Anticipated Discrimination and Wage Negotiation: A Field Experiment*

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Abstract

This paper proposes a field experiment to study whether a perception of gender discrimination affects requested wages. People interested in an advertised position can apply using an online portal. After the initial application, participants are randomly allocated to one of three treatments. In the baseline treatment, applicants are asked to fill in a standardized curriculum vitae template, containing information about the applicant's first name, surname, age, education, and employment. In a gender-blind treatment, applicants complete a curriculum vitae template in which they can only report their initials, so that information about gender is not transmitted. We also conduct a gender-blind treatment in which applicants receive a message that makes the nature of the blind process salient. In all treatments, applicants request the hourly wage they wish to receive if hired. We find that female applicants ask for just over half the wage requested by male applicants when the full name is revealed. However, when gender is undisclosed this difference in requests decreases by over 50%. Finally, the reinforcing message (third treatment) causes the gap in requested wages to completely disappear. Our results indicate that female workers request much lower wages when the firm clearly knows the applicant's gender, but that this lower request is entirely dependent on the degree to which they perceive that one's gender is known to the hiring firm.

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In Memoriam: This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gary Charness, who passed away as this work was nearing completion. Gary was a brilliant scholar and a remarkable coauthor and mentor whose influence on the field is beyond measure. As we share this work, we do so with deep gratitude for the lasting impact he made on us all.

1. Introduction

Many studies have reported a pervasive gender gap in pay. Men become CEOs more often than women who are under-represented in high-paying jobs and high-level occupations (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016). After controlling for a broad range of demographic and background characteristics, women earn less than men (Jarrell and Stanley, 2004; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Schwieren, 2003). This problem is particularly acute at the top of the salary-distribution range (Albrecht et al, 2003, Albrecht, et al, 2015, Blau and Kahn, 2017). According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2020, a 40% wage gap and an income gap (the ratio of the total wage and non-wage income of men to that of women) of over 50% are still to be bridged.

The underpinnings of this wage gap are still largely unexplained. Different explanations have been proposed, from gender-specific factors (Blau and Kahn, 2000), to discrimination against women (Spencer et al, 1999; Goldin and Rouse, 2000), maternal leave (Phipps et al, 2001; Dechter, 2014), and gender differences in competitiveness (Niederle et al, 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Flory et al, 2010; Samek, 2019). A key alternative explanation for the wage gap is that women are significantly less likely to engage in salary negotiations (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Babcock et al, 2006; Leibbrandt and List, 2015; Exley, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2020) or to apply for higher return jobs (Coffman et al, 2023) for than their male counterparts.[1] Along the same line, there is evidence that women request lower initial salaries than men (Barron, 2003; Dittrich et al, 2014; Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberri, 2018; Säve-Söderberg, 2019, Roussille, 2022).

Several factors have been proposed as drivers of these gender differences in negotiation. One strand of the literature suggests that men and women have a different view of the relational aspects of the negotiation (Greenhalgh and Chapman, 1995; Greenhalgh and Gilkey, 1986; Halpern and McLean-Parks, 1996). A second explanation is that women feel entitled to less pay than men (Bylsma and Major, 1992; Jost, 1997). Bowles et al (2007) show that men and women are treated differently when negotiating salaries: Attempting to negotiate for higher compensation has a negative effect on women's willingness to work. Also, women who initiate negotiations are

[1] However, evidence on this matter is not conclusive. For example, Stevens and Whelan (2019) and Artz et al (2018) find no gender gap in the propensity of entering into wage negotiation.

perceived to be more demanding. Charness et al. (2020) point to the role of anticipated discrimination in driving women's strategic choices in a labor-market setting. In particular, the authors focus on whether participants strategically hide (or reveal) their gender when competing for a job that carries a gender stereotype. In a laboratory experiment, they find that males do self-identify almost twice as often as females: Women strategically hide their gender when competing for a job that carries a male stereotype, presumably because they anticipate this would lead to a higher probability of being hired.

Building on this evidence, we explore whether gender differences in the willingness to negotiate is affected by women anticipating discrimination in the labor market, thereby highlighting the role played by (external) social incentives as opposed to (intrinsic) individual differences. This paper studies whether the gender gap in negotiated salaries is reduced when removing a source of potential (expected) discrimination in the labor market, that is, information about the gender of job applicants. We analyze whether women request higher salaries when they know that gender cannot be a factor in the hiring process than when they know it could be a factor. We take this as a starting point of our field experiment in which a position for a job is posted on a job-search platform in Uruguay.[2]

The job consists of cleaning and analyzing a database. All people interested in the position can apply, using a portal by which they must provide personal information and their qualifications related to the job. Once applicants show their interest, they are randomly allocated to one of three treatments. In the baseline treatment, applicants provide further information in a standardized curriculum vitae template. Applicants also request an hourly wage. In the main treatment, applicants provide the same information, but they are instructed to report their initials rather than their full name; this makes it clear to the applicants that the hiring process is (at least to this point) blind to gender. In the third treatment, applicants are also required to only provide their initials, but they also receive a message emphasizing that the employer remains unaware of the candidates' names, making the selection process based on applicants' merits.[3]

[2] We note that we selected a task that does not require a face-to-face interview, so that a gender-blind application was enabled. While this is certainly not a universal condition, it seems increasingly common for remote work. We return to this in the conclusion of the article.

[3] Our third treatment relates to the work on Affirmative Action (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al, 2013). In a field experiment conducted in Colombia, Ibañez and Riener (2018) find that affirmative action policies increase the number of female applicants in the recruitment process for research assistants without reducing the quantity or qualifications of male applicants.

Once the application process is over, a "hiring committee" evaluates candidates based on the information provided by each applicant. The committee members are briefed about the characteristics of the job posting, and they are asked to independently rank candidates from the pool of applications.

When applicants reveal their gender by reporting their full name, we find that the average salary requested by female applicants is just over half the salary requested by their male counterparts, a remarkable disparity. Yet, this disparity is reduced by 58% (to one-quarter of the salary requested by male applicants) in the gender-blind treatment, and it completely disappears when the gender-blind hiring process is reinforced with the message to the candidates. Importantly, our findings indicate that these results are not driven by selection effects. When evaluating hiring-committee decisions, we find that having a university degree and prior work experience are the two main drivers in applicant selection. However, our analysis also reveals a gender bias: for candidates who are identical in every dimension but gender, male candidates are more likely to be hired. This observation is in line with the beliefs we elicited from a different group of workers on the platform, which suggests that male applicants are perceived as having an advantage in the hiring process.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the experimental design. Section 3 shows the main results and provides some discussion. We conclude in Section 4.

2. Experimental Design and Procedures

2.1 Experimental Design

For this experiment, we partnered with Buscojobs, the leading online job search platform for the private sector in Uruguay. In this platform, companies advertise job openings and workers create a profile with a standardized curriculum vitae (CV) and apply to these job openings by sharing their standardized CV with the companies.[4]

Following the procedures in Leibbrandt and List (2015), the experiment is divided into three stages.

[4] We provide additional details about Buscojobs in Section 2.2.

Stage 1. A job opening is posted on the Buscojobs platform. The job consists of cleaning and preparing a database for use by a group of researchers.[5] During this stage, interested candidates can apply by submitting their pre-filled standardized CV through the Buscojobs platform.

Stage 2. After the first stage is over, applicants are randomly allocated to one of three treatments. In each treatment, applicants receive an email informing them that they must complete an additional curriculum vitae (CV) template to proceed with the application process. They are notified that this new CV, unlike the one submitted in Stage 1, will be the only information considered by the hiring committee.[6,7] After filling out the required information, all candidates are asked for their desired hourly wage in Uruguayan pesos ($U, hereafter). Filling out the template takes approximately 10 minutes on average. Applicants are given a deadline of one month to submit the required information.

In the *Gender-Reveal* treatment (*GR,* hereafter) applicants provide information regarding: i) name and surname, ii) highest education level achieved, iii) up to two relevant work experiences, iv) age, v) current work status, and vi) desired hourly wage.

The *Gender-Blind* treatment *(GB,* hereafter) is the same except that applicants are asked to provide only their initials instead of their name and surname. Hence, the gender of the candidate is implicitly (but not explicitly) unknown during the hiring decision.

The *Gender-Blind-Message* treatment *(GBM,* hereafter) is the same as *GB* with the only difference that when asked to provide only their initials applicants also receive an explicit message that emphasizes that the hiring process i) will be conducted without the employer knowing the names of the candidates, and ii) will be based on the applicants' proven merits.[8]

Stage 3. After the deadline to fill out the template has passed, those applicants who completed the second stage are randomly assigned to a "hiring committee" whose members select the candidates to be hired. The committee is composed of a predetermined number of individuals, with an equal representation of females and males. Applicants are not informed about the size or the composition of the committee.

[5] See Appendix A.1 for the job post.
[6] See Appendix A.2 for the emails received by the applicants in each treatment.
[7] See Appendix A.3 for the CV template.
[8] No references to gender discrimination or gender equality are made in this treatment. See Appendix A.2c for the detailed instructions.

The members of the committee evaluate an average of 24 applications (12 male candidates and 12 female candidates) based on all the information provided by applicants in Stage 2. The members of the hiring committee are also informed in advance that the hired candidate would receive their desired hourly wage (*requested wage*, hereafter).[9] The members of the committee are briefed about the task that the hired candidate will perform, and they are asked to independently rank the top five candidates to perform this task from the pool of candidates in their committee.[10]

Each member assigns 5 points to the highest ranked candidate, 4 points to the second highest, and so forth, down to 1 point for the fifth-ranked candidate. Candidates who are not ranked among the top five receive zero points. The candidate who accumulates the highest number of points from the committee members is offered the job. If the top-ranked candidate declines the offer, the position is then extended to the second-ranked candidate. The process stops if neither of the top two candidates accepts the position. While the candidates are aware of the presence of a hiring committee, they are not informed about the specific details of this selection process.

All members of the committee earn the same amount (regardless of how they rank the selected candidate). Each committee member receives a fixed amount of $6, plus a bonus that: i) increases with the productivity of the hired candidate, and ii) decreases with the hired candidate's requested wage in Stage 2. The members of the hiring committee are informed of the fixed amount and of the trade-off between productivity and the candidate's requested wage to determine their bonus.

Therefore, the payoff function for the hiring committee members is:

$$p = \$6 + \$1.5 * \frac{y}{10{,}000} - 0.02 * w$$

where y = number of correct entries entered in the database (see Section 2.2.2 for details on the task performed) and w = wage requested by the hired candidate.

[9] When filling out the information in Stage 2, the candidates are not aware that, if hired, they will be paid the wage they specified in the CV template.
[10] See Appendix A.4 for the detailed instructions received by the committee members.

For clarification, Figure 1 provides the timeline of the experiment.

Figure 1. Timeline of the experiment



2.2 Procedures

2.2.1 Platform[11]

The experiment was conducted in Uruguay. Job candidates were recruited through job posts published on Buscojobs from March 2022 to March 2023. Buscojobs is the leading online job search platform for the private sector in Uruguay. Buscojobs registers the highest number of job openings and is representative of the dynamics of the labor market in Uruguay's private sector: The changes in the number of job postings on the platform are highly correlated to changes in employment levels and hirings in Uruguay (Equipos Consultores, 2020). On Buscojobs, companies advertise job openings, while job seekers create a profile with a standardized curriculum vitae and apply to positions by sharing their standardized CV directly with employers.

As of January 2022, there were 228,674 job seekers registered on the Buscojobs platform in Uruguay.[12] Approximately 68% of these job seekers live in Montevideo, followed by 15.1% in Canelones and 6.2% in Maldonado. Table A.5.1 in Appendix A.5 summarizes additional observable characteristics of job seekers on Buscojobs, sorted by gender. The average age of registrants is around 31 years, with males being slightly older than females. Both genders report similar employment rates for the jobs listed on their CVs. In terms of educational attainment, males

[11] The summary statistics presented in Section 2.2.1 are calculated using proprietary data provided to the authors by Buscojobs.
[12] The database contains fourteen additional observations that are discarded for this analysis because they do not contain demographic information.

are more likely to have attended and completed post-secondary non-undergraduate education, while females are more likely to have attended and completed undergraduate education.[13]

In 2022, companies posted almost 15,346 job openings on Buscojobs. In line with its high share in Uruguay's total employment (almost 75%), most of these job openings were in the service sector. Specifically, companies posted positions in human resources (22.5%), retail, marketing, and sales (15.0%), information technologies (5.9%), and accountancy and audit (4.3%).[14] The most sought-after profiles by companies on the Buscojobs platform in 2022 were administrative workers (21.7%), salespersons (13.9%), customer service representatives (13.4%), and information technologies specialists (11.4%).[15]

2.2.2 Task

The task the candidates were requested to perform consists of reviewing a database with more than 382,000 self-reported entries on educational experiences of Uruguayan workers. Workers usually misclassify these experiences; for example, some workers classify a bachelor's degree as a course, while others classify a technical degree (e.g., programming analyst) as an undergraduate degree. Candidates were hired to review and correctly classify these educational experiences in one of the following categories: (i) course, (ii) technical degree, (iii) undergraduate degree, (iii) graduate degree.[16] Candidates were informed that, if they were hired, they would perform the task for ten hours.

2.2.3 Subjects

A total of 1,660 people initially applied for the position (Stage 1), with 503 subjects in *GR,* 669 subjects in *GB*, and 489 in GBM contacted to complete the template in the second stage.

For the "hiring committee", we recruited 190 students from the *Universidad Católica de Uruguay* and the *Universidad de la República*. The participants in the hiring process were majoring

[13] Post-secondary non-graduate education includes vocational, technical, and professional programs, with a duration of less than four years, that individuals pursue after dropping out or finishing mandatory secondary education. This category includes, for example, professional programs in management and business, vocational training in construction trades, specializations in computer programming, repairing and systems, graphic design and fashion, journalism and photography.

[14] 5.3% of the job openings were posted by companies that did not disclose their sector.

[15] 2.4% of the job openings were classified in more than one job category.

[16] See Appendix A.6 for the detailed instructions received by hired candidates and Appendix A.7 for an example of the spreadsheets containing the information reported by the workers.

in Accounting, Business Administration, Human Resources, Economics, and other Social Sciences. For the hiring phase, we conducted a total of 26 sessions with a total of 190 committee members involved. The average number of members per committee was 7.[17] Across all sessions, the gender composition remained consistent, with 50% female participants and 50% male participants. No subject participated in more than one session. On average, each hiring committee member received a payoff of $16, in accordance with the payoff function described in the previous section, for a session that lasted 30 minutes.

3. Results

The section is structured as follows. First, we analyze applicants' decisions regarding the requested hourly wage. Second, we examine the percentage of applicants who chose to participate in Stage 2 by completing the template in each treatment. We conclude with an analysis of the hiring decisions.[18]

Table 1 summarizes the average hourly wages requested by applicants as well as the application rate – i.e., the percentage of applicants that provided the information requested in Stage 2 – both for male and female applicants. [19,20]

[17] In one instance, there were 17 committee members due to a software malfunction. In two other instances, late withdrawals resulted in only 2 committee members. All our results remain robust even when these cases are excluded. These data can be made available by the authors upon request.

[18] To avoid deception, we hired candidates selected by the hiring committees to perform the task. Since the primary goal of this paper is not to investigate gender differences in performance, and due to the consequent small number of candidates hired for the task (10 in total), we cannot draw any significant conclusions of the candidates' performance data. We consider this limitation inconsequential to our study's primary focus on wage negotiation rather than on workers' productivity. We therefore refrain from including an analysis of workers' performance in the paper. These data can be made available by the authors upon request.

[19] Note that, given the nature of the field experiment, we considered that it was more natural not to establish any lower bound strictly higher than zero to requested wages. As a consequence, we observe a small number of participants who requested a wage below the minimum legal hourly wage in Uruguay, equal to approximately $U 97 in 2022 and $U 105 in 2023. The results reported are restricted to the subsample of subjects who requested an hourly wage above $U 100. As a robustness check, we replicated the analysis including the whole sample, and subsamples of applicants that requested hourly wages larger than $U 50 and $U 150. The conclusion from these robustness checks is that the main results are not sensitive to the selection of the lower bound for the requested wage. These data can be made available by the authors upon request.

[20] One may wonder why the application rate was not 100%. While it was costless for applicants to initially apply on Buscojobs to every job that related their interests – since they already have a profile on the platform – it was costly in terms of effort to continue the application process. Applicants must fill in more information and they also don't know how much information they will be required to provide. In addition, people may have found a more attractive job opening. It is worth noting that our application rate of about 35% is similar to that in Leibbrandt and List (2015).

Table 1. Stage 2 summary statistics by treatment

	GR		*GB*		*GBM*	
	Application rate (%)	Requested wage ($U)	Application rate (%)	Requested wage ($U)	Application rate (%)	Requested wage ($U)
Males	31.43	582.61	39.51	567.12	32.94	477.32
Females	34.37	309.42	39.44	451.96	41.07	485.69

How to read this Table: The leftmost column shows that, in *GR*, 31.43% of male applicants provided the requested information in Stage 2 of the hiring process. In the same way, 34.37% of female applicants filled the CV template for the application in Stage 2.

3.1. Requested Wage

We start by analyzing the wages requested by those applicants who filled out the template in Stage 2. Using the data from Table 1, Figure 2 shows that, when the gender of the candidate is implicitly revealed during the hiring process (*GR*), female applicants request a significantly lower wage ($U 309.42) than their male ($U 582.61) counterparts ($z = 3.492$, $p < 0.001$, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). [21]

[21] Here and elsewhere, we round *p*-values to the nearest third decimal place.

Figure 2. Requested wage by treatment and gender ($U)



Note: The black lines for each requested wage by treatment and gender represent 95% confidence intervals for the calculated average requested wage.

Results dramatically change when the hiring process does not reveal the gender of the applicant (*GB*). Male applicants request a slightly, but not significantly, *lower* wage in *GB* ($U 567.12) than in *GR* ($U 582.61), with a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test giving $z = 0.402$, $p = 0.688$. In contrast, female applicants request a 46% *higher* hourly wage when they are implicitly informed that the candidate's gender will not be revealed ($U 451.96) compared to the scenario where full information is available ($U 309.42). This difference is statistically significant ($z = -2.575$, $p = 0.010$, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). Although in *GB* the hourly wage requested by male applicants is larger than that requested by female applicants ($z = 1.959$, $p = 0.050$, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test), gender differences in the hourly wage requested in *GB* ($U 115.16) are reduced by 58% compared to those in *GR (*$U 273.19*)*.

Result 1: *When gender is revealed during the hiring process, male candidates request a much higher wage than their female counterparts. When gender is not revealed, male applicants slightly decrease their average requested wage, whereas female applicants significantly increase*

their average requested wage compared to when the gender is implicitly revealed. Taken as a whole, an implicitly blind hiring process reduces the gap in requested wages by 58%.

Next, we analyze the impact of introducing an explicit message that clarifies to candidates in the blind hiring process that gender is not known to the hiring committee (*GBM*). Figure 2 shows that the effect of the message is particularly strong for male applicants. Male applicants react to the message by decreasing their requested wage to $U 477.32 in *GBM.* This is significantly lower than in *GB* (z = 2.172, p = 0.030, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test) and marginally-significantly lower than in *GR* (z = 1.829, p = 0.067, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). Female applicants request a slightly higher wage in *GBM* than in *GB*, although this difference is not significant (z = -0.817, p = 0.414, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). Figure 2 also shows that gender differences even reverse slightly in GBM, with females in fact requesting slightly higher wages than males.[22]

Result 2: *Making the gender non-identification explicit (rather than implicit) in the blind hiring process mainly affects male applicants' behavior: male candidates significantly reduce their requested wages compared to gender-blind treatment (with no message). Female candidates also react to the message by increasing their requested wage, although this effect is weaker. Consequently, the gap in the requested wage completely disappears.*

3.2. Application Rate

This section analyzes applicants' decisions regarding whether to complete the standardized CV template in Stage 2 of our hiring process. Table 1 shows that in *GR*, a similar proportion of male (31.43%) and female applicants (34.37%) provided the required information in the second stage. This difference is not significant (z = -0.736, p = 0.462, two-tailed Mann Whitney test).

In *GB*, the percentage of male and female applicants who provided the required information increases to 39.51% and 39.44%, respectively. The increase in application rates is only weakly significant for male applicants (z = -1.834, p = 0.062, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test), and it is not significant for female applicants (z = -1.371, p = 0.170, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test). As a result,

[22] The individual-level analysis results presented in Appendix B, Table B.1, corroborates the conclusions drawn from Figure 2.

the ratio of applicants who participated in the second stage in *GB* is also not significantly different for males and females ($z = 0.015$, $p = 0.988$, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test).

Introducing a message to reinforce the blind hiring process does not have a very strong effect on participants' application rate. Neither male nor female participants significantly vary their application rate in *GBM* compared to *GB* ($z = -1.360$, $p = 0.182$; and $z = 0.430$ $p = 0.685$ two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the comparison *GBM* versus *GB* for male and female applicants, respectively).

Result 3*: There is no significant gender difference in the willingness to apply for the job offered, regardless of whether the gender of the candidate is revealed to the hiring committee, or the process is blind. This result holds even when a message reinforces the blind process.*

Although no significant differences exist in the willingness to apply across treatments and genders, selection effects could still lead to differences in the applicant pool for each treatment. For instance, candidates may perceive the message in *GBM* as an equal opportunity statement, which might discourage certain males from applying or encourage certain females to do so (Gaucher et al, 2011).

Table 2 examines and quantifies selection across treatments for both males and females in Stages 1 and 2. It reports, by gender and treatment, the observable characteristics of workers based on their Buscojobs 'CVs.[23]

[23] As we do not have comparable information for those who only applied in Stage 1, in this analysis we use data included in the Buscojobs' standardized curricula.

Table 2. Summary statistics of Stage 1 and Stage 2 applicants by gender

		Males					
		GR		*GB*		*GBM*	
		Stage 1	*Stage 2*	*Stage 1*	*Stage 2*	*Stage 1*	*Stage 2*
Age	*Mean*	30.56	30.69	31.31	31.22	28.97	30.48
Working (%)		46.43	48.05	46.94	48.96	41.23	55.36
Post-secondary (%)	*Attendance*	27.98	28.57	30.61	33.33	17.54	32.14
	Completed	16.67	19.48	22.45	22.92	11.40	26.79
Undergraduate (%)	*Attendance*	64.88	68.83	59.18	67.71	69.30	75.00
	Completed	26.79	24.68	24.49	33.33	27.19	32.14
Graduate (%)	*Attendance*	8.93	6.49	10.88	13.54	7.02	8.93
	Completed	4.76	2.60	8.16	9.38	2.63	8.93
Observations		168	77	147	96	114	56
		Females					
		GR		*GB*		*GBM*	
		Stage 1	*Stage 2*	*Stage 1*	*Stage 2*	*Stage 1*	*Stage 2*
Age	*Mean*	29.33	29.91	30.60	31.23	29.35	30.15
Working (%)		42.45	48.65	50.46	51.51	46.81	55.73
Post-secondary (%)	*Attendance*	25.94	32.43	33.03	31.69	29.26	22.90
	Completed	18.87	25.23	24.31	23.24	18.09	16.03
Undergraduate (%)	*Attendance*	71.23	67.57	70.64	69.01	65.43	74.05
	Completed	25.94	24.32	28.90	34.51	26.60	34.35
Graduate (%)	*Attendance*	3.77	8.11	5.50	5.50	7.98	9.16
	Completed	2.83	6.31	3.21	3.21	4.26	3.82
Observations		212	111	218	142	188	131

How to read this Table: The upper section of column 3 shows that male applicants in Stage 1 in *GR* are, on average, 30.56 years old. In the same way, the second column shows that male applicants in Stage 2 in *GR* are, on average, 30.69 years old.

Table 2, along with the two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests presented in Appendix 8 (see Table A.8.1 and Table A.8.2), demonstrates that the observable characteristics of female and male applicants in Stage 2 in *GR* and *GB* are largely similar, with the only marginally significant difference being that, compared to *GR*, in *GB* males are more likely to have pursued graduate education, while females are more likely to have completed undergraduate education. A similar pattern is observed when comparing *GB* to *GBM*, where no significant differences in the averages

of any variables across treatments and genders are detected. These findings suggest that selection bias does not influence our main result regarding the requested wage.

Further, we show that in each treatment, the means of observable characteristics for applicants at Stages 1 and 2 are similar. For female applicants, the similarity between Stages 1 and 2 is particularly strong, with the only marginally significant difference being that those who completed the form in Stage 2 in *GR* are slightly more likely to have pursued graduate education. Conversely, for male applicants, those who completed the form in Stage 2 in *GBM* are significantly more likely to have attained and completed post-secondary education and weakly more likely to be employed and have finished graduate education. These findings support the idea that the different information provided before Stage 2 does not significantly influence the type of applicant who decides to apply.

3.3. Hiring Process

This section focuses on the behavior of the "hiring committees". Each hiring committee evaluates 24 CVs, consisting of 12 male applicants and 12 female applicants. Table 3 reports the average gender composition of the candidates ranked in the first five positions by committee members. Specifically, for each member of the hiring committee, we compute how many male (female) candidates are ranked in the top five positions.

Table 3. Gender composition of candidates ranked within top 5 positions (%)

	GR	*GB*	*GBM*
Male applicants	49.4	42.0	44.6
Female applicants	50.6	58.0	55.4

How to read this Table: The leftmost column shows that, on average, 49.4% of the candidates ranked in the top 5 in *GR* are males.

As a first cut, in *GR* we observe that, on average, 49.4% of the applicants ranked in the top 5 are males and 50.6% are females. These averages are not statistically different from each other (z = -0.178, p = 0.859, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test).

For simplicity of exposition, and because the information received by the hiring committee member is identical in both treatments, we pool the data from *GB* and *GBM*. When we pool these

two treatments, the corresponding figures are 43.4% for males and 56.6%, for females, with this difference being statistically significant (z = -4.063, p = 0.000, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test).[24] This result suggests discrimination against female applicants in the standard hiring process: the significantly greater proportion of female applicants ranked among the top positions in the blind-hiring scenario suggests that they are viewed more favorably by the hiring committee members when the gender is not disclosed. Consequently, the absence of significant differences in *GR* appears to reflect gender-related bias against female applicants.

To gain more insights into the role played by individual characteristics of the candidates in the decision of the hiring committee members – including the requested wage – Table 4 shows a probit regression in which the dependent variable is the probability of a candidate being ranked in the first five positions by committee members. As explanatory variables, we include: i) *Male* – a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candidate has a male first name, and takes value 0 otherwise, ii) *Male Evaluator* – a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the committee member evaluating the candidate is male, iii) *Blind* – a binary variable that takes value 1 if the hiring process is blind (*GB* or *GBM*), iv) *University* – a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the candidate holds a university degree, v) *Working* – a binary variable that takes value 1 if the candidate is currently employed, vi) *Age* – representing the age of the candidate (in years), and finally vii) *Wage* – representing the wage requested by the candidate.

[24] This difference with respect to *GR* is also statistically significant when we consider both treatments – *GB* and *GBM* – individually: z = -3.350 and p = 0.001 for *GB,* and z = -2.164 and p = 0.030 for *GBM*.

Table 4. Probit regression on the probability of being ranked among the top 5 positions

	(1)	*(2)*
Constant	-1.040***	Cut 1: 1.059***
	(0.094)	(0.091)
		Cut 2: 1.221***
		(0.092)
		Cut 3: 1.412***
		(0.092)
		Cut 4: 1.657***
		(0.094)
		Cut 5: 2.003***
		(0.095)
Male	-0.022	0.061
	(0.072)	(0.070)
Male Evaluator	-0.050	-0.025
	(0.042)	(0.041)
Blind	-0.073*	-0.082*
	(0.043)	(0.043)
*Male*Blind*	-0.127	-0.115
	(0.088)	(0.086)
*Male*Male Evaluator*	0.103	0.045
	(0.087)	(0.085)
University	0.557***	0.598***
	(0.058)	(0.055)
Working	0.151***	0.169***
	(0.058)	(0.049)
Age	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Wage	-0.001*	-0.001*
	(0.0006)	(0.0005)
Observations	4,654	4,654
Log likelihood	-2255.855	-3311.137

Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.

Column (1) in Table 4 shows that the neither the candidate's gender nor the gender of the evaluator affect the probability of an applicant being ranked among the top 5 positions in a hiring committee. We also observe that candidates who hold a university degree and are currently working have higher probability of being ranked among the top 5 positions. Interestingly, the requested wage is only marginally significant, suggesting that members of the hiring committee value more the potential productivity of the candidate than the cost of hiring them.

Column (2) in Table 4 presents the result of an *Ordered Probit* in which the dependent variable is the ranking received by the applicant. The model includes the same set of covariates as in specification (1). The results closely resemble those reported in column (1): both *University* and

Working have a positive and significant effect on the ranking received by the candidate, while the requested wage reduces the applicant's ranking, albeit only marginally. Notably, *Blind* has a marginally significant negative effect, suggesting that, contrary to the interpretation of Table 3, female candidates are less likely to be ranked among the top 5 candidates in *GB* than in *GR*.

All in all, while we find signs pointing to potential discrimination in the hiring process (Table 3), our analysis also shows that several observable characteristics affect evaluators' decisions (Table 4). This complexity makes it challenging to draw clear conclusions about gender discrimination in committee evaluations.

To analyze gender discrimination by the members of hiring committees with greater precision, we conducted an additional experiment in which new subjects (33 males and 25 females) assumed the roles of hiring committees. Members of this committee were presented with two nearly identical candidates from the pool of those who completed Stage 2: both possess a university degree, have similar work experience, have the same age, and requested identical hourly wages. The sole difference between candidates is their gender, which evaluators could infer from the applicants' first names.[25]

Table 5. Percentage of evaluators choosing male and female applicants (%)

	Male applicant	*Female applicant*
Male evaluator	75.75	24.25
Female evaluator	64.00	36.00
Total	70.69	29.31

How to read this Table: The leftmost column shows that, the male applicant is chosen by 75.75% of male evaluators, by 64.00% of female evaluators, and by 70.69% of evaluators overall.

Table 5 reports the percentage of evaluators who selected male and female applicants. We perform this analysis separately for both male and female evaluators. A vast majority of the hiring

[25] The instructions and information given to these committee members are identical to those provided to the members of the committees involved in Stage 3 of the experiment (see Appendix A.4), with the exception of the number of CVs they were asked to evaluate.

committee members opt for the male candidate (71%) over the female one (29%). This difference is statistically significant (z = -3.840, p = 0.000, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test), showing a bias in favor of the male candidate.

Examining the behavior of male and female committee members reveal a consistent preference for male candidates across gender. Specifically, almost 76% of male evaluators and 64% of female evaluators select the male candidate over the female one (z = -3.591, p = 0.000 and z = -1.688, p = 0.09, two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, respectively). This shows that the discrimination against female candidates in this task was not driven by the gender of the evaluator.

Result 4: *There is evidence of discrimination against female candidates by both male and female evaluators.*

3.4. Expectations

In order to further study what drives candidates' behavior when requesting hourly wages, in this section we analyze elicited beliefs on perceived gender discrimination in the hiring process. A total of 60 (30 females and 30 males) subjects participated in this process of belief elicitation, all recruited through a job posting published from February to April 2024 on Buscojobs, the same platform used for the primary experiment.

For the elicitation of beliefs regarding gender discrimination within the recruitment process, participants were presented with the same instructions provided to members of the hiring committees involved in Stage 3 of the primary experiment, when committee members only ranked two nearly identical male and female candidates.[26] Participants were instructed to provide their anticipated likelihood that a female (male) candidate would be ranked as the top choice by the committee.[27] The payoffs of the participants depended on the accuracy of their predictions compared to the results shown in Section 3.3. They would make $5 if their prediction was correct, while a deviation from the actual probability generated a loss of approximately $0.125 per percentage point.[28]

[26] See Appendix A.4 for the detailed instructions.
[27] We randomized how the information was presented to the participants, that is, whether they were first asked to provide the probability that a female or a male was ranked first.
[28] See Appendix A.9 for the complete instructions.

Table 6. Participants' beliefs on gender discrimination in the hiring process (%)

	Male's expectations	*Female's expectations*	*Overall expectations*
Probability of male ranked 1st	51.60	53.97	52.89

How to read this Table: The leftmost column shows that male participants expect that the male candidate is ranked first 51.60% of the times.

Table 6 presents participants' beliefs regarding the probability of a male candidate being ranked first. This Table shows that participants do expect males to have a leg up in the hiring process. In particular, the overall expected probability of a male being ranked first by a hiring committee is almost 53%. This is significantly greater than 50% ($t = 2.725$, p = 0.008, two-tailed *t*-test), a percentage that would imply a belief that the hiring decision is random in terms of gender. This expected probability is higher when the beliefs are elicited from females (53.97%), and as expected, this percentage is also significantly greater than 50% ($t = 2.525$, $p = 0.015$, two-tailed *t*-test). While expected discrimination is less pronounced than what is presented in Table 5, these results support the idea that female candidates, recognizing the potential for bias in the hiring process, tend to request lower wages when the process is not blind.

Result 5: *There is evidence of expected discrimination against female candidates by both females and males.*

4. Conclusion

We present evidence from a field experiment in which applicants to a job posted on an online platform are asked to indicate their desired hourly wage. Prospective candidates are divided into three treatment groups. In the first group, candidates are required to complete a template that includes their name and surname, allowing recruiters to identify their gender. In the second group, candidates are required to complete a similar template, but they are asked to include their initials instead of their name and surname, which turns this hiring process into blind with respect to gender. Lastly, candidates in the third group complete the same template as those in the second group, but they also receive a message indicating that the selection process is solely based on candidates' merits.

We first find a strong difference in requested wages when the application reveals the applicant's gender: wages desired by males are twice as high as wages requested by females. This result aligns with the behavior exhibited by the hiring committee members, who displayed a preference for male candidates when all other observable characteristics were equal. We then find dramatic differences when candidates know that the hiring committee cannot identify their gender: Females increase their requested wage by 46%, reducing the gap in wages by 58% with respect to candidates in the non-gender-blind hiring process. Furthermore, if, additionally, the process is explicitly stated to be gender blind, females in fact ask for slightly higher wages than males.

This result is consistent with previous evidence in that it shows that females behave strategically when applying for a job (Charness et al., 2020). If there is a possibility of gender discrimination in the labor market, women compete by requesting a lower wage. However, this behavior becomes less frequent when we remove the possibility of gender identification through a blind hiring process. By contrast, males barely react to the blind process and only reduce their requested wage in the treatment in which the blind process is reinforced with a clear message received by the applicants stating that the hiring will be based only on people's merits.

The intuition behind this result is two-fold. First, one possibility is that females are more conscious and concerned about inequality than males, which would make males less receptive of a subtle incentive such as blind hiring. These differences in how reactive males and females are to potential discrimination could be explained by the "underdog principle" (Robinson and Bell, 1978). This theory suggests that disadvantaged individuals are more likely to be conscious of inequality and are more likely to judge equality to be fair. There is evidence showing differences on how males and females perceive gender inequality. Handley et al. (2015) find a relative reluctance among males to accept evidence of gender biases in STEM. Garcia-Gonzalez (2019), report results showing that females doing research perceive a greater degree of gender inequality than males. Popp et al. (2019) show that male geo-scientists are less aware of gender inequality and less supportive of intervention measures such as gender quota.

Second, by requesting a lower wage in the gender-blind treatment (*GB*), males could be acknowledging that they were privileged in the first place. There is extant evidence that accepting that there is a privilege would make people feel that they did not earn things on their own and, as a consequence, privileged group members respond defensively to evidence showing that their group benefits from inequity (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & Unzueta,

2014). In our scenario, if males perceive that they have an advantage in the market and that they can afford to request a higher wage, giving up that advantage would have a higher cost for them than for females –who were requesting a lower wage in the first case-. This would lead males to react only when the message makes explicit that there are no privileges in the hiring process.

There is very little previous research regarding the requested wages for males and females when gender discrimination in the hiring process is ruled out. Anticipation of discrimination is critical in terms of employment-related choices by workers. Our results seem to support the idea that, while females may later negotiate less due to intrinsic characteristics, a major force driving of the gender wage gap is that females anticipate gender discrimination in hiring and take this into consideration when stating a requested or desired wage. In this sense, females start the wage negotiation process at a serious disadvantage.

Potentially, our results could have interesting implications for policies aiming to reduce the gender gap in requested wages, suggesting that having a blind hiring process is a very effective approach to encourage women to apply for jobs and to request higher pay.

We believe that our results showcase an important finding and hope that this opens a line towards further research on anticipated and actual gender discrimination in different environments.

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Appendix A.1. Job Post[29]

We are looking for different profiles to assist in a research project that is being carried out at a university of international reputation. Those hired will manage, clean, describe and analyze databases with data from the United States and Uruguay.

We are looking for candidates with or without previous work experience, preferably with a technical or university background related to Economic Sciences or Business Administration.

The position is flexible, so the job can be performed remotely from home.

[29] The original job post and emails sent to prospective candidates were in Spanish. Here we provide the translated version of all the documents. The original material is available from the authors upon request.

Appendix A.2. Emails Received in Each Treatment by the Applicants[30]

Appendix A.2a. Email Received in the Second Stage by Applicants in *GR*

Dear Candidate,

Thank you for your interest in the Research Assistant position.

To speed up the hiring process, we kindly ask you to fill out the CV that you will find below. This information is what the hiring committee will consider in evaluating the candidates.

The deadline to fill out the CV is Sunday, December 9 at 11:59 pm.

The hired candidates will assist university professors in a research project. The job will consist of managing a database. The task can be performed remotely from any physical location during a week. Applicants will be hired for a total of 10 hours.

Click here to access the form.

Best regards,

RR.HH.

Appendix A.2b. Email Received in the Second Stage by Applicants in *GB*

Dear Candidate,

Thank you for your interest in the Research Assistant position.

To speed up the hiring process, we kindly ask you to fill out the CV that you will find below. This information is what the hiring committee will consider in evaluating the candidates.

The deadline to fill out the CV is Sunday, December 9 at 11:59 pm.

As you can see, in the part of the applicant's name, you must only enter your initials and not your full name. Our recruitment team will carry out the selection process without knowing the name of the candidate.

[30] We present here translations of the original emails that were sent in Spanish.

The hired candidates will assist university professors in a research project. The job will consist of managing a database. The task can be performed remotely from any physical location during a week. Applicants will be hired for a total of 10 hours.
Click here to access the form.

Best regards,
RR.HH.

Appendix A.2c. Email Received in the Second Stage by Applicants in *GBM*

Dear Candidate,
Thank you for your interest in the Research Assistant position.
We are committed to promote and maintain a culture of respect and equal opportunities so we kindly ask you to fill out the CV that you will find below in order to guarantee that the hiring decision is based solely and exclusively on the merits and abilities of the person. This information is what the hiring committee will consider in evaluating the candidates.
The deadline to fill out the CV is Sunday, December 9 at 11:59 pm.
As you can see, in the part of the applicant's name, you must only enter your initials and not your full name. Our recruitment team will carry out the selection process without knowing the name of the candidate, based exclusively on their proven merits.
The hired candidates will assist university professors in a research project. The job will consist of managing a database. The task can be performed remotely from any physical location during a week. Applicants will be hired for a total of 10 hours.
Click here to access the form.

Best regards,
RR.HH.

Appendix A.3. CV Template[31]

Summary Curriculum Vitae – Research Assistant

Introduction

GR:

In order to streamline the hiring process, we kindly ask you to fill out the CV that you will find below. This information is what the hiring committee will consider in evaluating the candidates.

The hired candidates will assist university professors in a research project. The job will consist of managing a database. The task can be performed remotely from any physical location during a week. Applicants will be hired for a total of 10 hours.

GB:

In order to streamline the hiring process, we kindly ask you to fill out the CV that you will find below. This information is what the hiring committee will consider in evaluating the candidates.

As you can see, in the part of the applicant's name, you must only enter your initials and not your full name. Our recruitment team will carry out the selection process without knowing the name of the candidate.

The hired candidates will assist university professors in a research project. The job will consist of managing a database. The task can be performed remotely from any physical location during a week. Applicants will be hired for a total of 10 hours.

GBM:

We are committed to promote and maintain a culture of respect and equal opportunities so we kindly ask you to fill out the CV that you will find below in order to guarantee that the hiring decision is based solely and exclusively on the merits and abilities of the person. This information is what the hiring committee will consider in evaluating the candidates.

As you can see, in the part of the applicant's name, you must only enter your initials and not your full name. Our recruitment team will carry out the selection process

[31] We present here a translation of the original template that was written in Spanish.

without knowing the name of the candidate, based exclusively on their proven merits.

The hired candidates will assist university professors in a research project. The job will consist of managing a database. The task can be performed remotely from any physical location during a week. Applicants will be hired for a total of 10 hours.

Enter the email on your Buscojobs profile in the next field.

- Email:

Demographic Information

- Age:

GR:

- Name:
- Surname:

GB & GBM:

- Initials:
    - Enter the first letter of your first name, the first letter of your first surname, and the second letter of your second surname (e.g., SGC, ATU).

Educational Attainment

- Highest educational level:
    - Undergraduate or higher.
    - Technical.
    - High school.
    - Primary school.

- Did you finish this educational level?:
    - Yes
    - No

Work Experience

Describe two work experiences more related to this position.

Job I

- Position:
- Company:
- Industry:
- Brief job description:
- Are you currently working in this position?:
  - Yes
  - No
- Start date:
- End date (if applicable):

Job II (if applicable)

- Position:
- Company:
- Industry:
- Brief job description:
- Are you currently working in this position?:
  - Yes
  - No
- Start date:
- End date (if applicable):

Desired Salary

How much, in Uruguayan pesos, would you like to make per hour? Please, write only the corresponding number:

(answers bounded to $0 <$ hourly salary < 3000).

Figure A.3.1 below shows screenshots from the Google Form where applicants filled out the standardized curriculum vitae.

Figure A.3.1. CV template screenshots

Curriculum Vitae Resumido - Asistente de Investigación

Con el compromiso de promover y mantener la cultura del respeto e igualdad de oportunidades y con el fin de garantizar que la decisión de contratación se basa única y exclusivamente en los méritos y capacidades de la persona, te pedimos que rellenes el CV que encontrarás a continuación.

Esta información será lo que considerará el comité de contratación para evaluar a los candidatos. Como podrás observar, en la parte del nombre del solicitante, debes poner sólo la inicial y no el nombre completo. Nuestro equipo de contratación llevará a cabo el proceso de selección sin saber el nombre del candidato/a, basándose exclusivamente en sus méritos acreditados.

Los/as candidatos/as que sean contratados/as asistirán a un grupo de profesores universitarios en un proyecto de investigación. Su trabajo consistirá en la gestión de una base de datos. La tarea se podrá realizar desde cualquier lugar, y el trabajo durará una semana. Los/as solicitantes serán contratados por un total de 10 horas.

En el siguiente campo ingresa el email con el que estás registrado en Buscojobs.

rrhh.asistente.investigacion@gmail.com Switch account

Datos Demográficos

Iniciales *

Ingresa la primera letra de tu primer nombre, la primera letra de tu primer apellido, y la primera letra de tu segundo apellido (e.g., SGC, ATU).

Your answer

Edad *

Nivel Educativo

Máximo nivel educativo alcanzado *

- ◯ Universitario
- ◯ Terciario no Universitario
- ◯ Secundaria
- ◯ Primaria

Appendix A.4. Committee Members Instructions and Information on Candidates[32]

For this task, you will receive information from a group of applicants who have applied for a research assistant position. Your task will be to independently rank the top five candidates according to who you consider the most suitable for the position. The work that the hired person will perform is explained in more detail below.

The selected person will be hired for 10 hours as an assistant to a group of researchers from the universities of Exeter, Georgetown, and Santa Barbara. The hired person's task will be to review each entry in a database and decide whether the information related to educational experiences entered in the database is in the correct category or if it belongs to another category. For example, some workers classify a bachelor's degree, which is an undergraduate study, as a course, while others classify a technical degree as an undergraduate study.

Below is an example of the task that the hired candidates will have to perform. Consider the table shown below; the two entries marked in orange within the "undergraduate" category are incorrect. The first one corresponds to a technical degree in electricity, and the second one seems to be a marketing course. Neither of them corresponds to an undergraduate degree. Therefore, the hired person should reclassify them to "technical" and "course," respectively.

[32] We present here a translation of the original instructions which were provided in Spanish.

Grado

IdPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
11	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay	ComputaciVon - Sistemas - Programacion	Informatica
76	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay	Administracion de Empresas	Adm. de Empresas
77	Completo		Universidad de la Republica (UdelaR)	Electricidad	Electrica
77	Completo	4,5	Universidad Catolica del Uruguay	Administracion de Empresas	Adm. de Empresas
92	Cursando	1	Universidad de la Republica (UdelaR)	Contabilidad/Auditoria	Contador Publico
106	Completo		Universidad ORT Uruguay	Periodismo / comunicacion social	Ciencias de la ComunicaciV≥n
190	Completo		Escuela Superior de Comercio de Villa Muñoz	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	Marketing/Mercadotecnia
190	Completo	3	Escuela de Administracion Universidad de la Republica	Administracion de Empresas	Adm. de Empresas
259	Cursando	5	Universidad de la Republica (UdelaR)	Quimica	Quimico

Cursos

IdPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
50	Completo		CLIE (Centro Latinoamericano de Instruccion Empresarial)		Operador PC Plus
50	Completo		CLIE (Centro Latinoamericano de Instruccion Empresarial)		Tecnico Comercial
50	Completo		ANGLO - Uruguay		First Certificate in English (Universidad de Cambridge)
58	Completo		Asociacion de Dirigentes de Marketing (A.D.M.)		Tecnico en Comercio Exterior
76	Cursando	Cursando	Circulo Informatico		Diseño Grafico

Postgrado

IdPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
106	Completo	1 y medio	UCUDAL -Universidad Catolica	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	Postgrado de especializacion en Marketing
418	Completo	1	Universidad ORT Uruguay	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	PROGRAMA MARKETING PARA PRODUCTOS CONSUMO MASIVO
533	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay		Maestria en Administracion de Empresas enfasis en MKT(tesis en elab.)
533	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay		Postgrado de Especializacion en Marketing
1068	Completo		Centro de Posgrados(Universidad de la RepVƒblica)		Curso de Actualizacion para Practica Profesional en Idioma Italiano

Tecnico

IdPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
2083	Completo		Universidad ORT Uruguay	Sonido	Tecnico en Imagen y Sonido
2196	Completo		Universidad ORT Uruguay	Relaciones Publicas	Tecnico en Relaciones Publicas y Organizacion de Eventos
1288	Incompleto	1	Universidad de la Republica UDELAR	Mecanica	Tecnoogo MecVanico
3160	Completo		Instituto Profesional de Enseñanza Periodistica	Periodismo / comunicacion social	Tecnico en ComunicaciV≥n Social Prensa
3518	Incompleto	2	U.T.U. superior de mecanica	Mecanica	Mecnica General

Once you finish ranking the applicants, the hiring process will be as detailed below. The candidate who you rank first will receive five points, the second-ranked candidate will receive four points, and so on until the fifth-ranked candidate, who will receive one point. The remaining applicants will not receive any points.

You, along with other people, will be a member of a hiring committee. When all the committee members have evaluated the applicants, the scores assigned to each candidate by each committee member will be added up, and the candidate with the highest score will receive an offer to be hired. The hired candidates will be paid the hourly wage they requested. You will be able to see the information about the requested salary as part of each candidate's information. In particular, you will receive information on the following variables for each candidate: i) age, ii) educational attainment, iii) related previous work experience, iv) salary requested by the candidate.

Your payment will be a combination of a fixed amount of $6 and a bonus. The bonus will increase with the effectiveness of the hired candidate. For every 10,000 correct entries that the hired candidate makes, you will receive $1.5. Similarly, the bonus will decrease with the salary paid to the hired candidate. In particular, your bonus will decrease by 2% of the salary paid to the hired person.

Example 1: Imagine that the hired person makes 60,000 correct entries and requests a salary of $10 per hour, equivalent to a total of $100 for 10 hours. In this case, your **bonus** would be: $1.5*5 - 0.02*100 = $9 - $2 = $7. Therefore, your **total payment** would be: $6 + $7 = $13.

Example 2: Imagine that the hired person makes 40,000 correct entries and requests a salary of $12 per hour, equivalent to a total of $120 for 10 hours. In this case, your **bonus** would be: $1.5*4 - 0.02*120 = $6 - $2.4 = $3.6. Therefore, your **total payment** would be: $6 + $3.6 = $9.6.

As you can see, a significant fraction of your payment will depend on the candidate who is hired. Therefore, it is important that you pay attention when ranking the applicants.

Remember that you will receive the fixed amount as soon as you complete the task. The bonus will be paid later once the person is hired and completes the task.

After reading the instructions, the hiring committee members received the information that the candidates had provided in the standardized CV in Stage 2. The following Figures A.4.1, A.4.2, A.4.3, and A.4.4 show how this information was presented to the hiring committee members in each treatment. Notice that the *GB* and *GBM* treatments are equivalent as they only differ in the message received by the candidates after Stage 1.

Figures A.4.1 and A.4.3 show tables with a summary of the standardized CVs of the candidates in a *GR* and *GB* or *GBM* hiring committee, respectively, and Figures A.4.2 and A.4.4 show detailed information of each candidate and the drop-down menu to rank this candidate, which are displayed once a committee member clicks on the row corresponding to one of the candidates, in a *GR* and *GB* or *GBM* hiring committee, respectively.

Figure A.4.1. Table with standardized CV summaries in *GR* committee.[33]

Información de los candidatos

Rank	id	Nombre	Edad	Máximo nivel educativo alcanzado	¿Finalizaste el máximo nivel educativo alcanzado?	Salario por hora demandado por el candidato (en dolares estadounidenses)	Nombre del cargo	Nombre del empleador	Rubro del empleador	Breve descripción del cargo	¿Trabajas actualmente en este cargo?
1			25	Universit...	No	20,00	Planni...		Administr...	Análisis de...	Si
2			23	Terciario...	No	6,25	Vende...		Comercio	Atención a...	No
3			28	Universit...	No	7,50	Vendo...		Bienes ra...	Ejecutiva ...	No
4			28	Universit...	Si	10,00	Analist...		Consultoría	Formaba p...	No
5			47	Universit...	Si	0,03	Docen...		Educación	Preparar ...	No
6			35	Universit...	Si	7,50	Recep...		Emergen...	Recepcion...	No
7			32	Universit...	Si	5,50	Super...		Slaud	Lic en Nut...	No
8			38	Universit...	Si	10,00	Encue...		Estadística	Realicé en...	No
9			28	Universit...	No	7,50	Secret...		Industria	Atención a...	No
10			32	Universit...	No	17,50	Secret...		Social	Tareas ad...	Si
11			28	Universit...	No	0,03	Analist...		Football	Análisis de...	Si
12			26	Universit...	No	3,00	Telefo...		Contact ...	Atención t...	No
13			23	Universit...	No	425,00	Rutas ...		Gerente	Atención a...	No
14			22	Universit...	No	27,50	Admin...		Servicio ...	Tareas ad...	No
15			35	Universit...	No	7,50	Analist...		Desarroll...	Analisis y ...	No
16			32	Universit...	No	6,25	Aux. V...		Alimentos	realice trab..	No
17			22	Universit...	No	37,50	Sin ex...		.	.	No
18			47	Universit...	No	17,50	JEFE ...		SALUD	TODAS LA...	No
19			22	Secunda...	Si	3,00	Emple...		Construc...	Empleado	No
20			24	Universit...	No	3,75	Desarr...		Ingeniero	Desarrollo ...	No
21			20	Secunda...	Si	12,50	Tester...		Tecnologí...	Reporte d...	No

[33] We have hidden the name of the participants and of their employers to preserve their anonymity.

Figure A.4.2. Candidate detailed information and ranking menu in *GR* committee.



Figure A.4.3. Table with standardized CV summaries in *GB* and *GBM* committee.[34]

Información de los candidatos

Rank	id	Edad	Máximo nivel educativo alcanzado	¿Finalizaste el máximo nivel educativo alcanzado?	Salario por hora demandado por el candidato (en dolares estadounidenses)	Nombre del cargo	Nombre del empleador	Rubro del empleador	Breve descripción del cargo	¿Trabajas actualmente en este cargo?
4	51		Universit...	Si	12,50	Admin...		Ventas d...	Hacer ges...	Si
5	26		Universit...	Si	75,00	Aboga...			Servicios ...	Si
6	32		Universit...	Si	3,75	Televe...		Venta y d...	Realizar v...	No
7	50		Universit...	Si	70,00	Asiste...		Agroindu...	Gestion de...	No
9	41		Universit...	Si	37,50	Arquit...		Arquitect...	Realizació...	Si
12	24		Universit...	No	3,75	Investi...		Comisión...	Investigaci...	Si
13	57		Universit...	Si	5,00	Consu...		Organism...	Construcc...	No
14	36		Universit...	No	11,25	Admin...		Gobierno...	Administra...	Si
16	37		Terciario...	Si	17,50	Gestió...		Organiza...	Las tareas...	No
41	33		Secunda...	Si	10,00	Admin...		Administr...	Atención a...	Si
78	23		Universit...	Si	8,75	Asiste...		Auditoria	Realizacio...	No
52	19		Universit...	No	7,50	Ninguno		Ninguno	Ninguno	No
69	27		Secunda...	Si	4,75	Recep...		Hotelería	Encargarm...	No
89	38		Universit...	Si	10,00	Acces...		Telefonia	Encargado...	No
2	33		Secunda...	Si	6,25	Auxilia...		Transporte	Atención a...	No
53	46		Secunda...	No	5,00	ayuda...		alimentos	controlar s...	No
81	26		Universit...	No	3,63	Aux co...		Administr...	Contabilid...	No
58	30		Secunda...	No	2,50	Emple...		Empresa ...	Atendía ge...	No
85	31		Universit...	Si	50,00	Aseso...		Apoyo y ...	Alimentaci...	No
27	33		Universit...	Si	5,00	Jefe d...		Ejecución...	Planificaci...	No

[34] We have hidden the name of the participants' employers to preserve their anonymity.

Figure A.4.4. Candidate detailed information and ranking menu in GR committee.



Appendix A.5. Summary Statistics of Buscojobs' Registered Job Seekers in January 2022

Table A.5.1. Summary statistics of Buscojobs job seekers by gender

		Males	*Females*	*Total*
Age	*Mean*	31.5	30.0	30.7
Working (%)		36.2	36.1	36.1
Post-secondary (%)	*Attendance*	23.0	18.5	20.4
	Completed	17.0	13.3	14.9
Undergraduate (%)	*Attendance*	37.5	46.7	42.7
	Completed	15.5	18.2	17.0
Graduate (%)	*Attendance*	4.3	4.4	4.4
	Completed	3.0	2.8	2.9
Observations		99,099	129,575	228,674

How to read this Table: The column '*Male*' shows that, in January 2022 the average age for male job seekers registered on Buscojobs platform in Uruguay was 31.5 years.

Appendix A.6. Task Instructions[35]

We have completed the selection process for the Research Assistant position, and I am pleased to inform you that you have been selected.

If you accept the position, you will be hired for 10 hours as an assistant to a group of researchers from the universities of Exeter, Georgetown, and Santa Barbara. Your hourly remuneration will be $X (X Uruguayan pesos), so your total remuneration will be $X (X Uruguayan pesos).

You have until Wednesday, February 7 at 6:00 PM Uruguay time to confirm your interest and until Friday, February 16 at 11:59 PM Uruguay time to complete the task. We will pay you in the first few days of March through a bank transfer to an account of your choice in Uruguay.

Your task will consist of classifying studies of workers in a database into the following categories:

- **Course**: usually short-term -generally less than a year- and involve specific training (e.g., computer software, languages, accounting, marketing).
- **Technical Degree**: usually last between two and three years, involve taking more than one course, and generally can be taken without finishing high school (e.g., accounting assistant, mechanical technologist, administration assistant, draftsman, programming analyst).
- **Undergraduate Degree**: usually last at least four years, require completing high school, and are generally pursued at universities and/or specialized institutions.
- **Graduate Degree**: usually last between one and six years, require a completed undergraduate degree, and are generally pursued at universities and/or specialized institutions (e.g., Master's, Doctorates, MBA, professional specializations).

In following link, you will find a file with spreadsheets containing studies self-reported by workers in the categories mentioned above: [Insert link to a Google Sheets file].

[35] We present here a translation of the original task instructions that were written in Spanish.

Your task will consist of reviewing the entries in these spreadsheets and decide whether the workers classified this information in the correct category or if they belong to another category. For example, some workers classify a bachelor's degree, which is an undergraduate degree, as a course, while others classify a technical degree as an undergraduate degree.

In the same file, you will find four sheets: “cursos_reclas,” “tecnico_reclas,” “grado_reclas,” and “postgrado_reclas,” where you should enter the reviewed data. If an entry is correctly classified by the worker, simply copy it to the corresponding sheet. If, on the other hand, you consider that an entry is not correctly classified, place it in the sheet you consider most appropriate and put a “1” on the “Reclas?” column of that sheet. The last column of these sheets is reserved for you to leave any comments and clarifications you find pertinent.

Appendix A.7. Database Spreadsheet Example

Figure A.7.1. Database Spreadsheet Example



A1 | IdPostulante

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	
1	IdPostulante	SituacionPostulanteEstudio	AniosCursadosPostulanteEstudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	TituloPostulanteEstudio	NombrePais	FechaInicioPostulanteEstudio	FechaEgr
2	50	Completo		CLIE (Centro Latinoamericano de Instrucción Empresarial)		Operador PC Plus			
3	50	Completo		CLIE (Centro Latinoamericano de Instrucción Empresarial)		Técnico Comercial			
4	50	Completo		ANGLO - Uruguay		First Certificate in English (Universidad de Cambridge)			
5	58	Completo		Asociación de Dirigentes de Marketing (A.D.M.)		Técnico en Comercio Exterior			
6	76	Cursando	Cursando	Círculo Informático		Diseño Gráfico			
7	280	Completo		Megasoft		Operador MEMORY			
8	280	Completo		Escuela de Informática		OPERADOR OFFICE			
9	296	Completo		Instituto Autoplot, Autodesk Training Center		Autocad 2000 2D			
10	296	Completo		Taller de Diseño Digital		Operador de Corel Draw			
11	296	Completo		Taller de Diseño Digital		Operador de Photoshop			
12	343	Completo		Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad ORT		Secretariado Ejecutivo			
13	343	Completo		Facultad de Ingeniería Bernard Wand-Polak, Universidad ORT Uruguay		Operador Office			
14	343	Completo		Facultad de Ingeniería Bernard Wand-Polak, Universidad ORT Uruguay		E-Commerce			
15	343	Completo		Instituto BIOS		Auxiliar Administrativo Contable			
16	535	Completo		Centro de Capacitación Linux		Prgramador PHP/MySQL			
17	533	Completo		Escuela de Cine del Uruguay		Especialización en Fotografía en Cine			
18	566	Completo		Anglo		"Proficiency in English"			
19	566	Completo		Club Brasilero		"Proficiência em Língua Portuguesa" (CELPE-BRAS)			
20	663	Completo		U.D.E. (Universidad de la Empresa)	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	Marketing Comercial - Té	Uruguay		
21	674	Completo		Taller de Informatica		Analista en Marketing			
22	681	Completo		PROET	Ofimática	Excel Avanzado	Uruguay		
23	699	Completo		Comité Olímpico Uruguayo		Adm. Deportiva			
24	699	Completo		Federación Uruguaya Handball		Adm. Deportiva			
25	699	Completo		DESEM		Empresas Juveniles			
26	699	Completo		Scuola Italiana--Universidad ORT Uruguay		Cursdos de Informática			
27	573	Completo		Cware		Operador pc			
28	573	Completo		Círculo Informático		Operador Internet			
29	759	Completo		UTU (Universidad del Trabajo del Uruguay)		Opreador Pc			
30	806	Completo	2 meses	Escuela de Negocios Internacionales	Financiera	Asistente en Comercio Ext	Uruguay		
31	984	Completo		IPC		OPERADOR OFFICE			
32	984	Completo		TATA		CALIDAD DE ATENCION Y SERVICIO AL CLIENTE			
33	984	Completo		NETGATE		TELETRABAJO			

curso | tecnico | grado | postgrado | curso_reclas | tecnico_reclas | grado_reclas | postg

Figure A.6.1 shows an example of the spreadsheets containing the workers' self-reported educational experiences and of the set of spreadsheets the hired candidates used to review and classify this information.

The spreadsheets titled "*curso*," "*tecnico*," "*grado*," and "*postgrado*" list the courses, technical certifications, undergraduate, and graduate degrees, respectively, as reported by workers. The spreadsheets "*cursos_reclas*," "*tecnico_reclas*," "*grado_reclas*," and "*postgrado_reclas*," are those used by the hired candidates to document all the entries reviewed during their work.

Appendix A.8. Two-tailed Mann-Whitney Tests for Averages of Applicants in Stages 1 & 2

Table A.8.1. Two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests for averages of male and female applicants in Stage 2 across treatments

			Males	
			GR vs. GB	*GB vs. GBM*
Age		*z*	-0.078	0.619
		p-value	0.938	0.536
Working		*z*	-0.118	-0.759
		p-value	0.906	0.448
Post-secondary	*Attendance*	*z*	-0.670	0.150
		p-value	0.503	0.881
	Completed	*z*	-0.546	-0.534
		p-value	0.585	0.593
Undergraduate	*Attendance*	*z*	0.157	-0.947
		p-value	0.875	0.344
	Completed	*z*	-1.238	0.150
		p-value	0.216	0.881
Graduate	*Attendance*	*z*	-1.505	0.846
		p-value	0.132	0.397
	Completed	*z*	-1.810	0.092
		p-value	0.070	0.927
			Females	
			GR vs. GB	*GB vs. GBM*
Age		*z*	-0.950	0.687
		p-value	0.342	0.492
Working		*z*	-0.435	-0.713
		p-value	0.664	0.476
Post-secondary	*Attendance*	*z*	0.125	1.622
		p-value	0.900	0.105
	Completed	*z*	0.366	1.491
		p-value	0.715	0.136
Undergraduate	*Attendance*	*z*	-0.245	-0.918
		p-value	0.806	0.359
	Completed	*z*	-1.750	0.027
		p-value	0.080	0.978
Graduate	*Attendance*	*z*	-0.293	-0.002
		p-value	0.770	0.999
	Completed	*z*	-0.010	0.942
		p-value	0.992	0.346

How to read this Table: The upper part of the leftmost column shows that, the z statistic of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the average age of males that completed the form in Stage 2 in GR compared to the average age of males that completed the form in Stage 2 in GR is -0.078 and that the corresponding p-value f this statistic is 93.8%**.**

Table A.8.2. Two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests for averages of male and female applicants in Stages 1 and 2 within treatments

			Males		
			GR	*GB*	*GBM*
Age		*z*	-0.784	-0.226	-0.993
		p-value	0.433	0.821	0.321
Working		*z*	-0.236	-0.307	-1.732
		p-value	0.814	0.758	0.083
Post-secondary	*Attendance*	*z*	-0.096	-0.445	-2.141
		p-value	0.924	0.656	0.032
	Completed	*z*	-0.536	-0.085	-2.534
		p-value	0.592	0.932	0.011
Undergraduate	*Attendance*	*z*	-0.605	-1.339	-0.769
		p-value	0.545	0.180	0.442
	Completed	*z*	0.348	-1.498	-0.668
		p-value	0.728	0.134	0.504
Graduate	*Attendance*	*z*	0.645	-0.623	-0.439
		p-value	0.519	0.533	0.660
	Completed	*z*	0.793	-0.328	-1.817
		p-value	0.428	0.743	0.069
			Females		
			GR	*GB*	*GBM*
Age		*z*	-0.234	-0.458	-1.077
		p-value	0.815	0.647	0.282
Working		*z*	-1.062	-0.176	-1.565
		p-value	0.288	0.860	0.118
Post-secondary	*Attendance*	*z*	-1.229	0.264	1.261
		p-value	0.219	0.791	0.207
	Completed	*z*	-1.329	0.233	0.477
		p-value	0.184	0.816	0.633
Undergraduate	*Attendance*	*z*	0.680	0.329	-1.635
		p-value	0.496	0.742	0.102
	Completed	*z*	0.317	-1.122	-1.488
		p-value	0.751	0.262	0.137
Graduate	*Attendance*	*z*	-1.654	-1.330	-0.372
		p-value	0.098	0.184	0.710
	Completed	*z*	-1.507	-1.405	0.195
		p-value	0.132	0.160	0.846

How to read this Table: The upper part of the leftmost column shows that, the z statistic of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the average age of males that only applied in Stage 1 in GR compared to the average age of males that completed the form in Stage 2 in GR is -0.784 and that the corresponding p-value f this statistic is 43.3%.

Appendix A.9. Beliefs Elicitation Instructions[36]

A group of people have participated in an experiment. Below are the instructions they received. Please read them carefully.

Para esta tarea, recibirás información sobre dos solicitantes que han solicitado ser contratados para un puesto de asistente de investigación. Tu trabajo será clasificar a los candidatos individualmente según quien consideres más adecuado para el puesto. El trabajo que realizará la persona seleccionada se explica con más detalle a continuación.

La persona seleccionada será contratada por 10 horas como asistente de un grupo de investigadores de las universidades de Exeter, Georgetown y Santa Bárbara. La tarea de la persona contratada será revisar cada entrada en una base de datos y decidir si la información relacionada con los estudios que se ha ingresado en la base de datos está en la categoría correcta o si pertenece a otra categoría. Por ejemplo, algunos trabajadores clasifican un título de licenciatura, que es un programa de grado, como un curso, mientras que otros clasifican un título técnico como un programa de grado.

A continuación, proporcionamos un ejemplo de la tarea que los candidatos contratados tendrán que realizar. Considera la tabla que se muestra a continuación; las dos entradas marcadas en naranja dentro de la categoría "grado" son incorrectas. La primera corresponde a un título técnico en electricidad, y la segunda parece ser un curso de marketing. Ninguna de ellas corresponde a un título. Por lo tanto, la persona contratada debería reclasificarlas como "técnico" y "curso", respectivamente.

Grado

idPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
11	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay	ComputaciVon - Sistemas - Programacion	Informatica
76	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay	Administracion de Empresas	Adm. de Empresas
77	Completo		Universidad de la Republica (UdelaR)	Electricidad	Electrica
77	Completo	4,5	Universidad Catolica del Uruguay	Administracion de Empresas	Adm. de Empresas
92	Cursando	1	Universidad de la Republica (UdelaR)	Contabilidad/Auditoria	Contador Publico
106	Completo		Universidad ORT Uruguay	Periodismo / comunicacion social	Ciencias de la ComunicaciVzn
180	Completo		Escuela Superior de Comercio de Villa Muñoz	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	Marketing/Mercadotecnia
190	Completo	3	Escuela de Administracion Universidad de la Republica	Administracion de Empresas	Adm. de Empresas
259	Cursando	5	Universidad de la Republica (UdelaR)	Quimica	Quimico

Cursos

idPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
50	Completo		CLIE (Centro Latinoamericano de Instruccion Empresarial)		Operador PC Plus
50	Completo		CLIE (Centro Latinoamericano de Instruccion Empresarial)		Tecnico Comercial
50	Completo		ANGLO - Uruguay		First Certificate in English (Universidad de Cambridge)
58	Completo		Asociacion de Dirigentes de Marketing (A.D.M.)		Tecnico en Comercio Exterior
76	Cursando	Cursando	Circulo Informatico		Diseño Grafico

Postgrado

idPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
106	Completo	1 y medio	UCUDAL -Universidad Catolica	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	Postgrado de especializacion en Marketing
418	Completo	1	Universidad ORT Uruguay	Marketing / Mercadotecnia	PROGRAMA MARKETING PARA PRODUCTOS CONSUMO MASIVO
533	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay		Maestria en Administracion de Empresas enfasis en MKT(tesis en elab.)
533	Completo		Universidad Catolica del Uruguay		Postgrado de Especializacion en Marketing
1068	Completo		Centro de Posgrados(Universidad de la Repv[blica)		Curso de Actualizacion para Practica Profesional en Idioma Italiano

Tecnico

idPostulante	estudios finalizados	tiempo de estudio	NombreInstitucion	NombreArea	titulo
2083	Completo		Universidad ORT Uruguay	Sonido	Tecnico en Imagen y Sonido
2196	Completo		Universidad ORT Uruguay	Relaciones Publicas	Tecnico en Relaciones Publicas y Organizacion de Eventos
1288	Incompleto	1	Universidad de la Republica UDELAR	Mecanica	Tecnogo MecVanico
3160	Completo		Instituto Profesional de Enseñanza Periodistica	Periodismo / comunicacion social	Tecnico en ComunicaciVzn Social Prensa
3518	Incompleto	2	U.T.U. superior de mecanica	Mecanica	Mecnica General

Una vez que termines de clasificar a los solicitantes, el proceso de contratación procederá de la siguiente manera. El candidato que ocupe el primer lugar en tu clasificación recibirá dos puntos, y el candidato clasificado en segundo lugar recibirá un punto.

Tú, junto con otras personas, serás miembros de un comité de contratación. Cuando todos los miembros del comité evalúen a los solicitantes, se sumarán las puntuaciones asignadas por cada miembro del comité a cada candidato, y el candidato con la puntuación más alta recibirá la oferta de trabajo. A los candidatos contratados se les pagará el salario por hora que hayan solicitado. Puedes ver la información sobre el salario solicitado como parte de la información de cada candidato. En particular, recibirás información sobre las siguientes variables para cada candidato: i) edad, ii) nivel educativo, iii) experiencia previa, iv) salario solicitado por el candidato.

Tu pago será una combinación de una cantidad fija de $6 y un bono. El bono aumentará con la efectividad del candidato contratado.

[36] We present here a translation of the original instructions which were provided in Spanish.

In the previous activity, there were two candidates to select, Carlos and María. Both applicants had a university degree, similar work experience, both had requested a salary of 120 pesos per hour, and they were 22 and 23 years old, respectively.

Your task today will be to estimate the percentage of times Carlos was ranked first by the participants in the experiment described before

Your earnings from this task will depend on the accuracy of your estimation. We will pay you 200 pesos if your estimate of the percentage of times Carlos was ranked first is correct. The greater the difference between your estimation and the actual percentage, the less you will earn. Specifically, 5 pesos will be deducted from the 200 for each percentage point that your estimate differs from the actual percentage.

Example 1: imagine that the actual percentage of times Carlos was ranked first is 55% (and María was ranked first 45% of the time) and your estimate is 50%. Then you will earn 200 pesos minus (55-50) * 5 = 25 pesos. As a result, you will earn 200-25 = 175 pesos.

Example 2: imagine that the actual percentage of times Carlos was ranked first is 40% (and María was ranked first 60% of the time) and your estimate is 50%. Then you will earn 200 pesos minus (40-50) * 5 = 50 pesos. As a result, you will earn 200-50 = 150 pesos.

Please, use the bar below to select the percentage of times that María and Carlos were ranked first.



Appendix B. Individual Analysis

In this section we provide a more detailed analysis on candidates' behavior regarding their requested wage. Columns (1) and (3) in Table B.1 reports the results of an OLS model fitted to data from *GR, GB* and *GBM*. The dependent variable is *Wage*, that captures the wage requested by the applicant. We use the following explanatory variables: *Female*, a binary covariate that equals 1 if the applicant is female; *GB (GBM)*, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the applicants was allocated to the *GB (GBM)* treatment, and 0 otherwise. We also include the interaction between *Female* and *GB* and between *Female* and *GBM*.

Table B.1. OLS regression on requested salaries

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Constant	582.608***	163.321	582.608***	260.531**
	(53.779)	(101.239)	(53.779)	(123.946)
Female	-273.191***	-232.319***	-273.191***	-245.878***
	(70.499)	(68.175)	(70.499)	(72.067)
GB	-19.848	0.683		
	(70.940)	(68.926)		
GBM			-105.287	-88.815
			(86.889)	(85.009)
*Female*GB*	150.940*	117.022		
	(92.245)	(89.413)		
*Female*GBM*			281.563***	255.501**
			(107.931)	(105.242)
University		-20.551		42.499
		(47.461)		(54.799)
Working		34.343		90.559*
		(44.151)		(50.955)
Age		12.757***		7.691**
		(2.634)		(3.324)
Observations	430	426	357	355
R-squared	0.041	0.085	0.041	0.064

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.

Estimations in Table B.1 offer additional support to the findings reported in the main text. Female candidates request a significantly lower wage than male candidates when gender information is available to the hiring committee. However, female candidates significantly increase their requested wage when the hiring process is blind (p=0.027, Wald-test for joint significance of *GB* and *Female*GB*). Similarly, female candidates also increase their requested

wage when the blind hiring process is reinforced by a message (p=0.006, Wald-test for joint significance of *GBM* and *Female*GBM*).

Specifications (2) and (4) also include as explanatory variables: *i) University*, a binary variable that takes value 1 if the applicant has a university degree and 0 otherwise; *ii) Working*, a covariate that takes value 1 if the applicant is currently working and 0 otherwise; and *iii) Age*, a variable that represents the age of the applicant. Results show that the findings in Columns (1) and (3) are robust even when controlling for other factors. We also observe that having a university degree does not lead applicants to request a larger wage. In the same line, being currently employed does not significantly increase the requested wage. Finally, age appears to influence applicants' decisions, as older individuals tend to request higher wages.

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