

# How GenAI-Driven Automation Prospects Shape Firms' Training Decisions

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- Firm training is essential for
  - skill development of the active workforce
  - labor market entry & acquisition of occupation-specific skills of apprentices
- Generative AI (GenAI) allows the automation of skilled tasks, altering skill demand

- Firm training is essential for
  - skill development of the active workforce
  - **labor market entry & skill acquisition of future workers**
- Generative AI (GenAI) allows the automation of skilled tasks, altering skill demand

→ **Our research question:**

*How will post-GenAI automation reshape firms' **decisions to train apprentices?***

→ Explored theoretically and experimentally

## Summary

**Research Question:** How will automation driven by GenAI reshape firms' decisions to train apprentices?

**Empirical Strategy & Data:** Vignette experiment as part of a survey among 3,006 training firms in Switzerland in 2024

### Findings:

- Firms reduce their apprenticeship positions more
  - the higher the automation intensity, and
  - the sooner its implementation
- Responses to automation intensity and timing vary by
  - occupations' routine intensity and worker retention share, and
  - firms' size and capital intensity

## Digital technology and skill demand

- Pre-GenAI digital transformation: (Autor et al., 2003; Katz and Murphy, 1992)
  - Substitution of low-skilled and routine workers
  - Complementarity with high-skilled and non-routine cognitive workers
- GenAI and skill demand:
  - Negative short-time effects on skilled cognitive workers (Demirci et al., 2025; Eloundou et al., 2023; Felten et al., 2023; Hui et al., 2023) and entry-level workers (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2025)
  - Uncertainty about mid-term effects on skill demand

## Digital technology and firm training

- Emerging literature shows mixed effects of pre-GenAI digital technology on firm training  
(Brunello et al., 2023; Gathmann et al., 2024; Heß et al., 2023; Muehlemann, 2024) Literature
- Still unexplored how post-GenAI automation will reshape firms' training decisions

## Apprenticeship training in Switzerland

- About 70% of Swiss youth start apprenticeships after compulsory school, choosing from over 230 occupations for 3-4 years
- Firms train apprentices mainly for two reasons: (Lindley, 1975; Stevens, 1994; Wolter and Ryan, 2011)
  - As cheap substitutes for unskilled labor
  - As investments in future skilled workers

## Model

- 3-period Stevens (1994) training model with tradeoff:
  - invest in training apprentices who become – with a certain conversion rate – future skilled workers
  - spend money to hire skilled workers
- Task-based Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) automation with two tasks being perfect complements
- Partial equilibrium model with
  - Wages fixed
  - Prices given by a Cournot model with  $M$  firms automating at the same time

### Hypotheses

## The experiment

Experiment embedded in a survey with 3,006 recruiters in training firms in Switzerland (2024, 63% response rate) completing 3 vignettes:

*Due to developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, certain professions will be partially automated. Imagine an internal analysis of your firm shows that in  $t$  years  $p$  % of tasks of a trained  $o$  will be automated. However, no tasks will be automated over the next  $t$  years. By how many percent would you reduce the number of apprenticeships for  $o$ ?*

$o$ : Occupation for which firm offers the most apprenticeship positions

$p$ : Percentage of tasks that are automated: 20, 40, 60

$t$ : Number of years until no automation happens: 2, 4, 6

Table: Effect on apprenticeships reduction, baseline

	(1)
Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)	1.448*** (0.103)
Time until automation (years)	-0.470*** (0.098)
Firm FE	✓
N	8927
Mean of Dep. Var.	11.354

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table: Occupation type

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)	1.448*** (0.103)	1.191*** (0.118)	1.570*** (0.148)
Time until automation (years)	-0.470*** (0.098)	-0.365*** (0.113)	-0.540*** (0.142)
Routine occupation * Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)		0.851*** (0.252)	
Routine occupation * Time until automation (years)		-0.461* (0.236)	
Manual occupation * Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)			-0.293 (0.211)
Manual occupation * Time until automation (years)			0.092 (0.200)
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓
N	8927	8435	8435
Mean of Dep. Var.	11.354	11.153	11.153

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table: Retention share

	(1)	(2)
Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)	1.448*** (0.103)	1.685*** (0.146)
Time until automation (years)	-0.470*** (0.098)	-0.644*** (0.136)
High Retention share * Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)		-0.519** (0.204)
High Retention share * Time until automation (years)		0.386** (0.195)
Firm FE	✓	✓
N	8927	8927
Mean of Dep. Var.	11.354	11.354

\* p &lt; 0.10, \*\* p &lt; 0.05, \*\*\* p &lt; 0.01

Table: Firm characteristics

	(1)	(2)
Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)	1.448***	1.131***
	(0.103)	(0.180)
Time until automation (years)	-0.470***	-0.169
	(0.098)	(0.163)
High CI * Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)		0.553**
		(0.221)
High CI * Time until automation (years)		0.071
		(0.211)
<10 employees * Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)		-0.060
		(0.224)
>99 employees * Share of tasks automated (10 ppt.)		0.822***
		(0.299)
<10 employees * Time until automation (years)		-0.383*
		(0.208)
>99 employees * Time until automation (years)		-0.635**
		(0.279)
Firm FE	✓	✓
N	8927	8927
Mean of Dep. Var.	11.354	11.354

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Conclusions

- First evidence on how post-GenAI automation can be expected to affect apprenticeship training
- Training firms can be expected to reduce apprenticeship positions in response to automation expectations
- Response heterogeneity by occupation type – due to varying task reallocation potential?
- Response heterogeneity by firm size and capital intensity

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## Digital technology and firm training

Emerging literature shows mixed effects of digital technology on firm training:

- Workers exposed to automation participate less in training as firms cut support (Heß et al., 2023).
- Advanced digital technologies can reduce firm-sponsored training, acting as substitutes (Brunello et al., 2023).
- Contrarily, digital investments during the pandemic increased German firms' training needs and provision (Gathmann et al., 2024).
- Pre-generative AI adoption was linked to more apprenticeship contracts, especially in SMEs (Muehleemann, 2024).

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## Hypotheses I

- ✓ H1: Higher automation intensity leads to a greater reduction in apprenticeship positions.
- ✓ H2: Earlier implementation of automation results in a greater reduction in apprenticeship positions.
- ✓ H3: A higher retention share of trained apprentices amplifies the effect of automation intensity and timing on apprenticeship reduction.

✓ Model-grounded                      ? Not yet model-grounded

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## Hypotheses II

- ? H4: A higher potential for task reallocation within an occupation mitigates the effect of automation intensity and timing on the reduction of apprenticeship positions.
- ? H5: Cognitive occupations respond more strongly to automation intensity and timing in terms of apprenticeship reduction.
- ✓ H6: Larger firms respond more strongly to automation intensity and timing in terms of apprenticeship reduction.

✓ Model-grounded                      ? Not yet model-grounded

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Table: Sample characteristics

	Mean
Firm size	
Small (<10 employees)	0.499
Medium (10 – 99 employees)	0.285
Large (100+ employees)	0.200
Language region	
German region	0.628
French region	0.271
Italian region	0.085
Sector	
Agriculture	0.052
Industry	0.278
Services	0.653