

PROBLEM OR OPPORTUNITY? IMMIGRATION, JOB
SEARCH, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES OF NATIVES IN GERMANY.

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Introduction

- Revisit effects of immigration in host economy (Germany).
- **Literature** evaluates diverse aspects of immigration in receiving countries.
- Focus on **wage** and **employment opportunities** of natives.
- Workers are job seekers (**main mechanism in literature**).
- Germany: **10-11%** natives (immigrants) are entrepreneurs.
- Competition with workers vs. competition with entrepreneurs.
- Policy: Assist workers **find jobs**, facilitate **business creation**.

Research questions

- (Same old question!) What are the labour market consequences of immigration (low-skilled shock)?

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- (New angle!) What are the general equilibrium and welfare effects of immigrant entrepreneurship?

What we do?

- ④ Develop a macroeconomic model with search frictions and endogenous entry into entrepreneurship.

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- 3 Quantitative assessment of effects of immigration on [wages](#), [employment opportunities of natives](#), [immigrants](#), and on [small businesses in Germany](#).


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- 1 Develop a macroeconomic model with search frictions and endogenous entry into entrepreneurship.
- 2 Calibrate the model using GSOEP.
- 3 Quantitative assessment of effects of immigration on [wages, employment opportunities of natives, immigrants, and on small businesses in Germany](#).
- 4 Evaluate the welfare effects of immigrants' entrepreneurship.


Economy

natives and immigrants


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
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
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
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
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
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
Economy



Economy



Economy



Calibration

- Native: born in Germany or has German nationality since birth.
- Low-skilled worker: less than 13 years of schooling.
- Potential entrepreneur: observed at least once in data as self-employed, freelance professional, or as small business owner.
- Model parametrized using GSOEP (2000-2017) and macro data.

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- Key differences between workers
 - 1 Higher cost of entry into entrepreneurship for immigrants.
 - 2 Imperfect substitution between skill groups.
 - 3 Perfect substitution between ethnic groups within skill group.
 - 4 Natives more productive.

parameters


data

model


Low-skilled immigration

- Germany received approximately three million immigrants between 2012 to 2017.
- Predominantly refugee influx, low-skill biased.
- 20% rise in immigration.
- 24% increase in the low-skilled immigrants' stock.
- 3.3% increase in total population.
- Share of the low-skill population from 64.6% to 65.9%.

Results: Long-run effect of a 20% increase in immigration on distribution of workers in entrepreneurship




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● Two main effects


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Two main effects

- ① – (+) effect on MP of low-skilled (high-skilled).


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
Two main effects

- 1 – (+) effect on MP of low-skilled (high-skilled).
- 2 Hiring low-skilled worker easy.


Results: Welfare effects of a 20% increase in immigration to Germany on representative workers



Results: Counterfactual immigrant entrepreneurship ban




Results: Counterfactual immigrant entrepreneurship ban




- Increase in immigrant unemployment.

Results: Counterfactual immigrant entrepreneurship ban



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- Reduces wage for regular workers.

Results: Counterfactual immigrant entrepreneurship ban



- Increase in immigrant unemployment.
- Reduces wage for regular workers.
- Increase entrepreneurship among natives.

Wrap up

Conclusions

- Low-skilled immigration creates both winners and losers within low-skilled group.
- Entrepreneurship reduces unemployment among immigrants.
- Immigrant entrepreneurship has spillover effects on native welfare.

Next!

- Validation of the model, empirical evidence in short run.

Contributions

- Unified framework for dual role of workers.
- New insights into the heterogeneous effects of immigration in Germany.
- Synthesis between literature on entrepreneurship and immigration.

Thank You

Literature

- **Wage effect:** Borjas (1999), Borjas (2003), Ben-Gad (2004), Ben-Gad (2008), D'Amuri et al. (2010), Felbermayr et al. (2010), Aydemir and Borjas (2011), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Dustmann et al.(2013), Dustmann et al., (2017).
- **Employment effect:** Card (1990), Altonji and Card (1991), Hunt (1992), Pischke and Velling (1997), Borjas (2003, 2006), Dustman et al. (2007), D'Amuri et al. (2010).
- **Implicit assumptions in the previous literature:**
 - perfect competition in the labour market.
 - all labour market participants are job seekers.

Literature


- **Literature on migration and labor market frictions:** Ortega (2000), Liu (2010), Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), Nanos and Schluter (2014), Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016), Battisti et al. (2018), Iftikhar and Zaharieva (2019);
 - Still assume that all labour market participants are job seekers.
- **Literature on the entrepreneurship of immigrants:** Constant et al. (2005), Constant and Zimmermann (2006), Duleep et al. (2021), Kerr & Kerr (2020), Azoulay et al. (2022);
 - Do not consider the spillovers of entrepreneurship on the job market for workers in paid jobs.

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
Economy: Workers

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
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
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
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
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
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
Economy: Workers



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Economy: Workers



Economy: Firms

$Y = F(K, Y_L, Y_H)$ final good (perfectly competitive)




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


Intermediate goods Y_L, Y_H


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
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
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
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
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Economy: Firms



Mechanisms

Incumbent workers (natives and immigrants)

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Mechanisms


Incumbent workers (natives and immigrants)

New immigration




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
Mechanisms

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
Mechanisms

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Mechanisms


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
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Mechanisms




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Mechanisms



back

Mechanisms



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Value function: Unemployment

Present value of expected income in **unemployment** for potential entrepreneurs is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & rU z - h X \lambda(\theta)(W - U) \underbrace{\delta \int_{\alpha_u}^{\alpha_s} (E_s(x) - U) dF(x)}_{\text{solo-entr. out of necessity}} \\
 & \underbrace{\delta \int_{\alpha_s}^{\alpha_0} (E(x) - U) dF(x)}_{\text{solo-entr. out of opportunity}} \underbrace{\delta \int_{\alpha_0}^{\bar{\alpha}} (B_0(x) - U) dF(x)}_{\text{business with co-workers}}
 \end{aligned}$$

where X denotes the group-specific search efficiency, so that $X\lambda(\theta)$ is the job-finding rate in the market for regular jobs. value functions

Value function: Employment

Present value of expected income in **paid employment** for potential entrepreneurs is given by:

$$rW - w(1-t) \underbrace{\delta \int_{\alpha_s}^{\alpha_0} (E(x) - W) dF(x)}_{\text{solo-entr. out of opportunity}} + \underbrace{\delta \int_{\alpha_0}^{\bar{\alpha}} (B_0(x) - W) dF(x)}_{\text{business with co-workers}} - \bar{\gamma}(W - U)$$

where $\bar{\gamma}$ is the exogenous job destruction rate in regular jobs.

Value function: Self-employment

Present value of expected income in **solo self-employment out of opportunity** is given by:

$$rE(\alpha) - \sigma\alpha(1-t) \delta \underbrace{\int_{\alpha}^{\alpha_0} (E(x) - E(\alpha))dF(x)}_{\text{improving profits}}$$

$$\underbrace{\delta \int_{\alpha_0}^{\bar{\alpha}} (B_0(x) - E(\alpha))dF(x)}_{\text{business with co-workers}} - \gamma(E(\alpha) - U)$$

where γ is the exogenous destruction rate in entrepreneurship.


Value function: Small businesses

- Present value of expected profits **from operating a small low skill business** with k immigrant and m native co-workers:

$$rB_{km}(\alpha) = \sigma\alpha(1-t) - c k(y_0^I - w_0^I)(1-\tau) - m(y_0^N - w_0^N)(1-\tau) \\ - \bar{q}(\theta_0)[\mu(B_{k1m}(\alpha) - B_{km}(\alpha)) + (1-\mu)(B_{km1} - B_{km}(\alpha))] \\ - \gamma(B_{km}(\alpha) - U)$$

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Intermediate sector



Final product

- Large firms are modeled as in a traditional SaM framework.
- Wages are determined via Nash-Bargaining.
- Final good

$$Y = AK^\eta Z^{1-\eta}, \quad \eta \in (0,1)$$


$$Z = [aY_L^\rho + (1-a)Y_H^\rho]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad \rho > 1$$

- Budget revenue; labour taxes and taxes on firm profits.
- Budget expenditure; unemployment benefits:
- Surplus used to finance a lump-sum transfer T .


Calibrated parameters

| Pnm. | Empirical moment/target | | | | Definition and calibrated value | | | |
|---------------|--|----|----|----|--|----|----|----|
| | NL | IL | NH | IH | NL | IL | NH | IH |
| γ | Average tenure of regular workers 11.55 8.78 11.55 8.78 | | | | Regular job destruction rate 0.0198 0.0270 0.0206 0.0269 | | | |
| γ | Share of workers in small businesses $ea/(ea + \varepsilon)$ 0.265 0.270 0.165 0.212 | | | | Business destruction/exit rate 0.0296 0.0358 0.0305 0.0292 | | | |
| δ | Share of active entrepreneurs $(b + s)/l$ 0.547 0.525 0.268 0.577 | | | | Transition rate to entrepreneurship 0.5803 0.5355 1.1149 0.5173 | | | |
| ε | Unempl. rate of immigrant workers $\hat{u}/(d - l)$ - 0.141 - 0.091 | | | | Search intensity for small businesses 1 0.5713 1 0.2851 | | | |
| X | Unempl. rate of immigrant pot. entrepreneurs u/l - 0.049 - 0.039 | | | | Search intensity for regular jobs 1 0.7593 1 0.2750 | | | |
| e | Share of solo-entrepreneurs $(b_0 + s)/(b + s)$ 0.586 0.607 0.591 0.459 | | | | Flow cost of a small business 1.1636 1.2919 2.2148 2.0985 | | | |
| ς | Businesses with 1-9 coworkers $\sum_{n=1}^9 b_n/(b + s)$ 0.366 0.362 0.326 0.425 | | | | Entrepreneurial productivity 0.2499 0.255 0.3703 0.2635 | | | |
| ψ_{0V} | Profits of small businesses with coworkers 2.63 2.77 4.20 4.52 | | | | Quantities in small (native) businesses 0.2973 0.2398 0.4109 0.3363 | | | |
| ψ_{0I} | Av. wages in small businesses ψ_0 1 0.8674 1.2950 1.1144 | | | | Quantities in small (immigrant) businesses 0.3437 0.3097 0.5293 0.4227 | | | |
| ψ | Av. wages of workers in regular jobs ψ 1.625 1.492 2.940 2.630 | | | | Quantities of workers in regular jobs 0.9727 1 0.9157 1 | | | |
| φ | Wages of pot. entrepreneurs in regular jobs w 1.222 1.246 1.884 1.309 | | | | Quantities of pot. entrepr. in regular jobs 0.8954 0.9004 0.8619 0.7440 | | | |
| ε | 60% replacement rate in the 1st year and ALG II assistance afterwards 0.035 - 0.014 - | | | | Unemployment benefits of pot. entrepreneurs 0.3719 0.3723 0.3757 0.3709 | | | |
| ε | 60% replacement rate in the 1st year and ALG II assistance afterwards 1.5500 1.2398 | | | | Unemployment benefits of regular workers 0.3828 0.3809 0.3948 0.3869 | | | |
| M | Unempl. rate of native entrepreneurs u/l 0.035 - 0.014 - | | | | Matching multiplier, regular jobs 0.5319 0.5072 0.9955 | | | |
| M | Unempl. rate of native workers $\hat{u}/(d - l)$ 0.085 - 0.022 - | | | | Matching multiplier, small businesses 0.0748 0.1809 | | | |
| e_k | Average job-filling rate $q(\theta)$ 1.5500 1.2398 | | | | Capital cost in regular firms 3.3821 2.5642 | | | |
| c_k | Rebsen, Stops, Zaharicva (2020) 1.0819 1.1905 | | | | Vacancy posting cost 0.7431 2.3344 | | | |
| β_0 | Assumption $\psi_{0I}^N/u_{0I}^N = \psi^N/u^N$ 1.0819 1.1905 | | | | Bargaining power of workers in small firms 0.4564 0.4222 | | | |
| r | Annual discount rate = 5% | | | | (Quarterly) Discount rate 0.0125 | | | |
| η | Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) Battisti et al. (2018) | | | | Elasticity of subst. between K and Z 0.350 | | | |
| ρ | Ottaviano and Peri (2012) Battisti et al. (2018) | | | | Elasticity of subst. between y^H and y^L 0.500 | | | |
| R | Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) Battisti et al. (2018) | | | | (Quarterly) cost of capital 0.030 | | | |
| A | Normalization $y^H = P_H$ | | | | Total factor productivity 2.5630 | | | |
| α | Normalization $y^H = P_L$ | | | | Income share of Y_L 0.5547 | | | |
| κ | Average tenure in small firms 8.2369 | | | | Cross-skill matching parameter 0.1700 | | | |
| C | Regression $\ln q(\theta)$ on $\ln \theta$ | | | | Elasticity of the matching function 0.47 | | | |
| β | Ratio of nominal wages to GDP 0.28 | | | | Bargaining power of workers in regular jobs 0.9084 | | | |

Results: Welfare effects of German-Indian cooperation



Results: Welfare effects of a ban on entrepreneurship

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