

Inflation Plucking Cycles

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 - Since 1960.q1, inflation has been positively skewed in *all* 38 OECD countries
 - All countries, except Germany, have experienced double-digit inflation.
 - In contrast, since 1960.q1, not a single OECD country has experienced double-digit deflation.
- We document that inflation displays "plucking" cycles:
 - A tendency for inflation to rise temporarily above its longer-term trend but rarely drop below it

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Friedman's "plucking" model

- Friedman (1964, 1993) introduced "plucking" to describe US business cycles
 - Output frequently drops below its longer-term trend but rarely rises above it:
 - Output is viewed as bumping along the ceiling of maximum feasible output, except that every now and then it is plucked down by a cyclical contraction.*
 - Friedman (1964)
- A testable implication of the plucking theory:
 - The size of a recession predicts the size of the subsequent expansion, while the size of an expansion does not predict the size of the subsequent recession.
 - Dupraz, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2024) show that the behavior of the US unemployment rate is consistent with this pattern

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This paper

- Our paper is the first to extend the concept of “plucking” to inflation dynamics
 - We provide empirical evidence of inflation plucking cycles in 33 out of 38 OECD countries, including the US
 - Increases in inflation are followed by decreases of similar amplitude, while the amplitude of a decrease does not predict the amplitude of the subsequent increase
- We extend an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with a scarce non-labor input with low substitutability in production
 - The nonlinear version of the model—solved with global methods—can match the plucking property
 - The model gives rise to a convex price Phillips curve, a positive inflation bias, and a negative output gap bias
- Optimal monetary policy responds aggressively to large negative supply shocks while accommodating large positive ones
 - This policy mitigates the inflation and output gap biases, generating sizable welfare gains (work-in-progress)

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
Related literature

- Plucking cycles: Friedman (1964, 1993), Kim and Nelson (1999), Sinclair (2010), Hartley (2021), Kohlscheen, Moessner, and Rees (2024), Dupraz, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2024)
- Nonlinear Phillips curve: Phillips (1958), Boehm and Pandalai-Nayar (2022), Cerrato and Gitti (2022), Forbes, Gagnon, and Collins (2022), Comin, Johnson, and Jones (2023), Harding, Lindé, and Trabandt (2023), Benigno and Eggertsson (2024), Blanco et al. (2024)
- Nonlabor production input: Lorenzoni and Werning (2023), Gagliardone and Gertler (2024)
- Optimal monetary policy with nonlinear inflation dynamics: De Polis, Melosi, and Petrella (2024), Karadi et al. (2024)

Empirical evidence

- Quarterly inflation data for all 38 OECD countries
 - For most countries, these data are available for the period 1960Q1-2024Q2 [Details](#)
- We run both cross-country and country-specific regressions
- We identify inflation peaks and troughs using the algorithm developed by [Dupraz, Nakamura, and Steinsson \(2024\)](#)

Identified peaks and troughs in four OECD countries



Inflation plucking cycles in the US





Figure 1: Inflation plucking cycles. This figure displays scatter plots of amplitudes of US inflation cycles. Dashed lines are OLS regression lines.

Inflation plucking cycles in the OECD




Figure 2: Inflation plucking cycles. This figure displays scatter plots of amplitudes of OECD countries' inflation cycles. Dashed lines are OLS regression lines.

Regression results

	United States		Cross-country OECD	
Regressor:	Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease
Regressand:	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.05 ^{***} (0.27)	0.07 (0.27)	0.71 ^{***} (0.05)	0.12 ^{***} (0.05)
R^2	0.62	0.01	0.42	0.02
n	9	9	346	341

Table 1: Plucking property of inflation. This table reports OLS regression results.

*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

Country-specific regressions

Robustness: De-trended inflation

Robustness: Low-inflation regimes

Model

Standard NK model:

- Households derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor.
- Sticky prices and wages à la Rotemberg
- Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule
- Government subsidies ensure an efficient steady state

Model details

Non-standard features:

- Scarce non-labor production input with low substitutability
- Global solution to preserve nonlinear features

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Intermediate goods producers use a CES production function:

$$Y_t = \left(\alpha L_t^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} + (1-\alpha) X_t^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} \right)^{\frac{\phi}{\phi-1}} \quad (1)$$

X_t is the non-labor production input

$\phi \in (0, \infty)$ is the elasticity of substitution

X_t follows a stochastic process:

$$X_t = (1 - \rho_X) \mu_X + \rho_X X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^X \quad (2)$$

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Intuition: Kinked marginal costs

- Marginal costs can be expressed as:

$$mc_t = \frac{w_t}{\alpha} \left(\alpha + (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{L_t}{X_t} \right)^{\frac{1-\phi}{\phi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\phi}}$$

- In the Leontief limit, we obtain:


$$\lim_{\phi \rightarrow 0} mc_t = \begin{cases} \frac{w_t}{\alpha} & \text{if } X_t = L_t, \\ w_t & \text{if } X_t > L_t, \\ \infty & \text{if } X_t < L_t. \end{cases}$$

Calibration

Parameters		Value	Source/Target
Households			
β	Subjective discount factor	0.99	4% s.s. real interest rate
γ	Coefficient of relative risk aversion	2	Standard in the literature
φ	Inverse Frisch elasticity	1	Standard in the literature
γ_W	Rotemberg wage adjustment costs	465.3	Wage duration of 4 quarters
ε_W	Elasticity of substitution, labor	6	Standard in the literature
Firms			
α	CES share parameter	0.9	US plucking property (Table 1)
ϕ	Elasticity of substitution of inputs	0.01	US plucking property (Table 1)
γ_P	Rotemberg price adjustment costs	29.4	Price duration of 3 quarters
ε	Elasticity of substitution, goods	6	Standard in the literature
Monetary and fiscal authority			
μ_π	Taylor coefficient on inflation	1.5	(Taylor, 1993)
μ_Y	Taylor coefficient on output gap	0.5	(Taylor, 1993)
τ_P	Production subsidy	$\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}$	(Erceg et al., 2000)
τ_W	Labor subsidy	$\frac{1}{\varepsilon_W-1}$	(Erceg et al., 2000)
Exogenous processes			
μ_X	Mean production of non-labor input	1	Normalization
ρ_X	Autoregressive coefficient, supply shock	0	<i>iid</i> assumption
σ_X	Standard deviation, supply shock	0.011	US inflation volatility
σ_i	Standard deviation, monetary policy shock	0.013	US FFR volatility

Quantitative analysis

Inflation plucking cycles in the model (1/2)



Inflation plucking cycles in the model (2/2)

	Global solution		Linear solution	
Regressor:	Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease
Regressand:	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.07 ^{***} (0.04)	0.14 ^{**} (0.06)	0.45 ^{***} (0.07)	0.34 ^{***} (0.06)
R^2	0.79	0.03	0.18	0.14
n	189	189	190	190

Table 2: Plucking property of model inflation. This table reports OLS regression results. *** and ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.

Nonlinear Phillips curve

With flex wages, the linearized version of the model entails a simple NKPC:

$$\pi_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+1}] + \kappa \tilde{y}_t \quad (3)$$





Figure 3: Phillips curves. The figure shows the Phillips curve relationship implied by the linear and nonlinear model, respectively, conditional on supply shocks.

Impulse responses: Small vs. large negative supply shock



Optimal policy

- We solve the fully nonlinear Ramsey problem under commitment
- The Ramsey planners maximizes social welfare

$$\max_{\{i_t, C_t, L_t, \Pi_t, X_t, mC_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right]$$

subject to the FOC's of the model

Ramsey

- The state-space becomes too large for a global solution.
 - Instead, we rely on a (highly accurate) fifth-order approximation

Accuracy of perturbation

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
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Accuracy of perturbation

Optimal monetary policy: Small vs. large negative supply shock

The Ramsey planner "neutralizes" the nonlinear effects of the large shock:



Conclusion

- We provide empirical evidence of inflation plucking cycles in nearly all OECD countries
 - Increases in inflation are followed by decreases of similar amplitude, while the amplitude of a decrease does not predict the amplitude of the subsequent increase
- The nonlinear version of a standard New Keynesian model, extended with a scarce non-labor input with low substitutability in production, can account for the plucking property
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Thank you for your time!



Link to paper

Appendix




Figure 4: Inflation plucking cycles (Hamilton filter). This figure displays scatter plots of amplitudes of changes in de-trended inflation rates for the US (upper panels) and the OECD countries (lower panels).

Hamilton filter	United States		Cross-country OECD	
Regressor:	Increase	Decrease	Increase	Decrease
Regressand:	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase
$\hat{\beta}_1$	1.23 ^{***} (0.15)	0.28 (0.23)	0.71 ^{***} (0.04)	0.11 ^{***} (0.04)
R^2	0.85	0.11	0.42	0.01
n	12	12	418	416

Table 3: Plucking property of de-trended inflation This table reports OLS regression results. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Return




Figure 5: Inflation plucking cycles in low-inflation regimes. This figure displays scatter plots of amplitudes of inflation cycles for low inflation regimes from pooled cross-country OECD observations. The dashed lines are univariate OLS regression lines.

Regressor:	Increase	Decrease
Regressand:	Subseq. decrease	Subseq. increase
$\hat{\beta}_1$	0.57 ^{***} (0.12)	0.13 (0.12)
R^2	0.20	0.01
n	88	86

Table 4: Plucking property in low-inflation regimes. This table reports OLS regression results for "low-inflation regimes." *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Return

Regressor:		Increase				Decrease			
Regressand:		Subseq. decrease				Subseq. increase			
Country	Period	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n
Australia	1960Q1-2024Q2	3.68** (1.30)	0.22 (0.23)	0.07	13	4.78** (1.79)	0.04 (0.34)	0.00	13
Austria	1960Q1-2024Q2	2.56** (0.86)	0.42* (0.18)	0.37	9	4.76 (2.98)	0.02 (0.65)	0.00	9
Belgium	1960Q1-2024Q2	0.85 (1.18)	0.85*** (0.16)	0.78	8	9.70** (2.55)	-0.54 (0.38)	0.22	7
Canada	1960Q1-2024Q2	3.09* (1.36)	0.38 (0.24)	0.23	8	6.76** (2.48)	-0.31 (0.46)	0.05	8
Chile	1971Q1-2023Q4	42.41 (32.84)	0.46** (0.16)	0.44	11	10.98** (4.13)	0.05* (0.03)	0.25	11
Colombia	1971Q1-2024Q2	4.42 (2.57)	0.56** (0.24)	0.30	13	6.78** (2.94)	0.26 (0.26)	0.07	13
Costa Rica	1977Q1-2021Q4	1.32 (0.96)	0.93*** (0.03)	0.99	12	7.43*** (1.74)	0.04 (0.06)	0.05	11
Czech Republic	1992Q1-2024Q2	1.95 (2.09)	0.94** (0.26)	0.73	5	14.37** (4.10)	-0.74 (0.42)	0.38	5
Denmark	1967Q1-2024Q2	1.34 (1.73)	0.83** (0.29)	0.45	10	5.29** (1.82)	0.01 (0.27)	0.00	10
Estonia	1998Q1-2024Q2	0.24 (1.89)	1.10* (0.26)	0.82	4	20.80 (8.66)	-1.14 (1.03)	0.23	4
Finland	1960Q1-2024Q2	2.04 (2.26)	0.72* (0.31)	0.37	9	9.13*** (1.83)	-0.36 (0.24)	0.20	9

Table 5: Country specific regressions. This table reports OLS regression results for OECD countries. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Regressor:		Increase				Decrease			
Regressand:		Subseq. decrease				Subseq. increase			
Country	Period	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n
France	1960Q1-2024Q2	3.77 (2.74)	0.32 (0.44)	0.08	6	6.54* (2.35)	-0.22 (0.35)	0.06	6
Germany	1960Q1-2024Q2	1.37 (1.32)	0.72* (0.29)	0.46	7	4.24 (2.38)	0.17 (0.50)	0.02	7
Greece	1960Q1-2024Q2	4.04** (1.61)	0.54*** (0.14)	0.57	12	12.17** (4.10)	-0.36 (0.39)	0.07	12
Hungary	1981Q1-2024Q2	2.74 (2.78)	0.70** (0.28)	0.39	10	12.30** (3.88)	-0.30 (0.36)	0.07	10
Iceland	1960Q1-2024Q2	2.49 (3.66)	0.83*** (0.17)	0.53	20	13.10*** (4.29)	0.17 (0.19)	0.04	20
Ireland	1976Q1-2024Q2	12.99*** (3.19)	-0.79 (0.45)	0.28	8	5.53* (2.42)	0.14 (0.24)	0.04	8
Israel	1971Q1-2024Q2	-9.02 (5.52)	1.28*** (0.07)	0.96	17	34.73 (20.06)	-0.07 (0.18)	0.01	17
Italy	1960Q1-2024Q2	3.98* (1.74)	0.50** (0.17)	0.52	8	11.95** (4.46)	-0.47 (0.49)	0.10	8
Japan	1960Q1-2021Q2	0.11 (0.63)	1.08*** (0.09)	0.92	11	5.46** (2.01)	-0.06 (0.27)	0.00	11
Latvia	1992Q1-2024Q2	1.68 (5.55)	1.68*** (0.02)	1.00	6	10.87** (3.16)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.05	6
Lithuania	1992Q1-2024Q2	119.53 (111.23)	0.96* (0.45)	0.43	6	12.60 (10.79)	0.03 (0.03)	0.19	6

Table 6: Country specific regressions. This table reports OLS regression results for OECD countries. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Regressor:		Increase				Decrease			
Regressand:		Subseq. decrease				Subseq. increase			
Country	Period	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n
Luxembourg	1960Q1-2024Q2	-0.83 (2.21)	1.14** (0.35)	0.64	6	7.07** (1.85)	-0.12 (0.28)	0.03	6
Mexico	1969Q1-2024Q2	-1.80 (6.04)	1.09*** (0.12)	0.87	11	29.14* (13.88)	0.04 (0.26)	0.00	11
Netherlands	1960Q2-2024Q2	1.33 (1.27)	0.70*** (0.21)	0.50	11	5.54** (2.23)	-0.08 (0.46)	0.00	10
New Zealand	1960Q1-2023Q3	2.35 (2.04)	0.62* (0.29)	0.26	13	4.24** (1.61)	0.33 (0.21)	0.17	12
Norway	1960Q1-2024Q2	1.53 (1.12)	0.69*** (0.19)	0.50	13	4.67** (1.61)	0.11 (0.28)	0.01	13
Poland	1996Q1-2024Q2	2.92 (1.65)	0.87*** (0.13)	0.79	12	4.42 (6.44)	0.58 (0.76)	0.05	11
Portugal	1960Q1-2024Q2	2.81 (2.88)	0.70** (0.26)	0.33	15	11.84*** (2.34)	-0.20 (0.20)	0.07	15
Slovakia	1992Q1-2024Q2	1.06 (0.72)	1.01*** (0.07)	0.97	6	5.03 (3.28)	0.24 (0.30)	0.09	6
Slovenia	1981Q1-2024Q2	-7.76 (5.58)	1.04*** (0.01)	1.00	15	224.01 (194.97)	0.00 (0.25)	0.00	15
South Korea	1960Q1-2023Q3	6.33** (2.46)	0.32 (0.21)	0.11	19	6.02** (2.68)	0.32 (0.23)	0.09	19

Table 7: Country specific regressions. This table reports OLS regression results for OECD countries. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Regressor:		Increase				Decrease			
Regressand:		Subseq. decrease				Subseq. increase			
Country	Period	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	R^2	n
Spain	1960Q1-2024Q2	0.09 (3.83)	1.00* (0.44)	0.36	9	9.85*** (1.84)	-0.26 (0.18)	0.19	9
Sweden	1960Q1-2024Q2	0.44 (1.64)	0.94** (0.30)	0.43	13	5.26*** (1.48)	0.08 (0.25)	0.01	13
Switzerland	1960Q1-2024Q2	0.66 (0.76)	0.89*** (0.15)	0.79	9	3.34* (1.66)	0.23 (0.33)	0.05	9
Turkey	1960Q1-2024Q2	4.42 (3.51)	0.69*** (0.13)	0.52	28	18.27*** (5.26)	0.06 (0.21)	0.00	27
United Kingdom	1960Q1-2024Q2	2.48 (1.65)	0.65*** (0.18)	0.56	10	9.88** (3.00)	-0.33 (0.35)	0.08	10
United States	1960Q1-2024Q2	-0.21 (1.55)	1.05*** (0.27)	0.62	9	5.02** (1.64)	0.07 (0.27)	0.01	9

Table 8: Country specific regressions . This table reports OLS regression results for OECD countries. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

[Return to data](#)

[Return to regressions](#)

- A continuum of households maximizes their lifetime utility

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta \left\{ \frac{C_{jt+s}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{L_{jt+s}^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right\} \right],$$

subject to their per-period real budget constraint

$$C_{jt} + b_{jt-1} (1 + i_{t-1}) / \Pi_t = (1 + \tau_W) w_{jt} L_{jt} + b_{jt} + d_{jt} - T_{jt} - \Upsilon_{jt}^W,$$

- An employment agency aggregates households' differentiated labor as in [Erceg et al. \(2000\)](#)

$$L_{jt} = \left(\frac{w_{jt}}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_W} L_t,$$

Households set wages subject to quadratic adjustment costs

$$\Upsilon_{jt}^W = \frac{\gamma_W}{2} \left(\Pi_t^W - 1 \right)^2 Y_t.$$

- Optimality gives an Euler equation and a wage Phillips curve

$$C_t^{-\gamma} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \frac{(1 + i_t)}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right],$$

$$L_t^{\varphi+1} \varepsilon_W = C_t^{-\gamma} \left[(1 + \tau_W) (\varepsilon_W - 1) L_t w_t + \gamma_W (\Pi_t^W - 1) Y_t \Pi_t^W \right]$$

$$- \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \gamma_W (\Pi_{t+1}^W - 1) Y_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^W \right].$$

- The households' stochastic endowment of the non-labor input follows an AR(1) process

$$X_t = (1 - \rho_X) \mu_X + \rho_X X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^X, \quad \varepsilon_t^X \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_X^2).$$

- Intermediate firms supply in monopolistic competition the final good producer

$$Y_{it} = (P_{it}/P_t)^{-\varepsilon} Y_t.$$

- Intermediate goods firm produce with

$$Y_{it} = \left(\alpha L_{it}^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} + (1-\alpha) X_{it}^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} \right)^{\frac{\phi}{\phi-1}},$$

- Cost minimization yields the factor demands,

$$L_{it} = \left[\frac{w_{it}}{\alpha mc_{it}} \right]^{-\phi} Y_{it},$$

$$X_{it} = \left[\frac{p_t^X}{(1-\alpha) mc_{it}} \right]^{-\phi} Y_{it}.$$

- Intermediate firms maximize the infinite horizon of discounted dividends

$$\max_{\{P_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} q_{t,t+j} m_{it},$$

where

- $q_{t,t+j}$ is the household's stochastic discount factor
- Per-period profits are

$$m_{it} = (1 + \tau_P) (P_{it}/P_t) Y_{it} - mc_{it} Y_{it} - \Upsilon_{it}^P (P_{it}, P_{it-1})$$

- Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment costs

$$\Upsilon_{it}^P = \frac{\gamma_P}{2} \left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_{it-1}} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t.$$

- The symmetric equilibrium yields the following price Phillips curve

$$(\Pi_t - 1) \Pi_t = \frac{1}{\gamma_P} ((1 + \tau_P)(1 - \varepsilon) + \varepsilon m c_t) + \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{q_{t,t+1}}{q_{t,t}} (\Pi_{t+1} - 1) \Pi_{t+1} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_{t+1}} \right].$$

- Monetary policy

$$1 + i_t = (1 + i) \Pi_t^{\mu_\Pi} \tilde{Y}_t^{\mu_Y} \varepsilon_t^i, \quad \varepsilon_t^i \sim \mathcal{N}(1, \sigma_i^2).$$

- The goods market clearing condition is given by

$$Y_t = C_t + \Upsilon_t^P + \Upsilon_t^W.$$

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Parameters		Value	Source/Target
Households			
β	Subjective discount factor	0.99	4% s.s. real interest rate
γ	Coefficient of relative risk aversion	2	Standard in the literature
φ	Inverse Frisch elasticity	1	Standard in the literature
γ_W	Rotemberg wage adjustment costs	465.3	Wage duration of 4 quarters
ε_W	Elasticity of substitution, labor	6	Standard in the literature
Firms			
α	CES share parameter	0.9	US plucking property (Table 1)
ϕ	Elasticity of substitution of inputs	0.01	US plucking property (Table 1)
γ_P	Rotemberg price adjustment costs	29.4	Price duration of 3 quarters
ε	Elasticity of substitution, goods	6	Standard in the literature
Monetary and fiscal authority			
μ_π	Taylor coefficient on inflation	1.5	(Taylor, 1993)
μ_Y	Taylor coefficient on output gap	0.5	(Taylor, 1993)
τ_P	Production subsidy	$\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}$	(Erceg et al., 2000)
τ_W	Labor subsidy	$\frac{1}{\varepsilon_W-1}$	(Erceg et al., 2000)
Exogenous processes			
μ_X	Mean production of non-labor input	1	Normalization
ρ_X	Autoregressive coefficient, supply shock	0	<i>iid</i> assumption
σ_X	Standard deviation, supply shock	0.011	US inflation volatility
σ_i	Standard deviation, monetary policy shock	0.013	US FFR volatility

The Lagrangian of the Ramsey planner is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{L} = & \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \frac{L_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} + \mu_{1t} \left[C_t^{-\gamma} - \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \frac{(1+i_t)}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right] \right] \right. \\
 & + \mu_{2t} \left[C_t^{-\gamma} \left[(1+\tau_W)(\varepsilon_W - 1) w_t L_t + \gamma_W (\Pi_t^W - 1) Y_t \Pi_t^W \right] \right. \\
 & \left. - L_t^{\varphi+1} \varepsilon_W - \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \gamma_W (\Pi_{t+1}^W - 1) Y_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^W \right] \right] \\
 & + \mu_{3t} \left[\frac{1}{\gamma_P} \left[(1+\tau_P)(1-\varepsilon) + \varepsilon m c_t \right] + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} (\Pi_{t+1} - 1) \Pi_{t+1} \frac{Y_{t+1}}{Y_t} \right] - (\Pi_t - 1) \Pi_t \right] \\
 & + \mu_{4t} \left[\left[\frac{w_t}{\alpha m c_t} \right]^{-\phi} Y_t - L_t \right] + \mu_{5t} \left[\left[\frac{p_t^X}{m c_t (1-\alpha)} \right]^{-\phi} Y_t - X_t \right] + \mu_{6t} \left[Y_t - \Upsilon_t^P - \Upsilon_t^W - C_t \right].
 \end{aligned}$$

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To assess the accuracy of the perturbation approximations, we propose the following metric:

$$E(w, X, \varepsilon^i) = 100 \times \left| \frac{U^{pa}(w, X, \varepsilon^i) - U(w, X, \varepsilon^i)}{U(w, X, \varepsilon^i)} \right|,$$

Perturbation	First order	Second order	Third order	Fourth order	Fifth order
Mean of E	0.046	0.024	0.019	0.013	0.012

Table 9: Accuracy of perturbation. This table reports the mean errors of perturbation of increasing order using the per-period utility. We use the ergodic distribution of the global solution to evaluate the errors.




Figure 6: Impulse response functions. Impulse responses to a large negative shock using a global (blue), Dynare's first-order (yellow), and fifth-order (red) solution, respectively. Hatted variables are denoted in percentage deviations from the stochastic steady state.

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


Figure 7: Impulse responses, Taylor: Large positive vs. large negative supply shock




Figure 8: Impulse responses to a large positive (blue) and large negative (red) supply shock with a Ramsey planner.

We can visually inspect the effects of policy by computing the difference between the IRFs:




Figure 9: Impulse responses, Ramsey minus Taylor: Large positive vs. large negative supply shock.

We can visually inspect the effects of policy by computing the difference between the IRFs:




Figure 10: Impulse responses, Ramsey minus Taylor: Small vs. large negative supply shock.

- In standard linearized models, stabilization policy has no effect on average levels, hence the welfare gains are trivial (Lucas, 1987, 2003).
- In the nonlinear model, stabilization policy mitigates the inflation and output gap biases:

	Taylor	Ramsey
$\mathbb{E}[4\pi_t]$	0.3	0.0
$\mathbb{E}[4\pi_t^W]$	0.3	0.0
$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{y}_t]$	-0.1	0.0

Table 10: Average values in pct.

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