The Battle of the Sexes for Mayoral Re-elections: Gender Differences in Gender Sensitive Services

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Stylised Fact 1: ↑ female political representation



Italian Chamber of Deputies, I Legislature (1948), **45 women** out of 613 members



Italian Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature (2018), **224 women** out of 630 members

Stylised Fact 2: many incumbents are office-motivated



In Italy, **60% of incumbent** mayors seek re-election.

Incumbents adapt policies to improve their re-election prospects (Brender, 2003; Nannicini et al., 2013; Drago et al., 2014; Cadot et al., 2006; Roberson, 2008)

Literature

Politicians' identity, office-motivation, and policy

- Political campaigns (Di Tella et al. 2023; Le Pennec 2024; Fernandes 2023)
  - Candidates tend to focus more on topics unrelated to their identity (Downs 1957)

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- Incumbents (Fredriksson et al. 2011)
  - Incumbents act to maximise their re-election chances rather than aligning with their identity

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Gap:

① We know little about how gender shapes policymaking by office-motivated incumbents

② We know even less when we focus on **gender-sensitive policies**

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① The need of gender-sensitive policies to reach a more equal society (Kleven et al. 2023)

Italy faces huge gender inequality in the labour market and severe gender stereotypes.

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Methodology: RDD on close mixed-gender elections

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Main data sources

Gender-sensitive services (2002-2015)

- Financial Statement Certificates (Italian Ministry of Interior)
  - Early childcare, school canteens, and sports centers

Local governments (2002-2015)

- Italian Ministry of Interior
  - Results of local elections (i.e., margin of victory, votes obtained by the candidates)
  - Data on local government members at the individual level

Socioeconomic and demographic controls

- Italian Population and Housing Census of 2001 and 2011
- Ministry of Economics and Finance (2002-2015)

Gender culture

- Results of the divorce abrogative referendum 1974 (Italian Ministry of Interior)

Sample of interest

- Re-running mayors
  - 60% of Italian mayors

Selection issues | Gender gap re-running

- Municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants
  - 70% of the Italian municipalities
    - Same fiscal rules
    - No gender quota

Confounding policy

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  - Elections where the top 2 candidates
  - 2837 mixed gender elections have opposite gender

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Regression Discontinuity Design

The model:

$$\text{Ihs}(\text{Gender-sensitive}_{it}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Female mayor}_{it} + P(MV_{it}\beta) + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation Gender-sensitive$_{it}$
- P stands for the diff. order polynomials
- Female mayor$_{it}$ is 1 when the mayor is female
- MV_{it} is the running variable
- ε_{it} clustered at the legislature level

Identification assumptions:

- No sorting behaviours around the cutoff
- Homogeneity of observable characteristics

Gender gap in gender-sensitive policies







Figure: Gender gap in early childcare across re-running mayors

Gender gap in gender-sensitive policies

	Linear Polynomial					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Early Childcare	**-0.603*****	**-0.692*****	**-0.498****	**-0.608****	**-0.638****	**-0.417**
	(0.232)	(0.229)	(0.253)	(0.284)	(0.269)	(0.280)
Bandwidth	0.187	0.177	0.187	0.167	0.153	0.159
Observations	3443	3269	3011	1834	1711	1561
School Canteens	-0.412**	-0.418**	-0.385*	-0.266	-0.240	-0.285
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.221)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.276)
Bandwidth	0.265	0.261	0.210	0.235	0.232	0.218
Observations	4378	4337	3305	2377	2371	2024
Sports Centers	-0.375**	-0.486***	-0.424**	-0.203	-0.237	-0.242
	(0.162)	(0.170)	(0.181)	(0.244)	(0.220)	(0.248)
Bandwidth	0.204	0.170	0.194	0.179	0.148	0.169
Observations	3693	3169	3126	1965	1666	1646
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

Quadratic Polynomial | Extensive margin | Confounding policies | Alternative bandwiths | Different samples | Falsification and placebo tests

A strategic gender gap in policy decisions

Explaining mechanism: Office-motivated incumbents try to appeal to opposite-gender voters with policies to increase their re-election chances

① "Gender-neutral" services

- No gender gap is expected
- Gender-neutral services: *local police*, *canteens*, *electoral service*, and *local institution*

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Gender-neutral policy

	Linear Polynomial					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Canteens	-0.055	-0.070	-0.030	-0.007	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Bandwidth	0.138	0.137	0.142	0.146	0.144	0.141
Observations	2693	2683	2457	1637	1621	1451
Local Police	-0.224	-0.184	-0.188	0.017	0.046	-0.144
	(0.232)	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.308)	(0.332)	(0.318)
Bandwidth	0.175	0.164	0.188	0.220	0.182	0.215
Observations	3250	3077	3094	2287	1992	2046
Electoral Service	-0.123	-0.118	-0.152	0.292	0.445	0.200
	(0.211)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.312)	(0.315)	(0.309)
Bandwidth	0.167	0.148	0.170	0.173	0.155	0.182
Observations	3136	2844	2805	1914	1733	1808
Local Institution	-0.168	-0.073	-0.133	0.081	0.059	0.097
	(0.244)	(0.235)	(0.264)	(0.398)	(0.376)	(0.387)
Bandwidth	0.214	0.225	0.215	0.193	0.202	0.213
Observations	3833	4002	3446	2075	2139	2015
Region and year F.E		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

Quadratic Polynomial | Share of Gendered vs. Neutral Service Spending | Spending across local government functions | Local government budget

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② Gender gap in policy preferences vs office motivation

- This contradicts the literature (Hessami and Baskaran, 2019)
- Gender policy gap across samples with incumbents with different office motivations
  (i.e., term-limited mandate (Alt et al., 2011; Fouirnaies et al. 2022: Bracco et al. 2024))

Ruling out a gender gap in policy preferences

Office motivation

- Mayors running for any position (local, regional, or national government)
- All mayors
- Mayors in their second mandate (cannot re-run for mayoral position)
- Mayors not re-running for the mayoral position
- Mayors not re-running for any position (regional or national government)

Office motivated incumbents

	Linear Polynomial					
		Parametric			Non-Parametric	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Re-running for any position						
Early Childcare	-0.561**	-0.676***	-0.500**	-0.717**	-0.792***	-0.492*
	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.227)	(0.286)	(0.273)	(0.287)
Observations	3896	3575	3766	2022	1813	1969
All mayors						
Early Childcare	-0.257	-0.359*	-0.217	-0.473*	-0.558**	-0.399
	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.206)	(0.275)	(0.246)	(0.276)
Observations	5390	5056	4881	2987	2762	2746
Region and year F.E		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

Quadratic Polynomial

Non-office motivated incumbents

	Linear Polynomial					
	Parametric			Non-Parametric		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Second mandate						
Early Childcare	-0.538	-1.274**	-0.648	-0.849	-1.951***	-0.561
	(0.607)	(0.634)	(0.601)	(0.780)	(0.642)	(0.797)
Observations	3896	3575	3766	2022	1813	1969
Not re-running for mayoral position						
Early Childcare	0.477	0.374	0.728	-0.040	-0.329	-0.039
	(0.444)	(0.416)	(0.481)	(0.641)	(0.497)	(0.699)
Observations	1433	1355	1207	915	825	782
Not re-running for any position						
Early Childcare	0.680*	0.412	0.735**	0.260	-0.153	0.549
	(0.363)	(0.369)	(0.338)	(0.644)	(0.513)	(0.529)
Observations	1574	1425	1497	822	798	749
Region and year F.E		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

Quadratic Polynomial | School Canteens | Sports Centers

Who is determining the gap ?

Office motivation leads to a relative difference in provision for gender-sensitive policies

Hypothesis

① Female mayors provide less gender-sensitive policies to fight gender stereotypes

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Difference-in-discontinuities

- Demand for the service (female employment)
- Progressiveness of gender culture (divorce referendum 1974)
- Salience (turnout)

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Difference-in-discontinuities (Casarico et al., 2022)



Male mayors have more incentives than female mayors to expand this service

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Event-study estimates

- Compare mayors of the same gender across their first and second mandate.

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



Conclusions

- Office motivation is a channel through which politician gender shapes policy outcomes
- Male incumbents may expand childcare more than their female counterparts, but only opportunistically
  - Short term commitment $\rightarrow$ No long term commitment
  - Places where the demand for the service is higher $\rightarrow$ Equity issue
  - $\rightarrow$ the institutional setting matter

Thanks for your attention!

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Appendix

Gender-sensitive policies

Gender-sensitive policies: all those policies having a disproportionate effect on women.

In this work: early childcare provision, schools canteens, and sports centers

- Substitutes to maternal care

Back

Italy as an ideal testing ground

① Huge gender inequalities
- *Labour-market*:
  - Female employment is below the EU average (49.4% in 2021)
- *Culture*:

  27.9% respondents agree with "*It is up to man to provide for the family's financial needs*" (ISTAT Survey 2019)
- *Politics*:

  11% of female mayors between 2002-2019

② Institutional setting More
- Municipalities oversee gender-sensitive policy (i.e., early childcare)
- Italian mayors are directly elected

③ Lack of gender sensitive policy More
- Below the 33% Barcelona target established by the EU for early childcare

Back

The Italian local governments

Three main bodies

- *Executive power*: the mayor, the executive committee
- *Legislative power*: the city council

Mayors are directly elected

- In small municipalities with the first-past-the-post
  The best candidate receive at least 2/3 of the seats
- In large municipalities are elected by run-off

Mayors hold office for 5 years

Back

The lack in early childcare provision

Services for children aged 0-3

National and regional governments set management criteria and common goals

Mixed framework: agreements with the private providers

- i.e., cover of fees, reserve slots in private nursery schools

Below the 33% Barcelona target established by the European Commission

Only 1/4 of municipalities provide this public service (2002-2015)

Figure: At least a nursery school (2002-2015)



Back

Selection in running for re-elections

	Early Childcare			School Canteens			Sports Centers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Region fixed effects									
Re-running	-0.164	-0.143	-0.138	-0.0110	-0.0261	-0.0116	0.0720	0.101	0.102
	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.0883)	(0.0936)	(0.0888)	(0.0665)	(0.0723)	(0.0708)
Panel B: Province fixed effects									
Re-running	-0.171*	-0.152	-0.144	-0.00132	-0.00245	0.0171	0.0668	0.0897	0.0930
	(0.0978)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.0855)	(0.0914)	(0.0872)	(0.0650)	(0.0708)	(0.0693)
Panel C: Municipality fixed effects									
Re-running	0.0263	-0.0107	-0.00941	0.0276	0.0412	0.0395	0.0748	0.0949	0.0946
	(0.104)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.0990)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.0754)	(0.0885)	(0.0879)
Observations	8,893	7,775	7,758	8,966	7,842	7,824	8,956	7,836	7,818
Year fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mayoral features		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
Socio-economic features			✓			✓			✓

Back

Gender gap re-running mayors

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Re-running	0.041	0.025	0.067	-0.037	-0.022	-0.063	0.100	0.097	0.112	-0.014	0.005	-0.040
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.095)
Bandwidth	0.140	0.142	0.133	0.157	0.158	0.161	0.140	0.142	0.133	0.231	0.230	0.232
Observations	4136	4175	3372	2523	2556	2245	4136	4175	3372	3359	3336	2930
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

Back

Confounding policy

- Law 215/2012 introduced gender quotas (above 5000 inhabitants)
- DSP established budject constraints from 1991 (above 5000 inhabitants)
- Mayoral salaries increase significantly in municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants.

Back

No sorting behaviours

This assumption imposes that the running variable can not be manipulated by agents

- Difficult to determine the margin of victory
- Staggered adoption of the local elections

McCray test checks for the discontinuity in the mass of the running variable around the cut-off

- Negative values represent cases where females lose, while positive values indicate the opposite
- Rejection of a severe discontinuity
- P-value is always greater then 0.05

Back

No sorting behaviours around the cutoff



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Homogeneity of observable characteristics



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Robustness checks

- Alternative measure of the outcomes extensive margin
- Alternative bandwidth selections msetwo msesum
- Different sample of municipalities 1000 $\preceq$ inh. $\preceq$ 5000 $\preceq$ 15000
- Control for confounding policies DSP and OBP
- Falsification and placebo tests →
  - Path dependence in service provision
  - Closely contested elections
  - Alternative cut-off thresholds

Back

Gender gap in gender-sensitive policies

	Quadratic Polynomial					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	**-0.614***	**-0.547**	**-0.565**	**-0.582***	**-0.558***	**-0.359**
	(0.346)	(0.335)	(0.386)	(0.309)	(0.302)	(0.313)
Bandwidth	0.187	0.177	0.187	0.249	0.214	0.225
Observations	3443	3269	3011	2460	2218	2058
School Canteens	-0.436	-0.475*	-0.303	-0.190	-0.171	-0.232
	(0.273)	(0.279)	(0.322)	(0.339)	(0.354)	(0.337)
Bandwidth	0.265	0.261	0.210	0.304	0.295	0.302
Observations	4378	4337	3305	2717	2658	2411
Sports Centers	-0.567**	-0.539**	-0.530*	-0.224	-0.235	-0.262
	(0.252)	(0.247)	(0.281)	(0.321)	(0.271)	(0.313)
Bandwidth	0.204	0.170	0.194	0.216	0.210	0.226
Observations	3693	3169	3126	2254	2184	2066
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

Back

Gender-Sensitive Outcomes

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.086***	-0.105***	-0.073**	-0.084**	-0.088**	-0.057	-0.085*	-0.071	-0.078	-0.077*	-0.079*	-0.050
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Bandwidth	0.189	0.178	0.187	0.164	0.151	0.156	0.189	0.178	0.187	0.239	0.220	0.228
Observations	3468	3304	3024	1817	1691	1533	3468	3304	3024	2383	2283	2067
School Canteens	-0.072	-0.082	-0.070	-0.054	-0.052	-0.087	-0.100	-0.112	-0.113	-0.036	-0.042	-0.077
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.093)
Bandwidth	0.191	0.184	0.189	0.245	0.239	0.247	0.191	0.184	0.189	0.299	0.308	0.310
Observations	3523	3426	3042	2452	2396	2182	3523	3426	3042	2696	2747	2448
Sports Centers	-0.130**	-0.139**	-0.130**	-0.066	-0.110	-0.126	-0.219**	-0.206**	-0.227**	-0.129	-0.132	-0.163
	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.121)
Bandwidth	0.182	0.193	0.195	0.224	0.159	0.202	0.182	0.193	0.195	0.205	0.195	0.212
Observations	3391	3561	3159	2322	1772	1902	3391	3561	3159	2147	2104	1964
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Alternative bandwidth msetwo

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.277*	-0.334**	-0.284*	-0.649**	-0.693**	-0.521*	-0.561***	-0.600***	-0.543**	-0.710**	-0.732**	-0.554*
	(0.148)	(0.143)	(0.166)	(0.283)	(0.271)	(0.285)	(0.194)	(0.186)	(0.212)	(0.314)	(0.306)	(0.323)
Observations	6254	6254	5393	1878	1751	1620	6254	6254	5393	2479	2392	2047
School Canteens	-0.335**	-0.336**	-0.373**	-0.263	-0.226	-0.310	-0.464**	-0.446**	-0.540***	-0.137	-0.186	-0.150
	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.151)	(0.271)	(0.277)	(0.274)	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.196)	(0.358)	(0.352)	(0.354)
Observations	6312	6312	5444	2356	2314	2148	6312	6312	5444	2576	2723	2210
Sports Centers	-0.161	-0.233**	-0.199*	-0.193	-0.220	-0.244	-0.137	-0.208	-0.206	-0.312	-0.265	-0.314
	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.248)	(0.211)	(0.243)	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.153)	(0.312)	(0.269)	(0.305)
Observations	6308	6308	5442	1873	1792	1680	6308	6308	5442	2450	2290	2179
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Alternative bandwidth msesum

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.277*	-0.334**	-0.284*	-0.627**	-0.649**	-0.418	-0.561***	-0.600***	-0.543**	-0.603*	-0.518*	-0.418
	(0.148)	(0.143)	(0.166)	(0.281)	(0.262)	(0.280)	(0.194)	(0.186)	(0.212)	(0.308)	(0.306)	(0.303)
Observations	6254	6254	5393	1972	1839	1563	6254	6254	5393	2509	2100	2231
School Canteens	-0.335**	-0.336**	-0.373**	-0.253	-0.219	-0.293	-0.464**	-0.446**	-0.540***	-0.107	-0.183	-0.135
	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.151)	(0.276)	(0.281)	(0.273)	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.196)	(0.366)	(0.350)	(0.367)
Observations	6312	6312	5444	2266	2208	2069	6312	6312	5444	2434	2722	2101
Sports Centers	-0.161	-0.233**	-0.199*	-0.204	-0.213	-0.254	-0.137	-0.208	-0.206	-0.217	-0.233	-0.277
	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.246)	(0.209)	(0.242)	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.153)	(0.324)	(0.262)	(0.309)
Observations	6308	6308	5442	1939	1891	1719	6308	6308	5442	2188	2335	2103
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Population below 15.000 inhabitants

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.495**	-0.693***	-0.356	-0.520	-0.686**	-0.248	-0.420	-0.473	-0.213	-0.595	-0.692*	-0.172
	(0.250)	(0.235)	(0.270)	(0.348)	(0.329)	(0.352)	(0.350)	(0.343)	(0.372)	(0.413)	(0.388)	(0.394)
Bandwidth	0.224	0.220	0.224	0.199	0.173	0.183	0.224	0.220	0.224	0.203	0.249	0.257
Observations	5463	5395	4812	3031	2749	2566	5463	5395	4812	3074	3525	3207
School Canteens	-0.120	-0.170	-0.139	-0.133	-0.150	-0.153	-0.254	-0.226	-0.124	-0.129	-0.122	-0.155
	(0.162)	(0.158)	(0.176)	(0.214)	(0.210)	(0.225)	(0.235)	(0.237)	(0.251)	(0.304)	(0.294)	(0.298)
Bandwidth	0.230	0.232	0.217	0.236	0.243	0.205	0.230	0.232	0.217	0.216	0.258	0.226
Observations	5586	5629	4773	3401	3490	2805	5586	5629	4773	3239	3599	2990
Sports Centers	-0.359**	-0.477***	-0.353**	-0.170	-0.269	-0.171	-0.439*	-0.471**	-0.429*	-0.301	-0.358	-0.270
	(0.168)	(0.157)	(0.170)	(0.244)	(0.218)	(0.242)	(0.251)	(0.235)	(0.250)	(0.299)	(0.259)	(0.299)
Bandwidth	0.159	0.153	0.176	0.150	0.131	0.158	0.159	0.153	0.176	0.200	0.192	0.211
Observations	4226	4123	4083	2419	2158	2266	4226	4123	4083	3062	2987	2856
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Population between 1.000 to 5.000 inhabitants

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.822***	-0.874***	-0.724**	-0.668*	-0.805**	-0.463	-0.653	-0.612	-0.679	-0.117	-0.338	0.042
	(0.317)	(0.317)	(0.345)	(0.362)	(0.355)	(0.358)	(0.448)	(0.466)	(0.491)	(0.410)	(0.415)	(0.412)
Bandwidth	0.172	0.158	0.174	0.154	0.137	0.147	0.172	0.158	0.174	0.149	0.152	0.162
Observations	2329	2171	2100	1287	1174	1117	2329	2171	2100	1244	1268	1198
School Canteens	-0.548**	-0.530**	-0.569**	-0.211	-0.155	-0.329	-0.475	-0.553*	-0.456	-0.140	-0.170	-0.211
	(0.227)	(0.221)	(0.235)	(0.311)	(0.315)	(0.303)	(0.337)	(0.319)	(0.340)	(0.393)	(0.386)	(0.391)
Bandwidth	0.164	0.169	0.178	0.160	0.163	0.169	0.164	0.169	0.178	0.197	0.233	0.193
Observations	2237	2308	2160	1319	1342	1253	2237	2308	2160	1577	1751	1415
Sports Centers	-0.361*	-0.514***	-0.422*	-0.066	-0.075	-0.074	-0.452	-0.336	-0.440	0.033	0.016	-0.065
	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.224)	(0.277)	(0.241)	(0.252)	(0.297)	(0.284)	(0.326)	(0.380)	(0.319)	(0.358)
Bandwidth	0.202	0.180	0.186	0.193	0.176	0.228	0.202	0.180	0.186	0.210	0.193	0.228
Observations	2663	2451	2267	1555	1443	1567	2663	2451	2267	1625	1555	1567
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Confounding policy

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.607**	-0.469*	-0.695***	-0.635**	-0.385	-0.628**	-0.601	-0.558	-0.483	-0.266	0.186	-0.294
	(0.261)	(0.282)	(0.256)	(0.285)	(0.278)	(0.276)	(0.403)	(0.447)	(0.376)	(0.329)	(0.349)	(0.319)
Bandwidth	0.190	0.185	0.179	0.159	0.134	0.146	0.190	0.185	0.179	0.139	0.133	0.140
Observations	2333	2048	2210	1183	890	1080	2333	2048	2210	1033	890	1050
School Canteens	-0.475*	-0.456*	-0.535**	-0.379	-0.398	-0.398	-0.581	-0.339	-0.616	-0.283	-0.322	-0.357
	(0.245)	(0.242)	(0.249)	(0.378)	(0.386)	(0.385)	(0.357)	(0.352)	(0.381)	(0.476)	(0.461)	(0.488)
Bandwidth	0.217	0.261	0.198	0.167	0.157	0.164	0.217	0.261	0.198	0.216	0.225	0.217
Observations	2596	2572	2434	1231	1032	1217	2596	2572	2434	1491	1378	1498
Sports Centers	-0.420**	-0.578**	-0.498**	-0.388	-0.342	-0.334	-0.686**	-0.553*	-0.560*	-0.496	-0.431	-0.441
	(0.196)	(0.233)	(0.213)	(0.333)	(0.317)	(0.290)	(0.298)	(0.326)	(0.297)	(0.404)	(0.392)	(0.362)
Bandwidth	0.205	0.175	0.173	0.142	0.141	0.147	0.205	0.175	0.173	0.189	0.184	0.181
Observations	2480	1941	2182	1065	945	1086	2480	1941	2182	1372	1199	1323
Budget Law F.E		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Ruling Out Alternative Explanations

① The results are due to **path dependence in the provision**

Falsification test: estimate if the gender of re-running mayors relates to prior average provision of gender-sensitive services.

② The possibility that the results arise from random chance rather than a true underlining causal relationship

Placebo test: replication of the analysis using placebo cut-offs $(-0.40, -0.20)$ and $(0.20, 0.40)$

③ The results are due to **close elections**, independent of the candidate's gender

Placebo test: estimate whether gender-sensitive policy provision differs across close elections between candidates of the same gender

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Falsification test

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early childcare	-0.255	-0.321*	-0.250	-0.279	-0.274	-0.309	-0.313	-0.291	-0.251	-0.222	-0.161	-0.203
	(0.173)	(0.167)	(0.194)	(0.219)	(0.211)	(0.204)	(0.262)	(0.273)	(0.284)	(0.252)	(0.251)	(0.240)
Bandwidth	0.199	0.186	0.209	0.165	0.157	0.161	0.199	0.186	0.209	0.219	0.199	0.197
Observations	3715	3512	3371	1834	1743	1596	3715	3512	3371	2277	2114	1888
School Canteens	-0.412**	-0.420**	-0.285	-0.278	-0.181	-0.299	-0.280	-0.221	-0.132	-0.414	-0.271	-0.362
	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.230)	(0.271)	(0.239)	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.303)	(0.330)	(0.374)	(0.351)	(0.367)
Bandwidth	0.250	0.205	0.201	0.222	0.243	0.192	0.250	0.205	0.201	0.193	0.214	0.202
Observations	4338	3778	3280	2301	2437	1854	4338	3778	3280	2085	2225	1905
Sports Centers	-0.449***	-0.538***	-0.428**	-0.332*	-0.379**	-0.253	-0.549**	-0.531**	-0.468*	-0.234	-0.253	-0.226
	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.170)	(0.195)	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.228)	(0.213)	(0.251)	(0.306)	(0.254)	(0.289)
Bandwidth	0.191	0.182	0.187	0.213	0.150	0.221	0.191	0.182	0.187	0.181	0.171	0.206
Observations	3588	3446	3080	2210	1680	2035	3588	3446	3080	1986	1898	1920
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

Controlling for unbalanced previous provision

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Provision of gender sensitive policies

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early childcare	-0.465**	-0.581**	-0.381	-0.456	-0.580**	-0.306	-0.447	-0.405	-0.412	-0.372	-0.492	-0.239
	(0.230)	(0.233)	(0.250)	(0.279)	(0.267)	(0.281)	(0.342)	(0.328)	(0.381)	(0.308)	(0.300)	(0.314)
Bandwidth	0.185	0.173	0.184	0.160	0.152	0.154	0.185	0.173	0.184	0.214	0.211	0.216
Observations	3421	3212	2970	1775	1696	1520	3421	3212	2970	2211	2180	1999
School Canteens	-0.098	-0.162	-0.126	-0.009	-0.089	-0.078	-0.232	-0.335	-0.185	0.239	0.117	0.142
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.212)	(0.189)	(0.206)	(0.195)	(0.217)	(0.206)	(0.299)	(0.285)	(0.296)
Bandwidth	0.266	0.197	0.264	0.206	0.229	0.224	0.266	0.197	0.264	0.216	0.216	0.221
Observations	4383	3615	3783	2151	2347	2056	4383	3615	3783	2266	2251	2040
Sports Centers	-0.051	-0.032	-0.126	0.130	0.099	0.011	-0.053	-0.146	-0.096	0.092	0.078	-0.013
	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.125)	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.176)	(0.180)	(0.172)	(0.200)
Bandwidth	0.180	0.162	0.170	0.202	0.175	0.183	0.180	0.162	0.170	0.284	0.286	0.238
Observations	3340	3047	2769	2138	1918	1772	3340	3047	2769	2636	2638	2119
Previous service provision	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Placebo alternative cut-off







Quadratic Polynomial Back

Placebo: alternative cut-off







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Placebo: closed-contexted male vs male election





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Local government budget

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Total Expenditure	-0.092*	-0.114**	-0.109**	-0.038	-0.026	-0.010	-0.112*	-0.078	-0.107	-0.019	-0.012	0.016
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.096)
Bandwidth	0.175	0.166	0.184	0.179	0.160	0.210	0.175	0.166	0.184	0.225	0.217	0.226
Observations	3253	3112	2988	1969	1782	1951	3253	3112	2988	2336	2268	2071
Total Revenues	-0.096	-0.159*	-0.156*	-0.083	-0.145	-0.152	-0.122	-0.141	-0.189	-0.057	-0.117	-0.126
	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.126)	(0.110)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.129)	(0.153)	(0.133)	(0.154)
Bandwidth	0.179	0.169	0.193	0.169	0.160	0.180	0.179	0.169	0.193	0.228	0.226	0.238
Observations	3290	3124	3085	1868	1787	1755	3290	3124	3085	2341	2336	2125
Surplus or Deficit	-7.942	-2.845	-4.141	37.784	35.460	27.212	11.310	20.697	-9.708	50.352	51.518	44.023
	(17.528)	(20.228)	(15.049)	(30.579)	(28.566)	(32.042)	(27.612)	(29.834)	(25.990)	(40.678)	(40.313)	(42.594)
Bandwidth	0.170	0.154	0.213	0.179	0.194	0.182	0.170	0.154	0.213	0.233	0.232	0.233
Observations	3176	2940	3338	1967	2088	1768	3176	2940	3338	2371	2371	2106
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Gender-neutral services

	Quadratic Polynomial					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Canteens	-0.105	-0.113	-0.099	-0.010	-0.027	-0.020
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Bandwidth	0.138	0.137	0.142	0.221	0.220	0.220
Observations	2693	2683	2457	2283	2283	2071
Local Police	-0.004	0.051	-0.141	0.124	0.150	-0.044
	(0.335)	(0.349)	(0.345)	(0.397)	(0.426)	(0.404)
Bandwidth	0.175	0.164	0.188	0.287	0.248	0.284
Observations	3250	3077	3094	2638	2467	2391
Electoral Service	0.347	0.639**	0.383	0.372	0.669*	0.322
	(0.298)	(0.309)	(0.307)	(0.367)	(0.394)	(0.365)
Bandwidth	0.167	0.148	0.170	0.268	0.211	0.275
Observations	3136	2844	2805	2554	2188	2362
Local Institution	-0.484	-0.629*	-0.448	0.085	0.115	0.014
	(0.362)	(0.359)	(0.376)	(0.527)	(0.465)	(0.534)
Bandwidth	0.214	0.225	0.215	0.238	0.303	0.231
Observations	3833	4002	3446	2384	2708	2146
Region and year F.E		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

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Share of Gendered vs. Neutral Service Spending

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sh. gender-sensitive	-0.042**	-0.055***	-0.032	-0.014	-0.007	-0.012	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.006	0.001	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Bandwidth	0.228	0.240	0.213	0.167	0.148	0.178	0.228	0.240	0.213	0.218	0.209	0.202
Observations	3586	3683	2979	1631	1471	1525	3586	3683	2979	1996	1924	1674
Sh. gender-neutral	0.026	0.027	0.025	0.013	-0.002	0.015	0.005	-0.008	-0.001	-0.005	-0.018	-0.017
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Bandwidth	0.200	0.184	0.202	0.207	0.195	0.221	0.200	0.184	0.202	0.207	0.194	0.195
Observations	3260	3024	2876	1893	1847	1795	3260	3024	2876	1893	1824	1654
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Macro categories of local government spending 1/2

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Education	-0.055	-0.137**	-0.047	-0.107	-0.119	-0.067	-0.061	-0.087	-0.013	-0.078	-0.110	-0.057
	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.108)	(0.099)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.105)	(0.130)	(0.114)	(0.129)
Local police	-0.007	0.027	-0.066	0.136	0.113	0.094	0.137	0.054	0.151	0.174	0.158	0.161
	(0.123)	(0.118)	(0.132)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.163)	(0.172)	(0.166)	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.176)	(0.191)
Administration	-0.103*	-0.087	-0.068	0.019	0.040	0.041	-0.017	0.012	-0.081	0.045	0.062	0.080
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.097)	(0.087)	(0.102)
Transport	-0.095	-0.066	-0.084	-0.025	0.024	0.035	-0.120	-0.077	-0.141	-0.018	0.030	0.059
	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.094)
Local development	-0.101*	-0.062	-0.125**	-0.055	-0.079	-0.074	-0.010	0.015	-0.124	-0.042	-0.051	-0.068
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.140)
Turisms	-0.020	-0.026	0.003	0.141	0.113	0.187	0.097	0.174	0.079	0.270	0.269	0.313
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.145)	(0.125)	(0.146)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.141)	(0.194)	(0.184)	(0.199)
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

Macro categories of local government spending 2/2

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Social spending	0.059	-0.044	0.151	0.193	0.031	0.338**	-0.020	-0.128	0.061	0.205	0.014	0.352*
	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.098)	(0.163)	(0.100)	(0.158)	(0.134)	(0.105)	(0.145)	(0.187)	(0.119)	(0.188)
Sport	-0.161**	-0.190***	-0.160*	-0.018	-0.057	-0.006	-0.101	-0.192*	-0.118	-0.011	-0.037	-0.017
	(0.078)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.119)
Pruductivity	-0.101	-0.101	-0.122	-0.174	-0.139	-0.150	-0.118	-0.076	-0.075	-0.200	-0.164	-0.210
	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.100)	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.159)	(0.128)	(0.120)	(0.144)	(0.175)	(0.185)	(0.187)
Culture	0.016	-0.069	0.008	0.051	-0.021	0.221	-0.007	-0.100	0.029	0.056	-0.046	0.246
	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.161)	(0.142)	(0.161)	(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.200)	(0.169)	(0.188)
Environment	-0.129*	-0.102*	-0.148*	-0.147	-0.079	-0.166	-0.118	-0.069	-0.237**	-0.142	-0.054	-0.160
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.077)	(0.107)	(0.088)	(0.113)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.104)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.134)
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Previous provision of gender-sensitive services

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric Estimates			*Non-Parametric Estimates*			*Parametric Estimates*			*Non-Parametric Estimates*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Early Childcare	-0.255	-0.321*	-0.250	-0.279	-0.274	-0.309	-0.313	-0.291	-0.251	-0.222	-0.161	-0.203
	(0.173)	(0.167)	(0.194)	(0.219)	(0.211)	(0.204)	(0.262)	(0.273)	(0.284)	(0.252)	(0.251)	(0.240)
Bandwidth	0.199	0.186	0.209	0.165	0.157	0.161	0.199	0.186	0.209	0.219	0.199	0.197
Observations	3715	3512	3371	1834	1743	1596	3715	3512	3371	2277	2114	1888
School Canteens	-0.412**	-0.420**	-0.285	-0.278	-0.181	-0.299	-0.280	-0.221	-0.132	-0.414	-0.271	-0.362
	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.230)	(0.271)	(0.239)	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.303)	(0.330)	(0.374)	(0.351)	(0.367)
Bandwidth	0.250	0.205	0.201	0.222	0.243	0.192	0.250	0.205	0.201	0.193	0.214	0.202
Observations	4338	3778	3280	2301	2437	1854	4338	3778	3280	2085	2225	1905
Sports Centers	-0.449***	-0.538***	-0.428**	-0.332*	-0.379**	-0.253	-0.549**	-0.531**	-0.468*	-0.234	-0.253	-0.226
	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.170)	(0.195)	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.228)	(0.213)	(0.251)	(0.306)	(0.254)	(0.289)
Bandwidth	0.191	0.182	0.187	0.213	0.150	0.221	0.191	0.182	0.187	0.181	0.171	0.206
Observations	3588	3446	3080	2210	1680	2035	3588	3446	3080	1986	1898	1920
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Office motivated incumbents

	Quadratic Polynomial					
		Parametric			Non-Parametric	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Re-running for any position						
Early Childcare	-0.594*	-0.472	-0.472	-0.713**	-0.759**	-0.501
	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.340)	(0.318)	(0.304)	(0.319)
Observations	3896	3575	3766	2668	2601	2620
All mayors						
Early Childcare	-0.254	-0.197	-0.267	-0.479	-0.544*	-0.399
	(0.293)	(0.284)	(0.310)	(0.316)	(0.295)	(0.320)
Observations	5390	5056	4881	3957	3583	3633
Region and year F.E		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

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Non-office motivated incumbents

	Quadratic Polynomial					
		Parametric			Non-Parametric	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Second mandate						
Early Childcare	-0.354	-0.992	-0.051	-1.000	-1.984***	-0.786
	(0.803)	(0.790)	(0.852)	(0.815)	(0.715)	(0.869)
Observations	3896	3575	3766	2668	2601	2620
Not re-running for mayoral position						
Early Childcare	0.810	0.734	0.679	-0.340	-0.485	-0.637
	(0.658)	(0.642)	(0.721)	(0.921)	(0.700)	(1.067)
Observations	1433	1355	1207	977	936	777
Not re-running for any position						
Early Childcare	0.597	0.515	0.963*	0.303	-0.275	0.646
	(0.592)	(0.602)	(0.535)	(0.751)	(0.707)	(0.657)
Observations	1574	1425	1497	1099	963	968
Region and year F.E		✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓

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Variation in office motivation of incumbents

	Linear Polynomial						*Quadratic Polynomial*					
	Parametric			Non-Parametric			Parametric			Non-Parametric		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Re-running for any position												
School Canteens	-0.480**	-0.484**	-0.440**	-0.275	-0.248	-0.139	-0.492*	-0.638**	-0.553*	-0.221	-0.216	-0.081
	(0.197)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.284)	(0.298)	(0.284)	(0.297)	(0.308)	(0.305)	(0.330)	(0.351)	(0.338)
All mayors												
School Canteens	-0.393**	-0.455***	-0.384**	-0.216	-0.256	-0.240	-0.452*	-0.378	-0.313	-0.101	-0.022	-0.138
	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.239)	(0.217)	(0.248)	(0.238)	(0.254)	(0.249)	(0.298)	(0.314)	(0.307)
Second mandate												
School Canteens	-0.762*	-1.343**	-0.602	-0.724	-0.893	-0.690	-1.397**	-1.462	-1.630**	-0.664	-0.855	-0.519
	(0.437)	(0.632)	(0.435)	(0.652)	(0.728)	(0.605)	(0.673)	(0.917)	(0.683)	(0.892)	(0.940)	(0.850)
Not re-running for mayoral position												
School Canteens	-0.522	-0.264	-0.563*	-0.326	0.349	-0.290	0.049	0.194	0.040	0.094	0.901*	-0.179
	(0.330)	(0.371)	(0.320)	(0.438)	(0.425)	(0.481)	(0.485)	(0.555)	(0.463)	(0.595)	(0.523)	(0.551)
Not re-running for any position												
School Canteens	-0.260	-0.365	-0.411	-0.105	-0.060	-0.170	-0.141	-0.158	-0.051	0.049	0.623	0.066
	(0.304)	(0.277)	(0.316)	(0.474)	(0.381)	(0.480)	(0.469)	(0.417)	(0.494)	(0.601)	(0.536)	(0.614)
Regions and years f.e		✓			✓			✓			✓	
Unbalanced controls			✓			✓			✓			✓

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Variation in office motivation of incumbents

	Linear Polynomial							*Quadratic Polynomial*				
	Parametric			Non-Parametric				Parametric			Non-Parametric	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Re-running for any position												
Sports Centers	-0.208	-0.347	-0.205	0.036	-0.246	0.081	-0.228	-0.466	-0.218	0.057	-0.218	0.112
	(0.342)	(0.309)	(0.349)	(0.501)	(0.377)	(0.502)	(0.546)	(0.477)	(0.556)	(0.773)	(0.573)	(0.765)
All mayors												
Sports Centers	-0.276**	-0.340***	-0.301**	-0.216	-0.235	-0.257	-0.357*	-0.343*	-0.367*	-0.259	-0.249	-0.310
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.135)	(0.198)	(0.161)	(0.199)	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.205)	(0.234)	(0.202)	(0.239)
Second mandate												
Sports Centers	-0.686*	-1.166**	-0.675*	-0.385	-0.446	-0.368	-0.591	-0.075	-0.518	-0.442	-0.338	-0.436
	(0.357)	(0.460)	(0.369)	(0.430)	(0.489)	(0.441)	(0.630)	(0.684)	(0.657)	(0.710)	(0.710)	(0.785)
Not re-running for mayoral position												
Sports Centers	0.072	0.083	-0.049	-0.231	-0.175	-0.414	-0.230	-0.223	-0.525	-0.268	-0.230	-0.527
	(0.220)	(0.213)	(0.248)	(0.280)	(0.258)	(0.315)	(0.306)	(0.319)	(0.352)	(0.337)	(0.303)	(0.374)
Not re-running for any position												
Sports Centers	0.075	0.001	-0.014	-0.166	-0.164	-0.267	-0.027	0.020	-0.003	-0.197	-0.162	-0.257
	(0.210)	(0.202)	(0.220)	(0.288)	(0.253)	(0.305)	(0.306)	(0.300)	(0.321)	(0.347)	(0.314)	(0.366)
Region and year F.E.	✓		✓			✓	✓		✓			✓
Unbalanced controls		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓

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Male vs male and childcare reduction

	Probability of victory							
	OLS				Probit			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Panel A: abs(MV)<0.20								
Childcare reduction	-0.178	-0.113	-0.125	0.0396	-0.163	-0.103	-0.115	0.041
	(0.173)	(0.179)	(0.182)	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.135)
Observations	915	905	876	876	915	905	876	876
Panel B: abs(MV)<0.15								
Childcare reduction	-0.170	-0.104	-0.108	0.0157	-0.174	-0.127	-0.132	-0.030
	(0.201)	(0.220)	(0.225)	(0.194)	(0.176)	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.166)
Observations	692	687	658	658	692	687	658	615
Political controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio and economic controls		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Opponent gender			✓	✓			✓	✓
Region F.E.				✓				✓
Election Year F.E.				✓				✓

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Female vs female and childcare reduction

	Probability of re-election							
	OLS				Probit			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Panel A: abs(MV)<0.20								
Childcare reduction	-0.360	-0.397*	-0.412*	-0.313	-0.360	-0.399	-0.415*	-0.311
	(0.237)	(0.233)	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.265)	(0.254)	(0.250)	(0.235)
Observations	841	834	782	782	841	834	782	749
Panel B: abs(MV)<0.15								
Childcare reduction	-0.363	-0.359	-0.403*	-0.344*	-0.366	-0.354	-0.404*	-0.336*
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.214)	(0.206)	(0.254)	(0.239)	(0.236)	(0.202)
Observations	688	681	634	634	688	681	634	601
Political controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio and economic controls		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Opponent gender			✓	✓			✓	✓
Region F.E.				✓				✓
Election Year F.E.				✓				✓

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Female vs female and childcare expansion

	Probability of re-election							
	OLS				Probit			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Panel A: abs(MV)<0.20								
Childcare expansion	0.0214	-0.003	0.001	0.033	0.024	-0.003	0.001	0.013
	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.144)	(0.115)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.130)
Observations	911	904	847	847	911	904	847	824
Panel B: abs(MV)<0.15								
Childcare expansion	0.0697	-0.106	-0.0971	0.0396	-0.067	-0.108	-0.098	0.010
	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.152)	(0.193)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.172)
Observations	730	723	671	671	730	723	671	638
Political controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Socio and economic controls		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Opponent gender			✓	✓			✓	✓
Region F.E.				✓				✓
Election Year F.E.				✓				✓

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