Lengthy waiting corrupts, especially when unexpected

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Academia is a bunch of people emailing "sorry for the late response" back and forth until one of them gets tenure.

2017-08-09, 5:51 PM

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YES!

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- Relaxing moral behavior is not primarily driven by income restoration but instead, experiencing a loss compared to a reference point adversely impacts moral behavior.
- We provide an environment where people can gain or lose time such that it is their entirely subjective perception.

Study 1: An overview



Distribution of reports by median split of waiting time



Empirical strategy

$$Normalized\_report_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \times Gap_i + \beta_3 \times Waiting_i + \epsilon_i. \quad (1)$$

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- A 25-minute increase in unexpected waiting is associated with an average one dot increase in reports
- When 'Gap' is defined as the unexpected proportion(!) of the total waiting time the coefficient loses significance

Study 2 - A Lab Experiment

Table 1: Steps of Study 2

START	The scheduled and effective beginning of the experiment.
1	Consent and being seated in a cubicle.
2	"Financial decisions study": completing a survey on demographics and administering the LOT–R items. Paper–and–pencil.
3	The "Psychology study": creating the waiting manipulation. Computerized.
4	"Financial decisions study": DUTC task. Paper–and–pencil.
5	"Financial decisions study": completing a survey on feelings during DUTC task. Paper–and–pencil.
	Filler task in Short cells.
6	Getting paid (money and course credit).
STOP	The scheduled and effective end of the experiment.

Results


6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
Report
**
**
Short Expected
Short Unexpected
Long Expected
Long Unexpected
Condition

Emotions


Normalized Report
Frustrated
$R^2 = 0.11$
$y = 0.24 + 0.29\,x$
Disappointed
$R^2 = 0.048$
$y = 0.54 + 0.25\,x$
Relaxed
$R^2 = 0.14$
$y = 1.9 - 0.33\,x$
Pleased
$R^2 = 0.032$
$y = 1.6 - 0.16\,x$

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- Expectations play a crucial role
- Unpredictable environments can exacerbate immoral behavior
- The current study offers many interesting avenues for further research:
  - How do outcomes that fall short of expectations shape moral judgments?
  - What directs attention during waiting, and how does this spill over into unrelated decisions?

Appendix

Data collection

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  - Participants are paid after their reports.

Study 1 - Results

Table 1. Regressing *Normalized Reports* on *Waited Duration* and *absolute Gap*

	(1)	(1A)	(2)	(2A)	(3)	(3A)
	B	B	B	B	B	B
Constant	1.0367***	1.6752*	1.0367***	1.2877	1.0367***	1.6387***
	(0.0823)	(1.6111)	(0.0793)	(1.5640)	(0.0784)	(0.4915)
Waited Duration	0.0133***	0.0133***	0.0096***	0.0100***		
	(0.0021)	(0.0027)	(0.0023)	(0.0027)		
absolute Gap			0.0361***	0.0329***	0.0376***	0.0342***
			(0.0091)	(0.0076)	(0.0074)	(0.0102)
Adjusted R^2	0.0823	0.1060	0.1487	0.1602	0.1682	0.1740
F-statistics	27.81***	2.936***	27.110***	3.952***	7.047***	3.294***
Df1	1	18	2	19	10	27
Df2	298	276	297	275	289	267
Observations	300	295	300	295	300	295
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Waited Duration FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: OLS with robust standard error estimates (i.e., HC1 method). Standard errors are in parentheses. P–values are two–sided. Scalar variables are demeaned and categorical variables are sum–coded, so the intercept is interpretable as the grand mean. The entered Controls are age, income levels, female dummy, education, employment, travel purposes, and self–reported patience. Samples in Columns 1A, 2A and 3A do not include 1 participant who reported their age incorrectly and 4 participants who did not report their income levels. Waited Duration FE denotes the Waited Duration deciles fixed effects. Detailed results of robustness checks by including controls are located in Tables B3 in Appendix 4.1. Additional robustness checks using raw Reports as the regressand are presented in Table B4.
$^{***}p \leq 0.001$, $^{**}p \leq 0.01$, $^{*}p \leq 0.05$, $^{+}p \leq 0.1$,

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