

# Supply Chain Shocks, Managerial Responses, and Resilience: Evidence from European Firms

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- 2 Data
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- 4 Unpacking Managers' Responses to Supply Chain Disruption
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## ● Context

- GVCs deliver efficiency but expose firms to shocks (COVID-19, geopolitical tensions, war, logistics bottlenecks).
- Revived **debates** on reshoring, diversification, and resilience.
- Literature focuses on macro-level efficiency and policy; we know far less about **firm-level managerial choices**.

## ● Research Question *How do managers react to supply-chain shocks, and which actions foster resilience?*

## ● Data & Scope

- Confidential **EIB Group Survey** (EIBGS) matched to **ORBIS**: ~12,000 EU firms per year, 2017-2024.
- SUCH Supply-Chain survey (since 2023) on sourcing & export detail (smaller sample).

## ● Empirical Strategy

- Event study/DiD → COVID employment shock mitigation from supply-chain action
- Panel logit models → shocks/actions, resilience, & financial constraints.

## ● Contribution Links shocks, supply chain managerial choices, financial frictions and resilience, filling a gap between macro-level policy debates and firm-level evidence.

- **Shock Mitigation**

- Proactive SC action (efforts to transform the SC) **counters COVID impact**; no recovery for passive firms.

- **Managerial Responses**

- Firms do everything **except reduce the share of imported goods** in the face of SC obstacles.
- Trade remains vital: monitor concentration risk rather than push blanket reshoring.

- **Resilience Pay-off**

- Despite the variety in managerial responses, only the more tangible operational adjustments (**stockpiling** and **digitalization**), rather than strategic longer-term restructuring, correlate with strong post-COVID resilience.
- The EU internal market helps (but for expanding exports rather than near-shoring imports).

- **Finance Bottlenecks**

- Shocks AND actions tightened firms' internal and external finance, especially for investment.
- Digitalization has current costs but improves financing prospects (transparency?).
- Resiliency vs. efficiency trade-off.


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# Preview of Key Survey Results

<b>The impact of COVID-19 has been:</b>	<b>since 2020</b>		
q64. a reduction in employment			54%
q65_4. an expected permanent reduction in employment			16%
q65a. decreased sales or turnover			49%
q65_2. an expected long term impact on supply chain (e.g. different organizations, not necessarily negative)			31%
q70_2. actions to transform your supply chain (e.g. bring more stages to the same location or closer to home country)			14 %
<b>q75. Since the beginning of ... were any of the following an obstacle (either minor or major):</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>
access to materials (or any of the below 3)	67%	64%	49%
commodities or raw materials (e.g., steel, copper, fossil fuels, lithium, etc.)		51%	36%
semiconductors and microchips		26%	18%
components, semi-finished products, services, or equipment		47%	33%
disruptions of logistics and transport	67%	54%	44%
trade restrictions (or any of the below 2)	34%	50%	52%
compliance with new regulations/certifications		45%	46%
changes in customs & tariffs (importers and exporters)		40%	40%
Any shock (of the above)	78%	80%	73%
<b>q76a. Since the beginning of ... has or is the firm planning to make these changes in sourcing strategy:</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	
increase stocks and inventory		27%	21%
invest in digital inventory and inputs tracking		19%	17%
reduce share of goods or services imported (importers)		10%	8%
reduce imports from outside the EU and substitute with EU imports (importers)		15%	15%
diversify or increase the number of source countries (importers)		26%	20%
Any action (of the above)		46%	39%

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## The Survey Data and COVID-19:



2020 shocks (or at least specifying **due to COVID** and not a specific year):

- **16%** of firms expected a **permanent reduction in employment** due to COVID (q65\_4, '20 & '21)
- **49%** of firms reported a COVID sales shock that caused **decreased sales** since 2020 (q65a, '21).

- 
- **31%** of firms expect COVID to have long term **impact on supply chain** e.g. different organizations, not necessarily negative... (q65\_2, '20 & '21)
  - **14%** of firms **transform their supply chain** (bring more stages to the same location or closer to home) in response to COVID (q70\_2, '21 & '22).

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**Trade disruptions and changes to SC strategy ...later**

**Question:** How did the COVID-19 employment shock affect firm performance, and did proactive supply-chain action mitigate it?

(a) Effect of COVID on firm turnover


- Event-study:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_{rst} + \sum_{k \neq 0} \beta_k D_{it}^k + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$


where

- $Y_{it}$  is ln turnover or employment of firm  $i$  in year  $t$ .
- $D_{it}^k$  is an Event-time dummy (1 if  $t - t_i = k$ ;  $k \in \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ , baseline  $k = 0$ : 2019).
- $\alpha_i$  are firm fixed effects.
- $\gamma_{rst}$  are region-sector-year fixed effects.
  - regions: North, East, or South EU
  - sectors: Manufacturing, Services, Construction, Other

Figure: Event study: impact of the COVID-19 employment shock



(a) log turnover



(b) log employment

Note: Estimates for the **full sample in blue**, and the sub-sample of firms that took action to transform their supply chain in red.

## (b) Supply chain action and mitigating the COVID shock

- Difference-in-differences (DiD) with interaction  $Shock \times SC\ Action$ :

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_{rst} + \sum_{g=1}^4 \beta_g G_{ig} \times Post_t + \epsilon_{it},$$

where

- $Y_{it}$  is ln turnover or employment of firm  $i$  in year  $t$ .
- $G_{ig}$  defines four groups for the  $Shock \times SC\ Action$  interaction:
  - $G_1$ : Shock + SC action (CV = 1 # SC tr = 1)
  - $G_2$ : Shock + No action (CV = 1 # SC tr = 0)
  - $G_3$ : No shock + SC action (CV = 0 # SC tr = 1)
  - $G_4$ : No shock + No action (CV = 0 # SC tr = 0)
- $Post_t$  is 1 in 2020-2022, 0 otherwise.
- $\alpha_i$  are firm fixed effects
- and  $\gamma_{rst}$  are region-sector-year fixed effects.
  - regions: North, East, or South EU
  - sectors: Manufacturing, Services, Construction, Other

**Table:** DiD: The role of supply chain action in mitigating the COVID-19 shock

DV:	log turnover					log employment				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
post2020 = 1 #										
CV = 1	-0.152*** (0.022)					-0.103*** (0.017)				
G <sub>1</sub> : CV = 1 # SC tr = 1		-0.055 (0.050)	0.122** (0.055)	0.174*** (0.063)	0.037 (0.107)		-0.038 (0.040)	0.080* (0.044)	0.128** (0.057)	-0.008 (0.071)
G <sub>2</sub> : CV = 1 # SC tr = 0		-0.176*** (0.025)					-0.117*** (0.021)			
G <sub>3</sub> : CV = 0 # SC tr = 1		0.014 (0.018)	0.190*** (0.029)	0.219*** (0.046)	0.180*** (0.037)		0.018 (0.014)	0.135*** (0.024)	0.156*** (0.037)	0.129*** (0.032)
G <sub>4</sub> : CV = 0 # SC tr = 0			0.176*** (0.025)	0.186*** (0.041)	0.171*** (0.032)			0.117*** (0.021)	0.107*** (0.033)	0.122*** (0.028)
Firm Fixed Effects (FEs)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Region-Sector FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16830	14921	14921	3680	11238	16199	14336	14336	3582	10751
R-sq.	0.147	0.151	0.151	0.185	0.147	0.026	0.028	0.028	0.049	0.031

**Note:** DV: log turnover (ORBIS) in columns (1) to (5), log employment (ORBIS) in columns (6) to (10). CV = 1 if COVID caused a permanent negative employment shock (q65\_4, '20 & '21). SC tr = 1 if firm responded to COVID by transforming its supply chain (q70\_2, '21 & '22). Sample balanced on ORBIS firm turnover availability. EU firms only. (4) and (9) reduce the sample to firms reporting a long-term impact of COVID on their SC (q65\_2, '20 & '21), and (5) and (10) the opposite. Robust errors; \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

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## Summary stats:

**Table:** Supply Chain Shocks and Supply Chain Actions in 2022 and 2023

	any shock		logistics		customs		materials	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
inc stock/inventory	34%	17%	37%	24%	38%	29%	36%	21%
digitalization of SC	26%	14%	28%	19%	29%	23%	27%	18%
reduce share imported	11%	6%	12%	7%	13%	8%	11%	7%
sub out extra-EU	18%	10%	20%	13%	20%	15%	20%	12%
increase countries	29%	15%	33%	19%	34%	22%	31%	19%
any action	61%	34%	66%	45%	70%	54%	64%	42%

**Note:** Comparison of the percentage of manufacturing firms taking each action, between those that experienced the indicated supply chain shock and those that did not in the 2-year cross-section.

- e.g. among firms that experience at least 1 of the 3 SC shocks/obstacles, 34% increase inventory
- e.g. among firms that do not experience any SC shock/obstacle, 17% increase inventory

**Question:** Do specific shocks translate into specific managerial responses?

- Probability of adopting a supply-chain action
  - Balanced panel: 5,157 EU firms observed in both 2023 & 2024 waves answering SC shock and response questions.
  - Conditional fixed-effects logit:


$$Pr(SCAction_{it} = 1 | SCShock_{it}, \alpha_i, \gamma_t, \beta) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\alpha_i - \gamma_t - SCShock_{it}\beta)}$$

where


- $SCAction_{it} = 1$  if firm  $i$  undertakes action  $a$  in year  $t$  (e.g. stockpiling, digitalization, supplier diversification).
- $SCShock_{it} = 1$  if firm  $i$  faces a supply-chain shock in year  $t$  (logistics, materials, customs; tested separately & jointly).
- $\alpha_i, \gamma_t$  are firm and year fixed effects.

# Unpacking Managers' Responses to Supply Chain Disruption

Figure: Panel Analysis: Supply Chain Shocks and Actions



(a) any shock




(b) shock count


**Note:** Conditional fixed effect logit regressions. All include year and firm fixed effects. Separate regressions for each indicated supply chain response outcome variable. The bars indicate 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals for standard errors.

# Unpacking Managers' Responses to Supply Chain Disruption

Figure: Panel Analysis: Supply Chain Shocks and Actions (cont.)



(c) shocks categories



(d) materials


**Note:** Conditional fixed effect logit regressions. All include year and firm fixed effects. Separate regressions for each indicated supply chain response outcome variable AND each supply chain shock. The bars indicate 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals for standard errors.

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**Question:** Which SC strategies associate stronger Post-COVID resilience?

- Understanding the micro-strategies behind resilient firms is crucial from both a managerial and policy perspective.
- **Data Challenge:** connect COVID shock resilience to later years that have survey data on SC responses (in 2022).
  - **Categorize a firm as relatively resilient** if its post-COVID sales performance relative to pre-COVID levels, adjusted for the post-COVID average growth rate of their 2-digit NACE industry, is above the median.

**Figure:** Defining firm resiliency



**Question:** Which SC strategies associate with post-COVID resilience?


- Logit model for firm resilience in 2022:

$$Pr(\text{ResilientFirm}_i = 1 \mid SC_i, Z_i, \lambda_n, \delta_j) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\lambda_n - \delta_j - SC_i\beta - Z_i\gamma)}$$

where:

- $\text{ResilientFirm}_i = 1$  if firm displays above-median resiliency, 0 otherwise.
  - $SC_i$  is a binary variable for supply chain strategy in 2022 (for each of the 5 survey questions, one at a time)
  - $Z_i$  are **firm-level controls** (pre-COVID avg. log turnover, turnover/assets, inventory/assets).
  - $\lambda_n$  and  $\delta_j$  are **country** and 2-digit **industry** fixed effects (country-industry FE in appendix)
- Estimates the probability of ending 2022 as a firm that was relatively resilient to the COVID shock conditional on each supply chain strategy in 2022.

Figure: Firm Resilience Post-COVID: Supply Chain Shocks and Actions in 2022



**Note:** Logit regressions. Controls are 2-dig industry FE, Country FE, exporter, avg pre log turnover, avg pre turnover to assets, and avg pre stock to assets. All but the 3 count dummies for responses are separate regressions. The bars indicate 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals for robust errors clustered on 2-dig industry codes. The samples include 7,251 firms for the SC actions regressions or 3,880 firms for the actions specific to importers, and 678 exporters with sufficient matched ORBIS data for the SUCH questions.

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## Summary stats:

Table: Financial Constraints EIBGS Questions

wave:	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
q23_1 Internal fin. (improve or same)	92%	92%	67%	89%	82%	85%	88%
q23_2. External fin. (improve or same)	91%	90%	72%	86%	75%	77%	87%
q38_8 Availability of fin. (not an obstacle)	52%	52%	50%	49%	51%	52%	53%

Note: Percentage out of all firms that answered, numbering around 12,000 per year.

## Full questions:

- q23\_1 and q23\_2: "Do you think that each of the following will improve, stay the same, or get worse **over the next 12 months?**"
- q38\_8: "Thinking about your investment activities in [COUNTRY OF INTERVIEW], to what extent **is** the availability of finance an obstacle? Is it a major obstacle, a minor obstacle or not an obstacle at all?"

**Question:** How are supply-chain shocks and firms' responses linked to financial constraints and firm performance (turnover)?


- Logit regression:

$$Pr(Y_{it} = 1 | SC_{it}, \lambda_n, \delta_{jt}) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-(fixedeffects) - SC_{it}\beta)}$$


where:

- $Y_{it} = 1$  if firm  $i$  reports no constraint in year  $t$ . ... to allow negative coefficients a financial constraint interpretation.
  - $SC_{it}$  is a binary supply chain shock or action dummy.
  - fixed effects: year, industry, and country OR industry-year and country OR year and firm.
- Unbalanced panel of firms (survey years 2021-2023).
  - Linear regressions for log turnover.

Figure: Panel Analysis: Firm Performance and Supply Chains




(a) DV: log turnover




(b) DV: internal finance (next 12 months)

- **left columns** include year, industry, and country fixed effects.
- **middle columns** include industry-year and country fixed effects.
- **right columns** include year and firm fixed effects (no industry-year FEs due to conditional fixed-effects logit models estimation limitations, but adding these FEs in a linear regression with firm FEs does not alter statistical significance levels).
- Controls include an exporter dummy and the 3-year lag number of employees. All but each grouping of the 3 count dummies for shocks are separate regressions.

Figure: Panel Analysis: Firm Performance and Supply Chains (cont.)



(c) DV: external finance (next 12 months)




(d) DV: availability of finance (now)

- **left columns** include year, industry, and country fixed effects.
- **middle columns** include industry-year and country fixed effects.
- **right columns** include year and firm fixed effects (no high dimensional FEs due to conditional fixed-effects logit models estimation limitations, but adding these FEs in a linear regression with firm FEs does not alter statistical significance levels).
- Controls include an exporter dummy and the 3-year lag number of employees. All but each grouping of the 3 count dummies for shocks are separate regressions.

- Firms hit by SC shocks are systematically more likely to report financial constraints.
- digitalization actions correlate with constrained availability of investment finance, but an improved outlook.
- Suggests two channels:
  - Costs of adaptation (digitalization, supplier diversification) tighten liquidity.
  - Actions may improve transparency for lenders ( $\downarrow$  external constraint).

**SC actions robust to** including SC shocks and an **interaction term** (with industry-year and country FEs):

- availability of investment finance:
  - negative association with **digitalization**
  - negative association with **increase countries**
  - negative association with **inc stock/inventory** when including logistics shock, but the interaction is positive (firms that stock up do better when hit with a logistics shock) ...**resiliency vs. efficiency trade-off** 

There is broad industry heterogeneity

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## ● Shock Mitigation

- Proactive SC action (efforts to transform the SC) **dampens COVID impact**; no recovery for passive firms.

## ● Managerial Responses

- Firms do everything **except reduce the share of imported goods** in the face of SC obstacles.
  - **Digitization efforts** associate with logistics and materials shocks.
  - **Inventory stockpiling** most strongly with logistics shocks (then customs, then materials).
  - **Increasing source countries** associates with materials and logistics shocks.
  - **Nearshore extra-EU imports to EU** most strongly with materials shocks (then customs, then logistics).
  - Firms' response to **Processor shocks** is limited; stockpiling only option.
- Trade remains vital: monitor concentration risk rather than push blanket reshoring.

## ● Resilience Pay-off

- Despite the variety in managerial responses, only the more tangible operational adjustments (**stockpiling** and **digitalization**), rather than strategic longer-term restructuring, correlate with strong post-COVID resilience.
- The EU internal market helps (but for expanding exports rather than near-shoring imports).

## ● Finance Bottlenecks

- Shocks AND actions tightened firms' internal and external finance, especially for investment.
- But digitalization can help improve external finance prospects (transparency?).
- Resiliency vs. efficiency trade-off.

Thanks!

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$$\text{PreAvg}_i = \frac{1}{3} \sum_{t=2017}^{2019} \text{Turnover}_{i,t}$$


$$\text{PostAvg}_i = \frac{1}{3} \sum_{t=2020}^{2022} \text{Turnover}_{i,t}$$

$$\text{PostCOVIDIndAvgGrowth} = \frac{1}{3} \sum_{t=2020}^{2022} \frac{\text{IndTurnover}_t - \text{IndTurnover}_{t-1}}{\text{IndTurnover}_{t-1}}$$

$$\text{Resiliency}_i = \frac{\text{PostAvg}_i - (\text{PreAvg}_i \times (1 + \text{PostCOVIDIndAvgGrowth}))}{\text{PreAvg}_i}$$

$$\text{ResilientFirm}_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if Resiliency}_i > \text{median}(\text{Resiliency}) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

# Firm Performance and Supply Chains: Interactions



**Note:** DV in left column is internal finance (next 12 months). DV in middle column is external finance (next 12 months). DV in right column is availability of finance (now). All employ logit regressions where negative coefficients have a financial constraint interpretation. All regressions include industry-year and country fixed effects. Other controls are an exporter dummy and the 3-year lag number of employees. All but each grouping of the 3 count dummies for shocks are separate regressions. The bars represent 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) confidence intervals for the standard errors. The samples include approximately 1,850 firms for SC shocks and 900 firms for SC actions with sufficient variation to remain in the conditional fixed-effects regressions, except for those specific to importers, where the number of firms with sufficient variation is 1,060 for the customs shock and from 222 to 358 for the SC actions.

▶ back

# Average Shocks by Industry

Industry	2021				2022				2023			
	w	u	obs	turn	w	u	obs	turn	w	u	obs	turn
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing (1,3)	.8	2	9	0	1.2	1.9	9	0	.1	1	6	0
Mining & Quarrying (6,9)	1	1	3	0	1	1	1	0	1	.5	2	0
Manufacturing:												
Food Products (10)	2.4	1.7	423	44	2	1.7	432	30	1.9	1.6	436	24
Beverages (11)	2.5	2.1	52	4	2.4	1.7	58	4	2.1	1.5	51	5
Tobacco Products (12)	2.1	2.2	6	1	2.1	1.7	6	1	2.5	2.8	4	0
Textiles (13)	2.5	2.2	118	3	1.4	1.6	117	3	1.9	1.7	127	4
Wearing Apparel (14)	2.2	1.7	111	1	1.7	1.3	110	1	1.8	1.3	97	1
Leather & Related Products (15)	2.1	1.6	39	1	2.4	1.7	35	1	2.6	1.7	38	1
Wood & Cork Prod. (no Furniture) (16)	1.6	1.7	185	7	1.9	1.7	202	9	2.1	1.5	199	9
Paper & Paper Products (17)	2	2	116	12	2.4	1.8	99	13	1.7	1.4	86	7
Printing and Reproduction (18)	1.7	1.8	106	2	1.7	1.8	108	2	1.7	1.5	124	1
Coke and Refined Petroleum (19)	.6	1.7	9	16	2.2	1.9	11	4	.9	1.2	9	4
Chemicals (20)	2.1	2.2	160	22	2.2	2.1	131	12	1.8	1.9	146	18
Pharmaceuticals (21)	1.8	2	41	4	2.4	2	45	13	1.7	1.6	41	4
Rubber & Plastic Products (22)	2.5	2.2	270	38	2.2	1.9	262	8	1.8	1.7	270	10
Other Non-metallic Mineral Prod. (23)	1.8	1.7	162	9	1.7	1.7	185	13	1.9	1.5	177	13
Basic Metals (24)	2.5	2	99	18	1.2	1.8	97	34	1.7	1.6	96	14
Fabricated Metal Prod. (no Mach.) (25)	2.5	1.9	643	26	2.1	1.7	635	16	1.8	1.5	663	12
Computers, Electronics, Optical (26)	1.7	2.1	116	6	3	2.1	136	241	1.9	1.6	115	7
Electrical Equipment (27)	2.9	2.1	143	153	2.6	2.1	144	9	2.1	1.7	169	14
Machinery & Equipment, n.e.c. (28)	2.5	2.2	357	26	2.6	2.1	327	31	2	1.8	341	22
Motor Vehicles & Trailers (29)	2.5	2.2	86	12	3	2.2	102	308	2.2	1.8	86	14
Other Transport Equipment (30)	2.3	2	38	6	2.8	2.4	34	5	2.8	2	46	5
Furniture (31)	2	2	144	2	1.7	1.8	139	4	1.6	1.2	141	3
Other Manufacturing (32)	2.2	2	103	2	1.5	1.8	112	3	1.6	1.5	111	3
Repair & Install of Mach. & Equip. (33)	2.2	1.8	123	2	2.6	1.8	113	2	1.9	1.6	133	2
Utilities (35,39)	1.6	1.1	674	85	1.9	1.5	607	41	1.6	1.2	625	47
Construction (41-43)	1.1	1.7	2509	151	2.2	1.6	2416	67	2.2	1.4	2393	60
Wholesale & Repair of Autos/Parts (45)	2.1	1.9	374	12	2.1	1.8	369	12	1.6	1.7	333	10
Wholesale Trade (46)	1.9	1.9	1403	82	1.8	1.8	1487	79	1.8	1.6	1448	149
Retail Trade (47)	1.6	1.6	830	35	2.6	1.5	835	105	2.5	1.3	793	104
Transport, Logistics, Postal (49-53)	1.6	1.4	1336	37	1.8	1.6	1345	34	1.6	1.4	1300	37
Accommodation, Food, Arts (55,56,90-93)	2	1.3	441	5	.8	1.3	440	8	1.4	1.1	486	7
Media, IT/ICT, Activities (58-88,94-96)	1.4	1.1	737	30	1	1.2	797	668	.9	1	861	27
All	2.0	1.7	11987	857	2.0	1.7	12001	1786	1.9	1.4	11984	636

# Supplier Price Increase Effects

DV:	Inc. Stock/Inventory			SC Digitalization			Increase Countries		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
price increase	0.732** (0.303)	0.649*** (0.244)	0.389* (0.210)	-0.515 (0.407)	0.580** (0.276)	0.304 (0.227)	-0.025 (0.452)	-0.132 (0.382)	-0.418 (0.296)
materials shock	0.928*** (0.150)			0.290* (0.162)			0.580*** (0.201)		
# price increase	-0.890*** (0.339)			0.686 (0.441)			0.297 (0.493)		
logistics shock		0.647*** (0.132)			0.648*** (0.157)			0.611*** (0.181)	
# price increase		-0.883*** (0.294)			-0.741** (0.332)			0.440 (0.432)	
customs shock			0.239* (0.139)			0.217 (0.154)			0.422*** (0.163)
# price increase			-0.493 (0.312)			-0.511 (0.344)			1.004*** (0.387)
Observations	1642	1651	1262	1642	1651	1262	1105	1115	1064