


The economics and psychology of carbon tax acceptance: Evidence from a survey experiment

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EEA Bordeaux, August 2025



Ambitious policies necessary to address climate change



Source: IPCC Synthesis Report 6

Some climate **policies remain underutilised** (Stechemesser A. et al. 2024), despite the public's growing demand for political action (Andre et al. 2024; Deschezleprêtre et al 2025).

A political economy challenge

Ambitious climate policy (e.g., carbon taxation) requires **broad public acceptance**.



How can we foster public support for carbon taxation?

Which motives determine reluctance about carbon taxes?

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1 Traditional political econ:

- need to address economic & distributive concerns, e.g. through lump-sum transfers
- but also limited understanding (e.g., *Dal Bo et al., 2018; Andres et al 2019; Stantcheva 2021; Douenne & Fabre 2022*)

2 Social & psychological factors:

- influential in political science, e.g. symbolic voting, partisan identity (*Sears et al., 1980; Achen & Bartels, 2017; Gennaioli & Tabellini. 2023*)
- role of perceived social norms (e.g., *Nyborg et al 2016; Andre et al 2022; Sparkman et al 2022*)

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This study: combining insights from both perspectives to increase public acceptability of carbon taxation

Study Design

Main Survey with interventions

Online, Prolific (N = 2,687)
Representative sample based on age, sex, and region

Experts Survey

Online, Social Science Prediction platform (N= 24),
Sample of academics (behaviouralists and Climate policy/Economists)

Follow-up Survey (obfuscated)

Online, Prolific (N=2,167)


August-September 2022

October 2022

January-March 2023


▶ Sample characteristics

Our initial survey consists of three blocks




Most Americans underestimate support for climate action

People **underestimate** how many other Americans are in favour of carbon neutrality → 69% according to Pew Research Center (2022)




Most Americans are uncertain about carbon pricing


(a) Self-assessed knowledge



(b) Support for environmental policies



Our initial survey consists of three blocks



Overview of video interventions

Control




Video 1 climate change explainer



+ Video 2 placebo

Norm




Video 1 climate change explainer + Norm



+ Video 2 placebo

Policy



Video 1 climate change explainer



+ Video 2 carbon pricing explainer

Norm + Policy




Video 1 climate change explainer + Norm



+ Video 2 carbon pricing explainer

Our initial survey consists of three blocks



1 Stated views toward CP with lump-sum redistribution

- *“Require fossil fuel companies to pay a fee on carbon emissions, and distribute the money collected to all U.S. citizens, in equal amounts, through monthly dividend checks”*
- 4-point Likert scale response
- Focus on policy support (“support” or “strongly support”) and resistance against policy (“strongly oppose”)

1 **Stated views toward CP** with lump-sum redistribution

- *“Require fossil fuel companies to pay a fee on carbon emissions, and distribute the money collected to all U.S. citizens, in equal amounts, through monthly dividend checks”*
- 4-point Likert scale response
- Focus on **policy support** (“support” or “strongly support”) and **resistance** against policy (“strongly oppose”)

2 **Incentivized donation opportunity**: split \$100 between oneself and two environmental organizations

- **Carbon Leadership Council (CLC)**: bipartisan group advocating for carbon tax with lump-sum cash transfer in the US
- **National Wildlife Federation (NWF)**

All information videos increase stated policy support


Table: Average treatment effects on stated support in the initial survey

	<i>Support carbon tax</i>			<i>Strongly oppose carbon tax</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Norm group	0.039** (0.019)	0.043** (0.019)	0.061** (0.028)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.016)	-0.035 (0.024)
Policy group	0.049** (0.019)	0.043** (0.019)	0.077*** (0.028)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.030 (0.026)
Norm+Policy group	0.064*** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.019)	0.085*** (0.029)	-0.037** (0.016)	-0.039** (0.016)	-0.057** (0.025)
<i>Excl. strong prior supporters</i>			✓			✓
Additional controls		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Baseline attitudes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p -value for $H_0: N = P = NP$	0.361	0.390	0.644	0.492	0.348	0.511
Control group mean	0.640	0.640	0.452	0.187	0.187	0.287
Observations	2688	2688	1501	2688	2688	1501
R^2	0.620	0.647	0.578	0.600	0.624	0.605

Robust SEs in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Heterogeneous effects by political identity

Figure: On strong opposition against carbon pricing




No effects on environmental donations

(a) Donations to the CLC – Control




(b) Donations to the CLC – Treated




Expert forecasts versus actual ATEs on stated support

(a) Stated policy support



(b) Donations to the CLC



Follow-up survey in a nutshell

- Obfuscated follow-up study from Jan-Mar 2023, about 4-6 months after the initial intervention
- Managed to recontact about 80% of the original sample
- No evidence for differential attrition

Condition	Main survey	Follow-up	Recontact rate
Control group	672	545	81.1%
Norm group	672	530	78.9%
Policy group	669	551	82.4%
Norm+Policy group	674	541	80.3%
Total	2,687	2,167	80.6%

Persistent decrease in strong opposition

Table: Average treatment effects in follow-up survey

	Support carbon tax			Strongly oppose carbon tax		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Norm group	-0.000 (0.024)	0.003 (0.023)	0.009 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.031 (0.029)
Policy group	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.029)
Norm+Policy group	0.008 (0.025)	0.001 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.053** (0.021)	-0.054*** (0.021)	-0.089*** (0.031)
<i>Excl. strong prior supporters</i>			✓			✓
Additional controls		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Baseline attitudes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p -value for $H_0: N = P = NP$	0.708	0.662	0.519	0.067	0.036	0.071
Control group mean	0.654	0.654	0.512	0.222	0.222	0.327
Observations	2171	2171	1228	2171	2171	1228
R^2	0.510	0.567	0.527	0.527	0.586	0.570


Robust SEs in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

► Donation histograms


Why does combining interventions matters

Potential explanation: norm info reduces **perceived political bias** of the explainer videos

(a) Climate change intro video



(b) CP policy explainer video



- Both norm-based info and policy explanation can make carbon taxation more publicly appealing in the short-term
- No long-term incremental effect on support, but persistent reduction in strong opposition in the combined treatment
- Role of both social and policy information in shifting the Overton window as a first step
- Highlights dynamic nature of building persistent policy acceptance and support

Thank you!



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Predictors of baseline support for carbon pricing


	<i>Support CP</i>		<i>Strongly oppose CP</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Republican/Lean Rep.	-0.210*** (0.024)	-0.136*** (0.022)	0.101*** (0.019)	0.029* (0.018)
Climate change concern (std.)	0.192*** (0.010)	0.086*** (0.011)	-0.161*** (0.010)	-0.090*** (0.010)
Perceived norms	0.168*** (0.045)	-0.007 (0.037)	-0.185*** (0.043)	-0.079** (0.040)
CP reduces emissions	-	0.256*** (0.026)	-	-0.145*** (0.024)
CP harms the poor	-	-0.043 (0.030)	-	0.033 (0.034)
CP harms own household	-	-0.084** (0.033)	-	0.064* (0.037)
CP harms the economy	-	-0.326*** (0.029)	-	0.169*** (0.026)
Market liberalism	-	-0.051 (0.035)	-	0.179*** (0.033)
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2685	2685	2685	2685
R^2	0.399	0.556	0.362	0.448

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Policy info improves factual knowledge about CP

Common misconceptions about carbon pricing as a policy:


(a) Bans certain technologies?



(b) Purpose is to raise funds?




Policy video improves perceived merits




Norm info induces belief updating about general norms

Prior/posterior perception of support for US carbon neutrality goals:

(a) In the general population




(b) Among friends and family




Belief updating by party identity

(a) Democrats and Independents




(b) Republicans




Effects are concentrated among those at the margin

Figure: Post-intervention transition probabilities

(a) In favor of carbon taxation




(b) Strongly oppose carbon taxation



Heterogeneous effects by political identity

Figure: Effects by party identity



▶ Environmental attitude

▶ Norm misperception


▶ Knowledge

▶ Fuel dependency

▶ Financial vulnerability


Heterogeneous effects by environmental attitudes

Figure: On support for carbon pricing




Environmental donations in the follow-up survey

(a) CLC Donations – Control/Norm



(b) CLC Donations – Policy groups



Heterogeneous effects by political identity

Figure: Follow-up survey (excl. strong prior supporters)

