining:

$$\iota_{ft} DS_{ft}^{\Pi, \tau} VF_{ft}^* = (1 - \iota_{ft}) DS_{ft}^{\Pi} (VW_{ft}^* - VU_{ft})$$

Export cutoff:

$$\bar{a}_{ft}^{ex} = (\theta_{ht} \mathcal{E}_t)^{\frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \left( \frac{\kappa_{ft}^{ex}}{X_{ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \frac{\eta_{ft}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f}}$$

Multinational cutoff:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{a}_{ft}^{mn} &= [(1 - \tau_{ft}^c) (\kappa_{ft}^{mn} - \kappa_{ft}^{ex})]^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \left\{ (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \left\{ \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h}} \right\}^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right. \\ &\left. - (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \left\{ \mathcal{E}_t \eta_{ft} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f}} \right\}^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\theta_{ht}}} \frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \left( \mathcal{E}_t \frac{\theta_{ht}}{X_{ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \end{aligned}$$

The number of foreign firms:

$$N_{ft}^f = (1 - \delta_f) (N_{ft-1}^f + \mathcal{N}_{ft})$$

The number of foreign firms that play the domestic strategy:

$$N_{ft}^{f,dom} = N_{ft-1}^f \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{ex}} \right)^{\zeta_f} \right]$$

The number of foreign firms that play the export strategy:

$$N_{ft}^{f,ex} = N_{ft-1}^f \left[ \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{ex}} \right)^{\zeta_f} - \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_f} \right]$$

The number of foreign firms that play the multinational strategy:

$$N_{ft}^{f,mn} = N_{ft-1}^f \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_f}$$

The average productivity of foreign firms that serve the foreign country:

$$\tilde{a}_{ft}^f = \left( \frac{\zeta_f}{1 + \zeta_f - \theta_{ft}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}} \bar{a}_f^{min}$$

The relative price of foreign firms that serve the foreign country:

$$\tilde{q}_{ft}^f = \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f} \tilde{a}_{ft}^f}$$

The average productivity of home firms that serve the foreign country by the export strategy:

$$\tilde{a}_{ft}^{h,h} = \left[ \frac{\zeta_h}{1 + \zeta_h - \theta_{ft}} \frac{(\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex})^{\theta_{ft}-\zeta_h-1} - (\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn})^{\theta_{ft}-\zeta_h-1}}{(\bar{a}_{ht}^{ex})^{-\zeta_h} - (\bar{a}_{ht}^{mn})^{-\zeta_h}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}}$$

The relative price of home firms that serve the foreign country by the export strategy:

$$\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \eta_{ht} \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} \tilde{a}_{ft}^{h,h}}$$

The average productivity of home firms that serve the foreign country by the multinational strategy:

$$\tilde{a}_{ft}^{h,f} = \left( \frac{\zeta_h}{1 + \zeta_h - \theta_{ft}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}} \bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}$$

The relative price of home firms that serve the foreign country by the multinational strategy:

$$\tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} = \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f} \tilde{a}_{ft}^{h,f}}$$

Aggregate price level:

$$1 = N_{ft-1}^f \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} + N_{ht}^{h,ex} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} + N_{ht}^{h,mn} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}}$$

The average after-tax profit of foreign firms from serving the domestic market:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{dom} = \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft}$$

The average after-tax profit of foreign firms from the export activity:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{ex} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} - (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \kappa_{ft}^{ex}$$

The average after-tax profit of foreign firms from the multinational activity:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{mn} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} - (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \kappa_{ft}^{mn}$$

The average after-tax profit of foreign firms:

$$\tilde{d}_{ft} = \tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{dom} + \left[ \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{ex}} \right)^{\zeta_f} - \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_f} \right] \tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{ex} + \left( \frac{\bar{a}_f^{min}}{\bar{a}_{ft}^{mn}} \right)^{\zeta_f} \tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{mn}$$

Expected after-tax profits of a potential entrant:

$$D_{ft} = E_t (1 - \delta_f) \beta_f \frac{l_{ft+1}^{c,s}}{l_{ft}^{c,s}} \left( \tilde{d}_{ft+1} + D_{ft+1} \right)$$

Free-entry condition:

$$\kappa_{ft}^N = D_{ft}$$

Capital demand:

$$K_{ft-1} = \frac{\alpha_f}{r_{ft}^k} \left\{ \frac{\theta_{ft} - 1}{\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} \left[ N_{ft-1}^f \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} + N_{ht}^{h,mn} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right] + \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{\theta_{ht} - 1}{\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,ex} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right\}$$

Demand for labor services:

$$L_{ft} = \frac{1 - \alpha_f}{(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}} \left\{ \frac{\theta_{ft} - 1}{\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} \left[ N_{ft-1}^f \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} + N_{ht}^{h,mn} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right] + \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{\theta_{ht} - 1}{\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,ex} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} \right\}$$

Market clearing by the bundler:

$$X_{ft} = C_{ft} + I_{ft} + \kappa_{ft}^{\mathcal{N}} \mathcal{N}_{ft} + \kappa_{ft}^{ex} N_{ft}^{f,ex} + \kappa_{ft}^{mn} N_{ft}^{f,mn} + GC_{ft} + GI_{ft}$$

Government capital:

$$GK_{ft} = (1 - \delta_f^{GK}) GK_{ft-1} + GI_{ft}$$

Government capital per firm:

$$gk_{ft} = \frac{GK_{ft-1}}{N_{ft-1}^f + N_{ht}^{h,mn}}$$

Revenue from the corporate-income tax:

$$TR_{ft}^c = \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ft-1}^f + \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,ex} + \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn} - \tau_{ft}^c \kappa_{ft}^{ex} N_{ft}^{f,ex} - \tau_{ft}^c \kappa_{ft}^{mn} N_{ft}^{f,mn}$$

Revenue from non-lump-sum taxes:

$$TR_{ft} = \tau_{ft}^{va} C_{ft} + \tau_{ft}^w v_{ft} L_{ft} + \tau_{ft}^k (r_{ft}^k - \delta_f^k) K_{ft-1} + \tau_{ft}^p w_{ft} L_{ft} + TR_{ft}^c$$

Fiscal budget:

$$GC_{ft} + GI_{ft} + \tau_{ft}^{ub} u_{ft} \mathcal{P}_f = TR_{ft} + \tau_{ft}^{ls,ns} \mu_f \mathcal{P}_f + \tau_{ft}^{ls,s} (1 - \mu_f) \mathcal{P}_f + b_{ft} - \frac{R_{ft-1}}{\Pi_{ft}} b_{ft-1}$$

Monetary policy:

$$\frac{R_{ft}}{R_f} = \left( \frac{R_{ft-1}}{R_f} \right)^{\phi_f^R} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi_{ft}}{\Pi_f} \right)^{\phi_f^{\Pi}} \left( \frac{Y_{ft}}{Y_{ft-1}} \right)^{\phi_f^Y} \right]^{1-\phi_f^R} \exp(\epsilon_{ft}^R)$$

Output:

$$Y_{ft} = \left[ N_{ft-1}^f \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} + N_{ht}^{h,mn} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} \right] X_{ft} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} N_{ft}^{f,ex} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht}$$

The broad definition of private investment:

$$\mathcal{I}_{ft} = I_{ft} + \kappa_{ft}^{\mathcal{N}} \mathcal{N}_{ft} + \kappa_{ft}^{ex} N_{ft}^{f,ex} + \kappa_{ft}^{mn} N_{ft}^{f,mn}$$

Export:

$$EX_{ft} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} N_{ft}^{f,ex} X_{ht}$$

Import:

$$IM_{ft} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} EX_{ht}$$

Net exports:

$$NX_{ft} = EX_{ft} - IM_{ft}$$

Output in the foreign country created by home multinationals:

$$Y_{ft}^{h,f} = \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn}$$

Repatriated profits from the home country to the foreign country:

$$RP_{ft} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} Y_{ht}^{f,h}$$

### A.3 International Linkages

Nominal exchange rate:

$$\Delta S_t = \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} \frac{\Pi_{ht}}{\Pi_{ft}}$$

Risk premium:

$$R_t^* = R_{ft} \exp \left( -\phi^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_t b_t^*}{Y_{ht}} \right)$$

Balance of payments:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} (Y_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t Y_{ft}) &= \frac{1}{2} (X_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t X_{ft}) + \mathcal{E}_t b_t^* - \mathcal{E}_t \frac{R_{t-1}^*}{\Pi_{ft}} b_{t-1}^* \\ &\quad + \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn} \end{aligned}$$

## B Additional Plots for Section 5









Figure B.1: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the permanent cut in quarter 1. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.




Figure B.2: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the permanent cut in quarter 1. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.




Figure B.3: A Permanent versus a Temporary Corporate-Tax Cut in the Home Country from  $\tau_{h0}^c = 25\%$  to  $\tau_{h1}^c = 20\%$ . The black solid lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a permanent corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the permanent dynamics in quarter 1. The blue dashed lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut. The home government announces and implements the temporary cut in quarter 1 and reverses the cut, as promised, in quarter 21. The green dotted lines depict the adjustment dynamics that are induced by a temporary corporate-tax cut which becomes permanent. The home government lowers the corporate tax in quarter 1, promises to reverse the tax cut in quarter 21 but surprises the market in quarter 21 by making the tax cut permanent.

## C The Possibility of International Profit Shifting

If one allows multinational firms to shift profits across borders, several equations of the baseline model have to be adjusted, and a few new equations have to be defined. I list here the necessary changes that have to be made.

Multinational cutoff of home firms:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{a}_{ht}^{mn} = & \left[ (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) (\kappa_{ht}^{mn} - \kappa_{ht}^{ex}) - \frac{(\tau_{ht}^c - \tau_{ft}^c)^2}{2(1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \Xi_h} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft} - 1}} \left\{ (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \left\{ \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1 - \alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1 - \alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f}} \right\}^{1 - \theta_{ft}} \right. \\ & \left. - (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \left\{ \frac{\eta_{ht} (r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1 - \alpha_h}}{\mathcal{E}_t \alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1 - \alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h}} \right\}^{1 - \theta_{ft}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1 - \theta_{ft}}} \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \left( \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\mathcal{E}_t X_{ft}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft} - 1}} \end{aligned}$$

Multinational cutoff of foreign firms:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{a}_{ft}^{mn} = & \left[ (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) (\kappa_{ft}^{mn} - \kappa_{ft}^{ex}) - \frac{(\tau_{ft}^c - \tau_{ht}^c)^2}{2(1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \Xi_f} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht} - 1}} \left\{ (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \left\{ \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1 - \alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1 - \alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h}} \right\}^{1 - \theta_{ht}} \right. \\ & \left. - (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \left\{ \mathcal{E}_t \eta_{ft} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1 - \alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1 - \alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f}} \right\}^{1 - \theta_{ht}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{1 - \theta_{ht}}} \frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \left( \mathcal{E}_t \frac{\theta_{ht}}{X_{ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht} - 1}} \end{aligned}$$

The average after-tax profit of home firms from the multinational activity:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ht}^{mn} = \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1 - \theta_{ft}} X_{ft} - (1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \kappa_{ht}^{mn} + \frac{(\tau_{ht}^c - \tau_{ft}^c)^2}{2(1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \Xi_h}$$

The average after-tax profit of foreign firms from the multinational activity:

$$\tilde{\Delta}_{ft}^{mn} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1 - \theta_{ht}} X_{ht} - (1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \kappa_{ft}^{mn} + \frac{(\tau_{ft}^c - \tau_{ht}^c)^2}{2(1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \Xi_f}$$

Home revenue from the corporate-income tax:

$$\begin{aligned} TR_{ht}^c = & \tau_{ht}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^h \right)^{1 - \theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ht-1}^h + \tau_{ht}^c \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,h} \right)^{1 - \theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,ex} + \tau_{ht}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1 - \theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn} \\ & - \tau_{ht}^c \kappa_{ht}^{ex} N_{ht}^{h,ex} - \tau_{ht}^c \kappa_{ht}^{mn} N_{ht}^{h,mn} - \tau_{ht}^c \frac{\Xi_h}{2} (\lambda_{ht})^2 N_{ht}^{h,mn} - \tau_{ht}^c PS_{ht} + \tau_{ht}^c \mathcal{E}_t PS_{ft} \end{aligned}$$

Foreign revenue from the corporate-income tax:

$$TR_{ft}^c = \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^f \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ft-1}^f + \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} \frac{1}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,ex} + \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn} \\ - \tau_{ft}^c \kappa_{ft}^{ex} N_{ft}^{f,ex} - \tau_{ft}^c \kappa_{ft}^{mn} N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \tau_{ft}^c \frac{\Xi_f}{2} (\lambda_{ft})^2 N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \tau_{ft}^c PS_{ft} + \tau_{ft}^c \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} PS_{ht}$$

Balance of payments:

$$\frac{1}{2} (Y_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t Y_{ft}) = \frac{1}{2} (X_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t X_{ft}) + \mathcal{E}_t b_t^* - \mathcal{E}_t \frac{R_{t-1}^*}{\Pi_{ft}} b_{t-1}^* + \tau_{ft}^c PS_{ht} - \mathcal{E}_t \tau_{ht}^c PS_{ft} \\ + \frac{1 - \tau_{ht}^c}{\theta_{ht}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ht}^{f,h} \right)^{1-\theta_{ht}} X_{ht} N_{ft}^{f,mn} - \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1 - \tau_{ft}^c}{\theta_{ft}} \left( \tilde{q}_{ft}^{h,f} \right)^{1-\theta_{ft}} X_{ft} N_{ht}^{h,mn}$$

Profit shifting of a home multinational firm:

$$\lambda_{ht} = \frac{\tau_{ht}^c - \tau_{ft}^c}{(1 - \tau_{ht}^c) \Xi_h}$$

Profit shifting of a foreign multinational firm:

$$\lambda_{ft} = \frac{\tau_{ft}^c - \tau_{ht}^c}{(1 - \tau_{ft}^c) \Xi_f}$$

Aggregate profit shifting of home firms:

$$PS_{ht} = \lambda_{ht} N_{ht}^{h,mn}$$

Aggregate profit shifting of foreign firms:

$$PS_{ft} = \lambda_{ft} N_{ft}^{f,mn}$$

Average productivity of home multinational firms weighted by home price elasticity:

$$\tilde{a}_{ht}^{h,mn} = \left( \frac{\zeta_h}{1 + \zeta_h - \theta_{ht}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ht}-1}} \bar{a}_{ht}^{mn}$$

Average productivity of foreign multinational firms weighted by foreign price elasticity:

$$\tilde{a}_{ft}^{f,mn} = \left( \frac{\zeta_f}{1 + \zeta_f - \theta_{ft}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_{ft}-1}} \bar{a}_{ft}^{mn}$$

Relative price of home multinational firms on the home market:

$$\tilde{q}_{ht}^{h,mn} = \frac{\theta_{ht}}{\theta_{ht} - 1} \frac{(r_{ht}^k)^{\alpha_h} [(1 + \tau_{ht}^p) w_{ht}]^{1-\alpha_h}}{\alpha_h^{\alpha_h} (1 - \alpha_h)^{1-\alpha_h} a_{ht} (gk_{ht})^{\gamma_h} \tilde{a}_{ht}^{h,mn}}$$

Relative price of foreign multinational firms on the foreign market:

$$\tilde{q}_{ft}^{f,mn} = \frac{\theta_{ft}}{\theta_{ft} - 1} \frac{(r_{ft}^k)^{\alpha_f} [(1 + \tau_{ft}^p) w_{ft}]^{1-\alpha_f}}{\alpha_f^{\alpha_f} (1 - \alpha_f)^{1-\alpha_f} a_{ft} (gk_{ft})^{\gamma_f} \tilde{a}_{ft}^{f,mn}}$$

The remainder of this appendix extends the analysis that I provide in Section 6. I show here for additional variables how their steady state alters if one introduces the possibility of profit shifting into the model.




Figure C.1: The Impact of International Profit Shifting on Long-Run Private Investment, Exports, and Imports. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is varied between 0% and 50% while the corporate-income tax rate in the foreign country  $\tau_f^c$  is kept unchanged at 25%. The analysis considers two calibrations of profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). All variables are expressed as deviations from the long run of the baseline model, which does not allow for profit shifting.




Figure C.2: The Impact of International Profit Shifting on the Long-Run Unemployment Rate and the Long-Run Operational Status of Firms. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is varied between 0% and 50% while the corporate-income tax rate in the foreign country  $\tau_f^c$  is kept unchanged at 25%. The analysis considers two calibrations of profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). All variables are expressed as deviations from the long run of the baseline model, which does not allow for profit shifting.




Figure C.3: The Impact of International Profit Shifting on the Long-Run Number of Firms. The corporate-income tax rate in the home country  $\tau_h^c$  is varied between 0% and 50% while the corporate-income tax rate in the foreign country  $\tau_f^c$  is kept unchanged at 25%. The analysis considers two calibrations of profit-shifting costs: high ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 1$ ) and low ( $\Xi_h = \Xi_f = 0.5$ ). All variables are expressed as deviations from the long run of the baseline model, which does not allow for profit shifting.